Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority ( 2012 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 11-1404
    DANIEL GRAJALES ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Selya and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law
    Offices C.S.P. was on brief, for appellants.
    José Vázquez García, with whom Maza & Green, P.S.C. was on
    brief, for appellee Puerto Rico Ports Authority.
    Luis R. Román-Negrón, Acting Solicitor General, with whom
    Jeanette M. Collazo-Ortiz, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, Zaira
    Z. Girón-Anadón, Deputy Solicitor General, and Susana I.
    Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, were on brief, for
    individual appellees.
    June 13, 2012
    SELYA, Circuit Judge.      This case requires us to revisit
    the plausibility threshold that a complaint must cross in order to
    survive a motion to dismiss.        See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 556
    (2007).   After careful consideration of a scumbled record, we
    reverse   the     judgment   of   dismissal   and   remand   for   further
    proceedings.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    We briefly rehearse the background of the case, reserving
    salient details for our discussion of the merits.            Because this
    appeal follows the granting of a motion for judgment on the
    pleadings, we glean the facts from the operative pleading (in this
    instance, the second amended complaint).        See R.G. Fin. Corp. v.
    Vergara-Nuñez, 
    446 F.3d 178
    , 182 (1st Cir. 2006).        For purposes of
    this appeal, we accept those facts as true.
    At all times relevant hereto, plaintiff-appellant Daniel
    Grajales worked for the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA).1            On
    June 19, 2006, Fernando Bonilla, the PRPA's executive director,
    named the plaintiff to a trust position within the PRPA.2          At the
    1
    Grajales's wife and their conjugal partnership also appear
    as plaintiffs and appellants.     Since their claims are wholly
    derivative, we opt for simplicity and focus our ensuing discussion
    on Grajales qua plaintiff and appellant.
    2
    In Puerto Rico, "career" positions are akin to civil service
    positions. "'Career' employees must be selected and terminated
    based on merit, not politics." Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 
    597 F.3d 423
    , 430 n.7 (1st Cir. 2010). By contrast, "trust" positions
    -2-
    time of his appointment, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) held
    the reigns of power in Puerto Rico.                In 2008, the plaintiff
    voluntarily resigned this post in order to accept a career position
    at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in Carolina.             Within
    a matter of months, he transferred to another career position as a
    security supervisor at the Aguadilla airport (a facility located in
    his hometown).
    The PDP lost the general election held in November of
    2008, and its main rival, the New Progressive Party (NPP), assumed
    office.   In early 2009, the plaintiff began experiencing workplace
    harassment.      Some of the most notable affronts included his
    banishment     from   the   Aguadilla    airport,     his   transfer   to   the
    Mercedita airport in Ponce (which was far from his home), the
    removal   of    his   sidearm,    a     series   of    negative   performance
    evaluations,    and   threats    of   suspension      and   termination.    No
    legitimate reason supported any of these actions.
    Dismayed by these events, the plaintiff sued the PRPA and
    six of his tormentors (defendants-appellees Alvaro Pilar-Vilagrán,
    Elmer Emeric, Carlos Travieso, Manuel Villazán Lig-Long, Gonzalo
    González-Santini, and Miguel Alcover). The centerpiece of his suit
    was a claim of political discrimination.              This claim asserted in
    do not enjoy comparable protections. Thus, employees who occupy
    positions of trust serve at the pleasure of the appointing
    authority and are subject to selection and dismissal on, inter
    alia, political grounds. See 
    id.
    -3-
    substance that the individual defendants had engaged in a campaign
    of harassment against him because of his ties to the PDP.
    We fast-forward past a melange of discovery and other
    pretrial proceedings to the point at which the plaintiff filed his
    second   amended     complaint.        After   filing    their   answers,   the
    defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
    complaint failed, in the words of the Supreme Court, to "state a
    claim to relief that is plausible on its face."            Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
     (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    ) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).   The district judge referred the motion to a magistrate
    judge, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1)(B), who recommended granting it.
    On de novo review, the district judge accepted the recommendation
    and dismissed all of the plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice.
    For ease in exposition, we do not distinguish between the two
    judicial officers but take an institutional view and refer to the
    decision as that of the district court.
    The district court concluded that the second amended
    complaint failed to cross the plausibility threshold because it did
    not allege sufficient facts to support a prima facie case of
    political discrimination.         Grajales v. P. R. Ports Auth., No. 09-
    2075,    
    2011 WL 1742972
    ,     at   *2-6    (D.P.R.   Jan.    25,   2011).
    Specifically, the complaint failed to allege facts demonstrating
    that the defendants knew of the plaintiff's political affiliation.
    
    Id. at *2
    . Moreover, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "causal
    -4-
    connection between the challenged employment action . . . and any
    conduct protected by the First Amendment that would have amounted
    to political discrimination."       
    Id. at *3
    .
    Elaborating   further,    the    court   noted   that   the   only
    indication of political animus was the plaintiff's conclusory
    statement to that effect.        See      
    id. at *6
    .      In the court's
    estimation, the facts alleged reflected no political undercurrents.
    See 
    id.
       This timely appeal followed.
    II.   ANALYSIS
    When, as now, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is employed as a
    vehicle to test the plausibility of a complaint, it must be
    evaluated as if it were a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).    See Remexcel Manag'l Consultants, Inc.
    v. Arlequín, 
    583 F.3d 45
    , 49 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009); Gray v. Evercore
    Restruc. L.L.C., 
    544 F.3d 320
    , 324 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).     It follows that the grant or denial of such
    a motion engenders de novo review.         SEC v. Tambone, 
    597 F.3d 436
    ,
    441 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc).            In conducting this review, we
    accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable
    inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor. Nisselson v. Lernout,
    
    469 F.3d 143
    , 150 (1st Cir. 2006).        "We may augment these facts and
    inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by
    reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts
    -5-
    susceptible to judicial notice." Haley v. City of Boston, 
    657 F.3d 39
    , 46 (1st Cir. 2011).
    It is a truism that a complaint need contain only "a
    short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
    entitled to relief."      Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).     Plausibility
    determinations must be evaluated in light of this truism.       See
    Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 
    640 F.3d 1
    , 8 (1st Cir. 2011).
    In order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
    claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to
    state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."     Katz v.
    Pershing, LLC, 
    672 F.3d 64
    , 72-73 (1st Cir. 2012) (alterations and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    A determination of plausibility is "a context-specific
    task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
    experience and common sense."   Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 679
    .    To cross
    the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable,
    but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability.
    
    Id. at 678
    .
    The plausibility standard implicates a two-step pavane.
    See 
    id. at 678-79
    . First, "the court must separate the complaint's
    factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its
    conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited)."
    Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P. R., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2012)
    [No. 11-1589, slip op. at 7].    Second, the court must determine
    -6-
    whether the factual content permits "the reasonable inference that
    the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ.
    of P. R., 
    628 F.3d 25
    , 29 (1st Cir. 2010) (Souter, J.) ("The make-
    or-break standard . . . is that the combined allegations, taken as
    true, must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for
    relief.").
    Before us, the plaintiff focuses single-mindedly on the
    viability of his political discrimination claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983.3
         He marshals both procedural and substantive attacks on
    the district court's rejection of that claim.      Procedurally, he
    contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
    entertained a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
    based on a supposed failure to state a plausible claim, after nine
    months of discovery.      Substantively, he contends that, in all
    events, his second amended complaint states a plausible political
    discrimination claim.
    An understanding of the travel of the case is needed to
    put the plaintiff's procedural contention into perspective.     The
    plaintiff commenced suit on October 16, 2009. The defendants moved
    3
    Although the district court dismissed with prejudice all of
    the plaintiff's federal claims, the plaintiff has presented
    developed argumentation only on this one claim. His other federal
    claims are, therefore, deemed abandoned, see United States v.
    Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17 (1st Cir. 1990), and may not be resurrected
    on remand.
    -7-
    to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court did not rule on
    the motion but, rather, allowed the plaintiff to file an amended
    complaint.    It then denied the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion as
    "moot,"   and     the   defendants      proceeded   to    answer   the   amended
    complaint.
    On   April   22,   2010,    the   district    court   granted   the
    plaintiff leave to amend yet again.            Although the proposed second
    amended complaint (which was nearly identical to its predecessor)
    was attached to the motion for leave to amend, it was not formally
    docketed until September 27, 2010.             The defendants served their
    answers in October and, on December 9, the individual defendants
    filed a Rule 12(c) motion.        By then, both the deadline for filing
    a motion for judgment on the pleadings (May 7, 2010) and the
    discovery closure date (November 18, 2010) had passed.4              The court
    below nonetheless entertained the motion and granted it.
    Under ordinary circumstances, a court may measure the
    plausibility of a complaint by means of a motion for judgment on
    the pleadings.      See, e.g., Elena v. Municipality of San Juan, ___
    F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2012) [No. 10-1849, slip op. at 8-11 &
    n.6]; Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 
    548 F.3d 155
    , 162-64 (1st
    Cir. 2008); Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 
    520 F.3d 26
    , 29-31 (1st
    4
    The deadline for filing a motion for judgment on the
    pleadings was established by the court in its initial scheduling
    order.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1).    That order also set a
    discovery closure date, which the court subsequently extended to
    November 18, 2010. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
    -8-
    Cir. 2008).    We have not, however, spoken to the question of
    whether it is appropriate to apply the plausibility standard after
    substantial pretrial discovery has taken place. An obvious anomaly
    arises in such a situation because a court attempting to determine
    whether a complaint should be dismissed for implausibility must
    decide, on the basis of the complaint alone, if the complaint lacks
    enough factual content to allow a "reasonable inference that the
    defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    .    This is, by its nature, a threshold inquiry, and logic
    strongly suggests that it occur prior to discovery.    Ignoring the
    entire panoply of facts developed during discovery makes little
    sense.
    An artificial evaluation of this sort seems especially
    awkward because one of the main goals of the plausibility standard
    is the avoidance of unnecessary discovery.     See Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 556-58
    ; Atkins v. City of Chicago, 
    631 F.3d 823
    , 832 (7th Cir.
    2011).    Applying the plausibility standard to a complaint after
    discovery is nearly complete would defeat this core purpose.    Cf.
    Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 
    623 F.3d 1229
    , 1233 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010)
    (expressing concern about entertaining a Rule 12(c) motion to test
    the plausibility of a complaint following a preliminary injunction
    hearing that generated an extensive record).    Thus, while district
    courts enjoy broad discretion in managing their dockets, we think
    that, once the parties have invested substantial resources in
    -9-
    discovery, a district court should hesitate to entertain a Rule
    12(c) motion that asserts a complaint's failure to satisfy the
    plausibility requirement.
    Here, however, we need not decide the difficult question
    of   whether   the    district     court's   decision      to   entertain        the
    defendants'    Rule   12(c)   motion    after      nine   months      of    pretrial
    discovery was an abuse of discretion.              As we explain below, this
    case can readily be resolved on the merits of the plausibility
    claim.    We     turn,   therefore,    to    the    plaintiff's       substantive
    contention.
    The    PRPA   is   "a    public   corporation        and    government
    instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."                       
    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, § 333
    (a).          Non-policymaking public employees are
    protected by the First Amendment from adverse employment actions
    based on political affiliation.          See Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo
    Rodriguez, 
    212 F.3d 69
    , 74 (1st Cir. 2000).
    For claims of political discrimination by state actors —
    and Puerto Rico is, for this purpose, the functional equivalent of
    a state, Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 
    655 F.3d 61
    , 69 (1st Cir. 2011)
    — section 1983 is the customary vehicle through which relief is
    sought.   See Martinez-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández, 
    506 F.3d 32
    , 39 (1st
    Cir. 2007).    "There are two essential elements of an action under
    section 1983: (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed
    under color of state law, and (ii) that this conduct worked a
    -10-
    denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
    States."    Martinez v. Colon, 
    54 F.3d 980
    , 984 (1st Cir. 1995)
    (internal   quotation   marks   omitted).     Within   this   rubric,   an
    actionable claim of political discrimination must encompass four
    elements: that the protagonists are members of opposing political
    parties; that the defendant knows of the plaintiff's political
    affiliation; that an adverse employment action occurred; and that
    political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind
    the adverse action.     See Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13.     In the
    case at hand, we look to these four elements as a backdrop for
    determining the plausibility of the claim.       See, e.g., id. at 13-
    19.
    A formal adverse action (such as a discharge or the
    denial of a promotion) is not a sine qua non for a claim of
    political discrimination. See Rojas-Velázquez v. Figueroa-Sancha,
    ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2012) [No. 11-1447, slip op. at 8].
    Political discrimination claims may be based on harassment as long
    as the "acts are sufficiently severe to cause reasonably hardy
    individuals to compromise their political beliefs and associations
    in favor of the prevailing party."       Welch v. Ciampa, 
    542 F.3d 927
    ,
    937 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We add a caveat.     As a general matter, liability for
    public officials under section 1983 arises only if "a plaintiff can
    establish that his or her constitutional injury resulted from the
    -11-
    direct acts or omissions of the official, or from indirect conduct
    that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization."                Ocasio-
    Hernández, 640 F.3d at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Moreover, supervisory liability under section 1983 cannot arise
    solely on the basis of respondeat superior.          Leavitt v. Corr. Med.
    Servs., Inc., 
    645 F.3d 484
    , 502 (1st Cir. 2011).           Such liability
    requires that the supervisor's conduct (whether action or inaction)
    constitutes      "supervisory      encouragement,        condonation     or
    acquiescence[,] or gross negligence of the supervisor amounting to
    deliberate indifference."       Welch, 
    542 F.3d at 937
     (alterations,
    internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Finally, the case
    law requires a separate assessment of the potential liability of
    each of the defendants.      Rogan v. Menino, 
    175 F.3d 75
    , 77 (1st Cir.
    1999).
    With these principles in place, we first address the
    district court's suggestion that the second amended complaint does
    not sufficiently show that the protagonists belonged to different
    political parties.    The second amended complaint alleges that each
    of the defendants "belong[s] to a different [political] party than
    [the plaintiff]."    This is a specific factual allegation which, in
    itself, is adequate for pleading purposes.           In connection with a
    threshold     plausibility    inquiry,    a   high    degree   of   factual
    specificity is not required.      See Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    .
    -12-
    We   previously   have    upheld   the   sufficiency    of   an
    allegation "that the defendants all belong to the NPP."             Ocasio-
    Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13 (alterations and internal quotation marks
    omitted).    The relevant allegation in the instant case is not
    materially different.
    It is equally plausible to infer that the defendants, all
    of whom work for the PRPA, had knowledge of the plaintiff's
    political allegiance.    While the second amended complaint contains
    only a conclusory averment of knowledge, we believe that, for
    pleading purposes, knowledge is inferable from other allegations.
    The complaint alleges that, in 2006, the plaintiff was designated
    as the PRPA's interagency coordinator for emergency management.
    This is, as the defendants conceded at oral argument, a trust
    position.   After serving in this highly visible trust position for
    well over a year, the plaintiff — with a general election on the
    horizon — arranged to be transferred into a career position at the
    Aguadilla airport.
    For purposes of a plausibility analysis, the allegations
    of a complaint must be assessed in light of "judicial experience
    and common sense."    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 679
    .        Bonilla, in addition
    to being the executive director of the PRPA and the appointing
    authority for the plaintiff's trust position, was a high-ranking
    member (Secretary of State) in the PDP administration.             It is no
    secret that political leaders most often choose political allies to
    -13-
    fill important policymaking positions.            When examining the factual
    allegations of the second amended complaint in context, we think
    that a plausible inference can be drawn that the plaintiff, who was
    named to a prestigious trust position by a PDP hierarch under a PDP
    administration, was a member of the PDP and that the defendants
    knew as much.    Nothing about the plausibility standard requires a
    court to blind itself to what is obvious.
    This   leads   to   the    question      of    whether   the   conduct
    described in the complaint comprises an adverse employment action.
    The second amended complaint names the PRPA and six individual
    defendants.   We summarize the relevant factual allegations against
    each individual defendant.     See Rogan, 
    175 F.3d at 77
    .            We do not
    make a similar analysis with respect to the PRPA because the
    defendants have not made any meaningful attempt to distinguish the
    PRPA's liability, at least for equitable relief, from the putative
    liability of the individual defendants.            Cf. Domegan v. Fair, 
    859 F.2d 1059
    , 1065 (1st Cir. 1988) (declining to engage in such an
    analysis when the defendants made "[n]o meaningful attempt at
    individuation").
    C Alvaro Pilar-Vilagrán (Pilar).
    Pilar,    an   appointee    of    the    NPP   regime,   became   the
    executive director of the PRPA following the 2008 election. On two
    separate occasions in early 2009, the plaintiff notified Pilar of
    "political persecution, discrimination[,] and harassment by other
    -14-
    employees of the PRPA."           Pilar referred the complaints to a
    subordinate for investigation but did not follow up, and no
    investigation took place.          For no apparent reason, Pilar later
    banished the plaintiff from the Aguadilla airport and transferred
    him involuntarily to an airport approximately ninety minutes from
    his home.     This was done without any provision to reimburse the
    plaintiff for the additional travel involved.
    C Elmer Emeric.
    Emeric served as the PRPA's director of general security.
    On two occasions, the plaintiff notified Emeric of the rampant
    harassment      that   was    taking   place.     Emeric    dismissed      these
    complaints as "unimportant" and never investigated them.                        In
    addition, Emeric insisted that the plaintiff clock-in at the
    distant Mercedita airport instead of at the conveniently located
    Aguadilla airport, thus adding roughly ninety minutes to the
    plaintiff's     work   day.    Other   PRPA   employees    who    worked   at    a
    considerable remove from their homes were allowed to clock-in at
    airports nearer to where they lived.
    C Carlos Travieso.
    Travieso, who was the interim security supervisor at the
    Aguadilla airport, assumed the plaintiff's position after the
    plaintiff was transferred.        Prior to the transfer, he consistently
    opposed   the    plaintiff's     continuation     as   security    supervisor,
    charging that the plaintiff had received the position through
    -15-
    political patronage.           As part of his campaign, Travieso falsely
    reported to the PRPA's director of general security that a private
    citizen had videotaped the plaintiff driving recklessly while on
    official business.          In reality, Travieso himself had done the
    videotaping and no private citizen had complained. When requested,
    Travieso refused to hand over the tape that he had made.
    C Manuel Villazán Lig-Long (Villazán).
    Villazán was the manager of general security at the PRPA.
    He colluded with Travieso by falsely claiming that a private
    citizen had reported and recorded the plaintiff's reckless driving.
    Around this same time, Villazán urged that Travieso replace the
    plaintiff    as     security    supervisor     at   the   Aguadilla    airport.
    Villazán also directed an underling to file false charges against
    the plaintiff for offensive behavior.                The charges were later
    dismissed for lack of evidence.
    C Gonzalo González-Santini (González).
    González      manages   the   Aguadilla      airport.       In    that
    capacity, he encouraged Pilar both to investigate the plaintiff and
    to abolish the security office at the Aguadilla airport.                      These
    actions clearly jeopardized the plaintiff's job.                Moreover, PRPA
    policy did not allow for the abolition of the Aguadilla airport's
    security office.
    This    was   only   the    tip   of   the    iceberg.     González
    undermined    the     plaintiff's    authority      as    security    supervisor,
    -16-
    falsely reported supposed wrongdoing by the plaintiff to the Office
    of Personnel and Management, engaged in verbal taunts, and tried to
    have the plaintiff's wife transferred from her job at the Aguadilla
    airport.
    C Miguel Alcover.
    Alcover was an internal security officer at the Aguadilla
    airport and, as such, worked under the plaintiff's supervision.
    His behavior toward the plaintiff was insubordinate, disrespectful,
    and hostile.       He filed false charges against the plaintiff for
    supposedly offensive behavior.          The charges were later dismissed.
    Alcover made other bogus accusations, such as an untrue statement
    that the plaintiff had used an official vehicle while on personal
    business.
    Taking these allegations as true, we think that their
    combined    effect,      culminating    in    the   plaintiff's    involuntary
    transfer to a remote and inconvenient work station, qualifies as an
    adverse employment action.         See Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-
    Roque, 
    889 F.2d 1209
    , 1217-20 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc).                  Fairly
    read, the second amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to hold
    each   of    the    individual     defendants       liable   for        political
    discrimination.       At the same time, the second amended complaint
    alleges sequential facts constituting a pattern of discrimination.
    All of the individual defendants actively contributed to this
    pattern,    and    the    plaintiff's     superiors    (Pilar     and    Emeric)
    -17-
    deliberately ignored the plaintiff's repeated complaints about the
    harassment.
    The remaining question is whether the second amended
    complaint    alleges   sufficient    facts    to    support      a   reasonable
    inference     that   political    affiliation      was   a     substantial    or
    motivating factor behind the adverse employment action.                      The
    complaint mentions just one occasion on which the plaintiff's
    political affiliation was openly discussed. This discussion was in
    connection    with   Travieso's   accusation    that     the    plaintiff    had
    obtained his career position "as a political favor" prior to the
    change in administration.
    This paucity of direct evidence is not fatal in the
    plausibility inquiry.      "Smoking gun" proof of discrimination is
    rarely available, especially at the pleading stage.                  See, e.g.,
    Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17.          Nor is such proof necessary.
    When "a protean issue such as an actor's motive or intent" is at
    stake, telltale clues may be gathered from the circumstances
    surrounding the adverse employment action. See Anthony v. Sundlun,
    
    952 F.2d 603
    , 605 (1st Cir. 1991).           The plausibility threshold
    "'simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
    that discovery will reveal evidence of the illegal conduct.'"
    Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17 (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 556
    )
    (alteration omitted).
    -18-
    Viewing the pleaded facts in the light most hospitable to
    the plaintiff, the following picture emerges.                In 2008, the
    plaintiff — who had an exemplary record of service within the PRPA
    — moved from a trust (policymaking) to a career (non-policymaking)
    position.    Shortly after the change in administration wrought by
    the 2008 election, the plaintiff began experiencing significant
    harassment at the hands of persons loyal to an opposing political
    party (which controlled the new administration).            This course of
    harassment consisted in large part of actions for which there was
    no   legitimate   explanation.        The    harassment     culminated   in
    unjustified disciplinary threats, disparate treatment, the loss of
    the plaintiff's right to carry a sidearm, his involuntary transfer
    to a remote work station, the elongation of his workday, and a
    denial of remuneration for the extra time and travel involved.
    The scenario here is not unfamiliar.          Similar claims of
    political discrimination in the public workplace following a change
    in   administration   appear   to    be    increasingly    common   in   the
    Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.         See, e.g., Rodriguez-Sanchez v.
    Municipality of Santa Isabel, 
    658 F.3d 125
    , 130 (1st Cir. 2011);
    Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago, 
    528 F.3d 15
    , 18-20 (1st Cir. 2008).            In
    this instance, the close temporal proximity between the regime
    change and the onset of pervasive cross-party harassment, coupled
    with the absence of any legitimate reason for much of the offending
    conduct, permits a plausible inference at the pleading stage that
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    political animus was a motivating factor behind the harassment.
    See Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17-18; cf. Geinosky v. City of
    Chicago, 
    675 F.3d 743
    , 746-50 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
    allegations   of   a   widespread   pattern   of   negative   conduct,
    perpetrated by officers belonging to a single police unit, met the
    plausibility threshold for equal protection and civil conspiracy
    claims under section 1983).
    We hold, therefore, that the factual allegations in the
    second amended complaint, taken as true and considered as a whole,
    state a plausible section 1983 claim for political discrimination.
    We caution, however, that a favorable plausibility determination
    does not necessarily herald a likelihood of success at subsequent
    stages of the litigation.      Factual allegations must be proven,
    evidence to the contrary must be factored into the mix, and the
    merits remain entirely open.
    There is one loose end.        On appeal, the individual
    defendants attempt to assert a defense of qualified immunity. See,
    e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 815 (1982); Goyco de
    Maldonado v. Rivera, 
    849 F.2d 683
    , 684 (1st Cir. 1988).        In the
    circumstances of this case, any consideration of such a defense at
    this time would be premature.       The defendants may, of course,
    reassert this defense in the district court on a more fully
    developed record. See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 
    590 F.3d 31
    , 52
    n.15 (1st Cir. 2009).
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    III.   CONCLUSION
    We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
    we hold that the plaintiff's second amended complaint sets forth
    sufficient factual content to make out a plausible claim for
    relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court
    on the plaintiff's political discrimination claim and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.        The plaintiff's
    local-law   claims,   which   the   lower   court   implicitly   dismissed
    without prejudice for want of supplemental jurisdiction, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c), may be revisited on remand.
    Reversed and remanded.
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