United States v. Howard , 89 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 635 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 11-1492
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    Deshawn Howard,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Lipez, and Thompson,
    Circuit Judges.
    Michael J. Sheehan on brief for appellant.
    Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, and
    Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    July 17, 2012
    THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.          During the execution of an
    arrest warrant, police found a gun and drugs floating in a toilet
    tank and they pinned the blame on Deshawn Howard.                Alleging
    improperly admitted evidence, erroneous jury instructions, and
    insufficient evidence, Howard now appeals from his gun and drug
    possession convictions.     Concluding that there is no reversible
    error, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    We outline the underlying incident and the travel of the
    case, saving additional details for our analysis of the purported
    errors.    Since Howard has lodged a charge against the sufficiency
    of the evidence, all facts are recited in the light most favorable
    to the verdict.     See United States v. Alverio-Meléndez, 
    640 F.3d 412
    , 416 n.1 (1st Cir. 2011).
    On June 10, 2009, police in Springfield, Massachusetts
    received a tip that Deshawn Howard, a suspected gang member with an
    outstanding arrest warrant for armed assault with intent to murder,
    was at a house located at 193 Nottingham Street.               A group of
    approximately eight officers, some accompanied by police dogs and
    armed with shotguns, were quickly assembled and dispatched to that
    address.     Officers   arrived   at    193    Nottingham   Street,   which
    constituted one side of a side-by-side duplex, and surrounded it.
    Several officers approached the front door, catching
    sight of two individuals silhouetted in the living room window.
    -2-
    One of the individuals disappeared and officers started pounding on
    the door, announcing themselves as police, and demanding entry.
    Almost immediately Cheryl Knowles opened the door yelling something
    to the effect of: "Don't shoot.       I'm coming out."    Knowles, it was
    later learned, had rented and resided at 193 Nottingham Street for
    approximately ten years.       She lived there with her twenty-five-
    year-old son Lyle Treadwell, who was a friend of Howard's.
    Knowles was ushered outside and officers headed into the
    house to locate Howard.    Howard had moved to the rear of the house
    and he was spotted peering out a small bathroom window by officers
    stationed in the back yard.      Officers raced through the house but
    did not encounter Howard.      Some officers near the bathroom noted a
    stairway and followed it into the basement.        Howard was not down
    there but a door leading to the basement of the adjoining duplex
    had been kicked in.       Officers found Howard in that adjoining
    basement crouched behind a washing machine.        A scuffle ensued and
    Howard was taken into custody.
    Howard was brought outside where he was treated for a
    head laceration sustained during the fracas.        Once the arrest had
    been successfully executed, things calmed down and weapons were
    stowed. Knowles was presented with a consent to search form, which
    she signed.   After securing Knowles' written permission, officers
    entered the house and performed an organized search.               Officer
    Edward   VanZandt   searched   the   bathroom   where    Howard   had   been
    -3-
    previously spotted.1       On the bathroom vanity VanZandt found a cell
    phone (later determined to be a pre-paid phone with pictures of
    Howard on it) and a burning cigarette (later determined to contain
    Howard's DNA).        VanZandt lifted the lid on the toilet tank and
    discovered a loaded semiautomatic handgun and a large bag of
    individually wrapped crack cocaine rocks floating on top of the
    water.    In the kitchen, other officers discovered more contraband
    on the kitchen table - another bag of individually packaged crack
    cocaine rocks, numerous unused plastic bags, and two digital
    scales.   Howard was transported to police headquarters where $200
    in cash was found on his person.
    A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment
    against   Howard,     charging   him   with    possession    with   intent     to
    distribute cocaine base (Count 1), 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), being a
    felon in possession of a firearm (Count 2), 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1),
    and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
    crime (Count 3), 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A).            The indictment also
    included an aiding and abetting charge for Counts 1 and 3.
    Prior to trial Howard moved to suppress the gun, drugs,
    and other evidence seized by police, arguing lack of probable
    cause,    lack   of    a   search   warrant,    and   lack    of    consent.
    Additionally, he argued that the waiver completed by Knowles was
    1
    Howard argues that this search actually occurred prior to
    Knowles giving consent. We will get to this later.
    -4-
    obtained by coercion.     Following a three-day evidentiary hearing,
    the district court denied the motion in an oral decision.        Among
    other things, the judge found that Knowles willingly and knowingly
    consented to the search and the search did not begin until consent
    was given.
    On December 6, 2010, the case proceeded to trial.   After
    five days of testimony and a couple of hours of deliberation, the
    jury found Howard guilty on all counts.          He was sentenced to
    thirteen years and three months in prison.        Howard now appeals,
    taking a threefold approach.      First, he claims officers searched
    the home prior to obtaining Knowles' consent and therefore the
    district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.          Next,
    Howard argues there was insufficient evidence to support the
    district court's jury instructions on joint possession and aiding
    and abetting.    Finally, he asserts there was insufficient evidence
    to support a finding that he possessed the gun and drugs.
    ANALYSIS
    A. Motion to Suppress
    Review of a denial of a motion to suppress is bifurcated.
    We review findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de
    novo.    See United States v. Tiem Trinh, 
    665 F.3d 1
    , 9 (1st Cir.
    2011).   "A clear error exists only if, after considering all the
    evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
    -5-
    mistake has been made."   United States v. Brake, 
    666 F.3d 800
    , 804
    (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Howard challenges the court's decision to admit the gun,
    drugs, and drug supplies into evidence claiming that the contraband
    was the product of an unlawful search.       Howard's argument is a
    strictly factual one. He takes aim at the court's finding that the
    search occurred after Knowles gave consent.2        In support, he
    singles out VanZandt's search of the bathroom.     By way of a brief
    background, we present VanZandt's chronology, as established by his
    trial testimony: VanZandt entered the home behind the initial wave
    of officers; he traveled through the living room, into the kitchen,
    and then into the bathroom; he then went to the basement where
    Howard was already in cuffs; he then conducted a search of the
    bathroom.
    Howard argues that VanZandt's testimony establishes that
    these events took place in immediate succession.    And, by Howard's
    estimate, twenty minutes elapsed between Knowles being removed from
    the home and her consenting to the search.    Thus Howard theorizes
    that the search must have occurred before Knowles gave consent. In
    further support of his challenge, Howard points to a photograph
    that another officer took of his half burnt cigarette, arguing that
    2
    This is a departure from Howard's approach at the
    suppression hearing, which consisted of first, countering the
    government's contention that Howard (as a guest in Knowles' home)
    did not have standing to challenge the search and second, arguing
    that Knowles' consent was not voluntary.
    -6-
    the cigarette would have burnt further down and there would be more
    ashes if it had been left smoking for twenty minutes.
    Whether Howard's theorem on the chronology of VanZandt's
    actions is or is not accurate, we need not say.        VanZandt did not
    testify at the suppression hearing; he only testified at trial.
    Similarly, the photograph of the cigarette was only introduced at
    trial.   Although Howard acknowledges this point, he nonetheless
    urges us to consider the testimony and photograph in our review of
    the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and, in
    particular, the court's factual finding on the search's timing.
    While it is true that we may consider evidence adduced at trial
    when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we may do so
    only if the defendant renewed his suppression motion at trial. See
    United States v. Scott, 
    566 F.3d 242
    , 245 (1st Cir. 2009); United
    States v. de Jesus-Rios, 
    990 F.2d 672
    , 675 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993).
    Howard did not renew his motion at trial and so our review does not
    include VanZandt's testimony or the photograph. Our examination of
    the propriety of the suppression ruling is limited to the evidence
    presented at the suppression hearing. See Scott, 
    566 F.3d at 245
    .
    At the suppression hearing, documentary evidence, in the
    form of the grand jury transcript, Knowles' statement to police,
    her consent waiver, and photographs of the house, was introduced.
    Additionally,     Knowles   and   six    Springfield   police   officers
    testified.     The officers were those involved in arresting Howard,
    -7-
    obtaining Knowles' consent, searching the house, booking Howard,
    taking Knowles' statement, or some combination of these things.
    This evidence, taken as a whole, supports the court's finding that
    consent preceded the search.
    Two officers testified that the search took place after
    Knowles gave consent.       Though he could not recall the particulars
    of how he was told, one officer explained: "I was notified the
    [consent waiver] was signed and we were moving into the house.          We
    moved into the house." Knowles, for her part, testified that while
    she was in the yard signing the consent waiver, some officers (who
    at this point had Howard out of the house and in custody) were
    already in the house.       The two stories are not inconsistent.       As
    the district court explained, officers were engaged in a protective
    sweep of the house at that time, looking for any individuals that
    might be hidden.    There is no indication that they were lifting up
    toilet tank lids or otherwise searching the home for contraband.
    The district court's conclusion that officers did not
    start   searching   until    Knowles   gave   consent   was   not   clearly
    erroneous.    The motion to suppress was properly denied.
    B. Jury Instructions
    Howard's contention to this court is the same as it was
    at trial.    He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
    a joint possession and aiding and abetting instruction. "We review
    de novo a preserved objection to the trial court's decision to give
    -8-
    a requested jury instruction."     United States v. Whitney, 
    524 F.3d 134
    , 138 (1st Cir. 2008).
    Prior to the start of trial the government supplied the
    court with proposed jury instructions.      These included a suggested
    joint possession instruction and an aiding and abetting instruction
    with regard to the drug possession count.3         We fast-forward to
    trial.    There Howard offered only one piece of evidence in his own
    defense.     The evidence (given to the jury in the form of a
    stipulation) was that Lyle Treadwell, Knowles' son who was living
    with her at the time of Howard's arrest, had three convictions
    extending from 2002 to 2008 for gun and/or cocaine possession.
    When the time came to debate the merits of its proposed
    jury instructions, the government pointed to this evidence in
    support    of   its   joint   possession   and   aiding   and   abetting
    instructions.     It argued that Howard's pointing the finger at
    Treadwell, and the evidence adduced at trial, supported an argument
    that Howard possessed the drugs in cahoots with Treadwell or
    perhaps Knowles. Howard objected to the proposed instructions. He
    claimed that he was the government's sole target and that the
    government did not present any evidence that the drugs belonged to
    anyone else.    He further claimed that to the extent the inference
    had been raised that the drugs belonged to Treadwell or Knowles,
    3
    The government also sought an aiding and abetting charge in
    connection with the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
    drug crime count. The court ultimately denied this request.
    -9-
    there was no evidence that Howard was working in concert with them.
    The trial judge disagreed, citing Howard's lone piece of evidence -
    the stipulation of Treadwell's convictions.       The court indicated
    that this evidence put the issue "squarely in the jury's lap" since
    Howard had suggested during his defense case that the drugs
    belonged to another.   The court gave the requested instructions.
    As a general matter, "[j]oint possession occurs when both
    the defendant and another person share power and intent to exercise
    dominion   and   control    over   contraband."    United   States   v.
    Georgacarakos, 
    988 F.2d 1289
    , 1296 (1st Cir. 1993) abrogated on
    other grounds by United States v. Scott, 
    270 F.3d 30
    , 35 (1st Cir.
    2001). Constructive possession, which is the theory the government
    relied on, can be joint.     See United States v. Hicks, 
    575 F.3d 130
    ,
    139 (1st Cir. 2009).       As for aiding and abetting liability, the
    government must prove that the principal committed the charged
    substantive offense and that the accomplice was associated with and
    took part in the criminal endeavor, intending to achieve its
    success.   See United States v. Gonzalez, 
    570 F.3d 16
    , 28-29 (1st
    Cir. 2009).
    Here, the evidence offered during the government's case
    demonstrated that on the date of Howard's arrest, Knowles was
    living at 193 Nottingham Street with Treadwell. Howard was friends
    with Treadwell and friendly enough with Knowles to spend time
    eating with, and socializing with, her alone.          Howard was at
    -10-
    Knowles' house because he was waiting for Treadwell to return home.
    Individually     packaged   crack    cocaine       rocks     along   with     drug
    distribution paraphernalia (i.e., digital scales and plastic bags)
    sat out in the open on Knowles' kitchen table.                  Crack cocaine,
    packaged in the same manner as that on the table, was in the
    bathroom that Howard had recently been in. The evidence offered by
    Howard established that Treadwell had multiple convictions for gun
    and drug possession.4
    When crafting jury instructions a judge must consider all
    of   the    evidence   introduced    at     trial,    in    other    words,    the
    government's as well as the defense's.             Here the evidence, in its
    totality,    established    that    there    was     an    individual,   with    a
    significant criminal past involving guns and drugs, living at the
    home where Howard, the gun, and the drugs were found.                Howard used
    this evidence to cast suspicion on Treadwell and Knowles, and in
    doing so, raised an inference that he possessed the drugs jointly
    with Treadwell or Knowles or that he hid the drugs in order to help
    them out.    The evidence extant and Howard's own theory of the case
    4
    If there was any doubt as to why Howard offered this
    evidence, defense counsel hammered the point home during closing
    argument. Of Knowles, counsel stated: "[O]bviously, is she going
    to say that's my gun and my drugs? Is she going to say that's my
    son's gun? That's my son's drugs? Or is she going to say I got no
    idea?" Counsel added: "Who's to say [Knowles] wasn't there bagging
    the drugs? We will never know. Who's to say [Treadwell] hadn't
    been there earlier that day bagging the drugs?"         The theme
    continued: "You know Lyle Treadwell's history and you saw his
    mother. To give him a pass when that's found in their house."
    -11-
    made the joint possession and aiding and abetting instructions
    appropriate.   See, e.g., United States v. Carrasco, 
    257 F.3d 1045
    ,
    1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a joint possession jury instruction
    appropriate when the defendant testified, and his counsel argued,
    that the gun he was charged with possessing belonged to his vehicle
    passenger); United States v. Oberle, 
    136 F.3d 1414
    , 1422 (10th Cir.
    1998) (finding that even though the government proceeded on the
    theory that the defendant was the principal bank robber, an aiding
    and abetting jury instruction was proper when there was some
    evidence that the defendant was involved in preparations for the
    robbery).   The court did not err in giving the instructions.
    C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    According to Howard, there was not enough evidence to
    convict him of possessing the gun and drugs.   Because he preserved
    this sufficiency claim by moving for judgment of acquittal at the
    close of the government's case and again at the end of trial, our
    review is de novo.    See United States v. Jones, 
    674 F.3d 88
    , 91
    (1st Cir. 2012).      When evaluating sufficiency, we examine the
    direct and circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to
    the prosecution. See United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 
    541 F.3d 19
    ,
    26 (1st Cir. 2008).     We then ask whether the evidence, and all
    plausible inferences taken therefrom, "would allow a rational
    factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
    committed the charged crime."   
    Id.
    -12-
    Howard was not found with the gun or drugs on his person
    and therefore the government proceeded on a theory of constructive
    possession.     Constructive   possession   "exists   when   a   person
    knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise
    dominion and control over an object either directly or through
    others."   Hicks, 
    575 F.3d at 139
    .     Constructive possession can be
    established through circumstantial evidence.     See 
    id.
    Howard's assertion that the evidence was insufficient to
    establish that he possessed the gun or drugs is premised on the
    following.5   First, he points out that he was a "mere guest" in
    Knowles' home and no one saw the gun or drugs in his hands.         He
    adds that forensic evidence tying him to the gun or drugs was
    nowhere to be found.   Howard continues by claiming that the police
    have no idea how long the items were in the toilet tank.     Finally,
    Howard draws our attention to the absence of any inculpatory
    statements made by others or admissions made by him.         Although
    Howard's contentions are all true, there was nonetheless enough
    circumstantial evidence to permit a rational juror to conclude that
    Howard possessed - that is, had the power and intention to exercise
    dominion and control over - the gun and drugs.
    5
    Howard does not argue that the evidence was insufficient on
    any other fronts (e.g., insufficient to establish that he was a
    felon, or that the gun traveled in interstate commerce, or that the
    amount of crack cocaine met the requisite amount, or that the crack
    cocaine was intended for distribution, or that the gun was intended
    to further this distribution). Therefore we direct our inquiry
    toward the possession issue alone.
    -13-
    Howard and Knowles were the only individuals found at 193
    Nottingham Street and officers, who had created a perimeter around
    the house, never saw anyone else leave. Knowles testified that the
    gun, drugs, and scales did not belong to her and she had not seen
    her son bring them into the house.          The gun and drugs were found
    floating   in   the   water   of   the   toilet   tank   in   the   downstairs
    bathroom. Howard was seen peering out of this bathroom just before
    officers entered the house.        A phone containing pictures of Howard
    was found in the bathroom, as was a burning cigarette containing
    his DNA.   One officer testified that he had participated in the
    execution of over one-thousand search warrants and that he has
    never come across guns or drugs being stored in water.                 In the
    nearby kitchen, additional drugs, scales, and plastic bags were
    found on a table sitting right in the middle of the kitchen.
    Howard had $200 cash on his person.
    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, we find that a rational juror could have concluded
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Howard possessed the gun and drugs.
    The cigarette conclusively tied Howard to the bathroom where the
    gun and drugs were found. The officers' testimony established that
    Howard was in the bathroom just before officers entered the home.
    The drugs in the toilet tank were bagged in a manner suggesting
    they were headed for distribution. The drugs on the kitchen table,
    which were out in the open, were packaged the same way.                In the
    -14-
    moments prior to the officers' entry, Howard was undoubtedly in or
    around the kitchen since the living room (where he was first
    spotted) was connected to the kitchen, and the bathroom (where he
    was next spotted) was adjacent to it.       In fact, these are the only
    three rooms on the first floor.
    Even   if,   as   Howard    suggested,   it   is   a   conceivable
    inference that Treadwell or Knowles elected to store a gun and
    drugs in the toilet tank, there is a plausible alternative read.
    That is, because of the distinct possibility that the gun and drugs
    would be damaged by water, Treadwell or Knowles would not have done
    so, and instead Howard, operating under the time constraints
    brought on by swarming officers, hastily stashed the gun and drugs
    in the tank to hide them.     It was within the jury's prerogative to
    choose which inference seemed most worthy of belief.             See United
    States v. Dwinells, 
    508 F.3d 63
    , 74 (1st Cir. 2007).             Because the
    jury's verdict was "supported by a plausible rendition of the
    record," we uphold it. United States v. Castro-Davis, 
    612 F.3d 53
    ,
    60 (1st Cir. 2010).
    CONCLUSION
    After taking a good look at Howard's arguments, we are
    satisfied that none have merit.        The judgment below is affirmed.
    -15-