United States v. Chaney ( 2011 )


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  •             United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 09-1835
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    VINCENT CHANEY,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro,   U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Ripple,* and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Robert Herrick for appellant.
    Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    John P. Kacavas, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellee.
    July 27, 2011
    *
    Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Vincent Chaney
    appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized from him
    in the raid of a motel room in which Chaney was a guest.   Placed on
    the floor and handcuffed in the wake of his host's arrest on drug
    charges, Chaney consented to a search of his pants pocket to locate
    identification; the search turned up seven small bags of crack
    cocaine.   A dozen rounds of .38-caliber ammunition were later
    discovered in the pocket of his jacket.
    After unsuccessfully moving to suppress this evidence,
    Chaney entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of simple
    possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm after a prior
    felony conviction.    On appeal, Chaney argues that the police
    exceeded the scope of his consent by removing cocaine, rather than
    identification, from his pocket; that his consent was the product
    of a coercive atmosphere and hence not voluntary; and that all
    evidence seized was the fruit of an unlawful de facto arrest.
    Finding no reversible error in the district court's rulings, we
    affirm.
    I.
    The events giving rise to this appeal took place in the
    course of a police raid on a Manchester, New Hampshire motel room
    in late 2005.    In reciting the facts, we draw on the district
    court's oral findings of fact at Chaney's suppression hearings as
    well as testimony taken at those hearings.
    -2-
    On November 30, 2005, state and federal law enforcement
    officials in possession of a federal arrest warrant for a man named
    Peter Boyd, suspected of distributing crack cocaine, went to the
    Queen City Inn in Manchester, New Hampshire.             Past experience
    flagged the motel as a likely choice for local drug dealers looking
    for temporary lodging.      Shown a picture of Boyd, a clerk at the
    Queen City Inn confirmed to an investigating United States Marshal
    that a man of Boyd's appearance was staying in a room at the motel.
    The   marshal   summoned   four   additional   federal   and   local    law
    enforcement officers to the motel to aid in executing the warrant.
    The motel room in which Boyd was staying was registered
    in the name of Brigit Hebert, a woman familiar to the authorities
    as the subject of several past drug-related arrest warrants.
    Unbeknownst to the officers, also present in Hebert's motel room
    was Vincent Chaney.    According to his testimony at the suppression
    hearings, Chaney had come the previous night from Virginia, hoping
    to visit two of his daughters who were living with their mother in
    Manchester.     Arriving too late to visit with his daughters, Chaney
    went to a bar and happened upon Boyd, an old acquaintance.             Boyd
    offered to put Chaney up for the night in the room he was sharing
    with Hebert at the Queen City Inn.       Boyd, Hebert, and Chaney were
    thus all present in Hebert's motel room when the officers arrived
    early in the afternoon of the next day to execute Boyd's arrest
    warrant.
    -3-
    Two local detectives were dispatched to cover the rear
    door to Hebert's motel room while three marshals approached from
    the front, knocking on the door and announcing their presence. The
    door opened to reveal Boyd, wearing pajama pants but shirtless and
    without shoes.      Boyd was taken into custody, and the marshals
    entered the room with their weapons drawn to perform a protective
    sweep.    They found the room darkened and clothing scattered across
    the floor, with Hebert lying in bed and Chaney, whom the officers
    did not recognize, standing next to it.             The marshals told Hebert
    to get out of bed and put her hands up, which she did.                Chaney was
    less compliant,     edging   toward    the       corner   of   the   bed   despite
    repeated commands to stop moving and lie on the ground.                After six
    or more warnings, Chaney acquiesced and was handcuffed on the
    floor.    The marshals completed their sweep of the main room, the
    space underneath the bed, and the bathroom, finding in plain view
    two   bags   of   what   appeared     to    be    marijuana     (sitting    on   a
    windowsill), three crack pipes (on the windowsill and on a chair),
    and a number of rounds of .22-caliber ammunition (located in a
    clear bag in the closet).1
    1
    A further search of the premises, conducted later in the day
    with Hebert's consent, unearthed two firearms (a .22-caliber, pump-
    action rifle with ammunition in it and a .38-caliber Derringer
    pistol), a bowl containing a white powdery substance that field-
    tested positive for cocaine, and various items associated with drug
    manufacture (baking soda, lighter fluid, and glassine bags).
    Notably, the Derringer pistol was found under the corner of the
    bed's mattress, the point toward which Chaney had been edging when
    the police first entered the motel room.
    -4-
    As the protective sweep was being conducted, the marshals
    opened the rear door of the motel to admit the local detectives.
    Detective Brian Newcomb approached Chaney, patted him down for
    weapons, and then attempted to learn his identity.                Chaney was not
    immediately forthright, telling Detective Newcomb only that his
    name was Vincent and providing him with several false dates of
    birth.    After the local dispatch reported that it was unable to
    find a match for the dates of birth in their database, Newcomb
    asked Chaney if he had any identification.            Chaney indicated that
    he did, and that it could be found in his back pocket.                 Detective
    Newcomb    asked   for    and    was    granted   consent    to   retrieve     the
    identification from Chaney's back pocket, but the pocket turned out
    to   be   empty.   Asked    if    the    identification     might     be   located
    elsewhere, Chaney suggested that it might be in his left front
    pocket.    Chaney again consented to have Newcomb search his pocket
    for the identification.
    Detective Newcomb placed his hand in Chaney's left front
    pocket and removed first a plastic bag that held seven individual
    plastic    bags,   each    of    which    contained   a     "chunky    off-white
    substance"; he then reentered Chaney's pocket and removed a social
    security card.2     Newcomb believed the off-white substance in the
    2
    Chaney disputed the sequence of events in his testimony at
    the suppression hearing.    According to Chaney, he responded to
    Newcomb's request for identification by removing the social
    security card from his back pocket and turning it over to Newcomb.
    Detective Newcomb then allegedly asked Chaney if he had any sharp
    -5-
    bags to be crack cocaine, having seen the substance in his prior
    law enforcement experience some fifty to one hundred times (a field
    test later confirmed his suspicions). Newcomb informed Chaney that
    he was under arrest for possession of crack cocaine with intent to
    distribute.   After learning from dispatch that the social security
    card found in Chaney's pocket, which bore the name "Vincent Earold
    Chaney," belonged to a four-year-old boy,3 Newcomb again asked
    Chaney for his date of birth.    Chaney provided the correct date
    this time, and a search of police records confirmed his identity
    and revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Massachusetts
    for a probation violation.
    As Detective Newcomb was escorting Chaney to a police car
    outside the motel, Chaney asked Newcomb to retrieve a backpack and
    jacket Chaney had left in the room.   Newcomb retrieved a backpack
    and jacket matching the description provided by Chaney.      After
    Chaney confirmed that they belonged to him, Newcomb searched both
    items, locating in the jacket pocket a plastic bag containing
    twelve rounds of .38-caliber ammunition.
    objects in his pockets, Chaney told Newcomb that he did not, and
    Newcomb proceeded to search Chaney's other pockets and remove items
    (including the plastic bags containing cocaine) without consent.
    In his oral findings of fact, Judge DiClerico adopted Detective
    Newcomb's version of the consensual search, implicitly discrediting
    Chaney's account.
    3
    The card belonged to Chaney's deceased son, Vincent Chaney,
    Jr.   Chaney stated that he had mistakenly grabbed the wrong
    identification card when he left his home in Virginia.
    -6-
    Chaney was eventually indicted in the district court on
    two counts arising out of the incident: one count of simple
    possession of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 844
    (a), and
    one count of unlawful possession of a firearm after a prior felony
    conviction, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
     and 924(a)(2).4
    Chaney moved to suppress all of the evidence seized in the course
    of his detention and arrest.
    The district court held two evidentiary hearings to
    evaluate possible grounds for suppression.     The first, held by
    Judge DiClerico on September 4, 2008, addressed Chaney's argument
    that the search of Hebert's motel room was unlawful due to the
    absence of a valid search warrant. After testimony from Chaney and
    three of the police officers who conducted the search and arrest,
    Judge DiClerico ruled that Chaney lacked standing to challenge the
    search of the motel room.   The judge also found that Chaney had
    consented to a search of his pockets, and that the search of
    Chaney's jacket before turning it over to him had been reasonable
    in light of officer safety concerns.
    4
    Chaney's indictment charged one additional felon-in-
    possession count related to a 2007 incident where an officer
    noticed a handgun in Chaney's pocket during a routine traffic stop.
    Chaney successfully moved to sever trial on the 2007 charge from
    the 2005 charges. Though the district court initially suppressed
    all evidence seized in the 2007 traffic stop, we reversed in an
    earlier appeal filed by the government.       See United States v.
    Chaney, 
    584 F.3d 20
     (1st Cir. 2009).
    -7-
    A second hearing was held before Judge Barbadoro on
    September 17, 2008.5        After brief supplemental testimony from two
    of the officers, Chaney's counsel presented arguments that the
    search of Chaney's pockets occurred during an unlawful de facto
    arrest and that Chaney's consent to the search was invalid because
    it was the product of coercion.                Judge Barbadoro rejected the
    arguments, ruling that Chaney's detention was not a de facto
    arrest, being limited in duration and reasonable in scope, and that
    Chaney's consent was voluntary.          At the close of the hearing, the
    judge    confirmed   that    all   of    the    issues   concerning   Chaney's
    detention and consent were preserved for appeal:
    It's preserved for purposes of appeal that the
    entry was illegal.       It's preserved for
    purposes of appeal that the scope of the
    detention after the entry was improper, and
    it's preserved for purposes of appeal that any
    consent given was not valid and does not
    justify and make lawful the seizure that
    followed.   I think you've presented every
    possible suppression argument that can be
    presented.
    Chaney   subsequently       entered into     a   conditional   plea
    agreement by which he reserved his right to appeal the district
    court's suppression rulings.            Subject to that agreement, Chaney
    pled guilty to one count of simple possession and one count of
    5
    Following the first suppression hearing, the case was
    reassigned   to  Judge   Barbadoro  due   to  Judge   DiClerico's
    unavailability for trial.    Judge Barbadoro set the additional
    suppression hearing in response to concerns from Chaney that
    certain arguments had not been addressed in the first hearing.
    -8-
    possession of a firearm after a felony conviction.           Judgment was
    entered against Chaney in April 2009, and this timely appeal
    followed.
    II.
    In evaluating the district court's denial of Chaney's
    suppression motion, we review the court's findings of fact for
    clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.           United States v.
    Larios, 
    593 F.3d 82
    , 92 (1st Cir. 2010).              Chaney raises three
    challenges to the district court's ruling.       First, he argues that
    the removal from his pocket of plastic bags containing cocaine
    exceeded the scope of his consent, which, he asserts, was limited
    to a search of his pocket to locate identification.            Second, he
    argues that, even if he consented to a general search of his pants
    pocket, the consent was involuntary because of an unduly coercive
    atmosphere.   Third, he argues that the consent was the fruit of an
    unlawful, de facto arrest, and thus any evidence found in the
    course of the search must be excluded.     We address each of Chaney's
    contentions in turn.
    A.   Scope of Consent
    It is a fundamental principle of Fourth Amendment law
    that a warrantless search may be conducted with the voluntary
    consent of a person authorized to give such consent.           See United
    States v. Stierhoff, 
    549 F.3d 19
    , 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing
    Schneckloth   v.   Bustamonte,   
    412 U.S. 218
    ,    222   (1973)).   A
    -9-
    warrantless search may not, however, exceed the scope of the
    consent granted. United States v. Marshall, 
    348 F.3d 281
    , 286 (1st
    Cir. 2003).   The scope of the consented-to search is generally
    defined by the expressed object of the search, which is "measured
    by a test of objective reasonableness: 'what would the typical
    reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
    officer and subject?'"   
    Id. at 286-87
     (quoting Florida v. Jimeno,
    
    500 U.S. 248
    , 251 (1991)).
    The United States raises a threshold objection to our
    consideration of Chaney's scope-of-consent argument, contending
    that the issue is forfeited due to Chaney's failure to squarely
    raise it in the suppression hearings.6   There may be some force to
    the government's argument, as the scope-of-consent argument Chaney
    presses on appeal does not appear to have been made below.     See
    United States v. Torres, 
    162 F.3d 6
    , 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (forfeiture
    "applies not only when a defendant has failed altogether to make a
    suppression motion but also when, having made one, he has neglected
    to include the particular ground that he later seeks to argue").
    On the other hand, Chaney raised generally the issue of the
    6
    The government identifies this argument as a claim of
    waiver, but it is actually one of forfeiture. As we have often
    explained, an argument or right is waived only when it is
    intentionally abandoned; mere failure to raise an argument or right
    due to inattention or neglect constitutes forfeiture. See United
    States v. Rodriguez, 
    311 F.3d 435
    , 437 (1st Cir. 2002).         The
    distinction is a substantive one. Waiver generally bars an issue
    from being raised on appeal, whereas forfeiture allows the issue to
    be reviewed for plain error. 
    Id.
    -10-
    adequacy of his consent before the district court, and the court
    assured him that it was "preserved for purposes of appeal that any
    consent given . . . does not justify and make lawful the seizure
    that followed."       Because we     may readily       dispose    of   Chaney's
    argument on the merits, we sidestep the government's claim of
    forfeiture and address the scope-of-consent issue head-on.                    See
    Stierhoff, 
    549 F.3d at 23
    .
    According       to   testimony    from    Detective    Newcomb,    who
    performed the search of Chaney's pocket, Chaney "stated that [the
    detective]   could   go    through   his    left    front     pocket   and   find
    [Chaney's] identification."          Chaney argues that the "expressed
    object"   of   this       consented-to      search      was     retrieval     of
    identification, and thus the removal of the plastic bags from his
    pocket fell outside of the scope of his consent.               We disagree.
    The tight confines of a pants pocket leave a searching
    hand little room for maneuvering and distinguishing between various
    objects that may be contained therein.             Given consent to retrieve
    an object from such a cramped space, it is objectively reasonable
    to assume that the consent extends to the removal of items that
    either may constitute the object of the search and cannot be
    immediately identified or that obstruct further access to other
    items in the pocket.       Nothing in Chaney's exchange with Detective
    Newcomb suggests that he intended to withhold consent for these
    sorts of practical measures that are reasonable incidents to the
    -11-
    search of a pocket.         Chaney's argument appears to be that, absent
    explicit   permission       to     remove    items   other   than    evidence   of
    identification, the detective was required to fish around in the
    pocket until he located an item that he could positively identify
    to be some form of identification and that could be removed without
    dislodging other items.          The "typical reasonable person" would not
    so interpret Chaney's exchange with the officer.7
    Because     it    was    objectively      reasonable     for Detective
    Newcomb to believe that the scope of consent extended to the
    removal of plastic bags from Chaney's pocket in the course of
    searching for identification, we find no unconstitutional excursion
    beyond the boundaries of Chaney's consent. See Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. at 249
       ("The   Fourth        Amendment       is   satisfied   when,     under    the
    circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to
    believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted [the
    challenged search].").8
    7
    This is not to say that Chaney's consent should be read as
    a generalized authorization to search his entire pocket, however.
    If the detective had immediately located identification, turning
    out the rest of Chaney's pocket would surely exceed the scope of
    consent. But the record does not suggest that such was the case:
    Detective Newcomb testified at the second suppression hearing that
    he removed the plastic bag from Chaney's pocket before the
    identification card.
    8
    Both parties discuss the possible application of the "plain
    feel" doctrine of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 
    508 U.S. 366
     (1993) to
    the present case. That rule, an extension of the familiar "plain
    view" doctrine, allows the seizure of contraband readily identified
    by feel during a Terry frisk. While we agree with Chaney that the
    doctrine would have no application where testimony suggests that
    -12-
    B.   Voluntariness of Consent
    Chaney next raises a more fundamental challenge to the
    consent search of his pocket, arguing that the coercive atmosphere
    of the police raid rendered his consent involuntary.                Whether a
    suspect's consent to a warrantless search was truly voluntary or,
    instead, the product of coercion "is a question of fact to be
    determined from an examination of the totality of circumstances."
    Marshall, 
    348 F.3d at 286
    .       Among the factors we will consider in
    making   that   determination    are     the    suspect's   "age,   education,
    experience,     knowledge   of   the    right    to   withhold   consent,   and
    evidence of coercive tactics."            
    Id.
         Upon close review of the
    record, we can find no clear error in the district court's finding
    that Chaney freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his
    pants pocket.
    Chaney draws on a number of factors in trying to paint a
    picture of coercion.    First, Chaney highlights the officers' "show
    of force" in entering the motel room with guns drawn.                 Setting
    aside the fact that his consent was given after all occupants of
    the room were handcuffed and the excitement of the initial entry
    had passed, neither the number of officers who entered the room
    (five) nor the readiness of their weapons suggests an overwhelming
    the contraband was not identified by feel but instead by visual
    inspection after removal from his pocket, we need not directly
    address these arguments given our holding that the removal of
    cocaine from Chaney's pocket fell within the scope of the consent
    granted.
    -13-
    show of force.     See United States v. Jones, 
    523 F.3d 31
    , 38 (1st
    Cir. 2008) (finding the fact that ten to fifteen officers entered
    hotel room with guns drawn insufficient to void voluntariness of
    consent).   Chaney notes as well that the occupants of the room were
    asleep when law enforcement arrived at the motel room.                   The
    evidence is mixed as to whether Chaney, who was standing and fully
    clothed when the officers entered the room, was actually awakened
    by the officers' arrival. Regardless, the mere fact of having been
    recently asleep does not necessarily affect one's capacity to
    voluntarily grant consent.         Although Chaney cites the officers'
    failure to advise him of his right to refuse consent to the search,
    a factor that is certainly relevant to voluntariness of consent,
    "[w]e have repeatedly held that the failure to advise a defendant
    of his right to refuse consent does not automatically render such
    consent invalid."    
    Id.
    Importantly, this was not Chaney's first encounter with
    law enforcement.    He had been arrested on more than a dozen prior
    occasions   and   convicted   of    a    comparable   number   of   criminal
    offenses.   It is reasonable to infer that a veteran of the criminal
    justice system will be "less likely than most to be intimidated by
    the agents' show of force."         United States v. Barnett, 
    989 F.2d 546
    , 556 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Cepulonis, 
    530 F.2d 238
    , 244 (1st Cir. 1976)).         Moreover, Chaney's conduct during
    the police raid betrayed no evidence of intimidation; to the
    -14-
    contrary, he ignored repeated commands from the police to stop
    moving when they first entered the motel room.
    In short, on this record, we can discern no clear error
    in the district court's finding that Chaney voluntarily consented
    to the search of his pocket.9
    C.   De Facto Arrest
    Chaney alternatively contends that the evidence seized
    from him was the fruit of an unlawful de facto arrest.10         While the
    period of detention leading to the discovery of crack cocaine in
    Chaney's pocket certainly bore some typical indicia of an arrest,
    we   concur   with   the    district   court's    conclusion     that   the
    circumstances did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest.
    Any detention of an individual by a police officer
    constitutes   a   seizure   and, to    be   lawful,   must   be adequately
    justified under the Fourth Amendment. Morelli v. Webster, 
    552 F.3d 9
    We note as well that we have been reluctant to find coercion
    in the commonplace context of a request for identification. See
    United States v. Winston, 
    444 F.3d 115
    , 122 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting
    that the "mundaneness of identification makes it unlikely that
    agents would bother to use coercive methods to obtain it").
    10
    There appear to be two aspects to his "fruit of the
    poisonous tree" argument, see Wong Sun v. United States, 
    371 U.S. 471
    , 484-85 (1963): first, that the purported de facto arrest
    caused Chaney to consent to the search of his pocket, cf. United
    States v. Navedo-Colón, 
    996 F.2d 1337
    , 1338-39 (1st Cir. 1993)
    (examining whether consent to search was fruit of illegal search),
    and second, that the search of Chaney's jacket pocket incident to
    his being taken into custody was a product of the de facto arrest.
    Because we find no de facto arrest, we do not reach the question of
    whether such a finding would require suppression of the evidence
    located during those two searches.
    -15-
    12, 19 (1st Cir. 2009).    The contours of the showing necessary to
    satisfy the Fourth Amendment depend on the nature of the detention:
    arrests, whether formal or de facto, require that the detaining
    officer   have   grounds   for    probable    cause,    whereas    temporary
    detentions (including investigatory or Terry stops, see Terry v.
    Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 21 (1968)) "may be grounded on a lesser showing
    equivalent to reasonable suspicion."          
    Id.
    Chaney does not contest that the police had reasonable
    grounds to temporarily detain him and ascertain his identity in the
    course of securing the motel room.           Instead, he argues that the
    conduct of the detention -- in particular, that the officers
    entered with guns drawn, ordered him to the ground, and handcuffed
    him -- transformed it from investigatory stop into de facto arrest.
    The distinction is critical.        Chaney argues, correctly, that no
    probable cause existed at the time of his detention,11 and thus the
    detention can survive constitutional scrutiny only if it was in the
    nature of a temporary investigative stop.
    There exist "no scientifically precise benchmarks for
    distinguishing between temporary detentions and de facto arrests."
    
    Id. at 20
    .   Instead, we inquire, in light of the totality of the
    circumstances,   whether   a     reasonable    person   in   the   suspect's
    position would have understood her position "to be tantamount to
    11
    The officers had no knowledge of who Chaney was or why he
    was present in the motel room, and thus plainly could have no
    probable cause for arrest.
    -16-
    being under arrest."   United States v. Zapata, 
    18 F.3d 971
    , 975
    (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 
    468 U.S. 420
    , 442
    (1984)).   This objective, suspect-focused inquiry is informed by
    our assessment of the reasonableness of the detaining officer or
    officers' actions in response to developing conditions.         Where an
    investigatory stop is justified at its inception, it will generally
    not morph into a de facto arrest as long as "the actions undertaken
    by the officer[s] following the stop were reasonably responsive to
    the circumstances   justifying   the    stop   in the   first   place as
    augmented by information gleaned by the officer[s] during the
    stop."   United States v. Trueber, 
    238 F.3d 79
    , 92 (1st Cir. 2001)
    (quoting United States v. Owens, 
    167 F.3d 739
    , 748 (1st Cir. 1999)
    (alterations in original)).
    The crux of the issue before us is whether the officers'
    entry into the motel room with drawn guns and their handcuffing of
    Chaney were reasonable. The use of drawn guns and handcuffs, being
    some "of the most recognizable indicia of a traditional arrest,"
    will generally tilt the scale to some significant degree toward a
    finding of de facto arrest. See United States v. Acosta-Colon, 
    157 F.3d 9
    , 18 (1st Cir. 1998).   However, we have repeatedly noted that
    neither factor is alone determinative.          See United States v.
    Fornia-Castillo, 
    408 F.3d 52
    , 64 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[N]either the
    use of handcuffs nor the drawing of a weapon necessarily transforms
    -17-
    a valid Terry stop into a de facto arrest.").12            In Acosta-Colon,
    we explained that "when the government seeks to prove that an
    investigatory detention involving the use of handcuffs did not
    exceed the limits of a Terry stop, it must be able to point to some
    specific    fact    or   circumstance      that   could   have   supported   a
    reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to
    carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law
    enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an
    undue risk of harm."         Acosta-Colon, 
    157 F.3d at 18-19
     (emphasis
    omitted).        We think this inquiry applies with equal force in
    assessing whether the use of drawn handguns was reasonable in
    initiating a stop.
    We can locate no error in the district court's finding
    that the specific circumstances of the November 30, 2005 raid gave
    rise to a reasonable concern for officer security that justified
    the use     of   handcuffs   and   drawn    handguns.     The    unanticipated
    presence, in a darkened motel room inhabited by two suspected drug
    dealers, of an unfamiliar man who ignored repeated orders from the
    police to stop moving and drop to the ground might alone be enough
    to justify more intrusive measures for briefly securing him during
    12
    See also Acosta-Colon, 
    157 F.3d at 18
     ("[T]he use of
    handcuffs in the course of an investigatory stop does not
    automatically convert the encounter into a de facto arrest.");
    United States v. Lee, 
    317 F.3d 26
    , 31-32 (1st Cir. 2003) (fact that
    officers drew guns and blocked defendant's vehicle from leaving did
    not convert investigative stop into de facto arrest); United States
    v. Taylor, 
    162 F.3d 12
    , 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (same).
    -18-
    an investigative stop. See United States v. Andrade, 
    551 F.3d 103
    ,
    113 (1st Cir. 2008) (more physically intrusive Terry stop justified
    where suspect refused officer's order to stop); United States v.
    Taylor, 
    716 F.2d 701
    , 709 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that no de facto
    arrest had occurred where police approached the suspect with guns
    drawn and handcuffed him after he twice refused to raise his hands
    and "ma[de] furtive movements inside the truck where his hands
    could not be seen"). There were, however, still other factors here
    that counseled particular caution.    The officers knew that Boyd,
    the subject of the arrest warrant, had an extensive criminal
    history, and a preliminary protective sweep of the motel room
    located not just drug paraphernalia but also ammunition. Moreover,
    the motel room was littered with clothing, which easily could --
    and, as was later discovered, did -- conceal a weapon within close
    reach of the occupants.
    Under circumstances such as these, especially in the
    close quarters of a motel room, we are mindful of the need for
    officers to safely secure the scene. "[T]he ultimate touchstone of
    the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,'" Brigham City v. Stuart,
    
    547 U.S. 398
    , 403 (2006), and "[p]olice officers engaged in an
    otherwise lawful stop must be permitted to take measures . . . they
    believe reasonably necessary to protect themselves from harm, or to
    safeguard the security of others," Acosta-Colon, 
    157 F.3d at 18
    .
    -19-
    We find the use of handcuffs and entry into the motel room with
    drawn guns to have been a reasonable precaution here.13
    Nor do the other relevant aspects of Chaney's detention
    support a finding of de facto arrest.            Chaney was detained for
    fewer than five minutes before being arrested for possession of
    cocaine. We have held significantly longer periods of detention to
    fall short of de facto arrest.         See, e.g., Owens, 
    167 F.3d at 749
    (noting that there is no talismanic time beyond which a Terry stop
    becomes unreasonable and holding that detention of fifty minutes
    was not de facto arrest); United States v. McCarthy, 
    77 F.3d 522
    ,
    531 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that seventy-five-minute detention in
    locked rear passenger compartment of police car was not de facto
    arrest).    Moreover, during the short period for which Chaney was
    detained,   the   police    officers    worked   diligently      towards     the
    investigative purpose for which he was being held -- namely,
    determining   Chaney's     identity.      See   Trueber,   
    238 F.3d at 94
    (finding no de facto arrest where defendant was detained for
    fifteen minutes of questions that were "brief and to the point[,]
    . . . targeted at ascertaining [the defendant's] identity, his
    reasons for being in the country, and whether he was involved in
    the suspected illegal activity").          Finally, it should have been
    reasonably clear to Chaney that Boyd, not Chaney, was the intended
    13
    We emphasize, however, that such forceful and intrusive
    measures have no place in routine investigatory detentions.
    Acosta-Colon, 
    157 F.3d at 18
    .
    -20-
    target of the raid: Boyd was immediately seized and handcuffed by
    the police upon their entry and was quickly led out of the motel
    room.   The fact that Chaney and Hebert were not similarly seized,
    but instead held in the room for follow-up questioning, should have
    suggested that their detention was merely incidental to Boyd's
    arrest.
    In light of these circumstances, we do not think that a
    reasonable person standing in Chaney's shoes would understand that
    he was subject to anything other than "a brief period of detention
    at the scene while the police sought by means of a moderate number
    of questions to determine his identity and to obtain information
    confirming or dispelling their suspicions."    
    Id.,
     
    238 F.3d at 93
    (quoting United States v. Streifel, 
    781 F.2d 953
    , 962 (1st Cir.
    1986)).   Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's
    conclusion that Chaney's detention did not constitute a de facto
    arrest warranting the suppression of evidence.
    III.
    Having closely reviewed the record, we are persuaded that
    the district court did not err in declining to suppress evidence
    seized from Chaney during the November 30, 2005 raid. The district
    court's judgment is therefore affirmed.
    So ordered.
    -21-