United States v. Hogan , 722 F.3d 55 ( 2013 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 12-1039
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    WYMAN HOGAN,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Stahl, and Thompson,
    Circuit Judges.
    John T. Ouderkirk, Jr. for appellant.
    Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellee.
    Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender for the
    Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Massachusetts, New
    Hampshire and Rhode Island Federal Defender, amicus curiae.
    July 5, 2013
    THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Wyman Hogan ("Hogan")
    was sentenced to 262 months' imprisonment for crack-cocaine related
    offenses in 2002.      When the United States Sentencing Guidelines
    ("U.S.S.G.") were amended in 2007 to reduce crack-cocaine base
    offense   levels,   Hogan   moved      for   and   was    granted   a   sentence
    reduction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).              The guidelines were
    amended again in 2011, retroactively lowering the base offense
    levels further for crack-cocaine offenses.               Hogan again moved for
    a reduction of his sentence under § 3582(c)(2), but the district
    court denied the motion. Hogan appeals, arguing the district court
    erred in concluding he was ineligible to receive that reduction.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2001, a jury found Hogan guilty of conspiracy to
    possess with intent to distribute and distribution of fifty grams
    or more of cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
     and 841(a)(1), and possession of cocaine base, in violation of
    
    21 U.S.C. § 844
    (a).     At Hogan's sentencing in 2002, the district
    court determined his base offense level ("BOL") was 34.                    After
    applying a three-level increase for an official victim enhancement
    and a two-level increase for a leadership role enhancement, as well
    as   a   downward   adjustment    of    two    levels      for   acceptance   of
    responsibility, the court found Hogan's total offense level ("TOL")
    was 37.      Although the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR")
    -2-
    determined Hogan's criminal history category ("CHC") was VI, Hogan
    requested and the court granted a downward departure pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.     The court departed to a CHC of III, on the basis
    that the CHC of VI "over-represent[ed] the seriousness" of Hogan's
    criminal   history.      That    departure   reduced   Hogan's   advisory
    guideline range to 262 to 327 months and the court sentenced Hogan
    to 262 months and five years of supervised release.
    Six years later, Hogan moved to reduce his sentence
    pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2), which permits district courts
    to modify previously imposed sentences in certain circumstances to
    take into account retroactive guideline amendments.1              Hogan's
    motion was based on a 2007 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines
    which retroactively reduced base offense levels for crack-cocaine
    offenses by two levels.         See U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 706, 713
    (effective Nov. 1, 2007); United States v. Caraballo, 
    552 F.3d 6
    ,
    8 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting the amendment "adjust[ed] downward by two
    levels the base offense level ascribed to various quantities of
    crack cocaine" in the Guidelines Manual drug quantity table).        The
    government and Hogan stipulated to the retroactive application of
    1
    Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2), a district court may reduce a
    sentence previously imposed "in the case of a defendant who has
    been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
    range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
    Commission." 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). A court may reduce the
    sentence "after considering the factors set forth in section
    3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable" and if reducing the
    sentence is "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
    the Sentencing Commission." 
    Id.
    -3-
    the sentencing guideline amendment and agreed Hogan's BOL should be
    reduced from 34 to 32, which reduced his TOL from 37 to 35, and
    yielded a guideline range of 210 to 262 months.            The parties
    proposed the amended sentence should be 210 months.       The district
    court concluded that the version of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 in effect at
    the time allowed it to apply the same departure in Hogan's CHC --
    from CHC VI to CHC III -- it had applied at his initial sentencing.
    See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2) (pre-2011 amendments) (providing that
    "[i]f the original term of imprisonment imposed was less than the
    term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to
    the defendant at the time of sentencing," the defendant could be
    granted "a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline
    range").     Applying the CHC departure, the court determined the
    revised guideline range was 210 to 262 months and agreed with the
    parties that Hogan's sentence should be reduced to 210 months.
    In 2011, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendments 750
    and   759,    both   effective   November   1,   2011.   Amendment   750
    retroactively implemented the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("FSA"),
    which reduced the statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses.
    See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 
    124 Stat. 2372
    ; U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011).
    The change in drug amounts reduced the "100-to-1 crack-to-powder
    ratio to 18-to-1."     Dorsey v. United States, 
    132 S. Ct. 2321
    , 2329
    (2012). While Amendment 750 made further retroactive reductions to
    -4-
    the   crack-cocaine   guidelines,    Amendment    759    limited   the
    availability of relief for prisoners who received below-guideline
    sentences in the first instance.
    As part of Amendment 759, the Sentencing Commission
    amended policy statement § 1B1.10(b)(2).    Prior to Amendment 759,
    § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) prohibited reducing a defendant's sentence under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) "to a term that is less than the minimum of
    the amended guideline range[.]" U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (2010).
    There was an exception to this rule under § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), which
    allowed a "reduction comparably less than the amended guideline
    range" in cases where "the original term of imprisonment imposed
    was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the guideline
    range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing."      Id.
    § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2010).   Amendment 759 kept § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)
    intact, but changed the exception found in § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) under
    which a court could further reduce a defendant's sentence.     Now, §
    1B1.10(b)(2)(B) allows a reduction comparably less than the amended
    guideline range only if the below-guideline sentence was due to the
    defendant's   substantial   assistance     to    the    government.
    Specifically, newly-amended § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) provides that if a
    defendant's term of imprisonment "was less than the term of
    imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the
    defendant at the time of sentencing pursuant to a government motion
    to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities,
    -5-
    a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range . . .
    may be appropriate."             U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2011).              In
    addition,    the    Commission      amended     Application    Note    1    to    §
    1B1.10(b)(2) which says that the "guideline range" consisting of
    "the   offense     level   and     criminal   history   category      determined
    pursuant to § 1B1.10(a) . . . is determined before consideration of
    any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance."
    Id. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1.
    Based    on    the    retroactive    application    of    the    2011
    guideline amendments, Hogan moved to reduce his sentence pursuant
    to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).           This time, the district court denied
    Hogan's motion.     The court concluded that although the retroactive
    application of the 2011 guideline amendments resulted in a two-
    level reduction in Hogan's BOL from 32 to 30, and a corresponding
    reduction in his TOL from 35 to 33, the amended version of §
    1B1.10(b)(2) did not entitle Hogan to a "reduction comparably less"
    than his amended guideline because he had been sentenced to a
    below-guideline sentence. United States v. Hogan, 00-CR-100-01-PB,
    
    2011 WL 6337629
    , at *2 (D.N.H. Dec. 16, 2011).
    The revised version of § 1B1.10(b)(2) under Amendment
    759, the court said, did not permit it to apply the CHC III
    departure in calculating Hogan's guideline range -- the same
    departure the court had applied in 2002 at his initial sentencing
    and in 2008 when granting Hogan's motion to reduce his sentence
    -6-
    based on the pre-2011 amendments.2          The court applied Hogan's
    original CHC (VI), instead of the reduced CHC (III), and a TOL of
    33 (reduced per the 2011 guideline amendments), resulting in an
    amended guideline range of 235 to 293 months.        Because the amended
    guideline range exceeded Hogan's modified sentence of 210 months,
    the court found the language of the newly-amended § 1B1.10(b)(2)
    prohibited any further reduction to the 210-month sentence and that
    Hogan was therefore ineligible for relief under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).   This is Hogan's appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    Hogan says the district court erred in concluding he was
    ineligible under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) for a sentence reduction.
    As best we can tell, Hogan raises two arguments in his brief:
    first, that the district court was wrong in finding the revised
    commentary in Application Note 1 bars the district court from
    applying his reduced CHC of III from his original sentencing in
    calculating the amended guideline range; and second, that the
    newly-amended   U.S.S.G.   §   1B1.10(b)(2)   does    not   prohibit   the
    district court from considering his reduced CHC in further reducing
    his below-guideline sentence.
    2
    Given the court's conclusion that it could not apply, as it
    had before, the same CHC III departure, we infer that the court had
    considered Application Note 1 to the amended § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)
    although it did not expressly mention it in its decision.
    -7-
    The sole issue on appeal is therefore whether Hogan, who
    received a CHC reduction at his original sentencing, is entitled to
    the application of the same or a similar reduction at re-sentencing
    under § 3582(c) in light of the newly-amended sentencing guideline,
    § 1B1.10(b)(2), and its commentary, Application Note 1.                Because
    this is a purely legal question, our review is de novo.              See United
    States v. Roa-Medina, 
    607 F.3d 255
    , 258 (1st Cir. 2010).
    Our starting point is 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2), the statute
    under    which   Hogan   moved   to   reduce      his   sentence.     Under   §
    3582(c)(2), a district court may reduce a sentence previously
    imposed "in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
    term    of   imprisonment   based     on    a   sentencing   range   that   has
    subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).    A court may reduce the         sentence "after considering
    the factors set forth in section           3553(a) to the extent that they
    are applicable" and if reducing the sentence is "consistent with
    applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
    
    Id.
    The parties agree that the applicable Commission policy
    statement on § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions is the newly-amended
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b).       Section 1B1.10(b) outlines the approach
    courts are to take in determining whether and to what extent a
    sentence reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) and the policy
    statement is warranted.          See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b).             Under §
    -8-
    1B1.10(b)(1), the court must first determine the amended guideline
    range that would have applied to the defendant if the guideline
    amendments     specified      in   the   policy   statement         (which      include
    Amendment 750) were in effect at the time of the defendant's
    initial sentencing.          Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1).        In doing so, the court
    may substitute only the amended guideline and must "leave all other
    guideline application decisions unaffected."                  Id.       Once a court
    determines     the   amended       guideline   range,    it     must         look   to   §
    1B1.10(b)(2) to see whether and to what extent it can reduce the
    defendant's sentence.
    As we mentioned, Hogan's first challenge to the district
    court's denial of relief under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) attacks the
    way the court calculated his amended guideline range pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1).           He argues the court should have applied
    the downward departure he received in his criminal history category
    at his initial sentencing when calculating the amended guideline
    range.   We disagree.
    We need look no further than Application Note 1 to
    determine      whether   §    1B1.10(b)(1)     allows     courts        to     consider
    departures prior to determining the applicable guideline range.
    The plain language of Application Note 1(A) makes clear that the
    applicable      guideline      range     calculated     under      §    1B1.10(b)(1)
    corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category
    which    is    "determined     before     consideration       of       any    departure
    -9-
    provision in the Guidelines Manual." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A)
    (emphasis added).    Thus, Application Note 1 prohibits courts from
    applying departures prior to the determination of the amended
    guideline range in a proceeding for a sentence reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).       See United States v. Montanez, 11-4933-CRL,
    
    2013 WL 2346409
    , at *4 (2d Cir. May 30, 2013); United States v.
    Steele, 
    714 F.3d 751
    , 754 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Givens,
    No. 12-14549, 
    2013 WL 1197899
    , at *2-3 (11th Cir. Mar. 26, 2013)
    (unpublished); United States v. Valdez, 
    492 F. App'x 895
    , 898-99
    (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
    A commentary provision, such as Application Note 1,
    "which functions to interpret a guideline or explain how it is to
    be applied" is binding as long as the Commentary does not conflict
    with the Constitution, a federal statute, or the guideline at
    issue.   Stinson v. United States, 
    508 U.S. 36
    , 42–43 (1993)
    (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).                We find
    meritless Hogan's sole argument as to why the Application Note is
    not binding.    Hogan argues that Application Note 1 conflicts with
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) "to the extent [Application Note 1's]
    application    prohibits    the   court   from   reducing   a   defendant's
    sentence" where the district court applied a downward departure to
    lower his guideline range at his initial sentencing but can no
    longer apply that departure to determine the amended guideline
    range.   Hogan's argument ignores the authority and "substantial
    -10-
    role" regarding sentence-modification proceedings that Congress
    gave the Commission.       Dillon v. United States, 
    130 S. Ct. 2683
    ,
    2691 (2010). Congress authorized the Commission to decide not only
    whether to amend the Sentencing Guidelines, 
    28 U.S.C. § 994
    (o), and
    to determine whether and to what extent an amendment would be
    retroactive, 
    id.
     § 994(u), but also to determine the extent to
    which -- "by what amount" -- sentences may be reduced based on
    those that it makes retroactive, Dillon, 
    130 S. Ct. at 2691
    .               In 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2), Congress explicitly stated that courts may
    reduce a sentence only if the reduction is "consistent with
    applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).      And, courts are "require[d]" to "follow
    the   Commission's   instructions      in   §   1B1.10   to    determine    the
    prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent
    of the reduction authorized."          Dillon, 
    130 S. Ct. at 2691
    .           In
    prohibiting further reductions to a defendant serving a below-
    guideline sentence based on departures other than those granted
    because of the defendant's substantial assistance, the Commission
    has plainly indicated "by what amount" sentences may be reduced on
    the basis of retroactive amendments.        We reiterate, as the Supreme
    Court has already made clear, that § 3582(c)(2) does not give the
    defendant a resentencing opportunity.            Id. at 2690 ("[Section]
    3582(c)(2)   does    not   authorize    a   sentencing    or    resentencing
    proceeding.").   Under § 3582(c)(2), Congress instead "intended to
    -11-
    authorize   only       a    limited        adjustment     to   an    otherwise     final
    sentence," id. at 2691, "within the narrow bounds established by
    the Commission," id. at 2694.                  Those narrow bounds, found in §
    1B1.10 and the Application Note, constrained what the court could
    do in modifying Hogan's sentence in this case. Id. at 2691 (noting
    that "§ 1B1.10(b)(2) also confines the extent of the reduction
    authorized").
    To    be       sure,     the    Commission's       decision     to    revise
    Application Note 1 under the 2011 guideline amendments was careful
    and deliberate.        The Commission noted that the version of § 1B1.10
    in effect prior to November 1, 2011 had "one rule for downward
    departures (stating that 'a reduction comparably less than the
    amended guideline range . . . may be appropriate') and another rule
    for variances (stating 'that a further reduction generally would
    not be appropriate')."              U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 759 (Reason for
    Amendment).      The difficulty in applying the distinction for cases
    in which the term of imprisonment was less than the minimum of the
    applicable guideline range prompted the Commission to determine
    that in the context of § 1B1.10, "a single limitation applicable to
    both   departures          and     variances    furthers       the   need    to    avoid
    unwarranted      sentencing         disparities     and    avoids     litigation      in
    individual cases."          Id.     The Commission said the "limitation that
    prohibits a reduction below the amended guideline range in such
    -12-
    cases promotes conformity with the amended guideline range and
    avoids undue complexity and litigation."   Id.3
    At oral argument, Hogan raised for the first time three
    arguments concerning the enforceability of Application Note 1.   He
    contended that Application Note 1 is not binding because: (1) it
    conflicts with the text of § 1B1.10(b)(1); (2) it conflicts with
    the purpose of the FSA; and (3) the Commission failed to comply
    with the Administrative Procedure Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 551-559
    , notice-
    and-comment requirements when amending the policy statement.4
    3
    Before the 2011 guideline amendments, the circuits were split
    "about when, if at all, the court applies a departure provision
    before determining the 'applicable guideline range' for purposes of
    § 1B1.10." U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 759 (Reason for Amendment). As
    the Commission has noted, we, along with the Second and Fourth
    Circuits had held that, for § 1B1.10 purposes, at least some
    departures -- i.e., departures under § 4A1.3 -- "are considered
    before determining the applicable guideline range, while the Sixth,
    Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the only applicable
    guideline range is the one established before any departures." Id.
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Recognizing the
    circuit split, the Commission amended Application Note 1 to
    "adopt[] the approach of the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits" and
    "clarify that the applicable guideline range referred to in §
    1B1.10 is the guideline range determined . . . before consideration
    of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any
    variance." Id.
    4
    Hogan's brief notes that the guideline amendments promulgated
    by the Commission retroactively implemented the reduced statutory
    penalties for crack-cocaine offenses under the FSA but does not
    specifically argue that the 2011 guideline amendments are
    inconsistent with the FSA. Instead, he makes the broad statement,
    without explaining why, that the FSA and the guideline amendments
    did not require the district court to return to the pre-departure
    CHC of VI when determining the applicable guideline range under
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) and in declining to further reduce Hogan's
    sentence under § 1B1.10(b)(2).
    -13-
    Hogan made no mention of any of these arguments in his brief.
    Thus, his argument that Application Note 1 is not binding based on
    those grounds is waived. See United States v. Bayard, 
    642 F.3d 59
    ,
    66 n.10 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that arguments raised at oral
    argument but not in a party's initial brief are waived); United
    States v. Giggey, 
    551 F.3d 27
    , 36-37 (1st Cir. 2008) (same).5
    We now turn to Hogan's argument that § 1B1.10(b)(2) does
    not preclude a reduction below the 210-month sentence he is
    currently serving.    Hogan says the CHC downward departure he
    received at his original sentencing should apply to yield a
    sentence reduction "comparably less than the amended guideline
    range," U.S.S.G § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), which in his case is 235 to 293
    months applying a CHC of VI.
    5
    We invited the Federal Public Defender for the Districts of
    Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island to file an amicus
    brief to address whether Hogan, who received a reduction in his CHC
    at his original sentencing, is entitled to the application of the
    same or a similar reduction upon consideration of a re-sentencing
    motion under § 3582(c)(2).
    At oral argument, counsel for Hogan "direct[ed]" us to the
    pages on which the amicus's argument that Application Note 1 was
    promulgated in violation of the non-delegation doctrine and
    separation of powers doctrine appeared, and asked the argument be
    "incorporated" in his brief. But such cursory allusion is the type
    of "generalized reference" that is "insufficient to place the
    putative adopter's weight behind the argument." In re Sony BMG
    Music Entm't, 
    564 F.3d 1
    , 3 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009); see R.I. Dep't of
    Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 
    304 F.3d 31
    , 47 n.6 (1st Cir. 2002).
    We thank the Federal Public Defender for filing its amicus
    brief.   The amicus was of great assistance in helping us think
    through the issue Hogan raised on appeal.
    -14-
    Our    analysis    starts     and    ends   with   the    plain   and
    unambiguous language of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) and (B).                Pursuant to §
    1B1.10(b)(2)(A), a court cannot reduce a defendant's sentence under
    "
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) and this policy statement to a term that is
    less than the minimum of the amended guideline range determined
    under subdivision (1)."             U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).6        The only
    exception to this rule is found in § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).                    Under §
    1B1.10(b)(2)(B), reductions "comparably less than the amended
    guideline range" are permitted only in cases where the original
    term of imprisonment was below the applicable guideline range
    "pursuant    to    a   government     motion     to   reflect   the   defendant's
    substantial assistance to authorities."               Id. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).7
    Every circuit court to have addressed the issue agrees that §
    1B1.10(b)(2)(B) bars a district court from lowering a defendant's
    below-guideline sentence unless the departure at his original
    sentencing    was      based   on    his   substantial     assistance     to   the
    government.       See United States v. Berberena, 
    694 F.3d 514
    , 518-19
    (3rd Cir. 2012); United States v. Anderson, 
    686 F.3d 585
    , 588 (8th
    6
    The Application Notes reiterate the limitation laid out in §
    1B1.10(b)(2)(A) that, subject to the exception under subsection
    (b)(2)(B), the court cannot reduce a defendant's sentence to a term
    less than the minimum of the amended guideline range determined
    under subdivision (1). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3.
    7
    The Application Notes reinforce this interpretation, stating
    that a defendant may seek a further reduction only if the initial
    sentence was lowered pursuant to a substantial assistance motion by
    the government. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3.
    -15-
    Cir. 2012); United States v. Glover, 
    686 F.3d 1203
    , 1207 (11th Cir.
    2012); accord United States v. Colon, 
    707 F.3d 1255
    , 1258 (11th
    Cir. 2013); United States             v. Lizalde, No. 10-50445, 
    2012 WL 6758274
    , at *2 n.2 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2012) (unpublished); Valdez,
    492 F. App'x at 898-99; United States v. Beserra, 
    466 F. App'x 548
    ,
    550 (7th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). We see no reason to depart from
    our sister circuits given the plain language of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)
    and (B).
    In the instant case, Hogan received a below-guideline
    sentence    but    it   was   based    on    a   departure   in   his    CHC,   not
    substantial assistance to the government.                  So he does not fall
    within   the      exception    under    §    1B1.10(b)(2)(B)      to    receive    a
    "reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range."
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).           To obtain relief under § 3582(c), the
    guideline    amendments       at   issue     must   "lower[]"     a    defendant's
    applicable     guideline      range.        U.S.S.G.   §   1B1.10(a)(2)(B)        ("A
    reduction in [a] defendant's term of imprisonment is not consistent
    with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) if . . . [the amendment] does not have the
    effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range").
    Here, they do not.       Hogan's amended guideline range is 235 to 293
    months and he received a below-guideline sentence of 210 months.
    -16-
    Accordingly, the district court committed no error in determining
    that Hogan was ineligible for a sentence reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).
    We, like the Second Circuit in Montanez, question as a
    policy matter, why courts "should not have the discretion to give
    defendants the benefit of § 4A1.3 departures during sentencing
    reduction proceedings."       
    2013 WL 2346409
    , at *6.              Because the
    Commission has made clear that a defendant's "amended guideline
    range" does not incorporate previously granted departures under §
    4A1.3, a defendant's criminal history category that overstates his
    past crimes during an initial sentencing will continue to do so
    when that defendant moves for a reduction.         We are troubled by the
    extent to which the amended policy statement and Application Notes
    severely limit the number of defendants (receiving below-guideline
    sentences   at    initial   sentencing    based   on   §   4A1.3    departures
    unrelated to substantial assistance) who will be able to obtain
    relief under § 3582(c)(2) in light of the crack-cocaine guideline
    amendments.      Despite our concerns, in these instances the district
    court's hands, as they were in this case, will be tied.              Affirmed.
    -17-