Caballero-Rivera v. Chase Manhattan Bank ( 2002 )


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  •            United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 01-1985
    CARMEN CABALLERO-RIVERA,
    TALÍ BENET-SOTO,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.,
    HOUSING INVESTMENT CORP.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Chief Judge,
    Kravitch,* Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Torruella, Circuit Judge.
    José M. Tous-Rodríguez, for appellants.
    Heriberto J. Burgos-Pérez, with whom Fiddler, González & Rodríguez
    LLP and Mariano A. Mier-Romeu, were on brief, for appellees.
    *   Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    January 10, 2002
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    Per Curiam. Plaintiffs-appellants Carmen Caballero-Rivera
    and Talí Benet-Soto appeal from the district court's dismissal of their
    case. Specifically, appellants argue that the district court erred in
    applying the doctrine of res judicata to preclude their claim.
    A brief examination of the procedural history of this case,
    however, reveals the accuracy of the district court's ruling. In 1999,
    plaintiffs filed suit in district court claiming that defendants had
    defrauded them by submitting false documents to the Superior Court of
    Puerto Rico in a previous lawsuit between the parties.1 Shortly after
    the suit was filed, defendants moved for summary judgment.         The
    district court granted defendants' motion on the grounds that
    plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact by not
    satisfying the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 9(b).2 Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's
    ruling.
    Instead, plaintiffs filed this suit in Puerto Rico Superior
    Court. Defendants removed the case to federal court and filed a motion
    1 In the interest of brevity, we refrain from discussing the lawsuits
    filed by plaintiffs against defendants in 1985, 1992, and 1995 over the
    same issue.
    2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides: "In all averments of
    fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
    be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
    condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."
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    to dismiss. The district court granted the dismissal, ruling that the
    doctrine of res judicata precluded plaintiffs' claim.
    The doctrine of res judicata promotes the goals of fairness
    and efficiency by preventing vexatious or repetitive litigation. See
    Comm'r v. Sunnen, 
    333 U.S. 591
    , 597 (1948). A claim will be precluded
    by res judicata if the following elements are demonstrated: "(1) a
    final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) sufficient
    identicality between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and
    later suits, and (3) sufficient identicality between the parties in the
    two suits." González v. Banco Central Corp., 
    27 F.3d 751
    , 755 (1st
    Cir. 1994).
    In the instant case, all three factors are so clearly present
    that only a brief discussion of them is necessary. First, the summary
    judgment ruling that disposed of plaintiffs' earlier claim constitutes
    "a final judgment on the merits." See Dowd v. Soc'y of St. Columbans,
    
    861 F.2d 761
    , 764 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that "[s]ummary judgment
    constitutes a final judgment on the merits for purposes of applying res
    judicata").3 Second, by plaintiffs' own admission, the instant case is
    3 Without considering the merits of the prior dismissal, we find no
    procedural error in the district court's decision to grant summary
    judgment on the basis of plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the pleading
    requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See, e.g., Murr
    Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Servs., 
    48 F.3d 1066
    , 1070 (8th
    Cir. 1995) (ruling that "[a] district court may enter summary judgment
    dismissing a complaint alleging fraud if the complaint fails to satisfy
    the requirements of Rule 9(b)"); see also Whalen v. Carter, 
    954 F.2d 1087
    , 1098 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). Our position is further buttressed
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    identical to the previous suit. Third, there is no question that the
    two suits contain the same parties.
    Because we find no error in the district court's application
    of res judicata, we affirm.
    by the fact that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the pleading requirements
    after eight years of litigation.
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