United States v. Herrera Gonzalez ( 2000 )


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  •        [NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 99-2198
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    MARCOS HERRERA-GONZALEZ,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    ____________________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
    ____________________
    Before
    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
    ____________________
    Lenore Glaser and Stern, Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin for appellant.
    Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Cherie L. Krigsman,
    Assistant U.S. Attorney, for appellee.
    ____________________
    April 14, 2000
    ____________________
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    LYNCH, Circuit Judge. In pleading guilty to conspiracy
    to distribute a controlled substance and distribution of a
    controlled substance, see 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846, defendant
    Herrera-Gonzalez admitted he was part of a cocaine distribution
    conspiracy but denied that his conspiracy included any agreement
    to   distribute   crack   cocaine.      After   hearing   evidence    at
    sentencing, the district court concluded to the contrary -- that
    Herrera could reasonably foresee the sale of crack by his
    business partner Celso DelRosario and that Herrera continued to
    be part of the conspiracy, despite his trips to the Dominican
    Republic.    And so the district court attributed the crack to
    Herrera and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum for crack
    cocaine distribution involving fifty or more grams: 120 months.
    See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(iii).
    The question on appeal is whether the district court's
    conclusions were clearly erroneous. See United States v. Elwell,
    
    984 F.2d 1289
    , 1297-98 (1st Cir. 1993).         They were not.       The
    court found the testimony of the undercover agent credible; that
    agent testified that the defendant had offered to sell the agent
    crack cocaine for a quoted price and to arrange for the agent to
    receive a sample of crack at the next meeting.       That sample was
    provided at the next meeting (albeit by defendant's business
    partner DelRosario).      Further, Herrera and DelRosario each said
    that either of them could be contacted about placing orders and
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    the quality of the merchandise; additionally, DelRosario and
    Herrera shared   a    cell   phone    and   an   address.   Credibility
    determinations were for the district court, see United States v.
    Sandoval, 
    204 F.3d 283
    , 287 (1st Cir. 2000), and the record amply
    justifies the conclusion that the defendant could reasonably
    foresee the sale of this crack to defendant.          See United States
    v. Garcia, 
    954 F.2d 12
    , 16-17 (1st Cir. 1992).
    The same is true for the district court's conclusion
    that Herrera had not withdrawn from the conspiracy before the
    sale of the crack to the undercover agent.           A lull in activity
    does not mean a break with one's business partners in crime. See
    United States v. Nason, 
    9 F.3d 155
    , 162 (1st Cir. 1993).          After
    his arrest, Herrera said that he had resumed the drug trade
    following his journeying to the Dominican Republic.            His own
    words, again, provided adequate support for the district court's
    conclusion.
    Affirmed.
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