Frontier Fishing Corp. v. National Marine Fisheries Service , 2 F. App'x 64 ( 2001 )


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  •      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 00-2244
    FRONTIER FISHING CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Circuit Judge,
    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
    Jeffrey T. Angley, with whom Phillips & Angley was on brief,
    for appellant.
    John A. Bryson, Attorney, with whom Lois J. Schiffer,
    Assistant Attorney General, Charles R. Shockey, Attorney, and
    Gene S. Martin, Jr., Office of Regional Counsel, National
    Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, were on brief, for
    appellee.
    March 16, 2001
    BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.           The plaintiff, Frontier
    Fishing Corporation ("Frontier"), brought suit in the United
    States District Court for the District of Massachusetts claiming
    that the action of the defendant, the National Marine Fisheries
    Service    ("NMFS"),   was    arbitrary,        capricious,   an    abuse    of
    discretion, otherwise not in accordance with law, or without
    observance of its own procedure.            The district court granted
    summary judgment in favor of the defendant and the plaintiff
    appeals.    For the reasons set forth below, we find that the
    plaintiff's claim is without merit and we affirm the district
    court.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Frontier    is    the   owner   of    the   fishing     vessel   F/V
    Settler.   The NMFS issues and regulates fishing permits pursuant
    to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
    16 U.S.C. § 1801.      The NMFS issued two permits to Frontier for
    the F/V Settler: a full-time limited access scallop permit and
    a   full-time   multispecies       fleet-days-at-sea      fishing     permit.
    These permits were renewed annually from 1994 until 1997.
    -2-
    On May 28, 1997, Patricia A. Kurkul of the NMFS wrote
    a   letter    to   Frontier   explaining   that   the    F/V   Settler's
    "multispecies limited access permit was issued in error" because
    of amendments made to the NMFS' regulations which effectively
    precluded the F/V Settler from holding dual permits.            The NMFS
    offered Frontier the option of choosing one of the two permits.
    The letter indicated that if Frontier did not make a choice, the
    NMFS would cancel the multispecies limited access permit.
    On August 8, 1997, Frontier wrote a letter to Dr.
    Andrew Rosenberg, Regional Director of the NMFS, requesting
    reconsideration of the agency's determination that the issuance
    of both permits was an error.           On September 9, 1997, Kurkul
    responded to Frontier's letter to Rosenberg.            In essence, this
    letter informed Frontier that the agency's decision to terminate
    one of the permits would stand, but Frontier would have the
    right to present its claim to a hearing officer for further
    review.      The letter concluded:      "A NMFS Hearing Officer will
    contact you so that you may present evidence that your vessel
    used a scallop dredge and a multispecies otter trawl in 1988,
    1989 or 1990."1
    1    This would enable the F/V Settler to hold both permits
    simultaneously because it would be classified as a "combination
    vessel." See 50 C.F.R. § 648.2 (1997).
    -3-
    Joel G. MacDonald, Regional Counsel for the NMFS, was
    selected to serve as the hearing officer.                             Frontier made a
    written submission to him and submitted documentary evidence.
    On January 12, 1998, MacDonald prepared a written recommendation
    for the regional director which was favorable to Frontier:                             he
    recommended that the F/V Settler be given a dual permit, finding
    that   it    met    the   criteria       for    a    combination       vessel     permit.
    Regional Director Rosenberg noted on MacDonald's recommendation
    that he did not concur.               Frontier did not receive a copy of
    MacDonald's recommendation.
    On     March      23,   1998,      Rosenberg          wrote   to    Frontier
    indicating that he had not yet reached a final decision, but
    that he did not expect to grant its request.                         Rosenberg offered
    various other options to Frontier and indicated that Frontier
    had    thirty      days   to    select    one       of   the   options.         Frontier,
    however, persisted that it be granted combination status.                              On
    May 6, 1998, Rosenberg issued his final decision.                               He denied
    Frontier's appeal, and determined that the F/V Settler did not
    meet the criteria for a combination vessel permit.                              He found
    that   the    vessel      was   eligible       only      for   a    full-time     scallop
    permit.
    Frontier sought judicial review in the district court,
    alleging that the NMFS did not follow its own appeal procedure
    -4-
    and    that   the        issuance      of   only     one   permit     "was    arbitrary,
    capricious,         an    abuse     of      discretion     and    otherwise         not    in
    accordance         with    the    law."       Both    parties     moved      for    summary
    judgment.      The district court found that "Frontier's claim that
    NMFS failed to comply substantially with [its] procedure for
    review of permit denials is without merit."                      (Footnote omitted).
    In a well-reasoned decision, the district court entered judgment
    in favor of the NMFS, holding that "[n]o substantial error in
    the process is apparent, and there is consequently no basis for
    overturning the agency's lawfully arrived at determination."
    Frontier now appeals the district court's decision, and persists
    with its claim that the agency failed to follow its own appeal
    procedure.
    II.      DISCUSSION
    We    review       the   grant    of    summary     judgment         de   novo.
    Assoc. Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 
    127 F.3d 104
    , 109 (1st
    Cir. 1997).         In reviewing an agency's determination, we apply
    the same standards as the district court.                         
    Id. We give
    great
    deference to the agency and cannot substitute our judgment for
    that of the agency, even if we disagree.                        
    Id. In fact,
    we can
    only    set    aside       an    agency's      action      if    it     is   "arbitrary,
    capricious, or otherwise contrary to law."                       
    Id. (citing 5
    U.S.C.
    § 706(2)(A)-(D)).
    -5-
    Frontier argues that the NMFS did not follow its own
    appeal   procedure 2 and, therefore, its action was arbitrary,
    capricious and contrary to law.     The appeal procedure is set
    forth in 50 C.F.R. § 648.4(a)(1)(H)(2) (1997):
    The Regional Administrator will appoint a
    designee who will make the initial decision
    on the appeal.   The appellant may request
    review of the initial decision by the
    Regional Administrator by so requesting in
    writing within 30 days of the notice of the
    initial decision. If the appellant does not
    request a review of the initial decision
    within 30 days, the initial decision shall
    become the final administrative action of
    the Department of Commerce.     Such review
    will be conducted by a hearing officer
    appointed by the Regional Administrator.
    The hearing officer shall make findings and
    a    recommendation    to   the     Regional
    Administrator [whi]ch shall be advisory
    2     The right to appeal the denial of a permit is created
    by 50 C.F.R. § 648.4(a)(1)(H)(1) (1997):
    Any applicant eligible to apply for an
    initial limited access multispecies hook-
    gear permit who is denied such permit may
    appeal   the    denial   to   the   Regional
    Administrator within 30 days of the notice
    of denial. Any such appeal must be based on
    one or more of the following grounds, must
    be in writing, and must state the grounds
    for the appeal:
    (i)    The information used by the
    Regional Administrator was based on mistaken
    or incorrect data.
    (ii) The applicant was prevented by
    circumstances beyond his/her control from
    meeting relevant criteria.
    (iii)   The   applicant   has  new   or
    additional information.
    -6-
    only.   Upon receiving the findings and a
    recommendation, the Regional Administrator
    will issue a final decision on the appeal.
    The Regional Administrator's decision is the
    final   administrative    action   of    the
    Department of Commerce.
    Frontier claims that the NMFS failed to substantially comply
    with this procedure.      This argument is without merit.
    Frontier mischaracterizes the "initial decision" as the
    recommendation of the hearing officer and argues that because
    Frontier was satisfied with that "decision," and did not appeal
    it further, that "decision" became the final agency action.
    Frontier makes much of the fact that it never received a copy of
    MacDonald's report.      Frontier, however, was not entitled to it.
    The   recommendation    of   MacDonald     was   an   internal   memorandum
    written to Regional Director Rosenberg.                In fact, the NMFS
    denied Frontier's request for that document on the grounds that
    it fell within an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act
    ("FOIA").     See   5   U.S.C.   §   552(b)(5).3      MacDonald,    as   the
    3   Frontier, pursuant to the FOIA, requested "[a]ll
    decisions and/or recommendations made by Joel MacDonald,
    Esquire, hearing officer for the National Marine Fisheries
    Service related to the appeal by the Frontier Fishing
    Corporation of the limited access multispecies and scallop
    combination status for the F/V Settler." The NMFS denied the
    request by letter to plaintiff's counsel, and stated, in
    pertinent part:
    This   information    is   protected    from
    disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This
    FOIA   exemption   protects    predecisional
    -7-
    appointed hearing officer, did exactly what was specified by the
    regulation:   he   made   "findings   and   a   recommendation   to   the
    Regional Administrator." This recommendation was advisory only;
    it was not a "decision" of the agency.
    A proper characterization of the appeal procedure used
    by the agency is as follows: The sequence of events began on May
    28, 1997, when Kurkal, on behalf of the NMFS, wrote a letter to
    Frontier indicating that the F/V Settler's "multispecies limited
    access permit was issued in error" and it could no longer hold
    two permits simultaneously.     The NMFS invited Frontier to choose
    which permit (scallop or multispecies) it wished to hold.             The
    letter concluded that if no selection was made within thirty
    days, the NMFS would cancel the limited access multispecies
    permit.   This letter, in effect, served as the denial of the
    dual permits.
    documents that are part of the deliberative
    process.      This   deliberative    process
    privilege is intended to prevent injury to
    the quality of agency decision making. Mr.
    MacDonald's recommendation to the Regional
    Administrator regarding the disposition of
    the appeal involving the F/V Settler was
    made as part of the deliberative process
    outlined in 50 C.F.R. § 648.4 and was
    formulated prior to the agency's decision on
    this appeal.   Thus, it falls within this
    exemption.
    -8-
    Frontier was unsatisfied with this "denial" of the dual
    permits and initiated the appeal process.                      Frontier wrote a
    letter to the Regional Director of the NMFS on August 8, 1997,
    and requested review of that decision.                 Kurkal, on behalf of the
    NMFS, responded to Frontier.           This was the "initial decision"
    made by a "designee" of the Regional Administrator.                     The letter
    begins:   "This responds to your recent letter to Dr. Rosenberg
    [the Regional Administrator] concerning your limited access
    multispecies permit."        The logical inference is that Kurkul was
    writing as the "designee" of the Regional Administrator.                           She
    indicated that she reviewed the record, but reached the same
    result.      This    "initial    decision     on       the   appeal"    made      by   a
    "designee" of the Regional Administrator concluded:                          "A NMFS
    Hearing   Officer     will   contact    you    so       that   you     may   present
    evidence [to bolster your claim]."
    Following the language of the regulations, the appeal
    process continued:        Frontier requested review of the initial
    decision of the agency.         Review was conducted by hearing officer
    MacDonald.      He    made   findings   and        a    recommendation       to    the
    Regional Administrator.          The memorandum was advisory only and
    could not be characterized as a "decision" of the agency.
    Upon receiving the findings and recommendation of the
    hearing   officer,     the   Regional   Administrator           issued       a   final
    -9-
    decision on the appeal.       He disagreed with the recommendation of
    the hearing officer, as was within his discretion, and denied
    Frontier's    appeal.          This   decision      became      the   final
    administrative action of the Department of Commerce.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We    hold   that    the   NMFS   did   follow   its   own   appeal
    procedure.    We find no error in the process used by the NMFS and
    hold that its decision was in accordance with law, and was not
    arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.            Therefore, we
    find no reason to set aside the agency's decision and hold that
    the district court's decision is affirmed.           No costs to either
    party.
    -10-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-2244

Citation Numbers: 2 F. App'x 64

Judges: Lynch, Bownes, Lipez

Filed Date: 3/20/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024