Daly v. Raytheon Company , 8 F. App'x 1 ( 2001 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1473
RICHARD H. DALY; R. G. GRIFFITH; ROBERT A. LAWSON;
RICHARD M. LANGLEY; WILLIAM ANDREW; FRANK H. WILDER;
JOSEPH E. MCNULTY; ENNIS TISDALE; WILLIAM CHIGNOLA;
ROSS OFRIA; ROBERT C. SNOW; D. H. ALESSANDRINI;
E. W. HENDERSON; RUSSELL B. MASON; FRANCIS J. DEMIGLIO;
LOUIS ROSI; ROBERT A. VEDUCCIO; STEVEN CACI;
STANLEY F. JOHNSON; JOHN BIGELOW; PHILLIP L. WARREN;
JEROME ELLNER; BARRY FORSYTHE; LINWOOD CLAY; JOSEPH A.
BILOTTA,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
RAYTHEON COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Thomas R. Mason for appellants.
Brian D. Carlson, with whom Thomas E. Shirley and Choate,
Hall & Stewart, were on brief, for appellee.
February 28, 2001
Per curiam. On May 1, 1991, plaintiffs-appellants, a
group of former employees of defendant-appellee Raytheon Company
(“Raytheon”), accepted layoffs pursuant to a voluntary layoff
program (“the 1991 Plan”). The 1991 Plan was not covered by the
Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). In
April 1992, Raytheon implemented a second early retirement plan
(“the 1992 Plan”), which was an ERISA plan. The 1992 Plan
provided more favorable benefits than the 1991 Plan.
On January 2, 1998, plaintiffs brought a state court
action against Raytheon for breach of contract, alleging that
Raytheon had induced them to accept the 1991 Plan by
representing that the Plan would be the “best benefits package
that Raytheon would ever offer its employees” and then not
honoring this representation. Raytheon removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
on the ground that plaintiffs’ cause of action was preempted by
ERISA, and then moved to dismiss on the same ground. The
district court granted Raytheon’s motion, but gave plaintiffs
leave to amend their complaint to set forth a claim under ERISA.
Plaintiffs did not and do not appeal from this ruling.
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Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
alleging that Raytheon’s conduct with respect to the 1991 Plan
violated ERISA. Although it is not entirely clear, plaintiffs’
case theory appears to have been that Raytheon breached the 1991
Plan, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (permitting
suits by an ERISA plan’s participants and beneficiaries to
recover benefits due, enforce rights, or clarify rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan), by not offering
plaintiffs the same benefits offered to employees under the 1992
Plan. Raytheon again moved to dismiss and/or for summary
judgment, arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs’ case theory did
not fit within the parameters of § 1132(a)(1)(B); that
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
with respect to the only ERISA plan arguably at issue in this
litigation; and that plaintiffs filed suit well after expiration
of the three-year limitations provision set forth in that same
ERISA plan.
On March 2, 200, the district court granted the motion.
In doing so, the court set forth its reasoning clearly and
succinctly:
Plaintiffs are unquestionably participants
in the 1991 Plan, whether it be an ERISA
plan or not. The difficulty with their
complaint is that they are not claiming
benefits due under that plan; nor are they
seeking to enforce any rights under the 1991
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Plan. If they are asserting that because
defendant misrepresented the terms of the
1991 Plan, they are entitled to benefits
equal to those of the 1992 Plan, they have
no claim because the statute does not
authorize such a suit. If, on the other
hand, plaintiffs contend that, absent
defendant’s misrepresentations, they would
be participants in the 1992 Plan and that
they are entitled to the benefits thereof,
then they would be bound by all of its
terms, including its claims review
procedures and three-year limitations
provision. It is undisputed that plaintiffs
have not followed, let alone exhausted, the
claims procedure contained in Article VI of
the 1992 Plan. Article VIII of the 1992
Plan requires any suit thereon to be brought
within three years after denial of a claim.
The record is clear, however, that
plaintiffs have known of defendant’s refusal
to recognize their claim since, at the
latest, March 1993, nearly five years before
they instituted suit.
On appeal, plaintiffs broadly assert that the court’s
ruling undermines ERISA’s purposes and hint at theories of
recovery not fairly presented in the amended complaint. But
plaintiffs utterly fail to specify where and how the district
court went erred in ruling as it did. That being the case, and
because the court was entirely correct in its ruling and
reasoning, we affirm for the reasons set forth in the March 2,
2000 memorandum of decision. See, e.g., Ruiz Rivera v. Riley,
209 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2000).
Affirmed. Costs to appellee.
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