De-Jesus v. Commissioner of Social Security , 61 F. App'x 726 ( 2003 )

(Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3)
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1609
RAUL DE-JESUS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Rafael Colon Flores and Colon Flores Law Firm on brief for
appellant.
Robert J. Triba, Regional Chief Counsel, Social Security
Administration, Camille Velez-Rive, Assistant United States
Attorney, and H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
April 28, 2003
Per Curiam. Raul De Jesus appeals from the district court's
determination that the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security to deny his request for Social Security disability
benefits was supported by substantial evidence. We have reviewed
the record, the issues the parties raised in their briefs, and the
applicable law, and we discern no reversible error.
The district court did not err in its determination that the
Commissioner's disability decision -- that De Jesus was not
disabled under the Social Security Act for the insured period
because he retained the residual functional capacity to perform the
full range of jobs in the medium exertional range -- was supported
by substantial evidence and was the result of the proper
application of the correct legal standards. See Seavey v.
Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). The submitted medical
evidence did not establish that De Jesus was disabled within the
meaning of the Act during the covered period. Specifically, the
Commissioner did not err in the determination that, although De
Jesus was not capable of returning to his past work as a stock
clerk, the Medical-Vocational Grids identified other jobs in the
national economy which De Jesus could perform. Concerning De
Jesus's request that he be allowed to introduce new evidence not
submitted before the ALJ, we note that De Jesus has at no point
even produced the medical records on which he seeks a reevaluation
of his disability claim. There is thus no reason to remand the
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case for consideration of "evidence" which does not exist in the
record. The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
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