Abidadoud v. Gonzales ( 2007 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2509
TANIOS ABIDAOUD,
Petitioner,
v.
ALBERTO R. GONZALES,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM AN ORDER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Lipez, Circuit Judge,
Selya and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.
Michael A. Paris and Cutler & Associates on brief for
petitioner.
Jesse M. Bless, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, and Peter D. Keisler,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for respondent.
September 4, 2007
STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. Petitioner Tanios Abidaoud
appeals from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
which affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ's) denial of his asylum
claim and other attendant immigration claims. Because a reasonable
fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude to the contrary, we
affirm the BIA's denial of petitioner's asylum claim.1 In
addition, because we find no abuse of discretion, we also deny
petitioner's petition to review the BIA's denial of a motion to
reopen based on changed country conditions.
The IJ found petitioner credible. Therefore, we relate
the facts of the case as he testified to them. Petitioner is a
Maronite Christian, born and raised in Lebanon. For several months
in his late teens he was a member of the Lebanese Forces, an armed
group that aimed to protect the Lebanese Christian minority during
that country's civil war. Petitioner left Lebanon in 1990 for
Lithuania, having received a scholarship to study architecture
there. He remained in Lithuania as a student for seven years, and
while there met and married his Lithuanian-born wife.
In 1997, the couple moved to Lebanon, where petitioner
continued to develop his interest in Lebanon's Phoenician past. He
founded a political party, the United Phoenician Party (UPP), whose
1
While petitioner purports to appeal from the BIA's denial of
withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against
Torture, he makes no sustained argumentation regarding either of
these claims. Therefore, we deem them waived. See United States
v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
-2-
principal tenet is that the various religious and ethnic factions
in Lebanon can peacefully co-exist if they rediscover their common
Phoenician roots. Petitioner attempted to register his party with
the Lebanese Interior Ministry, but his request was denied. At the
time of his asylum hearing in 2005, petitioner attested that there
were about ten UPP members worldwide.
Petitioner testified that his advocacy on behalf of the
UPP led to political disagreements with his employer in Lebanon,
and petitioner was fired as a result. Petitioner also testified
that he received three threatening telephone calls while in
Lebanon, during which unidentified callers threatened him with
"disappearance" and other harms. He believed that the threats were
related to his leadership of the UPP. The callers did not,
however, reference the UPP or petitioner's political beliefs.
After the second phone call, petitioner sent his wife and son to
Lithuania, out of concern for their safety. At some point after
the third phone call, petitioner himself left Lebanon for Canada.
After spending two months in Canada, he entered the United States
in September 1999 on a one-year nonimmigrant visa.
On appeal, petitioner points out a factual discrepancy in
the record regarding when he received the three threatening
telephone calls. In his written testimony and I-589 asylum
application, petitioner alleged that the threatening phone calls
began in 1998 and continued in 1999, and that he left Lebanon in
-3-
1999, shortly after the third call. In contrast, in his oral
testimony, petitioner stated that the phone calls occurred in 1997
and 1998, and that there was a nine-month gap between the third
phone call and his 1999 departure. However, in other oral
testimony, he corroborated his written application, saying that he
left Lebanon shortly after he received the third phone call. The
IJ credited petitioner's statement that he waited nine months after
the third call to leave Lebanon, and the BIA noted this nine-month
gap as evidence of petitioner's objective lack of fear of
persecution.
We review the decision below for substantial evidence,
accepting the BIA's findings of fact if they are supported by
"'reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.'" Njenga v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 335, 338
(1st Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992)). We will reverse only if "any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B). The burden of establishing eligibility for asylum
is carried by the petitioner, who must prove either past
persecution (thus giving rise to an inference of future
persecution) or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262
(1st Cir. 2005).
-4-
Because the petitioner in this case only claims a well-
founded fear of future persecution, we do not address whether he
suffered past persecution. "A well-founded fear of future
persecution entails both subjective and objective components. The
petitioner must demonstrate not only that she harbors a genuine
fear of future persecution but also that her fear is objectively
reasonable." Negeya v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir.
2005). Assuming that the petitioner in this case has satisfied the
subjective component, we address only whether the objective
component has been sufficiently met. To do so, the petitioner must
show "'credible, direct, and specific evidence'" that would
objectively support a reasonable fear of future individualized
persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. Guzman v.
INS, 327 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Ravindran v. INS, 976
F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1992)).
Therefore, we must decide whether the record evidence
compels the conclusion that the petitioner has established a well-
founded fear of future persecution. We conclude that it does not.
Several factors undermine petitioner's claim that the
record compels a favorable outcome on his asylum claim: he failed
to show any evidence of a connection between the three threats he
received and his political activities; he was not detained or
otherwise mistreated while living in Lebanon; he testified that he
remained in Lebanon for nine months following the third threat; and
-5-
he offered no evidence that other members of his political party
have suffered harm, either at the time petitioner was in Lebanon or
since he left the country. Given our limited scope of review, we
cannot conclude that this record compels the conclusion that
petitioner has a well-founded fear of persecution were he to return
to Lebanon.
We also briefly address petitioner's claim that he
misspoke during his oral testimony when he stated that nine months
elapsed between the third threat and his departure from Lebanon.
He argues that other evidence in the record suggests that he left
shortly after he received the third threat, and that the IJ should
have credited that evidence, rather than his alleged misstatements.
However, the fact that the record could support a different
conclusion than that reached by the IJ is not sufficient to compel
our reversal of that finding of fact. See Ziu v. Gonzales, 412
F.3d 202, 204 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[T]hat the record could support an
alternate inference from the one drawn by the IJ does not warrant
overturning the IJ's decision.").
Petitioner makes a second, underdeveloped argument
requesting that his case be remanded to the BIA based on changed
country conditions in Lebanon, and contesting the BIA's denial of
a similar motion to reopen. While petitioner may well have waived
this issue due to a lack of developed argumentation, see United
States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990), his claim also
-6-
fails on the merits. To reverse the BIA's denial of a motion to
reopen, we would have to determine that such a decision constituted
an abuse of discretion. See Roberts v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 33, 35
(1st Cir. 2005). To prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed
country conditions, the petitioner must demonstrate "[c]hanges in
conditions in the applicant's country of nationality" that
"materially affect[] the applicant's eligibility for asylum." 8
C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(i)(A). Here, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to reopen where petitioner failed
to connect the increased civil strife in Lebanon to his particular
grounds for claiming asylum.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
denied. The decision of the BIA is affirmed.
-7-