Carrero-Nazario v. Lopez-Bonilla , 493 F.3d 280 ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1084
BENJAMÍN CARRERO-NAZARIO; ANA MARÍA MARTÍNEZ;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CARRERO-MARTÍNEZ; BENJAMÍN
CARRERO-MARTÍNEZ; RITA CARO CARO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
CARRERO-CARO; VILLAS DE LA PRADERA, INC. PLAZA RINCÓN, INC.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CARLOS LÓPEZ-BONILLA, individually and as Mayor of the
Municipality of Rincón; DORIS SOTO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
LÓPEZ-SOTO; MUNICIPALITY OF RINCÓN,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jamie Pieras, Jr., U.S. Senior District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Baldock,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Joan S. Peters with whom Andrés Guillemard-Noble and Nachman
& Guillemard, were on brief, for appellants.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano with whom Johanna M. Emanuelli-Huertas
and Law Offices of Pedro Ortiz Alvarez, were on brief, for,
appellee, Doris Soto, Conjugal Partnership López-Soto; Municipality
of Rincón.
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Rosa Elena Pérez-Agosto, Assistant Solicitor General,
Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General with whom
Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor General, Mariana D. Negrón-
Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General and Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez,
Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellee López Bonilla
in his personal capacity.
July 18, 2007
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal of an award of
summary judgment to the mayor of Rincón, Puerto Rico (in his
individual and official capacities), his wife, their conjugal
partnership, and the municipality itself, on claims that they
engaged in unlawful political discrimination against two
developers, their development company, and related persons and
entities. The principal defendant, the mayor, is Carlos López-
Bonilla; the principal plaintiffs, a father-son real estate
development team, are Benjamín Carrero-Nazario and Benjamín
Carrero-Martínez. The mayor is a member of Puerto Rico's Popular
Democratic Party. The developers describe themselves as
"activists" in Puerto Rico's New Progressive Party and are related
by marriage to the former mayor of Rincón, whom López-Bonilla
defeated in the November 2000 election.
In 1997, Carrero-Nazario approached the Puerto Rico
Industrial Development Company and expressed an interest in
purchasing a parcel of land in Rincón owned by the Company. He
wanted to develop a shopping center with a large grocery store.
Negotiations ensued and, in June 1999, the parties reached a
preliminary agreement. In November 2000, just following the
mayoral election, the Puerto Rico Planning Board approved the
project and zoned the property for commercial use.
Shortly after taking office in early 2001, the mayor
began a campaign to halt the project. Over the next two years,
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prior to the formalization of the sale (which occurred on May 9,
2003), the mayor repeatedly wrote the Development Company, the
Planning Board and others, expressing strong disagreement with the
Company's decision to permit the property to be used for the
development of commercial, rather than industrial, infrastructure.
He also repeatedly suggested that the project only had been made
possible because of nepotism -- i.e., that it would not have gotten
off the ground without the helpful intercessions of the former
mayor, who is the father-in-law of Carrero-Martínez. When he was
unable to derail the project, the mayor began to express interest
in purchasing the property on behalf of the municipality. The
Development Company rebuffed these efforts, explaining that the
process was too far along with the developers. Undeterred, the
mayor initiated eminent domain proceedings and obtained unanimous
resolutions from the appropriate legislative bodies in support of
the proposed taking and then funding for the compensation to be
made to the developers. So far as we can tell, the eminent domain
proceedings are ongoing.
In June 2004, the developers initiated this lawsuit under
federal and Puerto Rico law. Their primary allegation, that the
mayor's crusade was materially motivated by unlawful political
discrimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
survived dismissal but prompted a motion for summary judgment from
the mayor on a number of grounds. The developers received an
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extension of time to oppose the motion and then, on the day their
opposition was due, filed a second motion for a one-day extension
because they were experiencing "technical difficulties" in their
attorneys' office. Late in the day, the district court denied the
motion by margin order. The developers were able to file their
opposition and statement of contested facts on time, but not the
exhibits in support of their opposition. The following day, the
developers filed a motion asking the court to accept their exhibits
(which were attached to the motion), explaining that the technical
difficulties experienced the prior day "related to [their
attorneys'] office scanner." The court denied the motion, again by
margin order.
Subsequently, the district court granted the mayor's
motion for summary judgment on the political discrimination claim
and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Puerto
Rico claims. In its opinion and order, the court stated that "the
uncontested facts permit no inference that the defendants' conduct
was motivated by discriminatory animus." In reaching this
conclusion, the court explained that, because the developers had
not filed any exhibits in support of their opposition to the
summary judgment motion, it would apply Local Rule Civ. P. 56 and
credit "all the defendants' proposed uncontested facts supported by
exhibits which would be admissible at trial." Crucially, however,
the court also stated that its conclusion as to animus would be
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unaffected even if it were to take the developers' opposition
materials into account.
The developers' appeal starts with an argument that the
district court's strict enforcement of the filing deadline was
unfair and an abuse of the court's discretion. We will go so far
as to say that it would have been preferable had the court
explained its harsh enforcement decision. Nevertheless, the
judgment should stand, even if we assume an abuse of discretion and
credit the evidence the developers attempted to submit, and even if
we by-pass a number of alternative grounds for affirmance involving
immunity defenses, intervening causes, and the viability of the
developers' case theory.
In support of their claimed entitlement to present their
political discrimination claim to a jury, the developers rely on
the mayor's admittedly unsupportable charges of nepotism, the
mayor's acknowledged awareness that the developers were heavily
involved with a rival political party, the lack of evidence
supporting the mayor's claim that a number of industrial
corporations would be interested in locating their operations on
the parcel in question, the mayor's failure to establish the
unavailability of similarly sized adjoining properties, and the
overall irrationality of the mayor's opposition to a project that
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was certain to create jobs within the town.1 But we think it clear
that this is not enough to ground a finding that the developers'
party membership constituted a "substantial factor or a motivating
factor driving" the mayor's opposition to their project. Centro
Médico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 10
(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)) (internal quotation marks and
ellipses omitted).
A jury could perhaps find that the mayor's position on
the project was unsound and driven by an unfounded concern that the
project was nothing more than a boondoggle designed to enrich the
former mayor's family. But that is as far as a jury reasonably
could go. Such an inference – which is hardly inevitable on the
record before us – simply does not, by itself, warrant a further
inference that unlawful political discrimination was prompting the
mayor's course of conduct. The line between reasonable inference
and unwarranted speculation is not always easy to draw, but we are
confident about the side of the line on which this case belongs.
Assuming that a cause of action for political discrimination could
lie against the mayor in circumstances such as these2 – a matter on
1
The developers also allege that the mayor supported less worthy
projects sponsored by members of his own party, but have failed to
support these allegations with admissible evidence.
2
See, e.g., Padilla-Garcia v. Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir.
2000) (noting that "circumstantial evidence . . . could alone
create an issue of fact on discriminatory animus").
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which we take no position – such a claim does not become
trialworthy simply because a jury could find that the defendant
elected official knows the political affiliation of those whose
project he opposes, that political affiliation is not the same as
his own, and a case could be made that the official's position is
not grounded in sensible public policy. Otherwise, it would be too
easy for a political opponent of an elected official who is
negatively affected by a discretionary decision of the official to
gum up the machinery of government by bringing a federal civil
rights lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the decision.
Affirmed.
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