United States v. Seger , 577 F. App'x 1 ( 2014 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1150
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT SEGER,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Virginia G. Villa, Assistant Federal Defender, for appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief,
for appellee.
October 8, 2014
Per Curiam. This is an appeal from the denial of a post-
conviction motion for a declaratory judgment in a criminal case.
The appellant has fully served the incarcerative portion of his
sentence, and his appeal turns on the question of when his term of
supervised release commenced. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). The
underlying legal issue is one that has split the circuits. Compare
United States v. Maranda, 761 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2014), United
States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2014), petition for
cert. filed, No. 14-5372 (U.S. July 22, 2014), and United States v.
Mobsy, 719 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905
(2014), with United States v. Turner, 689 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.
2012).
At oral argument in this court, the attorney for the
government represented that it would not oppose and (based on
information currently known) would support a motion for the early
termination of the appellant's term of supervised release. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). The appellant has served more than 12 months
of his supervised release term and, for aught that appears, has
faithfully complied with the conditions of supervised release.1
Thus, the appellant apparently satisfies the first two prongs of
section 3583(e)(1), leaving only the question of whether early
termination of his supervised release term would be in the interest
1
Both the appellant's counsel and the government's attorney
have indicated that this is so.
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of justice. Given the peculiar circumstances of this case — the
appellant's continued confinement for a substantial period of time
after the expiration of his original prison sentence due to the
pendency of civil commitment proceedings under the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248 — we think it likely
that the district court, upon the filing of a proper motion, will
find early termination of the supervised release term to be in the
interest of justice.
Viewed against this backdrop, the quickest way for the
appellant to bring his supervised release to an end would be to
pursue a petition for early termination under section 3583(e)(1).
Were he successful in this regard, that would moot the instant
appeal, and insulate him from the delay inherent in our resolution
of an unsettled question of statutory construction.
Accordingly, we withhold decision for the time being and
remand the matter to the district court in order to allow the
appellant to move for early termination of supervised release under
section 3583(e)(1). We assume, based on the colloquy with counsel
for both sides at the hearing before us, that such a motion will be
filed by the appellant's counsel without delay. We likewise
anticipate, again based on statements made at the hearing, that the
government will promptly notify the district court that it does not
oppose the motion. We direct the district court to expedite the
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handling of the anticipated motion and to act on the motion with
all deliberate speed.
The parties will report back to us on the status of this
matter within 30 days from the date of this opinion or at such
sooner time as the district court has acted on the section
3583(e)(1) motion. In the interim, we will retain appellate
jurisdiction.
So Ordered.
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