Harris v. Scarcelli (In Re Oak Knoll Associates, L.P.) , 835 F.3d 24 ( 2016 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 15-2189
    IN RE: OAK KNOLL ASSOCIATES, L.P.,
    Debtor
    ROBERT HARRIS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    ROSA SCARCELLI and OAK KNOLL ASSOCIATES, L.P.,
    Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    [Hon. Jon D. Levy, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges.
    James F. Molleur, with whom Molleur Law Office was on brief,
    for appellant.
    Daniel L. Cummings, with whom Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC
    was on brief, for appellee Rosa Scarcelli.
    August 19, 2016
    HOWARD, Chief Judge.     Appellant Robert Harris seeks to
    recover a real estate broker's commission that he claims is owed
    to him by Appellees Rosa Scarcelli and Oak Knoll Associates, L.P.
    (collectively, "Oak Knoll").     Concluding on these facts that Oak
    Knoll is not contractually obligated to pay Harris a commission
    and that Harris has failed to identify a basis upon which he would
    be entitled to equitable relief, we affirm the grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Oak Knoll.
    I.   Background
    Oak Knoll Associates, L.P., is a limited partnership
    whose general partners at all relevant times consisted of Pamela
    Gleichman and Rosa Scarcelli. This case began when the partnership
    sought to sell some apartment buildings that it owned in Norwalk,
    Connecticut.     To that end, Oak Knoll enlisted the services of
    Robert Harris, a real estate broker.
    The parties accordingly entered into an agreement dated
    May 16, 2011 ("the listing agreement").     The listing agreement was
    to remain in effect for six months and outlined two scenarios under
    which Oak Knoll would be obligated to pay Harris a commission for
    his services.1     First, Harris could earn a commission if the
    property were to be sold during the six-month term of the listing
    1 We reproduce the actual text of the listing agreement below,
    where we also discuss the parties' dueling interpretations
    thereof. For present purposes, we provide only a general summary
    of the listing agreement.
    - 2 -
    agreement.          Second, Harris could earn a commission if an offer to
    purchase or lease the property were to be accepted during the six-
    month term or within six months of the termination of the listing
    agreement (and if the accepted offer in fact resulted in a sale).
    The listing agreement also provided that if negotiations continued
    after     the       six-month    term,     the     listing        agreement   would    be
    automatically renewed until the conclusion of those negotiations.
    A rider to the listing agreement, in turn, provided that Harris's
    commission for selling the property would be 4.8 percent.
    Harris subsequently located a potential buyer, Navarino
    Capital    Management,          LLC   ("Navarino").          On    October    11,   2011,
    Navarino and Oak Knoll executed a purchase and sale agreement
    ("2011 P&S"), whereby Navarino agreed to purchase the property
    from Oak Knoll for $6,300,000.              The deal gave Navarino 45 days to
    inspect the property and allowed Navarino to terminate the deal
    for a number of reasons not relevant for present purposes.
    In November 2011, Navarino requested and received the
    first   in      a    series     of    extensions    to   the       inspection   period.
    Navarino had discovered that the property was subject to a number
    of restrictive covenants that Oak Knoll had agreed to at the behest
    of the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority when Oak Knoll first
    purchased the property in 1988.                  On February 24, 2012, Navarino
    wrote to Oak Knoll, offering to purchase the property at a reduced
    price in light of those covenants.
    - 3 -
    Oak Knoll did not accept this revised offer.        Instead,
    intra-partnership disputes spilled into federal court: on February
    28, 2012, Scarcelli sued Gleichman in United States District Court
    for the District of Maine.     Scarcelli obtained a default judgment
    against Gleichman and the district court in turn issued a permanent
    injunction in Scarcelli's favor.       See Scarcelli v. Gleichman, No.
    2:12-CV-72-GZS, 
    2012 WL 1965681
    (D. Me. May 31, 2012). Among other
    things, the injunction forbade Gleichman from entering into a
    contract to sell the property without Scarcelli's prior written
    consent.   See 
    id. at *4.
    Harris,   in     turn,     was   kept   apprised   of   these
    developments.    On June 25, 2012, Scarcelli's attorney emailed
    Harris to inform him that Scarcelli would seek contempt sanctions
    against Gleichman or any third party who -- knowing of the district
    court's injunction -- acted in violation of that injunction.        The
    record is silent as to what transpired over the following months,
    save for the fact that on November 13, 2012, Harris sent an invoice
    to Gleichman demanding payment for his services, and some months
    after that recorded a lien against the property for a broker's
    commission.
    The story picks up again on March 18, 2013, when the
    partnership filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in United States
    Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine.        Within days, Navarino
    demanded the return of his escrow deposit from Oak Knoll. On April
    - 4 -
    1, 2013, the partnership filed an application to retain Harris as
    a real estate broker, and on June 18, 2013, Harris filed a proof
    of claim for his brokerage services.2
    Although the retention application had not yet been
    approved, on August 21, 2013, the partnership's counsel sent Harris
    an email telling Harris to "get us a contract for the $6,275,000."
    That same day, Harris informed Navarino that Oak Knoll was amenable
    to selling the property for that amount.
    Then, on August 28, 2013, Scarcelli filed an objection
    to the application to retain Harris.        The bankruptcy court held a
    hearing on the application on September 4, 2013. At the conclusion
    thereof, the court granted the application, provided that Oak Knoll
    file a revised proposed order reflecting certain changes. However,
    such a proposed order was never filed and the bankruptcy court
    thus never approved the retention application.           In October 2013,
    the partnership's counsel withdrew the still-pending retention
    application with the court's approval.          That same month, Navarino
    and   Oak   Knoll   Associates   executed   a    new   purchase   and   sale
    agreement.      This second agreement eventually resulted in the
    successful sale of Oak Knoll's apartment buildings.
    But although Navarino got the property and Oak Knoll got
    its money, Harris received nothing for his efforts.               Oak Knoll
    2Oak Knoll and Scarcelli each eventually filed objections to
    the proof of claim.
    - 5 -
    never paid him.       Unsurprisingly, Harris pursued claims against
    both the partnership and Scarcelli in federal bankruptcy court,
    seeking the commission that he believed he was owed.          Eventually,
    Oak Knoll moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no
    material dispute of fact and that Harris was -- as a matter of
    law -- not owed a commission.               Following oral argument, the
    bankruptcy court granted the motion and denied Harris's claims.
    The bankruptcy court's decision, in turn, was appealed
    to United States District Court for the District of Maine, which
    affirmed the grant of summary of judgment.            This appeal timely
    followed.
    II.    Standard of Review
    "[T]he    legal    standards    traditionally   applicable   to
    motions for summary judgment apply [] without change in bankruptcy
    proceedings."     Daniels v. Agin, 
    736 F.3d 70
    , 78 (1st Cir. 2013).
    Thus, summary judgment is proper "if no genuine issue of material
    fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law."      Soto-Rios v. Banco Popular de P.R., 
    662 F.3d 112
    ,
    115 (1st Cir. 2011).      The evidence, of course, must be viewed in
    the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (in this case
    Harris) and all reasonable inferences must be taken in that party's
    favor.   See In re Varrasso, 
    37 F.3d 760
    , 763 (1st Cir. 1994).
    - 6 -
    We review, in turn, a bankruptcy court's grant of summary
    judgment de novo.     See 
    Soto-Rios, 662 F.3d at 115
    .3   And although
    the bankruptcy court's decision was first reviewed by the district
    court, we review the bankruptcy court's decision as if on a clean
    slate.   See 
    id. III. Discussion
    In seeking to recover his unpaid commission, Harris
    invokes two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.4      First, he cites
    11 U.S.C. § 501, arguing that he is owed a commission under the
    terms of his contract with Oak Knoll.     Second, Harris argues that
    he is entitled to it as a form of equitable relief under 11 U.S.C.
    § 105(a).   We consider each theory of recovery in turn, explaining
    why each one fails as a matter of law in light of the undisputed
    facts of this case.
    3 There may be some tension within our cases as to whether we
    defer to a bankruptcy court's findings of fact when reviewing its
    grant of summary judgment.    Compare In re Moultonborough Hotel
    Group, LLC, 
    726 F.3d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir. 2013) (reviewing questions of
    law de novo and findings of fact for clear error) with Stoehr v.
    Mohammed, 
    244 F.3d 206
    , 207-08 (1st Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
    (applying de novo review to questions of law and to findings of
    fact). It is, however, presently unnecessary to reconcile these
    cases, as Harris's claims fail under either standard of review.
    4 Harris also sought payment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503.
    However, he abandoned this theory of recovery on appeal and we
    therefore do not consider it.
    - 7 -
    A.    Proof of Claim
    Harris filed a proof of claim for his unpaid commission
    pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501.                  The Bankruptcy Code, in turn,
    provides that when, as here, a party objects to such a claim, the
    bankruptcy court is to hold a hearing, and must thereafter allow
    the claim unless (in addition to other exceptions not presently
    relevant) the claim "is unenforceable against the debtor and
    property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for
    a    reason    other    than     because     such    claim    is    contingent        or
    unmatured. . . ."           
    Id. § 502(b)(1).
         The ultimate validity of such
    a claim is determined with reference to state law.                  See Raleigh v.
    Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 
    530 U.S. 15
    , 20 (2000) ("The 'basic federal
    rule' in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of
    claims . . . .").            Here, the parties agree that we must look to
    Connecticut law to determine whether Harris is entitled to his
    commission.
    In    Connecticut,      a     broker's      right    "to    recover      a
    commission depends upon the terms of [his] employment contract
    with the seller."            Revere Real Estate, Inc. v. Cerato, 
    438 A.2d 1202
    ,   1204       (Conn.    1982).       Thus,   while   a   broker     can   earn    a
    commission merely by procuring a ready, willing, and able buyer,
    see Menard v. Coronet Motel, Inc., 
    207 A.2d 378
    , 379 (Conn. 1965),
    the parties can "make the broker's right to a commission dependent
    on specific conditions, such as the consummation of the transaction
    - 8 -
    and full performance of the sales contract."     Revere Real 
    Estate, 438 A.2d at 1205
    .
    With this in mind, we turn to the listing agreement,
    which provides, in relevant part, as follows5:
    In order protect AGENT should the property known as Oak
    Knoll Apartments . . . (the "PROPERTY") is sold within
    six (6) months from the date hereof, to sell the property
    for $7,000,000.00 or any such price as the OWNER may
    subsequently agree upon, agree to pay AGENT the
    commission set forth below.        All parties to this
    agreement also agree that all communications and
    agreements, whether written oral, will be transmitted
    through AGENT.
    OWNER agrees that if the property is sold during the
    term of this Agreement to a Purchaser, procured by Agent
    during the term of this Agreement as outlined above,
    OWNER will pay AGENT a commission per Schedule A
    attached.   Should negotiations continue after the six
    (6) month period the OWNER agree to automatically extend
    this agreement and its terms until such as the
    negotiations are completed.
    The commission shall be due and payable by certified
    check in full upon the closing of title (or lease
    execution). If, during the term hereof, or within six
    (6) months from the termination of this Agreement,
    should there be an acceptance of an offer to
    purchase/lease from the PURCHASER, OWNER agrees to pay
    the AGENT a commission as per this AGREEMENT.
    This Agreement shall become effective immediately and
    shall remain in effect six (6) months from the date
    hereof.
    Harris zeroes in on two provisions of the listing agreement.
    First, he points out that it obligates Oak Knoll to pay him "should
    5 With the exception of the property's address, we have
    otherwise reproduced the relevant portion of the listing agreement
    verbatim, with its warts and all.
    - 9 -
    there be acceptance of an offer," and asserts that he was owed a
    commission when an offer to purchase the apartments was accepted
    back   in   October   2011.   Second,   he   asserts   that   the   listing
    agreement's automatic extension provision (i.e., in the event of
    continued negotiations) kept the listing agreement alive such that
    he earned a commission based on the eventual sale of the property
    to Navarino.     We examine his arguments seriatim, explaining why
    neither is persuasive.
    1.     Acceptance of an Offer
    As stated, the listing agreement obligates Oak Knoll to
    pay Harris a commission "should there be acceptance of an offer"
    during the term of the listing agreement or within six months of
    its termination.      The parties don't appear to dispute that there
    was acceptance of an offer to purchase the property in October
    2011, within the effective term of the listing agreement.           Harris
    accordingly argues that he was owed a commission as of that date,
    because (in his telling) the listing agreement requires Oak Knoll
    to pay him upon the mere acceptance of an offer, regardless of
    whether this results in a sale.           Oak Knoll counters that the
    listing agreement requires that a sale actually occur in order for
    Harris to earn his commission.     Thus, succinctly put, our task is
    to interpret the contract (using Connecticut law) to determine
    whether Oak Knoll's obligation to pay Harris is predicated on the
    - 10 -
    sale of the property.   See In re Advanced Cellular Sys's., Inc.,
    
    483 F.3d 7
    , 13-14 (1st Cir. 2007).
    Although the listing agreement is hardly an exemplar of
    draftsmanship, we nonetheless think it unambiguous.   See Salce v.
    Wolczek, 
    104 A.3d 694
    , 698 (Conn. 2014) ("If the contract is
    unambiguous, its interpretation and application is a question of
    law for the court, permitting the court to resolve a breach of
    contract claim on summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute
    of material fact."); see also Ramirez v. Health Net of the Ne.,
    Inc., 
    938 A.2d 576
    , 587 (Conn. 2008) ("A contract is ambiguous if
    the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the
    language of the contract itself.").6   That is, the language of the
    contract leaves no doubt that the parties intended that a sale
    take place in order for Harris to earn his commission.
    We acknowledge, of course, that in Connecticut, a court
    has "no right to add a new term to a contract."        Williams v.
    Lilley, 
    34 A. 765
    , 768 (Conn. 1895).    We have not done so here.
    While the acceptance-of-an-offer provision does not explicitly
    6 Indeed, other courts -- when interpreting contracts under
    Connecticut law -- have found that typographical errors and the
    like do not necessarily render those contracts ambiguous. See,
    e.g., United Aluminum Corp. v. Boc Grp., Inc., No. 08-CV-977 (JCH),
    
    2009 WL 2589486
    , at *6-7, *7 n.5 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2009) (finding
    contract unambiguous despite the presence of "typographical
    error[s]" or mistakes produced by "inattentive drafting"). And so
    too here.    The many such errors in the listing agreement may
    produce frustration on the part of the reader, but they do not
    produce ambiguity so as to stave off summary judgment.
    - 11 -
    state that an accepted offer must result in a sale, the text of
    the    listing    agreement   nevertheless    indicates    that    this   is
    precisely what must happen if Harris is to earn his commission.
    For starters, the acceptance-of-an-offer provision is qualified by
    important language: that Oak Knoll "agrees to pay the AGENT a
    commission as per this AGREEMENT."         The last four words dictate
    that we read this provision consistent with the contract as a
    whole. And indeed, the sale requirement is unambiguously reflected
    in the contract.        Cf. 
    Ramirez, 938 A.2d at 587
    (explaining that
    courts should not "import terms into [an] agreement . . . that are
    not reflected in the contract" (emphasis added)).
    For example, the listing agreement is titled a "Non-
    Exclusive Agency Sale Agreement."          Cf. Bialowans v. Minor, 
    550 A.2d 637
    ,    639-40   (Conn.   1988)   (holding,   in   the   context   of
    interpreting contract language, that a section heading delimited
    the scope of language appearing under said heading).              Similarly,
    the first sentence of the quoted portion of the listing agreement
    provides:
    In order protect AGENT should the property known as Oak
    Knoll Apartments . . . (the "PROPERTY") is sold within
    six (6) months from the date hereof, to sell the property
    for $7,000,000.00 or any such price as the OWNER may
    subsequently agree upon, agree to pay AGENT the
    commission set forth below.
    The drafting errors do not obscure the critical point: this
    sentence announces the general purpose of the listing agreement
    - 12 -
    (viz., protecting the agent in the event that the property "is
    sold") and concomitantly sets forth Oak Knoll's duty to pay Harris
    a commission. A commonsense reading would suggest that Oak Knoll's
    obligation to pay Harris is connected to the overall purpose of
    the listing agreement.    Cf. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 
    554 U.S. 570
    , 577 (2008) ("Logic demands that there be a link between the
    stated purpose and the command.").       And by thus linking the
    protection of Harris's interests, the sale of the property, and
    Oak Knoll's obligation to pay Harris a commission, the listing
    agreement indicates that a sale must take place in order for Harris
    to earn his commission.
    Other features of the listing agreement support this
    conclusion.   The second-quoted paragraph of the listing agreement
    conditions payment of Harris's commission on the property being
    "sold" during the term of the listing agreement.   The third-quoted
    paragraph of the listing agreement provides that the commission
    "shall be due and payable . . . upon closing of title."   Similarly,
    Schedule A states (under the heading of "Sale Commissions") that
    "[t]he commission for selling the property shall be [] 4.8%."7   All
    told, these repeated references to the sale of the property confirm
    7 As the listing agreement expressly referenced Schedule A,
    and the parties were undoubtedly aware of that document's terms,
    we may properly consider it as having been incorporated into the
    listing agreement. See, e.g., Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. BFA Ltd.
    P'ship, 
    948 A.2d 318
    , 324 (Conn. 2008).
    - 13 -
    that the parties intended to make Harris's commission contingent
    on the sale of the property.
    Finally (and critically), reading the listing agreement
    as not requiring a sale (as Harris would have us do) would render
    the first and second-quoted paragraphs of the listing agreement
    superfluous, thereby contravening well-settled Connecticut law.
    See 
    Ramirez, 938 A.2d at 586
    ("The law of contract interpretation
    militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a
    provision superfluous." (internal citations omitted)).     That is,
    Harris maintains that the listing agreement obligates Oak Knoll to
    pay him if an offer is accepted, regardless of whether a sale
    ultimately occurs.     The listing agreement, however, is crystal-
    clear that Oak Knoll must pay Harris a commission if the property
    "is sold."    It is axiomatic that a sale is preceded by acceptance
    of an offer; as Harris concedes, the former necessarily entails
    the latter.     Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 
    191 U.S. 441
    , 447
    (1903).   Consequently, if acceptance of an offer were all that
    were needed for Harris to earn his commission, there would have
    been no need to specify (as the listing agreement repeatedly does)
    that he could do so upon the successful closing of a sale.    Thus,
    we do not believe that the listing agreement is susceptible to two
    reasonable interpretations and that Oak Knoll merely offers a
    better reading than Harris.    Cf. Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC,
    
    84 A.3d 828
    , 835 (Conn. 2014) ("If the language of the contract is
    - 14 -
    susceptible     to   more   than   one   reasonable   interpretation,   the
    contract   is   ambiguous.").       Rather,   we   believe   that   Harris's
    interpretation of the listing agreement is untenable, failing to
    "give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a
    reasonable overall result."         R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Cont'l
    Cas. Co., 
    870 A.2d 1048
    , 1059 (Conn. 2005).8
    The lily having been sufficiently gilded, the important
    point is this: the listing agreement unambiguously requires that
    a sale take place in order for Harris to earn his commission.9           The
    8 Harris tries to flip this point on its head, arguing that
    the foregoing interpretation of the listing agreement renders the
    acceptance-of-an-offer provision superfluous.    His argument is
    without merit. The acceptance-of-an-offer provision as we have
    construed it expands Harris's contractual rights in two respects:
    First, it requires Oak Knoll to pay a commission if an offer
    were to be accepted within the term of the listing agreement and
    resulted in a sale, but the sale only closed after the listing
    agreement's expiration, and no negotiations took place so as to
    keep the listing agreement alive until the closing.    In such a
    case, Harris would not be entitled to a commission but for the
    acceptance-of-an-offer provision.
    Second, this provision enables Harris to claim a commission
    if an offer were to be accepted (again, resulting in a sale) within
    six months of the listing agreement's expiration and in the absence
    of continued negotiations.    And once more, in such a scenario,
    Harris's only route to a commission would be through the
    acceptance-of-an-offer provision.
    Thus, our interpretation of the listing agreement does not
    render the acceptance-of-an-offer provision superfluous.
    9 Accordingly, it does not matter whether Navarino was a
    ready, willing, and able buyer, as Oak Knoll was not obligated to
    pay Harris unless a sale actually happened.      Harris similarly
    argues that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that Oak Knoll
    was not responsible for the failure of the 2011 P&S. However, our
    conclusion that the listing agreement requires a sale may make it
    - 15 -
    bankruptcy court thus correctly determined that Harris was not
    entitled to his commission based on the acceptance of an offer in
    2011.
    2.      Continued Negotiations
    Oak   Knoll   and   Harris    also   agreed   that   the   listing
    agreement would be automatically renewed in the event of continued
    negotiations.      Harris maintains that such negotiations took place
    and thereby kept the listing agreement alive, such that he earned
    a commission based on the ultimate sale of the property.                     We
    disagree.
    We begin by considering the language of the contract.
    The     listing    agreement     states,     in   relevant    part:     "Should
    negotiations continue after the six (6) month period the OWNER
    agree to automatically extend this agreement and its terms until
    such as the negotiations are completed."              Harris takes this to
    mean that the listing agreement would not expire so long as
    unnecessary to reach this point. Cf. Revere Real 
    Estate, 438 A.2d at 1205
    ("A seller cannot defeat a broker's right to its commission
    by his unilateral nonperformance of a sales contract unless the
    listing contract reserves the right to condition payment upon
    consummation   of   the   sales   contract."   (emphasis   added)).
    Regardless, we need not address this argument because it is waived:
    Harris fails to bring to our attention any authority indicating
    that Oak Knoll's supposed breach of the 2011 P&S has any bearing
    on our analysis. See United States v. Munyenyezi, 
    781 F.3d 532
    ,
    542 n.11 (1st Cir. 2015).      In fact, he offers no explanation
    whatsoever as to why this point should even affect the bottom-line
    conclusion. A claim of error without explanation as to the error's
    import generally amounts to little more than sound and fury. Which
    is to say, it signifies nothing.
    - 16 -
    negotiations took place at least once every six months.10         Harris
    claims, in turn, that he would be entitled to a commission if an
    offer were to be accepted within twelve months of the last instance
    of negotiations.11
    Even assuming for the sake of argument that this is a
    reasonable interpretation of the contract, see 
    Cruz, 84 A.3d at 835
    , Oak Knoll is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment as there
    is no evidence that an offer was accepted within twelve months of
    the last instance of negotiations.         Despite taking all reasonable
    inferences in Harris's favor, the record contains no evidence of
    any negotiations occurring between June 2012 and March 2013.          In
    fact, it is wholly silent on that point.           Thus, under Harris's
    proffered        interpretation   of   the    listing   agreement,   the
    negotiations concluded at some point in June 2012 (i.e., as no
    negotiations took place within six months of that date), and the
    listing agreement expired in December 2012.        There is, in turn, no
    evidence that an offer was accepted within twelve months of June
    2012.        Thus, even under Harris's proposed interpretation of the
    10
    In other words, negotiations would be deemed to "continue"
    unless there were a six-month gap in those negotiations.
    11
    That is, seizing on the words "and its terms," Harris points
    out that one of the "terms" of the listing agreement is that it is
    to remain in effect for six months. And moreover, the acceptance-
    of-an-offer provision entitles Harris to a commission if an offer
    were to be accepted within six months of the listing agreement's
    expiration (although, as we have established, the offer would have
    to result in a sale).
    - 17 -
    contract, he cannot show that continued negotiations kept the
    listing agreement alive such that he earned a commission.
    In attempting to show otherwise, Harris points to an
    exchange of emails in late March 2013.       He also highlights an April
    2, 2013 affidavit from Gleichman, in which she states that Harris
    "recently" emailed her to say that "we have a deal for $6.0
    period."    And Harris further points out that he contacted Navarino
    in August 2013.      But again (and by Harris's own logic), the
    negotiations rang down the curtain and joined the choir invisible
    in June 2012, taking the listing agreement with them six months
    later.     And while the negotiations were eventually rekindled at
    some point in 2013, Harris makes no argument that the already-
    expired listing agreement could be similarly resuscitated.                 The
    evidence cited by Harris is of no help to him.
    Similarly,   the   evidence    cited   by   Harris   in   no   way
    suggests that the parties were continuously negotiating within the
    relevant timeframe: it does nothing to address the substantial gap
    in the record.      Accordingly, Harris hasn't pointed to "hard
    evidence of a material factual dispute," and thus fails to stave
    off summary judgment.      Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 
    904 F.2d 112
    , 115
    (1st Cir. 1990); see also 
    id. ("Evidence which
    is 'merely colorable
    or is not significantly probative' will not preclude summary
    - 18 -
    judgment." (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    ,
    249-50 (1986)).12
    B.   Equitable Relief
    This leaves us with Harris's claim for equitable relief.
    Congress has given bankruptcy courts the authority to "issue any
    order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
    carry out the provisions" of the Bankruptcy Code.          11 U.S.C. §
    105(a).    We have cautioned, however, that this does not give
    bankruptcy courts "a roving writ, much less a free hand" to provide
    equitable relief.   In re Jamo, 
    283 F.3d 392
    , 403 (1st Cir. 2002).
    Rather, this statute "may be invoked only if, and to the extent
    that, the equitable remedy dispensed by the court is necessary to
    preserve   an   identifiable   right     conferred   elsewhere   in   the
    Bankruptcy Code."   
    Id. As the
    foregoing demonstrates, Harris was
    not owed a commission based on the terms of his contract with Oak
    Knoll; if he has an identifiable right, it must accordingly have
    its genesis elsewhere.
    To that end, Harris points to a Connecticut statute which
    entitles a real estate broker to recover a commission "if it would
    be inequitable to deny such recovery."         Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-
    12Harris also relies on the bankruptcy court's statement that
    "viewing the facts most favorably for Harris, [the negotiations]
    stopped by March 2013." But as stated, there is no record evidence
    of negotiations taking place between June 2012 and March 2013.
    And neither Harris nor the bankruptcy court points to anything
    that would suggest otherwise.
    - 19 -
    325a(d).    However, we need not address the merits of this argument
    as it is doubly waived.       First, having failed to present this
    theory below, Harris may not do so for the first time on appeal.
    His argument is kneecapped: unpreserved claims don't warrant our
    review.    See In re Woodman, 
    379 F.3d 1
    , 2 (1st Cir. 2004) (refusing
    to review a party's argument in light of its "failure to advance
    [it] before the bankruptcy court in the first instance").      Second,
    the   argument    is   insufficiently    fleshed-out   to   merit   our
    consideration.    That is, the statute cited by Harris allows for
    equitable relief only when a broker has "substantially complied"
    with the statute's formalities. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-325a(d);
    see also Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 
    949 A.2d 1189
    , 1203
    (Conn. 2008) (substantial compliance with § 20-325a is the "sole
    avenue to recovery that the [Connecticut] legislature chose to
    provide in circumstances wherein the strict construction of § 20-
    325a would lead to unfair results or unjust enrichment").      Harris,
    however, makes no effort to argue that he so complied.        As such,
    this argument is waived.     See Alicea v. Machete Music, 
    744 F.3d 773
    , 780 (1st Cir. 2014). Since Harris otherwise fails to identify
    a right which would entitle him to equitable relief,13 we reject
    this claim as well.
    13
    In his reply brief, Harris fleetingly mentions his broker's
    lien and 11 U.S.C. § 506 in conjunction with his equitable relief
    claim. But we need not consider the merits of this undeveloped
    argument for another reason altogether. "Contentions not advanced
    - 20 -
    IV.   Conclusion
    Some may find this result unfair, particularly insofar
    as the partnership filed an application to retain Harris's services
    and asked Harris to communicate with Navarino (knowing that the
    retention application had not yet been approved), only to withdraw
    the pending application after Harris did so.      And some may be
    especially troubled by Oak Knoll's conduct given the bankruptcy
    court's conclusion that the partnership was in a position to make
    "a 100% payment to all creditors, with money left over to pay out
    to [the partnership's] insiders."   We are not, however, asked to
    decide whether Oak Knoll is deserving of opprobrium, but whether
    Oak Knoll was entitled to summary judgment.    And for the reasons
    stated, we hold that it was.
    AFFIRMED.
    in an appellant's opening brief are deemed waived."     DeCaro v.
    Hasbro, Inc., 
    580 F.3d 55
    , 64 (1st Cir. 2009). And so it is here.
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