Cooper v. D'Amore , 663 F. App'x 1 ( 2016 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 16-1067, 16-1211
CAROL DIANE COOPER and JOHN SCOTT COOPER, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Peter M. Cooper, Jr., Deceased,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ALYSSA JANE D'AMORE, f/k/a Alyssa J. Cooper,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Keith P. Carroll, with whom Andrew Nathanson and Mintz, Levin,
Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. were on brief, for
appellants.
Robert J. O'Regan, with whom Burns & Levinson LLP was on
brief, for appellee.
October 5, 2016
Per Curiam. This is a dispute over the distributions
from the assets of one Peter M. Cooper, Jr., who died in July 2012.
The suit was brought by John S. Cooper, the executor of Peter
Cooper's estate, and Carol Cooper, the mother of Peter Cooper and
a primary beneficiary of the estate. They have sued Alyssa J.
D'Amore, Peter Cooper's ex-wife, claiming that her receipt of a
distribution in the sum of $228,495 from an Individual Retirement
Account ("IRA") was wrongful.
Three primary issues are presented on appeal:
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion when
it sanctioned plaintiffs' then-counsel for misleading the court
during summary judgment proceedings by failing to produce or
discuss a document, the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement, that
the court thought was material to the issues as they had been
framed by the parties. We find no abuse of discretion and explain
more fully below. We thus affirm the sanctions order.
2. Whether the district court erred by entering summary
judgment in favor of D'Amore. The court's entry of summary
judgment appears largely to have been based on the application of
Delaware law. It also appears to have been based on the court's
rejection on reconsideration of three of plaintiffs' ancillary
arguments, which they say would justify entry of summary judgment
in their favor. The parties agree that summary judgment for
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D'Amore cannot be justified on the basis that Delaware law applied
through the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement.
That raises the question of whether a different argument
-- that D'Amore was not the proper party for certain claims --
provides an alternative basis for at least partial affirmance.
The district court reasoned that plaintiffs could not assert two
claims against D'Amore, but only against a non-party, Mesirow
Financial. For the reasons discussed below, we cannot affirm
judgment for D'Amore on that basis. We remand to the district
court for further limited proceedings. Nor have plaintiffs
convinced us they are entitled to judgment on their arguments on
which the court actually ruled.
However, we agree with the district court's conclusion
that the Marital Settlement Agreement did not, under Florida law,
waive D'Amore's right to the IRA, and so we affirm dismissal of
that claim by plaintiffs.
3. The third purported appellate issue, whether the
district court erred in denying reconsideration, is rendered moot
by our remand and need not be discussed further.
I.
We eschew discussion of the facts, which are well known
to the parties, and cut to the chase.
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A. Sanctions Order
We cannot usurp the role of the trial judge in sanction
matters and can reverse only if there is an abuse of discretion.
See Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2003). There cannot
be an abuse of discretion if a trial judge reasonably could have
concluded that plaintiffs misled the court into adopting an
erroneous legal conclusion during the summary judgment
proceedings. See id. (abuse of discretion standard for reviewing
sanctions order "is not appellant-friendly -- and a sanctioned
litigant bears a weighty burden in attempting to show that an abuse
occurred"). Further, trial judges must have some leeway in
controlling the conduct of proceedings in their courts. See
Barreto v. Citibank, N.A., 907 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) ("Trial judges have considerable discretion in the
selection and imposition of sanctions."). There was a reasonable
basis for the trial judge to have taken the position he did, and
so we affirm.
B. Summary Judgment Ruling
To the extent summary judgment was entered on the basis
that Delaware law applied throughout, as evidenced by the choice-
of-law provision in the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement, we
do not think that document is dispositive, and no party suggests
that it is. Even if that document controlled, the period of
control of the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement ended, at the
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latest, on October 1, 2010, when Delaware Charter resigned as
trustee of the IRA. As such, that document could not have
controlled a distribution of the IRA assets in 2012.
We turn to the district court's December 8, 2015 denial
of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration disposing of three other
issues, to see if other grounds exist on which an affirmance or
partial affirmance can be based. See, e.g., Second Generation
Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 624 (1st Cir. 2002)
(disagreeing with district court's rule, but affirming on other
grounds). We also look at plaintiffs' argument to the district
court that judgment must be entered in their favor.
1. Status of Mesirow As a Non-Party
If, as the district court held, plaintiffs should have
sued Mesirow, not D'Amore, on plaintiffs' conversion and
restitution claims, that might be an alternative basis to affirm
dismissal of those claims. The district court ruled that any
claims arising out of the proper execution of the Mesirow IRA
cannot stand against D'Amore as the sole defendant.
Plaintiffs' summary judgment papers asserted theories
concerning breach of the Mesirow Custodial Account Agreement and
transfer of assets to TD Ameritrade, and their complaint brought
conversion and restitution claims against D'Amore. The district
court sua sponte held that these claims could solely be asserted
in a suit against Mesirow, which has not been made a defendant in
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this action. With respect, we disagree with the district court's
adoption of that theory. D'Amore now holds funds from the IRA and
was a proper defendant against whom plaintiffs could assert the
claim of wrongful distribution. We cannot affirm entry of summary
judgment as to those theories on the grounds utilized by the
district court.
2. Rejection of Marital Settlement Agreement Argument by
Plaintiffs
In the interest of expediting further proceedings, we do
agree with the entry of summary judgment against one of plaintiffs'
theories under Florida law. For the reasons it stated, the
district court correctly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
D'Amore waived her rights under Florida law to the IRA account
when she entered into the Marital Settlement Agreement. See,
e.g., Crawford v. Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 2011)
("General language in a marital settlement agreement, such as
language stating who is to receive ownership, is not specific
enough to override the plain language of the beneficiary
designation in the separate document."); Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682
So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1996) (same). We affirm that ruling.
II.
We reject the invitation from both parties to decide
certain issues of Illinois and Florida law ab initio. The district
court should decide them in the first instance.
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We vacate the entry of summary judgment, except as noted,
and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
We also urge the parties to utilize again the services
of this court's CAMP settlement program, in light of this ruling.
No costs are awarded.
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