Irish v. Irish , 842 F.3d 736 ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1053
DAWN E. IRISH,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
CRAIG S. IRISH,
Defendant, Appellant,
PEBBLE NUCLEAR, INC., f/k/a Nuclear Logistics, Inc.;
ARON SEIKEN,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Robert J. O'Regan, with whom Laura R. Studen, Elizabeth G.
Crowley, Andrea L. Martin, and Burns & Levinson LLP were on brief,
for appellant.
Sean T. Carnathan, with whom O'Connor, Carnathan and Mack
LLC, Michael Gottfried, and Duane Morris LLP were on brief, for
appellee.
November 14, 2016
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This appeal comes to us from the
district court's award of damages to Dawn Irish arising out of her
2010 divorce in Massachusetts from Craig Irish and the Separation
Agreement filed in their divorce proceeding. After the divorce,
Dawn brought suit in federal court, rather than state court,
arguing that Craig did not fully disclose his assets or deal in
good faith during the negotiation of their Separation Agreement.
The federal court exercised jurisdiction over those claims.
We do not reach Craig's challenges to the merits of the
district court's decision because we hold that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the domestic
relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for dismissal of
the action, with prejudice as to federal jurisdiction and without
prejudice as to any state court action Dawn might bring.
I.
We derive the following facts from Dawn's allegations in
federal court. Dawn and Craig Irish wed on October 3, 1992.
During their marriage, Craig worked at Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
("NLI"), eventually serving as an officer and acquiring a minority
ownership stake in the company, while Dawn primarily maintained
the marital home. On February 4, 2009, Craig filed for divorce.
Craig and Dawn, each represented by counsel, thereafter
negotiated the terms of a Separation Agreement, which, inter alia,
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provided for alimony and divided their marital assets. The
agreement divided all marital assets equally, with the exception
of Craig's ownership stake in NLI. At the parties' final pre-
divorce conference, Dawn produced a draft agreement under which
she would receive 20% of Craig's total interest in the company.
But at Craig's urging, Dawn agreed to amend the relevant provision
to give Dawn 24 shares of NLI instead, which was 20% of the 120
shares Craig represented he owned. Dawn later attested that she
consented to this revision because Craig "had represented many
times that he would not get any more from a sale [of NLI] than his
6% equity entitled him to."
In the same provision dividing the shares, Craig
promised that he would do "nothing to deprive [Dawn] of the
benefits intended by this agreement, including . . . entering into
any agreement intended to diminish [her] share of any compensation
paid for [his] interest in [NLI]." In addition, three different
provisions referenced Craig's "Financial Statement," which was
submitted to the Middlesex Probate and Family Court along with the
Separation Agreement, and contained the following clause: "I
certify under the penalties of perjury that the information stated
on this Financial Statement . . . is complete, true, and accurate."
On January 21, 2010 -- the same day that the Irishes
filed their Separation Agreement -- the probate court entered a
judgment of divorce nisi. Under Massachusetts law, when parties
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asserting an irretrievable breakdown in their marriage file a
separation agreement in their divorce proceeding, the state
probate court must determine whether it approves of that agreement,
and that "agreement either shall be incorporated and merged into
[the divorce] judgment or by agreement of the parties, it shall be
incorporated and not merged, but shall survive and remain as an
independent contract." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 1A; see also
id. § 1B. In its judgment, the probate court found that the
Irishes' agreement was "fair and reasonable," and "ordered that
the parties shall comply with [its] terms." Additionally, and in
line with parallel language in the agreement itself, the probate
court declared that the agreement was "incorporated and not merged
in" the divorce judgment and that it would "survive and have
independent legal significance."
Roughly two years after the divorce became final, NLI
was acquired for $80,000,000, plus $20,000,000 in potential earn-
out compensation. Despite having disclosed only a 6% ownership
stake during negotiations about the Separation Agreement with
Dawn, Craig received a payment of $21,600,000 from the sale of
NLI.
On November 15, 2012, Dawn chose to file a complaint in
federal district court in Massachusetts based on diversity
jurisdiction, alleging various contract, tort, and fraud claims
against Craig and two other parties not relevant to this appeal.
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The primary basis for Dawn's suit against Craig was her claimed
entitlement to 20% of the $21,600,000 payment. Pointing to emails
between Craig and his accountant that support her contention, Dawn
insisted that Craig concealed a pre-divorce "side deal," which
granted him "phantom equity" well beyond the 6% interest he
purported to hold in shares. Accordingly, she sought compensation
equal to 20% of his actual profits from the sale, rather than 20%
of his 120 shares. Craig, through his pleadings, denied the
existence of a side deal. He characterized the $21,600,000 payment
as a "bonus" unrelated to any "interest or expectancy due . . . at
the time of the divorce." Dawn also claimed entitlement to 50% of
$53,719.47 in uncashed checks that she alleged Craig had failed to
disclose during negotiations, pursuant to the equal division of
non-NLI assets in the Separation Agreement.
On January 22, 2014, the court entertained Craig's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on
the domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction. From the bench, the court granted Craig's motion as
to the claims sounding in tort and fraud, reasoning that they dealt
with "the formation of the divorce decree," and that to decide
them would therefore "necessarily involve[] a revision of that
decree."1 However, the court denied Craig's motion as to the
1 Dawn does not appeal the district court's dismissal of
her tort and fraud claims, and we need not address the propriety
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contract claims, reasoning that they dealt with the Separation
Agreement, which was "to be performed over time, [separate from]
the [divorce] decree [that] can stand as it is."
Thus, even though Dawn and Craig agreed that the probate
court would have jurisdiction to try all of the claims, the federal
court dismissed the tort and fraud claims but not the contract
claims. Instead, the court entered an order "remand[ing]" the
contract claims to the probate court so that the entire case could
be tried together, despite the fact that the case had not come
from the probate court. The court explained that if the claims
were "not in fact adjudicated" in the probate court, either party
could move to reopen the federal case "upon the conclusion of such
proceedings as there may be in the" probate court.
On May 30, 2014, Dawn moved to have the contract claims
set for trial in the federal district court. In her motion, she
stated that the probate court had been "unwilling to recognize the
remand order as valid, [as] the matter did not originate" there,
but she attached no document or order from that court. She also
alleged that if she wished to proceed in a state probate court,
she would need to "file a new action and start over." At oral
argument for this appeal, Dawn's counsel conceded that Dawn never
attempted to file a complaint or other paper in the probate court.
of that decision.
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Dawn's counsel further stated that Dawn preferred to have the
contract claims promptly resolved, even at the expense of her tort
and fraud claims, and that was why she had returned to federal
court.
The district court granted Dawn's motion to reopen the
case on June 2, 2014, and two days later, Craig filed a motion for
reconsideration. Craig noted that "it [was] not clear what
exactly, if anything, [Dawn had] been doing in the Probate Court
in [the preceding] five months," but she had not initiated a "new
action," and the district court should not sanction her "whimsical
forum shopping." The district court denied Craig's motion the
following day. In light of the court's decision to exercise
jurisdiction, the parties agreed to a case-stated hearing on the
issue of liability.
Following that hearing on the merits, the court
determined that Craig had in fact concealed equity in NLI from
Dawn during the divorce. From this the court concluded that Craig
was in breach of two terms of the Separation Agreement, as well as
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Specifically,
the court found that Craig had (1) breached the promise in his
Financial Statement -- which the court deemed a part of the
agreement -- to fully disclose his assets; (2) breached the promise
in the agreement itself to do nothing to diminish Dawn's share of
his interest in NLI; and (3) acted in bad faith by structuring and
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representing his interest in NLI as he did. The court also
declared Craig liable in contract for concealing uncashed checks.
In a footnote to its June 2015 merits opinion, the court
explained its rationale for asserting jurisdiction over the
contract claims. According to the court, because the assets at
issue were not disclosed "and thus [were] not litigated in the
original divorce proceeding," "no judgment the Court could make
with regard to these assets would 'alter a divorce decree' in such
a way that would bring the matter within the domestic relations
exception."
After a bench trial on the issue of damages, the court
awarded Dawn (1) $3,840,000, representing 20% of the $21,600,000
that Craig had earned from the NLI sale, minus the share that Dawn
had already received; (2) $26,859.74, representing 50% of the
$53,719.47 that Craig had concealed in uncashed checks; and (3)
pre-judgment interest on both sums.
Craig appeals, raising several challenges to the
district court's findings and jurisdiction. Because we agree that
the domestic relations exception precluded federal jurisdiction,
we reach only that issue.
II.
A district court's "conclusion regarding the existence
vel non of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject
to de novo review." Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 72 (1st
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Cir. 2003). Because the domestic relations exception pertains to
subject matter jurisdiction, parties cannot waive challenges based
on it. Dunn v. Cometa, 238 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2001).
The domestic relations exception divests federal courts
of jurisdiction over "a narrow range of [cases implicating]
domestic relations issues" that would otherwise meet the
requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307 (2006) (quoting
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701 (1992)). Formally, it
is the product of judicial construction of Congress's intent in
enacting the diversity jurisdiction statute. Ankenbrandt, 504
U.S. at 700-01. One commentator suggests that the Supreme Court
has anchored the exception in congressional acquiescence to
federal court decisions and the policy considerations underlying
them. See Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and The Federal System 1331 (4th ed. 1996). Chief
among those policy considerations is the desire "to keep federal
courts from meddling in a realm that is peculiarly delicate, that
is governed by state law and institutions (e.g., family courts),
and in which inter-court conflicts in policy or decrees should be
kept to an absolute minimum." Dunn, 238 F.3d at 41. This desire
is in line with the traditional reluctance of federal courts to
sanction federal interference with matters thought to be
distinctively local. See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 32
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(1903) ("[I]t is certain that the Constitution . . . confers no
power whatever upon the government of the United States to regulate
marriage in the States or its dissolution . . . ."), abrogated on
other grounds by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 353 (1948).
That said, we have explained that, "[i]n general,
lawsuits affecting domestic relations, however substantially, are
not within the exception unless the claim at issue is one to
obtain, alter or end a divorce, alimony or child custody decree."
Dunn, 238 F.3d at 41 (emphasis added). This is so because both
Ankenbrandt and Marshall stress that the exception's circumscribed
reach extends "not to the subject of domestic relations, but to
particular [familial] status-related functions that fall within
state power and competence." 13E Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3609.1 (3d ed.) (emphasis added).
In that vein, this circuit has been clear that "the
allocation of property incident to a divorce [is a] longstanding
local function[]" of the type best reserved for "state resolution."
DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704, 706); see also Gonzalez Canevero v.
Rexach, 793 F.2d 417, 417 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (construing
a former wife's suit, seeking damages equal to her alleged half
interest in a corporation controlled by her former husband, as "a
request to obtain a distribution of [marital] property" and
affirming its dismissal as "a domestic relations dispute, not
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properly encompassed within [federal] diversity jurisdiction"),
abrogated on other grounds by Mooney v. Mooney, 471 F.3d 246, 248
(1st Cir. 2006).
Indeed, cognizant of the fact that property-distribution
and alimony arrangements necessarily accompany a divorce, exist in
inextricable relation to each other, and jointly declare rights
and obligations arising from marital status under state law, other
circuits have also recognized that the domestic relations
exception covers attempts to determine or modify not only alimony
awards but also the division of marital property pursuant to a
divorce. See, e.g., McCavey v. Barnett, 629 F. App'x 865, 867
(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); Wallace v.
Wallace, 736 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 2013); McLaughlin v. Cotner,
193 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1008(2000). In our view, there is not more published law on this
subject because few claims to divide marital property are ever
filed in federal court. This reflects an understanding that the
federal forum is inappropriate and reinforces the exception's
policy rationale: state courts are experts at dividing marital
property, entering the necessary decrees, and handling the
sensitive conflicts that follow. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at
704. This logic extends to the subject matter of the case before
us -- a dispute over property arising from a separation agreement
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that ordered alimony, divided marital assets, and was incorporated
into a probate court's divorce decree.
III.
The district court based its assertion of jurisdiction
on the notion that, because the assets at issue had never been
divided by the state probate court, no federal adjudication as to
them could alter an existing domestic relations decree. Our
contrary view is that in effectively classifying the assets as
marital and allocating them in the first instance, the district
court altered an existing domestic relations decree pertaining to
divorce and alimony, by amending it and adding new terms to it, as
well as by determining the meaning of that decree, which had been
entered by the state probate court. Thus, the district court
committed error by not dismissing Dawn's particular contract
claims, which she had improperly brought in federal court, and
then compounded that error by provisionally "remanding" the claims
to a state probate court in which they did not originate instead
of dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction. The court then erred
once more by granting Dawn's motion to reopen the adjudication of
those claims in federal court. State courts are perfectly
competent to address the issues raised by Dawn's claims, and
federal courts have no business "allocating property that [should
be] in the custody of a state court, or interfering with" a
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distribution already made by a state court. See 13E Wright &
Miller, supra, § 3609.1 (3d ed.).
Dawn contends that the district court did not perform a
domestic relations function, and she relies heavily, but
mistakenly, on Dunn, 238 F.3d 38, and Mooney, 471 F.3d 246. In
the former case, this court considered tort claims, brought by a
father against the ex-wife of his incapacitated son, alleging that
she had mismanaged the son's care and finances. Dunn, 238 F.3d at
39-40. This court held the domestic relations exception
inapplicable although, in theory, the conduct giving rise to those
claims for damages could have also formed the basis of a charge in
the ex-spouses' earlier divorce proceeding, which would have
affected the level of alimony awarded to the son. Id. at 41.
Notwithstanding the possible connection to a divorce decree, this
court recognized that the plaintiff was not asking the court to
grant him alimony or to disturb his earlier award, but rather to
independently compensate him for a discrete injury. Id. Here, in
contrast, the claims are not so independent, as the plaintiff is
asking the federal court to disturb the earlier award by granting
her a larger share of the marital assets.
Ultimately, Dunn held that the circumstances counseled
the federal court to abstain under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943), and stay the federal case as to the tort claims.
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238 F.3d at 42-43. We thus see no conflict between Dunn and our
conclusion.
We reject Dawn's argument that her action is permissible
in federal court not as one to obtain a division of marital
property, but as one merely to enforce the division envisioned in
her existing agreement with Craig. First, Dawn's self-serving
characterization of her action does not resolve the jurisdictional
issue. We look to the reality of what is going on. The domestic
relations exception "governs claims over [domestic relations
decrees] even where they are cloaked in the 'trappings' of another
type of claim." Mandel v. Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 271 (1st
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d
842, 844 (1st Cir. 1981) ("Although [plaintiff] clothed her
complaint in the garb of a civil rights action, . . . her claim
boil[ed] down to a demand for [child] custody . . . 'best left to
the states.'" (citation omitted)). It is an "uncontroversial
proposition that a plaintiff may not artfully cast a suit seeking
to [create or] modify . . . a [domestic relations] decree as a
state-law contract or tort claim in order to access the federal
courts." Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 795–96
(6th Cir. 2015). And "[i]t is incumbent upon the . . . court to
sift through the claims . . . to determine the true character of
the dispute to be adjudicated." Firestone v. Cleveland Tr. Co.,
654 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Second, while it is true -- as we noted in Mooney --
that state law, depending on the nature of the claims in the post-
divorce suit, may provide for a further action in the probate
court, see, e.g., Carpenter v. Carpenter, 901 N.E.2d 694, 699-700
(Mass. App. Ct. 2009), or an independent action in superior court,
see, e.g., Reed v. Luther, No. MICV201101210, 2011 WL 6975979, at
*3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 2011), that fact does not decide the
question of whether there is federal jurisdiction, which is a
matter of federal law, see Dunn, 238 F.3d at 42.
In any event, Dawn's action is clearly distinct from the
model independent "enforcement" action conceived of in Mooney --
a suit to enforce compliance with a separation agreement's terms
ordering alimony -- and the converse action actually before the
Mooney court -- a suit to have the agreement deemed unenforceable
due to defects at contract formation. See 471 F.3d at 247.
Dawn does not seek to compel a payment actually due under
her agreement. And she claims she does not seek rescission, even
though the basis of her charge is also a defect at contract
formation.2 Disjointedly, she alleges she was induced to enter a
2 Mooney also pointed out a 1985 opinion of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Saltmarsh v. Saltmarsh, 480
N.E.2d 618 (Mass. 1985), which stressed that a party seeking
rescission of a separation agreement, on the grounds that her
"husband had made various misstatements to her on which she had
relied in agreeing to" it, should do so in the original divorce
court rather than assert that claim by way of an independent post-
divorce action. See id. at 620. Dawn's claims are strikingly
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deal for which she would not have bargained, but styles her
requested remedy as the benefit of what she bargained for. Yet,
since the agreement is silent as to the proper division of the
assets at issue, rather than effectuate the parties' manifest
intent, the federal court is asked to decide upon an equitable
distribution of marital property in the first instance.
As this court explained in Dunn, a single series of acts,
such as fraud, can give rise to many different kinds of suits,
including one for "civil tort [damages], [one for] divorce[,] and
surely [one for] the allocation of property incident to a divorce."
238 F.3d at 41. While certain types of contract disputes would
not fall under the domestic relations exception, the claims on
appeal in this case do. Unlike the tort suit in Dunn, which had
domestic relations overtones but asked the court merely to
adjudicate "breach of fiduciary duty[,] negligence and waste"
claims well within a federal court's competence, id., Dawn's suit
actually asks the court to perform a domestic relations function
reserved for state courts. Specifically, though her complaint is
drafted to sound in contract law (a request for damages for
breached disclosure and good-faith obligations), Dawn's suit calls
upon the federal court to determine whether certain assets were
similar to those described in Saltmarsh, which further reinforces
our conclusion. She does not brief whether Saltmarsh would
preclude her independent action as a matter of state law.
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acquired and held by Craig during the marriage and then to decide
what share of them should have been apportioned to Dawn upon the
parties' separation. The resulting "damages" award operates as a
sub silentio assignment of part of the Irishes' marital estate, on
top of the preexisting arrangement approved by the probate court.3
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 1A.
IV.
In concluding that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to the domestic relations exception
-- without considering any of Craig's other grounds for appeal --
we make no appraisal of the merits of Dawn's claims. We simply
hold that a federal court was an improper forum for them.
The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the
case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal suit
with prejudice for want of jurisdiction. The dismissal is without
prejudice as to the assertion of similar claims in an appropriate
state court.
So ordered. Each party to bear its own costs.
3 While not the basis of our jurisdictional holding, the
structure of the award that the district court ultimately granted
to Dawn confirms our concerns. In splitting assets 80-20 and 50-
50, the court did not calculate the sum of Dawn's damages from
breached disclosure and good-faith obligations so much as declare
what it believed to be an equitable division of those assets.
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