Corado-Arriaza v. Lynch , 844 F.3d 74 ( 2016 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 15-2227
    GUSTAVO ALBERTO CORADO-ARRIAZA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    LORETTA E. LYNCH,
    Attorney General of the United States,
    Respondent.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
    THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Lynch, Lipez, and Kayatta,
    Circuit Judges.
    Jonathan Ng, with whom Jason Panzarino and The Law Office of
    Johanna Herrero were on brief, for petitioner.
    Lindsay B. Glauner, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
    and Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director, were on brief, for
    respondent.
    December 19, 2016
    LYNCH, Circuit Judge.     Gustavo Corado-Arriaza petitions
    for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") affirmance
    of an immigration judge's ("IJ") denial of his motion to suppress
    and consequent issuance of an order of removal.        We agree with the
    BIA's affirmance of the IJ's conclusion that Corado-Arriaza did
    not present a prima facie case that the search and seizure leading
    to his arrest amounted to an egregious violation of the Fourth
    Amendment.     We see no need to reach the independent grounds that
    support the BIA's conclusion.
    The petition is denied.
    I.
    Corado-Arriaza,   a   native   and   citizen   of   Guatemala,
    entered the United States in June 2005 on a B-2 visitor visa that
    permitted him to remain in the United States until December 2005.1
    Corado-Arriaza does not dispute that he stayed in the United States
    beyond the expiration of his visa and resided, without lawful
    status, in Massachusetts until he was detained by United States
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents on February 27,
    2013.
    1 A B-2 visa is issued to a "visitor for pleasure" and
    permits the visitor to "be admitted for not more than one year,"
    though the visitor "may be granted extensions of temporary stay in
    increments of not more than six months each."            
    8 C.F.R. § 214.2
    (b)(1); see Ibragimov v. Gonzales, 
    476 F.3d 125
    , 128 n.2
    (2d Cir. 2007).
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    On that day, he was working as a cook in a restaurant in
    Wellesley, Massachusetts.2     At around 10:30 A.M., Corado-Arriaza's
    manager and the head chef asked Corado-Arriaza to help them with
    something.     Corado-Arriaza followed the manager into a fifteen-
    foot by fifteen-foot boiler room.         Inside the room were four men
    dressed in khakis and boots.          Corado-Arriaza's manager told him
    that the men wanted to talk to Corado-Arriaza and then left the
    room.
    Two of the men moved in front of the door to block
    Corado-Arriaza's exit.       They then identified themselves as ICE
    agents, and one of the agents asked him, "Are you Gustavo Gomez?"
    The agent showed him some papers, which he believed to be a
    warrant, that included a fuzzy black-and-white photo of a man who
    Corado-Arriaza said "was obviously not me."           Corado-Arriaza told
    the agent that his name was not Gustavo Gomez, but rather Gustavo
    Corado-Arriaza.      Corado-Arriaza later learned that Gustavo Gomez
    was a man who had worked at the restaurant before him.              When the
    agent asked Corado-Arriaza for his identification, Corado-Arriaza
    provided him with his Guatemalan driver's license.
    After   Corado-Arriaza    showed   the   agent   his   driver's
    license, the agents handcuffed his hands behind his back and began
    2 We take the facts from Corado-Arriaza's declaration in
    support of his motion to suppress, which the IJ and the BIA assumed
    to be true.
    - 3 -
    to question him about topics such as his date of birth and the
    names of his children.   At one point, Corado-Arriaza heard one of
    the agents say, "It's not a match.      The date of birth and the name
    of the wife and son aren't the same."         Nonetheless, the agents
    continued to question Corado-Arriaza about his identity, and they
    searched his pockets and his wallet.      Corado-Arriaza continued to
    tell them that he was not the man for whom they were looking, and
    he "feared that it was going to go on and on if I didn't answer
    all of their questions."
    When asked by the agents whether he had a green card,
    Corado-Arriaza answered "no," and did so "because I didn't feel
    like I had any option but to answer their questions."         At some
    point, Corado-Arriaza told the agents that his passport was in his
    jacket in the restaurant.   After the agents retrieved the jacket,
    they asked Corado-Arriaza how he had come to the United States,
    and he told them that he had arrived on a visa.
    Though the agents were carrying firearms, they did not
    brandish them or point them at Corado-Arriaza.      Nor does he allege
    that the agents yelled at him or threatened him.       Corado-Arriaza
    did state, however, that the agents never read him his rights or
    told him that he could call a lawyer.
    The agents then placed Corado-Arriaza, still handcuffed,
    in the back of their vehicle.   Corado-Arriaza overheard the agents
    saying, "What should we do with this guy?"         One of the agents
    - 4 -
    received a phone call, and Corado-Arriaza heard him say, "not the
    target, but we got someone else."         The agents then told Corado-
    Arriaza that he was being arrested for overstaying his visa.
    II.
    On   February    27,   2013,    the    Department   of   Homeland
    Security ("DHS") served Corado-Arriaza with a Notice to Appear
    that charged him with removability under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(B)
    on the basis that he had remained in the United States beyond the
    six months permitted by his B-2 visa.           On June 11, 2013, Corado-
    Arriaza, through counsel, denied the allegations in the Notice to
    Appear.   DHS filed amended factual allegations on July 19, 2013,
    clarifying the date that Corado-Arriaza was admitted into the
    United States (June 27, 2005) and the date on which his B-2 visa
    expired (December 25, 2005).     Corado-Arriaza denied these factual
    allegations.
    In support of its allegations, DHS submitted a copy of
    Corado-Arriaza's passport and an Arrival/Departure Form known as
    a Form I-94.    See 
    8 C.F.R. § 264.1
    (a).             The Form I-94 is a
    registration    form      that    "includes        the   collection     of
    arrival/departure and admission or parole information by DHS,
    whether in paper or electronic format, which is made available to
    the person about whom the information has been collected, as may
    be prescribed by DHS."      
    Id.
     § 1.4.      Corado-Arriaza's Form I-94
    lists his name as "Gustavo Alberto Corado Arriaza," his date of
    - 5 -
    birth as June 6, 1981, and his citizenship as Guatemalan.                It also
    lists his arrival date as June 27, 2005, and it is stamped with
    the date "DEC 25 2005," which the government identifies as the
    date through which Corado-Arriaza was authorized to remain in the
    United    States.        Corado-Arriaza     does    not    dispute    that     the
    information contained in the Form I-94 is sufficient to establish
    his removability.
    During    a    hearing   before    the    IJ,    counsel    for     the
    government informed the IJ that he obtained the Form I-94 -- after
    Corado-Arriaza's arrest -- by contacting United States Customs and
    Border Protection ("CBP"), which, like ICE, is an agency within
    DHS.   Corado-Arriaza acknowledges that the government was already
    in possession of the Form I-94 well before his arrest and that the
    Form I-94 played no role in his arrest.
    On December 9, 2013, Corado-Arriaza filed a motion to
    suppress "all evidence, physical and testimonial, obtained as the
    fruit of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's . . . unlawful
    search,   seizure,   interrogation,       arrest,     and    detention       which
    occurred on or about February 27, 2013."             Specifically, he moved
    for suppression of his passport and the Form I-94.             Corado-Arriaza
    argued that these documents should be suppressed, as relevant here,
    (1) because they were obtained as the result of an "egregious"
    violation of the Fourth Amendment, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. 1032
    , 1050 (1984) (plurality opinion), and (2) because they
    - 6 -
    were obtained in violation of DHS regulations.                 In support of his
    motion, he submitted a declaration attesting to the facts about
    his encounter with ICE described above.
    On January 14, 2014, the IJ, following a merits hearing,
    issued     an     oral   decision       denying   Corado-Arriaza's        motion   to
    suppress.3       The IJ correctly noted that the exclusionary rule does
    not apply to searches and seizures in civil immigration proceedings
    unless the alien can show "egregious violations of [the] Fourth
    Amendment."       
    Id. at 1050
    .        The IJ found that Corado-Arriaza failed
    to "allege[] facts in his declaration which, even if true, would
    provide a reason to suppress the contested evidence."4
    The IJ also noted that the government had stated during
    the hearing that the Form I-94 was obtained independently of
    Corado-Arriaza's seizure, and that Corado-Arriaza had offered no
    evidence        "that    the    ICE     agents    obtained    the     I-94    during
    questioning."
    On September 17, 2015, the BIA affirmed the IJ's denial
    of   Corado-Arriaza's          motion    to   suppress.      The    BIA   held   that
    3   Corado-Arriaza also filed a motion to terminate
    proceedings, which the IJ denied, and a request for voluntary
    departure, which the IJ granted.     Corado-Arriaza presents no
    developed argument independently challenging the denial of his
    motion to terminate. See United States v. Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17
    (1st Cir. 1990).
    4   Corado-Arriaza did not present a claim to the IJ that he
    was the subject of race discrimination, and he has not disagreed
    with the government's assertion that the claim was not exhausted.
    - 7 -
    "[a]ssuming the facts as presented by the respondent to be true,
    and assuming that his arrest was illegal (an issue that we do not
    need to reach), we uphold the Immigration Judge's determination
    that based on the totality of the circumstances, the respondent
    did not meet his burden of establishing a prima facie egregious
    violation of the Fourth Amendment."        The BIA explicitly rejected
    Corado-Arriaza's argument that he had shown egregiousness because
    he had felt intimidated and not free to leave, citing case law
    explaining that that did not render his responses nonconsensual.
    See INS v. Delgado, 
    466 U.S. 210
    , 216 (1984).        It also explicitly
    rejected his argument that it was enough to show that the agents
    were visibly armed, citing case law stating that the presence of
    a holstered firearm carried by a uniformed officer is unlikely to
    contribute   to    coerciveness   absent   active   brandishing   of   the
    weapon.   See United States v. Drayton, 
    536 U.S. 194
    , 205 (2002).
    It further found that nothing about the conduct of the agents
    undermined the reliability of the evidence DHS had proffered.
    The BIA also "agree[d] with the Immigration Judge that
    even if circumstances were considered to rise to the level of
    'egregious,' the DHS presented sufficient independent evidence to
    establish removability" through the Form I-94.
    In addition, the BIA rejected Corado-Arriaza's argument
    that alleged regulatory violations by the ICE agents warranted
    suppression.      The BIA also noted that whether or not the "arrest"
    - 8 -
    was    illegal       had    no    bearing       on     Corado-Arriaza's      removal
    proceedings.
    This petition for review followed.
    III.
    "Since 'the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ's ruling,
    and discussed some of the bases for the IJ's opinion, we review
    both the BIA's and IJ's opinions.'"                   Sauceda v. Lynch, 
    819 F.3d 526
    , 531 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Idy v. Holder, 
    674 F.3d 111
    , 117
    (1st Cir. 2012)).           We review the resolution of legal issues,
    including whether evidence is suppressible, de novo.                         Garcia-
    Aguilar v. Lynch, 
    806 F.3d 671
    , 675 (1st Cir. 2015).
    In    Lopez-Mendoza,       the    Supreme    Court     held   that   the
    exclusionary rule generally does not apply in removal proceedings.
    
    468 U.S. at 1050
    . This court has noted that Lopez-Mendoza provides
    "only a 'glimmer of hope of suppression.'"                  Kandamar v. Gonzales,
    
    464 F.3d 65
    ,    70    (1st   Cir.   2006)        (quoting   Navarro–Chalan     v.
    Ashcroft, 
    359 F.3d 19
    , 22 (1st Cir. 2004)).                 Specifically, Corado-
    Arriaza must have established that the search and seizure at issue
    amounted to an "egregious violation[] of [the] Fourth Amendment"
    that    so    "transgress[ed]      notions       of    fundamental    fairness     and
    undermine[d] the probative value of the evidence obtained," as to
    constitute a Fifth Amendment violation of the right to due process.
    Lopez-Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. at
    1050-51 & n.5.
    - 9 -
    Like the BIA, we bypass the question of whether there
    was any Fourth Amendment violation. See Martinez–Medina v. Holder,
    
    673 F.3d 1029
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e need not and do not
    decide whether the seizure violated Petitioners’ Fourth Amendment
    rights because we conclude that, even if [it did], the violation
    was not egregious."); Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 
    789 F.3d 434
    , 451
    (4th Cir. 2015); Martinez Carcamo v. Holder, 
    713 F.3d 916
    , 922-23
    (8th Cir. 2013).     We also need not spell out the precise conduct
    that would rise to the level of an egregious violation, see Garcia-
    Aguilar, 806 F.3d at 676 n.4, because it is plain from "the
    totality of the circumstances" that the conduct here fell short,
    see Martinez Carcamo, 713 F.3d at 922-23.
    We likewise reject Corado-Arriaza's alternative argument
    that suppression is warranted because, he alleges, the ICE agents
    violated two regulatory provisions: 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.3
    (c) (requiring
    that an alien arrested without a warrant and placed in formal
    proceedings be apprised of the reason for his arrest, his right to
    representation, and that any statement he makes may be used against
    him in a subsequent proceeding), and 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b)(1) ("An
    immigration officer, like any other person, has the right to ask
    questions of anyone as long as the immigration officer does not
    restrain the freedom of an individual, not under arrest, to walk
    away.").    These regulations, even if violated, do not furnish
    aliens   with   a   right   to   suppression   in   removal   proceedings.
    - 10 -
    Navarro-Chalan,   
    359 F.3d at 23
        ("[
    8 C.F.R. §§ 287.3
    (c)   and
    287.8(b)(1)] 'do not, are not intended to, shall not be construed
    to, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive
    or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil
    or criminal.'" (quoting 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.12
    )); see also, e.g., Yanez-
    Marquez, 789 F.3d at 474.
    IV.
    The petition for review is denied.
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