Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers , 844 F.3d 358 ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1267
BLOCK ISLAND FISHING, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
JAMIE ROGERS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Lipez, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Jonathan E. Gilzean, with whom David F. Anderson and Latti &
Anderson LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Thomas J. Muzyka, with whom Kirby L. Aarsheim and Clinton &
Muzyka, P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
December 23, 2016
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This case involves rulings of
some significance to seamen and their employers in this circuit,
as well as for summary judgment practice. Jamie Rogers, a seaman,
was injured on October 3, 2013, on the vessel F/V HEDY BRENNA.
Admiralty law entitles seamen who become injured during the course
of their service at sea to recover "maintenance and cure" payments
from their employers. Block Island Fishing, Inc., is the owner
and operator of the fishing vessel. Having made some maintenance
and cure payments to Rogers and believing it had overpaid, Block
Island brought this suit against Rogers to dispute the duration
and amount of maintenance and cure payments that it owed.
Block Island then moved for summary judgment on the
ground that its maintenance and cure duties terminated on July 31,
2014. It supported its motion with record evidence showing that
Rogers had returned to work as a commercial fisherman on another
fishing vessel in July.
The district court rejected July 31 as the proper date
of termination. But it went beyond the issue raised by Block
Island's summary judgment motion and found November 18, 2014 as
the date on which Block Island's obligations ended. That was the
date on which a doctor, but not Rogers' primary care physician,
found that Rogers no longer needed follow-up care.
The district court also noted that injured seamen are
generally entitled to maintenance and cure payments only in the
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amount of their actual living expenses, but it reserved for a jury
to determine the exact sum that Block Island owed Rogers, along
with other issues not resolved at the summary judgment stage.
Relatedly, the district court held on summary judgment that Block
Island had overpaid Rogers by calculating its maintenance and cure
payments using figures that overestimated Rogers' actual living
expenses. It further ruled that Block Island could offset the sum
of overpayment against any damages award that Rogers might win at
trial. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
As to the exact date on which Block Island's maintenance
and cure obligations ended, the district court erred by sua sponte
replacing Block Island's proposed date (July 31) with its own
(November 18) without giving Rogers sufficient notice or
opportunity to make his case against the new date. A summary
judgment order is premature where the nonmoving party lacked
"notice and a reasonable time to respond" to the grounds on which
that motion would be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
We agree with the district court's implicit recognition
that injured seamen like Rogers can generally recover only
reasonable expenses through maintenance and cure payments, and
that it will be the factually exceptional case where the seaman's
actual expenses are not reasonable. Whether this case presents
such exceptional circumstances is an issue for the jury. Finally,
as a matter of first impression, we adopt the ruling of the Fifth
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Circuit in Boudreaux v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 721 F.3d 723
(5th Cir. 2013), and hold that Block Island may offset any
overpayment against Rogers' potential damages award, but may not
sue for the sum in an independent action. See id. at 726–28.
I.
"Because our review of a grant of summary judgment is de
novo, we, like the district court, are obliged to review the record
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to draw
all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." LeBlanc
v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993). Although
there are numerous dates at issue, the core of the dispute involves
(1) when Block Island's maintenance and cure obligations
terminated, and (2) the amount, if any, of the maintenance and
cure owed. Block Island takes the position that it overpaid Rogers
based on an inflated rent amount that it believed Rogers to be
paying when, in fact, Rogers had found less expensive housing.
Rogers takes the position that special circumstances dictate that
actual expenses are not the appropriate measure here.
A. Rogers' Injury and His Various Residences from 2013 to 2014
In August 2013, Rogers and his family moved into a
single-family home in Bristol, Rhode Island. He paid the first
month's rent of $1,600, which included utilities, but he cannot
remember paying rent in subsequent months. In September 2013,
Rogers joined the crew of the F/V HEDY BRENNA, a commercial fishing
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vessel owned and operated by Block Island. For a fishing trip in
which he participated that month, Rogers was paid $2,892 in his
catch share for the trip.
On October 3, 2013, during another fishing voyage,
Rogers fell off the top bunk while sleeping and injured himself.
Three days later, upon returning from the voyage, Rogers was
diagnosed with a fractured rib and received medical treatment. In
October 2013, Block Island paid Rogers $1,752.37 in catch share
from the October 3 voyage and $475 in maintenance. On November 1,
2013, Block Island supplemented that amount with an additional
$175 in maintenance and $1,857.78 in lost wages. The total sum
paid from Block Island to Rogers over this period equaled
$4,260.15.
In November 2013, Rogers and his family were evicted
from the Bristol apartment and moved to a less expensive apartment
in Fall River, Massachusetts. He paid $625 in monthly rent,
excluding utilities, for the new Fall River apartment. On November
4, 2013, Rogers' treating physician, Dr. Christian Campos, gave
him a "fit for duty" slip and cleared him to return to work as a
fisherman "without restrictions."
Rogers' health worsened in December, however, when he
was diagnosed with pneumonia and was hospitalized for three weeks.
Rogers attributes the pneumonia to his rib injury. Block Island
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learned about Rogers' condition and hospitalization on December
19, 2013.
On February 20, 2014, Dr. Campos reported that Rogers'
condition was improving and that Rogers could "increase his level
of physical activity as tolerated without restrictions" while
staying on pain medication. On March 17, 2014, Dr. Campos
completed another examination and once again advised Rogers to
continue to "increase his level of physical activity as tolerated
without restrictions."
In March 2014, Rogers moved to Sparta, Tennessee, where
he lived with his brother. Rogers paid his brother $800 per month
as rent. Finally, in May or June 2014, Rogers purchased a 38-foot
boat for $2,500 and lived on that boat before returning to Fall
River in June.
On June 19, 2014, Rogers' primary care physician, Dr.
Melanie Cardoza, examined Rogers for pain in his lower back and
left leg. During this examination, Rogers told the doctor that he
had returned from a fishing trip the previous day and that he was
planning to embark on another fishing trip the next day. The
conversation demonstrated that Rogers had been working as a
fisherman in June. Dr. Cardoza's examination of Rogers' chest and
lungs revealed "normal excursion with symmetric chest walls and
quiet, even and easy respiratory effort with no use of accessory
muscles."
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By July 2014, Rogers was working on, and was physically
fit to captain, another fishing vessel, the KELLY ANN. But Dr.
Campos examined Rogers in August 2014 and provided him with a
letter stating that he was not yet fit to return to work as a
commercial fisherman.
On November 18, 2014, Dr. Campos examined Rogers again
and found that "his condition had improved to the point that no
'further formal follow-up' was necessary." At oral argument,
Rogers' counsel clarified that although Dr. Campos had discharged
Rogers from his care on November 18, he had "transferr[ed] all
follow-up care to his primary care physician, Dr. Cardoza, who was
also treating Rogers for his illness and injury."
B. Communications Between Parties Regarding Maintenance and Cure
In January 2014, after learning about Rogers' pneumonia
and hospitalization the previous month as recounted above, Block
Island hired Neil Stoddard of Marine Safety Consultants to
investigate Rogers' demand for maintenance and cure. From that
point, almost a year of correspondence ensued between Stoddard and
Danny Alberto, a paralegal employed by Rogers' counsel, regarding
the rate of maintenance and cure owed to Rogers.
In a letter dated January 9, 2014, Stoddard requested
medical records from Rogers' counsel to support Rogers' claim of
ongoing medical treatment. On January 24, 2014, Alberto responded
to Stoddard's letter and requested that Block Island pay Rogers
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$72 per day in maintenance and cure. Alberto cited the following
as Rogers' monthly expenses: $1,600 for rent, $119.25 for gas,
$61.28 for electricity, and $362.50 for food, based on the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's Moderate Cost Plan for a person of
Rogers' age living in a four-person family home.
Upon Stoddard's objection that Alberto had provided only
"cash receipts" with "nothing on them to identify them as a rent
payment," Alberto mailed Stoddard a copy of the Bristol lease on
March 27, 2014. (Rogers had vacated the Bristol home in November
2013.) This lease indicated that the monthly $1,600 rent included
utilities. When Stoddard discovered that Rogers had moved to the
Fall River apartment, and he further objected to the $72 daily
rate demanded by Alberto, Alberto responded that "he had provided
'all of Mr. Rogers['] living expenses and all of his medical
records'" and warned that he would pursue punitive damages on
Rogers' behalf if Block Island did not begin making the requested
maintenance and cure payments. At some point during this exchange,
Alberto also provided Stoddard with two utility invoices that
reflected two different addresses in Fall River.
In late June, Block Island paid $68,891.41 in cure to
Rogers' health care providers. Then, on July 23, 2014, Block
Island sent Rogers a maintenance check for $10,800.06 -- based on
a daily rate of $63.26 -- covering the period from October 2013 to
April 23, 2014, "the date of his last treatment record received."
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The $63.26 rate was calculated based on Rogers' $1,600 monthly
rent for his Bristol home and $279.80 per month in food. As the
Bristol lease reflected that utilities were included, Block Island
did not account for electricity and gas bills in calculating the
maintenance and cure rate.
On July 25, 2014, Alberto sent Stoddard a copy of Rogers'
Fall River lease, which reflected a monthly rent of $625 excluding
utilities. (Rogers had vacated this apartment in March 2014.)
After another threat from Alberto that he would seek punitive
damages if Block Island did not provide additional maintenance of
$72 per day, Block Island sent Rogers a second check for
$11,956.14, based on a daily rate of $63.26.
II.
On November 25, 2014, Block Island filed a complaint
against Rogers in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. Block Island sought a declaratory judgment on the
amount of retroactive maintenance owed to Rogers (Count I), on
whether it had any continuing obligation to pay maintenance and
cure, and on whether it was entitled to reimbursement for
overpayments resulting from Rogers' failure to provide accurate
and timely information about his living expenses and medical
treatment (Count II). On March 6, 2015, Rogers filed a
counterclaim alleging negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 30104 (Count I), unseaworthiness (Count II), continuing
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maintenance and cure (Count III), negligent or intentional failure
to provide maintenance and cure (Count IV), and lost wages (Count
V).
Block Island moved for summary judgment on its counts
for declaratory judgment, and on Counts III and IV of Rogers'
counterclaim. Block Island also sought $13,027.80, the amount by
which it had allegedly overpaid Rogers.
The district court granted in part and denied in part
Block Island's motion. First, as to its demand for reimbursement
for its overpayment, the district court agreed with Block Island's
premise that it had overpaid Rogers because his actual expenses
were lower than what Block Island believed them to be: "The
undisputed evidence is that Rogers vacated the Bristol apartment
[with $1,600 monthly rent] in November of 2013, and that his
monthly rent since leaving Bristol has not exceeded $800. It is
also undisputed that in calculating the daily maintenance due[,]
Block Island relied on the $1,600 monthly rent figure and that an
overpayment resulted." Nonetheless, the court relied on the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Boudreaux to rule that, despite the
overpayment, Block Island could not seek affirmative recovery of
maintenance and cure payments that it had already made. See 721
F.3d at 726–28. But the court did allow Block Island to offset
the sum of overpayment, to be determined by a jury, against any
damages award that Rogers might win at trial.
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The district court then denied Block Island's summary
judgment motion as to Count IV of Rogers' counterclaim, which
alleged that "Block Island negligently or intentionally failed to
promptly provide maintenance and cure prior to November 3, 2014."
"[A]s with most issues of negligence," the court explained, "the
issue of the provision of prompt and proper maintenance and cure
is a matter for the jury."
With regard to Block Island's summary judgment request
for declaratory relief "establishing a specific date upon which
its maintenance and cure obligations to Rogers came to an end,"
the district court rejected Block Island's proposed date of July
31, 2014 but sua sponte supplied its own date of November 18, 2014
to ultimately grant summary judgment in Block Island's favor. The
court noted that "[o]n this issue, the relevant question before
the court is not whether Rogers returned to work as a fisherman
(which could be explained by necessity as well as by cure)."
Accordingly, although Rogers had been working on the KELLY ANN in
July 2014, that fact was not dispositive of whether Rogers had
reached the point of maximum medical recovery, as Block Island had
argued.
The district court then turned to November 18, 2014 --
the date on which Dr. Campos had found that Rogers' health had so
improved that he required no more follow-up visits -- as the date
on which Rogers had reached maximum medical recovery and thus was
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no longer entitled to maintenance and cure. The court observed
that while Rogers protested that he continued to have trouble
breathing and to experience pain at the site of his injury, Rogers
"offer[ed] no medical evidence that contradict[ed] his own
doctor's evaluation that he had achieved the maximum feasible
recovery as of November 18, 2014." On that basis, the court
granted Block Island's summary judgment motion as to Count III
(continuing maintenance and cure) of Rogers' counterclaims.
The court lastly denied Block Island's request for
attorney's fees.
Rogers' interlocutory appeal, permissible in admiralty
cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) and our circuit's case law,
followed. See Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 419 F.3d 3, 6–7 (1st Cir.
2005); P.R. Ports Auth. v. Barge Katy-B, 427 F.3d 93, 100–01 (1st
Cir. 2005); Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v.
Unidentified Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1063–64 (1st Cir. 1987).
III.
We review de novo the entry of summary judgment. Hannon
v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2011).
A. District Court's Duty to Give Notice Before Entering Summary
Judgment on Grounds Not Stated in the Motion
Rogers' primary argument on appeal is that the district
court erroneously entered summary judgment on a ground that Block
Island had "never briefed, argued, or raised," thus depriving
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Rogers of due notice or opportunity to contest that ground. We
agree.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), a district
court may grant a summary judgment motion on grounds not raised by
the moving party, but may do so only "[a]fter giving notice and a
reasonable time to respond" to the opposing party. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(f). Our circuit has established two criteria that a district
court must meet before entering summary judgment sua sponte: First,
"discovery [must be] sufficiently advanced that the parties have
enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to glean the material facts."
Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted). Rogers does not claim that he did not have
a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
Second, the district court must "first give[] the
targeted party appropriate notice and a chance to present its
evidence on the essential elements of the claim or defense." Id.
"Notice, in this context, has two aspects: the summary judgment
target is entitled to know both the grounds that the district court
will consider and the point at which her obligation to bring forth
evidence supporting the elements of her claim accrues." Rogan v.
Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Berkovitz, 89 F.3d
at 31).
Here, Block Island sought summary judgment explicitly
and only on the ground that its maintenance and cure obligations
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terminated on July 31, 2014 because Rogers had resumed his job as
a commercial fisherman by that point. According to Block Island,
Rogers' return to work signaled that it need not make further
payments because "[m]aintenance and cure is designed to provide a
seaman with food and lodging when he becomes sick or injured in
the ship's service; and it extends during the period when he is
incapacitated to do a seaman's work and continues until he reaches
maximum medical recovery." Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531
(1962).
While the district court rejected the July 31, 2014 date
and the return-to-work theory, it independently, and without
notice to Rogers, determined that November 18, 2014 should be the
date on which Block Island's maintenance and cure obligations
ended, based on a theory of maximum medical recovery. November 18
is the date on which Dr. Campos advised that Rogers no longer
required follow-up care from him.
As a threshold matter, the district court correctly
noted the well-established law that a fishing vessel must continue
to make maintenance and cure payments until the point of maximum
medical recovery -- that is, the point at which an injured seaman's
"condition has stabilized and further progress ended short of a
full recovery." Whitman v. Miles, 387 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2004)
(quoting In re RJF Int'l Corp. for Exoneration from or Limitation
of Liab., 354 F.3d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 2004)). As a matter of
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summary judgment law, we hold that the district court nonetheless
erred when it substituted a new date and ground for summary
judgment without first notifying Rogers and giving him an
opportunity to dispute this new date and ground.
The court's decision to grant summary judgment based on
the November 18 date, notwithstanding the fact that Block Island's
summary judgment motion had focused exclusively on July 31,
deprived Rogers of the opportunity to argue and present evidence
that he had not yet reached maximum medical recovery as of November
18. Indeed, Rogers suffered prejudice as a result of the district
court's failure to provide notice of the ground on which it would
enter summary judgment. Had he known that maximum medical recovery
would be an issue at summary judgment, Rogers says that he would
have submitted additional evidence (already in his possession) of
further treatment with Dr. Cardoza, his primary care physician,
after November 18. In light of the lack of notice afforded to
Rogers, the district court acted prematurely when it concluded
that Rogers had "offer[ed] no medical evidence that contradict[ed]
[Dr. Campos's] evaluation that he had achieved the maximum feasible
recovery as of November 18, 2014."
Although Block Island concedes that it briefed only the
July 31, 2014 date and return-to-work theory, it argues that the
district court committed no error in entering summary judgment
based on the November 18 date because Rogers had been "fully aware"
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that maximum medical recovery would be a central issue throughout
this case. Block Island contends that Rogers had "a reasonable
opportunity to glean the material facts" on that issue during
discovery. But this argument misses the point. Rogers had no
reason to know that he would face the issue at summary judgment.
The district court has a duty to notify the nonmoving party of the
stage in the litigation at which his "obligation to bring forth
evidence supporting the elements of [his] claim accrues." Rogan,
175 F.3d at 79. That Rogers knew he would need to dispute that he
had reached maximum medical recovery at trial, is not the same as
knowing that the issue would be decided at summary judgment.1
B. Calculating the Amount of Maintenance and Cure Payments
Rogers also complains that the district court erred when
it allegedly ruled that the amount of Rogers' maintenance and cure
recovery is capped at the actual living expenses that he incurred.2
1 In vacating the district court's decision on the end date of
Block Island's maintenance and cure obligations, we note that we
need not and do not reach the question of whether a lack of notice
before a summary judgment ruling could ever be per se sufficient
for a vacatur absent a further showing of prejudice. Here, there
is sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that Rogers
was prejudiced by the district court's premature summary judgment
ruling on the end-date issue. The end date of the obligation to
pay maintenance and cure, in turn, affects the issue of the total
amount of maintenance and cure owed, and that, in turn, affects
the issue of whether there has been an overpayment.
2 Rogers' argument that the district court imposed such a cap
presumably comes from two places in the summary judgment opinion.
First, while recounting the governing law applicable to the
dispute, the district court cited Johnson v. United States, 333
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We understand differently the district court's statements on the
law governing the calculation of maintenance and cure.
We do not read the district court's statements on this
point as a ruling that limited, as a matter of law, Rogers'
maintenance and cure recovery to his actual living expenses.
First, the district court stated that an overpayment had resulted
in the specific context of determining "whether the court can --
or should -- do anything about the maintenance overpayment in a
restitutionary sense." That is, recognition of the overpayment
immediately preceded the court's ruling that Block Island could
not affirmatively seek to recover any amount of overpayment but
rather could only offset it against any damages that Rogers might
win at trial.
Second, our reading is bolstered by the fact that, in
the same summary judgment opinion, the district court refused to
decide whether Block Island had unduly delayed making maintenance
and cure payments to Rogers, an issue that is material to establish
whether Block Island's negligence contributed to Rogers' move from
U.S. 46, 50 (1948), and noted that a seaman is "entitled to recover
maintenance only for his actual living expenses." Then, the
district court listed the following three propositions as
"undisputed" for the purposes of the summary judgment motion:
(1) that Rogers vacated the Bristol apartment with $1,600 monthly
rent in November 2013; (2) that Rogers' rent since leaving Bristol
has not exceeded $800 per month; and (3) "that in calculating the
daily maintenance due[,] Block Island relied on the $1,600 monthly
rent figure and that an overpayment resulted."
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the Bristol home to a series of less expensive residences. The
court reserved this issue for the jury, noting that "as with most
issues of negligence, the issue of the provision of prompt and
proper maintenance and cure is a matter for the jury." By
assigning the decision to the jury, the court left open the
possibility that the jury might find that Block Island did
negligently delay in paying Rogers. This finding might, in turn,
impact the amount of maintenance and cure to which Rogers is
entitled.
In this circuit, as in numerous sister circuits, the
norm is to award an injured seaman maintenance and cure payments
in the amount of his actual living expenses. See, e.g., Johnson,
333 U.S. at 50 (affirming circuit court's decision to reject
injured seaman's claim for maintenance and cure because "there
[wa]s ample evidence . . . that petitioner had incurred no expense
or liability for his care and support at the home of his parents");
Hall v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) Inc., 242 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir.
2001) ("A seaman is entitled to the reasonable cost of food and
lodging, provided he has incurred the expense." (emphasis added));
Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 1990)
("Because maintenance is intended to substitute for the food and
lodging that a seaman enjoyed at sea, it is established that the
seaman is entitled only to expenses actually incurred. Thus, if
a seaman is not charged for hospitalization or lives with his
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family without incurring any expense or liability for his care, no
maintenance is due." (citations omitted)).
But the rule remains that an injured seaman may recover
reasonable expenses beyond the amount that he actually incurred,
even if it is the exceptional case where the seaman's reasonable
expenses will exceed his actual expenses. See, e.g., McMillan v.
Tug Jane A. Bouchard, 885 F. Supp. 452, 463–67 & n.13 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that injured seaman was entitled to maintenance and
cure payments even though he had paid no rent, after factfinding
at trial that the seaman had involuntarily moved in with friends
and family because his employer had refused to pay him
maintenance), abrogated on other grounds by Hicks v. Tug PATRIOT,
783 F.3d 939 (2d Cir. 2015); cf. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S.
527, 530–31, 533 (1962) (holding that injured seaman was entitled
to attorney's fees and to his wages earned as taxi driver without
offset, after factfinding that his employer had negligently
remained "silen[t,] neither admitting nor denying" its duty to pay
maintenance and cure for two years). Rogers argues that this case
presents just this kind of exceptional circumstance because Block
Island's delayed maintenance and cure payments forced him to vacate
the Bristol home and seek cheaper housing. That fact-bound
determination, however, is one for the jury. To the extent that
the district court could be understood as having ruled otherwise,
any such ruling would be error.
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C. Method of Recovery for Any Overpayment
Finally, both parties seek affirmance of the district
court's decision that although Block Island cannot affirmatively
sue to recover any maintenance and cure payments that it has
already made to Rogers, it can offset any overpayment (the exact
amount of which should be determined at trial) against any damages
that Rogers may win.
The district court properly relied on Boudreaux v.
Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 721 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 2013). There,
the Fifth Circuit faced a similar question -- namely, whether a
Jones Act employer, upon establishing that it overpaid an injured
seaman, is "automatically entitled to a judgment against the seaman
for benefits already paid." Id. at 725. The court answered this
question in the negative, observing that allowing for such
affirmative recovery would disturb a central policy of admiralty
law, which seeks to "achieve[] a fair reconciliation between
protecting seamen in the wake of debilitating on-the-job injury
and ensuring that shipowners can protect themselves from liability
for sums attributable to concealed preexisting injuries." Id. at
728. By denying the availability of affirmative recoveries but
allowing for offset against the injured seaman's damages award,
the court in Boudreaux strove to strike the proper balance. We
agree with Boudreaux's sound rule, as well as the rationale
animating it.
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We thereby adopt the Fifth Circuit's approach in
Boudreaux that "once a shipowner pays maintenance and cure to the
injured seaman, the payments can be recovered only by offset
against the seaman's damages award -- not by an independent suit
seeking affirmative recovery." Id. at 728.
IV.
We affirm the district court's ruling that Block Island
may offset any overpayment that occurred against any damages that
Rogers may win at trial.
We vacate the ruling that Block Island's maintenance and
cure obligations terminated on November 18, 2014, and remand for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The
district court did not provide Rogers with sufficient notice and
opportunity to contend otherwise before entering summary judgment.
No costs are awarded.
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