Burgos-Yantin v. Municipality of Juana Diaz ( 2018 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 14-1359
    CARMEN D. BURGOS-YANTÍN,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,
    v.
    MUNICIPALITY OF JUANA DÍAZ, et al.,
    Defendants, Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Silvia Carreño-Coll, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
    Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Emil Rodríguez-Escudero and
    Martínez-Luciano & Rodríguez-Escudero Law Office were on brief,
    for appellant.
    José R. Olmo-Rodríguez for appellee.
    Margarita L. Mercado Echegaray, Solicitor General, and Susana
    I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of
    Justice, on brief for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, amicus
    curiae.
    November 19, 2018
    Per   curiam.       This   appeal     arises    from     the   district
    court's     exercise     of    ancillary       jurisdiction     to     enforce    a
    resolution,    issued    by    the   Puerto     Rico    Secretary    of    Justice,
    directing the Municipality of Juana Díaz to indemnify two municipal
    police officers found liable under Puerto Rico tort law after a
    federal jury trial for using excessive force resulting in a death.
    The Municipality argues that the district court's order stretched
    federal    ancillary    enforcement      jurisdiction       beyond    its    proper
    bounds.1    We disagree and therefore affirm.
    I.
    Appellee and other family members filed this action
    after the shooting death of their relative, Miguel Ángel-Burgos,
    at the hands of the police.          They brought federal claims under 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Puerto Rico's general
    tort statute, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141.                       The complaint
    initially     named      the    Municipality           of   Juana     Díaz     (the
    "Municipality"), its mayor, and several municipal police officers
    as defendants.         In 2009, however, the district court granted
    summary judgment on the issue of municipal liability and dismissed
    the Municipality from the case.              Almost a year later, the court
    1 Consistent with our precedent, we use the terms "ancillary
    enforcement jurisdiction" and "enforcement jurisdiction" to refer
    to the inherent power of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
    by enforcing judgments "in certain situations where jurisdiction
    would otherwise be lacking." Futura Dev. of P.R., Inc. v. Estado
    Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 
    144 F.3d 7
    , 9 n.1 (1st Cir. 1998).
    - 2 -
    held a jury trial for the remaining defendants.                      The jury rejected
    plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, as well as most of their tort law
    claims.      It did, however, return a verdict for Carmen Burgos-
    Yantín ("Burgos-Yantín"), the decedent's mother, with respect to
    her negligence claims against two municipal police officers in
    their personal capacities.                The district court entered judgment
    against the two officers for $25,000 and $5,000, respectively.
    In       December    2012,    Burgos-Yantín        filed       a    Motion     for
    Execution        of    Judgment   2   asserting       that    the    Municipality           was
    "responsible for the payment of the Judgment" against its officers
    by operation of a Puerto Rico statute commonly referred to as "Law
    9."     See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, §§ 3085-3092.                           Law 9 permits
    Commonwealth          and    municipal    officials      sued       in    their      personal
    capacities       for        alleged   civil   rights         violations         to   ask    the
    Commonwealth to "assume the payment of any judgment" so long as
    they acted "in good faith."              
    Id. § 3085.
        With respect to municipal
    officials, judgments must be "defrayed from available funds in the
    corresponding . . . municipality."                
    Id. § 3092.
                The Puerto Rico
    Secretary of Justice (the "Secretary") is charged with determining
    whether payment is due under Law 9.               
    Id. § 3087.
               Here, the parties
    agree     that    the       Secretary    issued   a    resolution          in    April     2011
    2Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, "[a] money
    judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court
    directs otherwise." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1).
    - 3 -
    requiring       the    Municipality    to     pay    the    judgments   against   the
    individual defendants.3
    The Municipality opposed the Motion for Execution of
    Judgment, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
    enforce the Secretary's resolution.                  The district court rejected
    this       argument,     holding    that      it    had    "ancillary   enforcement
    jurisdiction" and inviting Burgos-Yantín to move for a writ of
    execution against the Municipality.                 Burgos-Yantin v. Municipality
    of Juana Diaz, No. 07-1146(JA), 
    2013 WL 435203
    , at *2-4 (D.P.R.
    Jan.       2,   2013).     Burgos-Yantín           subsequently    filed    a   motion
    requesting "the garnishment, attach[ment], or restraining of the
    Municipality of Juana Diaz's assets and properties."                    The district
    court granted that motion.            Burgos-Yantin v. Municipality of Juana
    Díaz, No. 07-1146(SCC), 
    2014 WL 1096016
    , at *3 (D.P.R. Mar. 19,
    2014).      The Municipality now appeals the district court's ruling.
    II.
    This case turns on the district court's jurisdiction (or
    lack thereof) to enforce the Secretary's Law 9 resolution against
    the    Municipality.         A     district      court     may   exercise   ancillary
    jurisdiction for two reasons:               "(1) to permit disposition by a
    single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,
    factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function
    3   The resolution itself is not in the record.
    - 4 -
    successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
    authority, and effectuate its decrees."            Peacock v. Thomas, 
    516 U.S. 349
    , 354 (1996) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
    
    511 U.S. 375
    , 379-80 (1994)).        Here, the district court relied on
    the second rationale, i.e., ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.
    Enforcement jurisdiction is "a creature of necessity,"
    which grants a federal court the "inherent power to enforce its
    judgments."      
    Id. at 356,
    359; see also U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D.
    Constr. Co., 
    230 F.3d 489
    , 496 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The jurisdiction
    of a Court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but
    continues until that judgment shall be satisfied." (quoting Wayman
    v.   Southard,    23   U.S.   (10   Wheat.)   1,   23    (1825)   (alteration
    omitted))).      But the scope of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction
    is limited by its purpose.      Such jurisdiction does not exist "where
    the relief [sought is] of a different kind or on a different
    principle than that of the prior decree."               
    Peacock, 516 U.S. at 358
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
    Likewise, ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is inapt when a party
    seeks "to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment
    on a person not already liable for that judgment."             
    Id. at 357.4
    4These principles apply both when the plaintiff invokes
    enforcement jurisdiction in a second lawsuit, as occurred in
    Peacock, and in the context of supplemental proceedings brought in
    the original lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69.
    See 
    U.S.I., 230 F.3d at 500
    n.10.
    - 5 -
    In this appeal, the Municipality argues that Burgos-
    Yantín's Motion for Execution of Judgment does not fall within the
    district court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction because the
    motion seeks to impose a new obligation on the Municipality to pay
    the "existing federal judgment" against the two police officers.
    The Municipality also rejects the validity of the Secretary's Law
    9 resolution and, consequently, the indemnification obligation it
    purports to impose on the Municipality.     Burgos-Yantín counters
    that the resolution is valid and enforceable.     Accordingly, she
    argues, her motion is an appropriate procedural mechanism for
    enforcing the judgment because, pursuant to the Law 9 resolution,
    the Secretary has determined the Municipality's obligation to
    indemnify the judgment rendered against the municipal officers.
    A. The Validity of the Law 9 Resolution
    The Municipality argues that the Secretary's resolution
    is invalid because the Municipality was given no opportunity to
    participate in the administrative process that led to its issuance,
    an omission that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico subsequently
    ruled improper in a different case.   See Municipio de Fajardo v.
    Secretario de Justicia, 187 D.P.R. 245 (2012).5    In Fajardo, the
    Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that in a Law 9 proceeding, the
    5 A certified translation of the Fajardo decision, originally
    submitted to the district court, is included in appellants'
    appendix. See App'x at pp. 138-46.
    - 6 -
    Secretary could not "unilaterally commit the funds of autonomous
    municipalities without even giving them the opportunity to be
    heard," and directed the Justice Department to "design a process
    that grants participation to municipalities when deciding to grant
    judgment payment benefits" that would have "the potential of
    committing municipal funds."      App'x at 144.   The Law 9 resolution
    at issue in Fajardo was voided, and "the matter was remanded to
    the Secretary to reassess its determination after hearing from
    Fajardo."    Burgos-Yantin, 
    2014 WL 1096016
    , at *2.
    As the district court's well-reasoned opinion explained,
    see 
    id. at **2-3,
    the decision in Fajardo does not help the
    Municipality in this case.       Under the administrative scheme in
    place at the time the Secretary issued the Law 9 resolution
    challenged here, the Municipality had fifteen days to seek judicial
    review of the Secretary's decision.       See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32,
    § 3087.     It did not do so.6   Hence, "by the time the Municipality
    first objected to the resolution -- after the [Puerto Rico] Supreme
    6 Puerto Rico's Uniform Administrative Procedure Law ("UAPL")
    provides for a thirty-day period for seeking judicial review of
    administrative decisions. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 2172. The
    Secretary's Law 9 resolutions qualify as administrative decisions.
    App'x at 143 (Fajardo, 187 D.P.R. at 258 n.6) (explaining that the
    UAPL applies to the Puerto Rico Department of Justice and thus to
    Law 9 adjudications).      We, however, need not consider the
    interplay between the two deadlines because the Municipality
    failed to meet even the longer one. See Burgos-Yantin, 
    2014 WL 1096016
    , at *2 ("In the three years since the administrative
    proceedings ended and the resolution issued, the Municipality has
    never sought to challenge it in state court.").
    - 7 -
    Court's decision in Fajardo -- the [Law 9] resolution was already
    final."     Burgos-Yantin, 
    2014 WL 1096016
    , at *2.
    The   Municipality     argues    that   notwithstanding       that
    Fajardo was decided in 2012, it applies to this case retroactively.
    We   disagree.     The    Fajardo   court    had   the   discretion   to   give
    retroactive effect to its decision, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
    § 3 annot. 1 ("The courts are the ones called to determine if a
    decision should be retroactively applied or not." (citing Pedro
    Quiles Rodríguez v. Superintendente de la Policía, 139 D.P.R. 272
    (1995))), but "[n]othing in [the opinion] purported to revoke
    final,     unchallenged   resolutions    previously      issued."     Burgos-
    Yantin, 
    2014 WL 1096016
    , at *2; cf. Pueblo v. Báez Cintrón, 2 P.R.
    Offic. Trans. 42, 50 (P.R. 1974) (stating that "[w]e do not find
    a grounded reason for imparting a retroactive effect to this
    rule").     Indeed, as the district court aptly observed, "it is
    worth recalling that the remedy that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
    required in Fajardo was forward-looking: the creation of a new
    administrative scheme that would give municipalities a voice in
    Law 9 decisions."     Burgos-Yantin, 
    2014 WL 1096016
    , at *2 (emphasis
    added).7    Thus, by the time the Municipality chose to contest the
    Secretary's Law 9 resolution, it was final and unappealable.
    7In an attempt to avoid the statutory time bar, the
    Municipality emphasizes that it challenged the Secretary's
    decision by filing an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in the
    Fajardo case.   This argument is meritless.   The Municipality's
    - 8 -
    Having concluded that the Law 9 resolution is valid, we
    consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to order the
    Municipality to make the required payment to Burgos-Yantín.
    B. The Applicability of Ancillary Enforcement Jurisdiction
    The Supreme Court in Peacock cautioned courts against
    exercising ancillary enforcement jurisdiction "over proceedings
    that are entirely new and 
    original." 516 U.S. at 358
    (internal
    quotation    marks   omitted).      The    plaintiff       there,   Thomas,   had
    obtained a judgment on an ERISA cause of action against his former
    employer, Tru–Tech, Inc.      After failing in his efforts to collect
    from the company, Thomas filed a new action in federal court
    seeking     to   impose   liability       on   a    Tru-Tech    executive     and
    shareholder, Peacock, based, inter alia, on Peacock's alleged
    siphoning of company funds to prevent payment to Thomas.                      The
    district court granted judgment against Peacock in "the precise
    amount of the [first] judgment against Tru-Tech."                   
    Id. at 352.
    The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that
    the district court had properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction
    over Thomas's suit.
    In   reversing,   the     Supreme      Court    rejected   Thomas's
    contention that his second suit fell within the federal court's
    expression of support for a legal argument asserted by a different
    municipality in a different case does not excuse its failure to
    preserve that argument in its own proceeding.
    - 9 -
    ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.                 
    Id. at 356.
           The Court
    acknowledged that it had previously "approved the exercise of
    ancillary    jurisdiction    over       a   broad    range   of   supplementary
    proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection
    and enforcement of federal judgments -- including attachment,
    mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudgment avoidance of fraudulent
    transfers."    
    Id. In this
    instance, however, the Court concluded
    that Thomas's second suit was not a means of executing the prior
    judgment,   but   rather    an    impermissible       attempt     to   shift   the
    liability imposed in the earlier litigation from Tru-Tech to
    Peacock.    
    Id. at 358.
       Indeed, Peacock had been named in the first
    suit but found not liable.         
    Id. at 351.
          The Court stated that it
    had "never authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a
    subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing
    federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment."
    
    Id. at 357.
    The Municipality maintains that the circumstances here
    are equivalent to those in Peacock because it, like defendant
    Peacock, was dismissed from the case earlier, and Burgos-Yantín is
    thus seeking to shift liability to a party "not already liable for
    that   judgment."    
    Id. The circumstances
       here,    however,     are
    materially different from Peacock.              Most significantly, the new
    claims in Peacock were premised on defendant Peacock's actions
    after the original judgment was entered, and the plaintiff relied
    - 10 -
    on a new theory of liability -- piercing the corporate veil -- to
    seek the recovery from Peacock that previously had been assessed
    against Tru-Tech.       
    Id. at 353.
           Here, by contrast, Burgos-Yantín
    is not seeking to hold the Municipality itself liable for its own
    or the officers' conduct.       That is, there is no claim of wrongdoing
    by the Municipality, nor is there any claim that the Municipality
    is liable for the conduct of the officers on some theory of
    vicarious    liability.      Rather,       Burgos-Yantín      is   attempting     to
    collect funds that the Secretary has determined the Municipality
    must pay to satisfy the original judgment rendered against the
    officers.    In other words, Burgos-Yantín is seeking to enforce the
    original    judgment    by   enforcing       the    Municipality's       statutory
    obligation, pursuant to the Secretary's Law 9 resolution, to
    indemnify the officers.
    We have previously distinguished between collecting on
    an original judgment and obtaining a new judgment in a separate
    proceeding against a new party.             In U.S.I. Properties, we noted
    that   courts    routinely      have   exercised          jurisdiction    over     a
    "postjudgment claim [that] is simply a mode of execution designed
    to reach property of the judgment debtor in the hands of a third
    
    party." 230 F.3d at 496
    .     We observed that "federal enforcement
    jurisdiction is clear" when state procedural mechanisms -- "such
    as garnishment or attachment" -- "allow the court to reach assets
    of   the   judgment    debtor   in   the    hands    of    third   parties   in    a
    - 11 -
    continuation of the same action."                
    Id. The Supreme
    Court in
    Peacock also distinguished the new action challenged in that case
    from the "broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third
    parties" that courts have allowed pursuant to their ancillary
    enforcement    jurisdiction      "to     assist     in    the     protection    and
    enforcement of federal judgments."             
    Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356
    .        The
    Court expressly identified garnishment and attachment as among the
    procedures that had been deemed permissible.               See 
    id. The Municipality
    argues that the rationale for allowing
    enforcement jurisdiction over proceedings seeking garnishment or
    attachment of a judgment debtor's funds held by a third party does
    not extend to funds "owed" as a result of an indemnification
    arrangement.        Indeed, we reserved judgment in U.S.I. Properties
    on   essentially      this   scenario:     whether       the    federal   courts'
    enforcement jurisdiction covers proceedings against municipalities
    that have contractual obligations to pay judgments on behalf of
    impecunious police 
    officers. 230 F.3d at 497
    n.6.          Although the
    indemnification obligation here arises by statute, rather than
    contract,     the     question   of    whether     indemnification        may    be
    equivalent to the mechanisms previously determined to support
    enforcement jurisdiction is the same in either situation.
    Now directly faced with that question, we conclude that
    Burgos-Yantín's        motion    to     execute        judgment     against     the
    Municipality, based on the Municipality's statutory obligation to
    - 12 -
    pay, falls within the district court's enforcement jurisdiction.8
    In practical terms, the jurisdictional inquiry here is largely
    indistinguishable    from    that   applicable     to   garnishment    or
    attachment.   The Municipality's obligation to pay the damages
    award won by Burgos-Yantín has been determined with finality under
    state law, and that debt is not based on the Municipality's own
    liability for the plaintiff's injury.9      Moreover, this is also not
    a situation -- like Peacock or U.S.I. Properties -- where the
    plaintiff asserted a new theory of direct liability.         See, e.g.,
    
    id. at 500
    (noting that the plaintiff's "claim is not simply one
    to collect a judgment already rendered but rather one to newly
    establish liability directly on the part of a third party").
    We thus conclude that the execution of judgment sought
    by   Burgos-Yantín   bears   a   much   stronger   resemblance   to   the
    8As we elaborate infra, we are not concluding that post-
    judgment proceedings based on indemnification will always fall
    within the court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.      As the
    Seventh Circuit observed, such jurisdiction may be inappropriate
    where "the additional proceeding    . . . inject[s] so many new
    issues that it is functionally a separate case." Yang v. City of
    Chicago, 
    137 F.3d 522
    , 526 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. City
    of Chicago, 
    120 F.3d 681
    , 684 (7th Cir. 1997)).
    9To be sure, garnishment and attachment are not identical to
    the indemnification procedure in this case.             Unlike the
    garnishment and attachment contexts, the funds at issue here were
    never the municipal officers' property, and, indeed, the
    Municipality must itself generate those proceeds. However, this
    factor   does   not   outweigh   the   similarities   between   the
    indemnification here and the enforcement procedures listed in
    Peacock that the Supreme Court viewed as within the federal courts'
    enforcement jurisdiction.
    - 13 -
    supplemental proceedings that the Court in Peacock identified as
    enforcement mechanisms than to the new action it rejected as
    impermissible.     To reiterate our observation in U.S.I. Properties,
    "[f]ederal courts have drawn a distinction between postjudgment
    proceedings that simply present a mode of execution to collect an
    existing    judgment   and   proceedings   that      raise   an   independent
    controversy with a new party, attempting to shift 
    liability." 230 F.3d at 498
    .10     Simply put, Burgos-Yantín is seeking to collect on
    a judgment from the party holding the proceeds she is owed.                As
    such, she is properly invoking the court's ancillary enforcement
    jurisdiction.      See Groden v. N&D Transp. Co. Inc., 
    866 F.3d 22
    ,
    29   (1st   Cir.   2017)   (explaining   that   in   ancillary-enforcement
    proceedings against third parties, a judgment creditor does not
    seek to impose new liability for a money judgment, but attempts to
    secure the judgment debtor's funds via a mechanism designed for
    that purpose); IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int’l Partners,
    LLC, 
    438 F.3d 298
    , 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (contrasting Peacock, which
    10Indeed, the Supreme Court in Peacock appeared to recognize
    this distinction when it described two prior cases as consistent
    with its holding because "[i]n those cases, we permitted a judgment
    creditor to mandamus county officials to force them to levy a tax
    for payment of an existing 
    judgment." 516 U.S. at 358
    . The Court
    went on to observe: "The order in each case merely required
    compliance with the existing judgment by the persons with authority
    to comply.   We did not authorize the shifting of liability for
    payment of the judgment from the judgment debtor to the county
    officials, as Thomas attempts to do here." 
    Id. We note
    that this
    enforcement procedure is very similar to the one we upheld in
    Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 
    368 F.3d 49
    , 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004).
    - 14 -
    "addressed whether ancillary jurisdiction was available to find
    primary liability," with a prior circuit decision that "dealt with
    ancillary jurisdiction to seek satisfaction of a judgment from a
    party    that    is   alleged    to   be    secondarily    liable    based    on   an
    indemnification agreement").
    The    Municipality     argues     that,    even      if   ancillary
    enforcement          jurisdiction      is      appropriate      based        on     an
    indemnification theory, it is not proper here because Law 9 makes
    the     indemnification         obligation      discretionary        rather       than
    mandatory.       We fail to see any significance in that distinction
    on the facts of this case.            Before Burgos-Yantín filed her motion
    for execution, the Secretary had exercised his discretion under
    Law 9 in concluding that the Municipality must indemnify the
    defendant officers.         As discussed above, the Municipality failed
    to challenge the Secretary's resolution either administratively or
    through appeal to the Commonwealth courts.                 Accordingly, at this
    point,    the    resolution     is    final,    and   it   imposes    a   mandatory
    obligation on the Municipality to pay the judgment on behalf of
    the officers.
    To be sure, in some cases, factual disputes or unresolved
    issues    of    state    law    may   counsel    against     assuming     ancillary
    enforcement jurisdiction over post-judgment proceedings based on
    indemnification.        As noted above, see supra note 8, we acknowledge
    that a proceeding that involves "so many new issues that it is
    - 15 -
    functionally a separate case," may be outside the scope of a
    court's enforcement jurisdiction.                 Yang v. City of Chicago, 
    137 F.3d 522
    , 526 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. City of Chicago,
    
    120 F.3d 681
    ,    684    (7th    Cir.    1997)).         Courts    have   expressed
    different views as to when the need to address state law issues
    forecloses    such    jurisdiction.              In   two    cases     cited   by   the
    Municipality, for example, the courts disagreed about whether
    unresolved    scope-of-employment               questions     precluded      ancillary
    enforcement jurisdiction over indemnification-based claims.                         In
    Yang, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal court could resolve
    the scope-of-employment issue.              See 
    id. at 526.
            The Sixth Circuit
    expressly    disagreed       with       Yang,    holding     that    a   "legitimate,
    unresolved dispute[] concerning whether conduct occurs within the
    scope of employment or authority deprives a federal court of
    ancillary    jurisdiction          in   a   garnishment       action     pursuant   to
    Peacock."    Hudson v. Coleman, 
    347 F.3d 138
    , 146 (6th Cir. 2003).
    In the Sixth Circuit's view, jurisdiction was improper when "[t]he
    City's liability under the indemnification agreement" had not yet
    been established.          
    Id. at 143;
    see also 
    id. at 144
    (noting that
    "substantial questions" remained concerning indemnification).11
    11
    The court in Hudson also noted that the plaintiff's "newly
    presented indemnity principle" was premised on "hold[ing] the City
    individually liable under the indemnity clause for the full amount
    of the Officers' 
    settlement." 347 F.3d at 144-45
    .     The court
    concluded that this theory of direct liability did not fall within
    the supplementary proceedings allowed under Peacock: "The type of
    - 16 -
    Here, we have no unresolved questions of law or fact
    concerning indemnification.         We have a final determination by the
    Secretary of Justice directing the Municipality to indemnify the
    two officers.         Burgos-Yantín's motion simply asks the federal
    court to enforce her judgment by ordering the Municipality to
    follow the Secretary's Law 9 determination, thus properly invoking
    the court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.
    C. Order for Execution of Judgment
    Having    determined    that    the   district      court   properly
    exercised    jurisdiction     over    Burgos-Yantín's       motion,      we    must
    consider whether the district court's order to enforce the judgment
    against the Municipality complies with Puerto Rico law.                       Under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, state law governs "not only
    the   parties'   substantive        rights    [concerning       execution     of    a
    judgment] but also the procedure to be followed."                  Whitfield v.
    Municipality of Fajardo, 
    564 F.3d 40
    , 43 (1st Cir. 2009).                          In
    ordering that "the judgment of $30,000 in favor of Burgos[-Yantín]
    be EXECUTED against the Municipality of Juana Díaz," the district
    court directed the appointment of a receiver for "any property
    garnished,     attached,    or   restrained        from   the     Municipality."
    garnishment proceeding referred to in Peacock does not contemplate
    making the garnishee personally liable on the judgment based on
    some independent legal theory as [the plaintiff] seeks to do in
    this case." 
    Id. at 144.
    - 17 -
    Burgos-Yantin,     
    2014 WL 1096016
    ,     at   *3. 12        Because      no   party
    addressed the issue, and we considered it important, we ordered
    briefing     on   whether        property    belonging       to       a    Puerto     Rico
    municipality may be attached.
    We now conclude it is unnecessary to reach that question.
    As we previously have noted, Puerto Rico law provides that the
    funds needed by a municipality to pay a court judgment must be
    allocated in the municipality's budget.13                See Acevedo-Garcia v.
    Vera-Monroig, 
    368 F.3d 49
    , 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004); P.R. Laws Ann.
    tit. 21, § 4303(c).         In Acevedo-Garcia, we went on to determine
    that a court order directing that "future budgets take account of
    a court judgment" does not create an attachment of public funds.
    
    Id. at 56
    (citing Librotex, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueducts & Sewer Auth.,
    138 D.P.R. 938, 942-43 (1995), for the proposition that "direct
    attachment of the funds of a public agency [is] impermissible, but
    an equitable order requiring the judgment to be included in the
    agency's next budget cycle [is] acceptable").                             We have thus
    recognized    that   Puerto       Rico   law   authorizes         a       procedure   for
    executing a monetary judgment that does not implicate our concern
    about the attachment of municipal property.
    12   This order mirrored the plaintiff's request to the court.
    13Law 9 also provides that if the municipality does not have
    enough funds to pay the judgment, the balance is paid by the
    Commonwealth. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3092.
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    Consistent with our precedent, and the law of Puerto
    Rico, the district court should enter an order directing the
    Municipality of Juana Díaz to allocate funds in its budget for the
    next fiscal year providing for the payment of the judgment at issue
    in this case.   To the extent that there are any issues concerning
    the timing of the preparation of the next municipal budget, or the
    way in which that allocation of funds to pay the judgment should
    be set forth in the budget, the district court should work out
    those details with the parties.
    So ordered.   Costs to appellee.
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