Smith v. ME Bureau of Revenue Services , 910 F.3d 576 ( 2018 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1573
IN RE: LELAND S. SMITH, JR.,
Debtor.
LELAND S. SMITH, JR.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MAINE BUREAU OF REVENUE SERVICES,
Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Stahl, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Christopher J. Keach, with whom James F. Molleur and Molleur
Law Office were on brief, for appellant.
David Yen and Tara Twomey on brief for National Consumer
Bankruptcy Rights Center and National Association of Consumer
Bankruptcy Attorneys, amici curiae.
Kevin J. Crosman, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Thomas F. Knowlton, Assistant Attorney General, was on brief, for
appellee.
December 12, 2018
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Maine's Bureau of Revenue
Services (MRS) has a claim for a tax debt owed by Leland Smith, a
repeat Chapter 13 bankruptcy filer. In this appeal, MRS and Smith
dispute the scope of the termination of the Bankruptcy Code's
automatic stay for repeat filers like Smith who file a second
petition for bankruptcy within a year of the dismissal of a prior
bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).
The filing of a petition for bankruptcy stays collection
actions against the debtor, the debtor's property, and property of
the bankruptcy estate. See id. § 362(a). Yet § 362(c)(3)(A)
provides that "if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending
within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed," id.
§ 362(c)(3), then this automatic stay "shall terminate with
respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing" of a
petition for bankruptcy, id. § 362(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
Before the end of the thirty-day period, the bankruptcy court "may
extend the stay" if the debtor or a creditor shows "that the filing
of the [second] case is in good faith." Id. § 362(c)(3)(B).
This case presents an important question, one of first
impression in the courts of appeals: Does § 362(c)(3)(A) terminate
the automatic stay as to actions against property of the bankruptcy
estate? Courts have divided. Some have held that § 362(c)(3)(A)
terminates the stay in its entirety, allowing actions against the
debtor, the debtor's property, and property of the bankruptcy
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estate. Others have held that it terminates the stay only in part,
allowing actions against the debtor and the debtor's property to
go forward, but preserving the stay as to actions against estate
property.
On this close question, we hold that § 362(c)(3)(A)
terminates the entire stay thirty days after the filing of a second
petition. We note that this only occurs if the procedure for
extending the stay, in which the debtor or a creditor has the
burden of demonstrating good faith, has not been successfully
invoked.
Our holding that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the entire
stay is based on the provision's text, its statutory context, and
Congress's intent in enacting the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) and § 362(c)(3)(A). We
first evaluate the parties' textual arguments and, finding that
they do not resolve the issue, next consider the statutory context
and congressional purpose. We ultimately decide that MRS's reading
is the only one compatible with the text, seen in light of its
context and purpose.
We affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court, In re
Smith, 573 B.R. 298 (Bankr. D. Me. 2017), which was also affirmed
by the district court, Smith v. Me. Bureau of Revenue Servs., 590
B.R. 1 (D. Me. 2018).
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I.
Leland Smith's first Chapter 13 case, filed in August
2011, was dismissed in October 2014 when Smith failed to make the
payments required under his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.1 Two
months later, in December 2014, Smith filed another Chapter 13
petition. This was also dismissed, in November 2016, because Smith
failed to make required payments. A month later, on December 28,
2016, Smith filed the Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition underlying
this appeal. Smith's last two cases, which were both pending in
the same one-year period, cause § 362(c)(3)(A) to apply.
Smith's December 2016 petition identified two priority
creditors -- the Internal Revenue Service and MRS. MRS has proven
that Smith owed $51,596.53 in state taxes, interest, and penalties.
Smith also identified numerous general unsecured creditors with
claims, including for unpaid credit card and medical bills. In
total, Smith said he owed almost $200,000.
The bankruptcy court eventually confirmed a plan in
Smith's December 2016 Chapter 13 case, under which Smith must pay
the trustee $800 per month for 60 months.
1 "Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code enables an individual
to obtain a discharge of his debts if he pays his creditors a
portion of his monthly income in accordance with a court-approved
plan." Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 64 (2011).
This process allows consumer debtors with a regular income to "deal
comprehensively with both unsecured and secured debts." 8 Collier
on Bankruptcy ¶ 1300.01 (16th ed. 2018).
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While this Chapter 13 plan was being considered, Smith
and MRS disputed the scope of the automatic stay. Under § 362(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code, Smith's December 2016 petition "operate[d]
as a stay" of eight types of actions against Smith, Smith's
property, and property of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a). Neither Smith nor another "party in interest," like a
creditor, had moved "for continuation of the automatic stay," as
allowed under § 362(c)(3)(B). As a result, by January 27, 2017,
thirty days after the filing of his December 2016 petition, some
part of the stay had terminated under § 362(c)(3)(A), the provision
we construe in this case.
At a hearing in the bankruptcy court in February 2017,
MRS moved for an order under § 362(j) "confirming" the extent to
which the automatic stay had terminated. Id. § 362(j). MRS argued
that § 362(c)(3)(A) had terminated the automatic stay in full on
January 27. Smith argued in opposition that § 362(c)(3)(A) --
specifically, the phrase "with respect to the debtor" –- meant
that the stay terminated on January 27 only as to actions against
the debtor and the debtor's property, not as to actions against
the property of the bankruptcy estate.
At the hearing, MRS explained that it had not yet taken
any action to collect estate property and that it sought
clarification because it "d[id]n't want to take the position that
the automatic stay is not applicable, then only to have a lawsuit
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slapped on" if it later chose to do so. See id. § 362(k)(1)
(allowing "an individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay" to sue and "recover actual damages"). MRS explained at oral
argument, for example, that it might later bring an action to
collect estate property if Smith were to default on his plan
payments.
The bankruptcy court ruled that the automatic stay had
terminated in full, including as to property of the estate. Smith,
573 B.R. at 299. As mentioned, the district court affirmed.
Smith, 590 B.R. at 19.
We directly examine the bankruptcy court's decision.
See Irving Tanning Co. v. Kaplan, 876 F.3d 384, 389 (1st Cir.
2017). There are no disputes about the facts, so we proceed to
reviewing the bankruptcy court's legal conclusion de novo. Id.II.
We begin with a close look at the provision's text and
the parties' textual arguments.
A. Statutory Background
The filing of a petition to begin a bankruptcy case under
Chapters 7, 11, or 13 "operates as a stay" of certain actions in
three categories: against the debtor, the debtor's property, and
property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). More
specifically, the filing of a petition stays:
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(1) the commencement or continuation,
including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before
the commencement of the case under this title,
or to recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or
against property of the estate, of a judgment
obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property
of the estate or of property from the estate
or to exercise control over property of the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any
lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce
against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a
proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning a tax liability of a debtor that is
a corporation for a taxable period the
bankruptcy court may determine or concerning
the tax liability of a debtor who is an
individual for a taxable period ending before
the date of the order for relief under this
title.
Id. § 362(a).
The automatic stay is a "fundamental . . . protection[]
provided by the bankruptcy laws." Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
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Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986) (quoting S.
Rep. No. 95–989, at 54 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 340
(1977)). It serves several goals of bankruptcy. It offers debtors
"breathing room" during the period of financial reshuffling.
Soares v. Brockton Credit Union (In re Soares), 107 F.3d 969, 975
(1st Cir. 1997). The stay also protects the debtor's assets from
"disorderly, piecemeal dismemberment . . . outside the bankruptcy
proceedings." Mann v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 316 F.3d 1,
3 (1st Cir. 2003). And it "enabl[es] 'the bankruptcy court to
centralize all disputes concerning property of the debtor's estate
so that reorganization can proceed efficiently, unimpeded by
uncoordinated proceedings.'" SEC v. Miller, 808 F.3d 623, 630 (2d
Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Lines v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. &
Indem. Ass'n (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir.
1999)); see also Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 33 F.3d 106, 114
(1st Cir. 1994) (same).
Congress, concerned about abuses of the automatic stay,
altered the stay's applicability to repeat-filing debtors like
Smith in BAPCPA. Before BAPCPA, the automatic stay "remain[ed] in
force" for all filers until specific judicial action lifted or
modified it, or until the end of the bankruptcy case. Soares, 107
F.3d at 975. BAPCPA added § 362(c)(3)(A), which states:
(3) if a single or joint case is filed by or
against a debtor who is an individual in a
case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a
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single or joint case of the debtor was pending
within the preceding 1-year period but was
dismissed . . .--
(A) the stay under subsection (a) with
respect to any action taken with respect
to a debt or property securing such debt
or with respect to any lease shall
terminate with respect to the debtor on
the 30th day after the filing of the
later case.
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).
Since then, two competing interpretations of
§ 362(c)(3)(A) have emerged.2 One view, advanced by Smith and
sometimes called the majority view, reads the provision to
terminate the stay as to actions against the debtor and the
debtor's property but not as to actions against property of the
bankruptcy estate. Another view, sometimes called the minority
view, was adopted by the bankruptcy and district courts in this
case, is advanced here by MRS, and reads the provision to terminate
the whole stay.
2 No circuit has yet weighed in, although a couple have
passingly noted in dicta that, under § 362(c)(3)(A), "the
automatic stay generally dissolves after 30 days." Tidewater Fin.
Co. v. Williams, 498 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Adams
v. Zarnel (In re Zarnel), 619 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating
that the stay "terminates after thirty days").
District and bankruptcy courts are split. The First
Circuit's bankruptcy appellate panel has twice endorsed Smith's
view, see Witowski v. Knight (In re Witkowski), 523 B.R. 291, 297
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2014); Jumpp v. Chase Home Fin. LLC (In re Jumpp),
356 B.R. 789, 797 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006), but both district courts
in the circuit to have examined the question have concluded that
§ 362(c)(3)(A) ends the entire stay, see Smith, 590 B.R. at 3; St.
Anne's Credit Union v. Ackell, 490 B.R. 141, 144-45 (D. Mass.
2013).
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B. The Parties' Textual Arguments
After a thorough evaluation of the parties' textual
arguments, we conclude that the text of § 362(c)(3)(A) does not
lend itself to one clear reading. We arrive at that conclusion in
two steps.
First, we address Smith's plain meaning argument that
the phrase "with respect to the debtor" unambiguously limits the
scope of the stay's termination. Finding flaws in Smith's
reasoning, we decide that this meaning is not plain. In the
process, we also identify oddities, including redundancy, in
§ 362(c)(3)(A) which lead us to conclude that strict application
of the canons of interpretation, including the rule against
superfluities, would be unhelpful here.
Having concluded that, second, we entertain MRS's
arguments. We doubt that the phrase "with respect to the debtor"
clarifies that the provision does not apply to the debtor's spouse
in a joint case. We are more sympathetic to MRS's argument that
the phrase "with respect to the debtor" is superfluous, and that
the operative language of § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the entire
stay. We find evidence that the phrase may be superfluous in other
provisions of BAPCPA (without any ruling as to whether those other
usages of the phrase are in fact superfluous). But we also notice
a tension between the simplicity of MRS's reading and the complex
verbiage of § 362(c)(3)(A).
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Finding neither party's reading clear, in later
sections, we proceed to evaluate the two possible readings in light
of the statutory context and congressional intent.
1. Smith's Textual Argument
Smith argues that it is plain and unambiguous that "with
respect to the debtor" signals that the stay terminates for actions
against the debtor and the debtor's property but not for actions
against the bankruptcy estate.3 There is a flaw in Smith's reading.
Further, as we discuss anon, the interpretive canons do not support
his argument, nor do indicia of congressional intent.
a. "With Respect to the Debtor"
A primary obstacle to Smith's reading is that the phrase
"with respect to the debtor" would most naturally be read to
terminate the stay only for actions against the debtor, and not,
as he reads it, for actions against both the debtor and the
debtor's property. See, e.g., In re Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 323
(Bank. N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting this anomaly); In re Bender, 562
B.R. 578, 583 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016) (same). Yet no court has
read the provision that way. See Reswick v. Reswick (In re
3 Other courts have agreed with Smith. See, e.g., Holcomb
v. Holcomb (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813, 815 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
2008) ("[W]e see no ambiguity in the language of the statute.");
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796; In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 2006).
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Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 367-68 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (observing
this). Nor does Smith ask us to do so.
Recognizing that obstacle, Smith says that the phrase
"property securing such debt" earlier in § 362(c)(3)(A) supplies
the necessary reference to property of the debtor. See In re
Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 365 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (offering this
same interpretation). But that phrase encompasses any "property
securing . . . debt," whether property of the estate or property
of the debtor. It does not support the distinction between estate
property and debtor property on which Smith's reading depends.
The location of the phrase "property securing such debt"
after "the stay under subsection (a)" and the combination of the
phrase with "with respect to a debt" and "with respect to any
lease" indicate that the clause summarizes the actions stayed in
"subsection (a)." That subsection stays actions against both
property of the debtor and property of the estate, so the phrase
cannot establish that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay for
actions against debtor property but not for actions against estate
property. Indeed, it suggests the opposite.
Smith's two other attempts to find this distinction
between debtor and estate property in § 362(c)(3)(A)'s text are
unsuccessful. First, he stresses that the bankruptcy estate is a
separate legal entity, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541 (defining
bankruptcy estate), so that it would be unnatural to read "property
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securing such debt . . . with respect to the debtor" in
§ 362(c)(3)(A) to include estate property. But Smith's reading is
the more unnatural one; it ignores the familiar legal distinction
between a person and his or her property. Just as creditors can
proceed against a debtor or against a bankruptcy estate, creditors
can proceed in rem against a debtor's property or in personam
against a debtor.
Second, Smith asserts that "with respect to," like the
term "'respecting' . . . generally has a broadening effect,
ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject
but also matters relating to that subject." Lamar, Archer &
Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1760 (2018) (construing
the term "statement respecting the debtor's financial condition"
in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)). As a result, Smith says, "with respect to
the debtor" should be read to encompass the debtor and his
property. But again the argument misfires: the bankruptcy estate
is as much a "matter[] relating to th[e] subject" of the debtor as
is the debtor's property. Smith has no explanation for why the
expander "with respect to" would not include estate property if it
includes debtor property.
Finally, Smith also searches unsuccessfully for his
distinction in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. He
emphasizes that § 362(a), which lays out the various actions
covered by the automatic stay, distinguishes among acts "against
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the debtor," see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2), (6), (7), (8), acts
against "property of the debtor," see id. § 362(a)(5), and acts
against "property of the estate," see id. § 362(a)(2), (3), (4).
He infers from this differentiation in § 362(a) that Congress
intentionally excluded a reference to "property of the estate"
from § 362(c)(3)(A) in order to preserve the portion of the
automatic stay covering actions against estate property. But Smith
does not convince us that the subparagraph at issue,
§ 362(c)(3)(A), adopts § 362(a)'s precise framework. None of the
"with respect to" phrases in § 362(c)(3)(A) mirror language in
§ 362(a). Section 362(c)(3)(A) references "property securing such
debt," but not "property of the debtor" or "property of the
estate." That the text of the provision at issue does not
explicitly reference "property of the estate" does not signify
that the provision leaves untouched the stay as to actions against
estate property.
b. Interpretive Canons
As we have just explained, the text does not render
Smith's reading the most likely. Smith argues that even if his
reading is not perfect, we should prefer it over MRS's because his
is consistent with several canons of interpretation. We think
not, and we conclude that strict application of the interpretive
canons would be unhelpful here.
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Smith refers to a handful of canons. First, he appeals
to the plain meaning rule, which provides that courts must enforce
a statute's language, however awkward, "at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd." Lamie v. U.S.
Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). As
we have said, the language at issue could have different meanings.
To support his argument that estate property would be
mentioned were it affected by the termination in § 362(c)(3)(A),
Smith also relies on the logic of "[t]he maxim 'expressio unius
est exclusio alterius' -- which translates roughly 'as the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of other things.'" Smith,
590 B.R. at 11 (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Ferrer, 599
F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2010)). That logic, of course, would lead
also to the conclusion that the stay is preserved as to actions
against property of the debtor, as we have just explained.
He next relies on the maxim that "Congress generally
acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another." Id. (quoting Dep't of
Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015)). We have
also already rejected that logic for § 362.
Finally, Smith presses the rule against superfluities,
which holds that we must "give effect, if possible, to every clause
and word of a statute." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404
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(2000) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39
(1955)). Smith points out that effectuating the end of the entire
stay would have required only the use of the words "the stay under
subsection (a) shall terminate on the 30th day after the filing of
the later case." MRS's reading, Smith notes, renders "with respect
to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing
such debt or with respect to any lease" and "with respect to the
debtor" superfluous. The rule against superfluities, he says,
means that we should prefer his reading, which gives effect to the
phrase "with respect to the debtor." His reading, as we will
detail, also ignores several of § 362(c)(3)(A)'s clauses.
The Supreme Court, most notably in King v. Burwell, has
warned courts to be careful about "rigorous application of the
canon[s]" where a provision may be "inartful[ly] drafted." King
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (discussing the rule
against superfluities). This is because canons like those Smith
cites assume that Congress has been able to choose each word and
to craft each phrase with precision, and with technical rules like
the canons in mind. So where it is apparent that a provision
deviates from those assumptions about artful drafting, strict
application of the canons "does not seem a particularly useful
guide to a fair construction." Id. King must be followed here.
Section 362(c)(3)(A) is not an exemplar of precision,
and that reality leads us to apply King's approach. The provision
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is a collection of "with respect to" phrases, and it is not obvious
how the phrases relate to each other, or how the phrases connect
to other related provisions. Yet expressio unius and the
preference for consistent readings assume that Congress has
drafted using a uniform and stable set of categories and terms.
This assumption does not hold for § 362.
Smith's reliance on the rule against superfluities is,
not only for this reason, but also for another, misplaced. At
oral argument, Smith conceded that his reading gives no force to
the first three "with respect to" clauses. Similarly, MRS's
reading does not give those clauses independent meaning. Given
this, we think the preference against superfluities is of limited
help in choosing between the parties' interpretations of
§ 362(c)(3)(A). See Ardente v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 744 F.3d
815, 819 (1st Cir. 2014) (rejecting application of the rule against
superfluities where "redundancies abound" (quoting TMW Enters.,
Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 574, 577–78 (6th Cir. 2010))).
2. MRS's Textual Arguments
a. "With Respect to the Debtor" in a Joint Case
We do not accept MRS's primary reading of the phrase
"with respect to the debtor." That reading depends on the need to
differentiate the debtor from the debtor's spouse. MRS argues
that "with respect to the debtor" clarifies that the stay expires
for a repeat-filing debtor but not for a debtor's non-repeat-
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filing spouse in a joint case. See, e.g., Daniel, 404 B.R. at
326-27 (adopting this reading). This argument is based on the
provision's terms; § 362(c)(3) starts by defining repeat debtors
as those with either "single or joint case[s]." 11 U.S.C. §
362(c)(3).
We disagree that this introductory phrase requires
clarification. Joint bankruptcy petitions are jointly
administered but generally keep the rights of the two debtors
separate. As a result, even without the addition of "with respect
to the debtor," it would be clear that § 362(c)(3)(A) is
inapplicable to the non-repeat-filing spouse. See id. § 302; 2
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 302.01-302.02.
Congress's failure to include similar clarifying
language at § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) further undermines MRS's spousal
reading. That provision reads:
if a single or joint case is filed by or
against a debtor who is an individual under
this title, and if 2 or more single or joint
cases of the debtor were pending within the
previous year but were dismissed, . . . the
stay under subsection (a) shall not go into
effect upon the filing of the later case.
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i).
b. Superfluity Argument
MRS next, and more plausibly, argues that the phrase
"with respect to the debtor" in § 362(c)(3)(A) is an example of
the imprecision and redundancy we have identified, and is not, as
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Smith contends, the key to reading § 362(c)(3)(A). To support its
argument that the phrase is superfluous, in the sense of providing
inessential or no additional meaning, MRS cites a survey finding
that all ten "stand-alone"4 uses of the phrase "with respect to
the debtor" or "a debtor" in the Bankruptcy Code were added in
BAPCPA and that all could be read as "filler." Peter E. Meltzer,
Won't You Stay a Little Longer? Rejecting the Majority
Interpretation of Bankruptcy Code § 362(c)(3)(A), 86 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 407, 430-31 (2012).
Our consideration is limited to the section of the
Bankruptcy Code at issue here, and we do not construe the other
provisions of BAPCPA cited in the survey. Suffice it to say,
however, that the examples discussed there indicate that Congress
may have used the phrase "with respect to a" or "the debtor" in
BAPCPA to reemphasize that a provision applied to the debtor rather
than to add new information about the meaning or scope of a
provision. In light of this pattern across BAPCPA, we agree with
MRS that it would be odd for Congress to have chosen "with respect
to the debtor" to articulate an important reform, one placing a
highly consequential limit on termination of the automatic stay.
4 There are uses of the phrase that could not stand alone
because they contain a qualifying clause. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 704(b)(1) ("With respect to a debtor who is an individual in a
case under this chapter . . . .")
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On the other hand, like Smith's reading, MRS's reading
of § 362(c)(3)(A)'s language is not obvious. MRS's interpretation
-- that the whole stay terminates -- is simple. Section
362(c)(3)(A)'s prolix "with respect to" clauses seem in tension
with this straightforward result. We have already rejected strict
application of the rule against superfluities, but we do find
relevant the principle behind that rule -- Congress generally uses
words to some effect. That common sense principle underscores the
tension between MRS's interpretation and § 362(c)(3)(A)'s
language.
III.
For the reasons discussed, the text of § 362(c)(3)(A),
including the phrase "with respect to the debtor," does not on its
own obviously support or obviously foreclose either party's
reading. So we turn to statutory context and congressional purpose
for further evidence.
A. Context
MRS says that its reading is a better fit than Smith's
with related sections of the automatic stay provision, while Smith
argues that MRS's reading is in direct conflict with paragraph
§ 362(c)(1). We resolve each of these arguments in favor of MRS's
reading.
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1. The Automatic Stay's Operation for Other Filers
The automatic stay operates differently for first-time,
second-time, and subsequent filers. For first-time filers, the
stay is automatic and permanent, at least until the bankruptcy
case closes or a court acts to modify the stay. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362(a)(1)-(2); id. § 362(d). And when a debtor has pending in
one year three or more petitions for bankruptcy, § 362(c)(4)
provides that "the stay under subsection (a) shall not go into
effect upon the filing of the [third or subsequent] case." Id.
§ 362(c)(4). Section 362(c) seems to establish a system of
progressive protections, so protections for second-time filers
should fall, as the bankruptcy court put it, "[i]n the middle."
In re Smith, 573 B.R. at 305.
We conclude that the most sensible middle ground, and
the one most likely intended by Congress, is found under MRS's
reading, under which second-time filers get the benefit of the
stay, but only temporarily (albeit with a procedure to seek the
stay's continuation). To be sure, protections for second-time
filers under Smith's construction also fall somewhere in the
middle. However, after a careful evaluation of Smith's and amici's
arguments about results, we deem the middle ground under Smith's
reading to be the less plausible.
First, we turn to amici's argument that termination of
the stay as to actions against the debtor alone does have an
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intangible benefit to creditors and detriment to debtors in that
it allows creditors to make collection calls. Although frequent
or aggressive calls from collectors may be exasperating for
debtors, cf. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S.Ct. 1407, 1416
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (documenting an aggressive
collection strategy), even amici ultimately acknowledge that
creditor contact is not a "tangible detriment" to debtors.
Second, Smith and amici argue that, under their reading,
tangible consequences flow from the termination of the stay as to
actions against debtor property. Creditors, they emphasize, would
be free to pursue a category of the debtor's property called exempt
property.5 A look at the purpose of exempt property and at the
law governing it shows why we think Congress, in reforming the
automatic stay, would not have been moved by this consequence.
The bankruptcy law, apart from the automatic stay, already provides
significant protection to exempt property.
The vast majority of the debtor's property becomes
estate property on the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See 11
U.S.C. § 541(a); see also Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S.
638, 642 (1992) ("When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, all
5 Property of the debtor also includes abandoned property
and property that does not pass to the estate. See In re Jupiter,
344 B.R. 754, 757 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006). But neither Smith nor
amici argue that lifting the stay as to abandoned property or
property that does not pass to the estate is consequential.
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of his property becomes property of a bankruptcy estate." (citing
11 U.S.C. § 541)). Little property remains property of the debtor
because, as a leading commentator explains, "In order to achieve
the[] goals [of bankruptcy], it is necessary and desirable that
the property included in the bankruptcy estate be as inclusive as
possible." 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2018).
Debtors are paid from estate property and a financial fresh start
is easier if property is consolidated in the estate. See id. In
the Chapter 13 context, the definition of the property which
becomes estate property is particularly broad, including most
property and wages that the debtor acquires pre-petition and post-
filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306; see also In re Jupiter, 344 B.R.
754, 760 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) ("In a chapter 13 setting, property
of the estate encompasses nearly all of a debtor's valuable assets
pursuant to § 1306.").
The Bankruptcy Code does allow debtors to claim certain
types of property as exempt from the bankruptcy estate. See 11
U.S.C. § 522. These exemptions facilitate the debtor's financial
fresh start by "let[ting] the debtor maintain an appropriate
standard of living as he or she goes forward after the bankruptcy
case." 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.01 (16th ed. 2018).
Consistent with this purpose, categories of property that are
helpful to a debtor in day-to-day living are exemptible. For
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example, values in a car, furniture, clothing, and benefits like
pensions tend to be exemptible.6 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
Significantly, in part because exempt property is
designed to help the debtor with basic expenses, bankruptcy law
strictly limits creditors' ability to pursue this property. Under
§ 522(c), with limited exceptions, "property exempted . . . is not
liable during or after the case for any [pre-petition] debt of the
debtor." Id. § 522(c).7 That is, "[t]his exempt property may
never be reached to satisfy a prepetition debt . . . ." 4 Collier
on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.01 (16th ed. 2018). Exempt property cannot
generally be reached by creditors regardless of the automatic stay
or of its termination.
Smith and amici do not address this general rule,
focusing instead on specific exceptions. They ultimately identify
four consequences of lifting the automatic stay as to actions
against debtors and their property: (1) certain governmental
creditors can collect tax refunds for non-tax debts, (2) certain
6 These categories of exemptible property are
illustrative. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.01 (16th ed. 2018).
States can opt debtors out of the federal exemptions and into
state-specific exemptions, so state law sometimes governs what is
exemptible. Id.
7 To the extent that state law governs in some cases,
states have similar restrictions. See Jupiter, 344 B.R. at 762
n.11 (noting that "state law prohibits a creditor from satisfying
any judgment it obtains against" exempt property). Maine's list
of property that cannot be attached or executed is found at Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 4422.
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governmental creditors can pursue exempt property to satisfy non-
dischargeable tax debts, (3) certain governmental creditors can
suspend a debtor's driver's license, and (4) creditors can make
collection calls.
Smith's and amici's proposed result makes less sense to
us than does MRS's. Had Congress wanted § 362(c)(3)(A) to
terminate the stay as to these four specific actions, it likely
would have enumerated those actions rather than signifying them
with the nebulous "with respect to the debtor." Further, Smith
and amici "do[] not explain why Congress would" choose to allow
these particular actions against second-time filers after thirty
days but not others. Appling, 138 S. Ct. at 1761. We doubt that
Congress would have "draw[n] such seemingly arbitrary
distinctions" between second-time and other repeat filers. Id.In the end, MRS's view that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic
stay in full after thirty days fits better with the operation of
the stay for all types of filers.
2. Extension of the Automatic Stay for Second-Time Filers
MRS next argues that its reading fits better with the
provisions governing extensions of the automatic stay for second-
time filers. As stated, § 362(c)(3)(B) allows the bankruptcy court
to extend the temporary automatic stay before it expires at the
request of a debtor or a creditor and on a showing of good faith
as to the creditors being stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B). For
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purposes of the extension, "a case is presumptively filed not in
good faith" for several categories of filers, including filers
like Smith whose previous case was dismissed for failure to
"perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court." Id.§ 362(c)(3)(C). However, that "presumption may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence." Id.
Under Smith's reading, this scheme makes less sense than
it does under MRS's, for at least two reasons. First, it is hard
to imagine that Congress would develop a process for extensions,
and lay it out in such detail, if extensions would be needed only
in the event that one of the four consequences Smith and amici
identify were threatened. Second, rather than allowing only a
debtor to move for an extension, Congress allowed any "party in
interest," including a creditor, to move to extend the stay. Id.
§ 362(c)(3)(B); see also id. § 1109(b). Most likely, Congress
anticipated that a creditor might move to extend the stay to
prevent another creditor from reaching, and draining, estate
property in a separate action during the bankruptcy process. That
situation would arise only under MRS's reading.
Smith and amici do acknowledge that Congress was
concerned with creditor actions against estate property outside of
the bankruptcy process. They argue that § 362(c)(3)(B) extensions
would be inadequate to protect estate property, however, and that
as a result § 362(c)(3)(A) must be read to preserve the stay as to
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estate property. Smith and amici emphasize that a debtor's
creditors will be paid from estate property, so that its protection
from piecemeal distribution is essential to the success of an
individual bankruptcy case, and to advancing the broader purposes
of bankruptcy. See, e.g., 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 541.01 (16th
ed. 2018) (explaining how the estate and the stay work in tandem
to achieve certain purposes of bankruptcy).
When read alongside § 362(c)(3)(B)'s extension process,
MRS's interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A) is consistent with these
goals of bankruptcy. A second-time filer with a meritorious
bankruptcy case, or a creditor whose self-interest dictates it,
may get an extension of the stay on "demonstrat[ing] that the
filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to
be stayed." 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B). Notably, courts must act
quickly on these requests; Congress provided that any hearing on
a request for an extension must be "completed before the expiration
of the 30-day period." Id. Section 362(c)(3)(B) reflects an
attempt by Congress to ensure that certain second-time filers who
meet an enhanced burden have an escape route from the termination
of the entire automatic stay, including as to actions against
estate property.
3. Smith's Conflict Argument
Finally, Smith argues that MRS's reading of
§ 362(c)(3)(A) would conflict with § 362(c)(1), which states, "the
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stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a)
of this section continues until such property is no longer property
of the estate." Id. § 362(c)(1).
Smith misreads the provision. As he sees it, this is a
mandate that the automatic stay remain in effect indefinitely for
estate property. Not so. Properly read, the provision is
narrower, and more technical. It works with § 362(c)(2) to define
precisely the timing of the dissolution of the stay for different
types of actions. Specifically, under § 362(c)(1), the stay
"continues until [estate] property is no longer property of the
estate." Id. § 362(c)(1). And under § 362(c)(2), "the stay of
any other act under subsection (a) continues until . . . the time
the case is closed" or "the time the case is dismissed" or a
"discharge is granted or denied." Id. § 362(c)(2); see also
Bigelow v. Comm'r, 65 F.3d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1995) (summarizing
the provision's operation). These instructions are applicable
only as long as the stay has not otherwise lifted under
§ 362(c)(3)(A), or some other provision. MRS's reading creates no
conflict with § 362(c)(1).
B. Congressional Intent
Having concluded that MRS's reading is a better fit with
the statutory context, we turn to congressional intent. Smith
argues that looking at legislative purpose and history is
inappropriate because the language of the statute is plain. As
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explained, we disagree that the statute's words are so clear. And
we do not think that legislative purpose and history should be
disregarded in interpreting § 362(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court
often consults legislative history in bankruptcy decisions to
ensure that its interpretations are consistent with Congress's
purposes. See, e.g., Appling, 138 S. Ct. at 1763-64; Ransom v.
FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 71 (2011); Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 236 n.3 (2010).
Our analysis of that history shows that MRS's reading better
reflects Congress's intent in enacting BAPCPA and § 362(c)(3)(A)
in particular.
BAPCPA aimed "to correct perceived abuses of the
bankruptcy system." Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 231-32. Milavetz, for
example, interpreted BAPCPA's bar on debt relief agencies
"advis[ing]" clients "to incur more debt in contemplation of such
person filing a" bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4). In light
of BAPCPA's purpose, as well as other evidence, Milavetz construed
this language as a bar only on advice "in contemplation of" an
abusive filing. That is, the provision "prohibits a debt relief
agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the
debtor is filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose."
Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 243. We turn to BAPCPA's legislative history
to build on Milavetz's basic instruction about Congress's intent.
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At "[t]he heart of [BAPCPA's] consumer bankruptcy
reforms," the House Judiciary Committee report accompanying BAPCPA
said, were "provisions intended to deter serial and abusive
bankruptcy filings." H.R. Rep. No. 109–31(I), at 2 (2005);8 see
also Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform: Congressional
Crackdown on Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, 89 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 241, 242 (2015). Among these reforms was § 362(c)(3)(A).
Congress described that provision as an "amend[ment to] section
362(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to terminate the automatic stay
within 30 days in a chapter 7, 11, or 13 case filed by or against
an individual if such individual was a debtor in a previously
dismissed case pending within the preceding one-year period." H.R.
Rep. No. 109–31(I), at 69 (2005). Notably, this description
reflects MRS's, but not Smith's, interpretation.
The provision was designed to "Discourag[e] Bankruptcy
Abuse," and in particular, to "Discourag[e] Bad Faith Repeat
Filings" -- that is, filing for the benefit of triggering the
automatic stay, rather than for some valid reason. Id. This
purpose is best achieved by interpreting § 362(c)(3)(A) to
8 The Supreme Court relied on this House Judiciary
Committee Report in Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. to determine
that "Congress designed the means test," the formula at issue in
Ransom, "to measure debtors' disposable income and, in that way,
'to ensure that [they] repay creditors the maximum they can
afford.'" Ransom, 562 U.S. at 71 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109–31(I),
at 2 (2005)). "[C]onsideration of [this] purpose strengthen[ed]"
the Court's reading of the term at issue. Id.- 31 -
terminate the entire stay, including as to estate property. The
portion of the stay that is most valuable to a bankruptcy
petitioner, just as to a creditor, is the portion that protects
estate property.
Further evidence for the conclusion that the legislative
purpose and history support MRS's reading comes from BAPCPA's
precursor legislation. In 1998, Congress attempted reform of the
Bankruptcy Code, including an amendment that was "essentially
identical" to § 362(c)(3)(A). Reswick, 446 B.R. at 372; see also
id. at 371 n.8, 372 n.9 (quoting the House and Senate versions of
the earlier amendment). Even though that legislation was vetoed,
see S. Rep. 107-19, at 88 (2001), we look to its purposes, given
the uniformity of its language with the language of the provision
at issue.
Congress drafted the earlier legislation based in part
on a report by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission that
highlighted the problem of debtors
fil[ing] for chapter 13 . . . on the eve of a
foreclosure or eviction for the sole purpose
of delaying the state legal process. When the
threat passes, they dismiss their cases, only
to file again when the mortgagee or landlord
brings another legal action to seize control
of the property.
Nat'l Bankr. Review Comm'n, Report of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission, § 1.5.5, 278-79 (Oct. 20, 1997) (footnote
omitted).
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This concern -- abuse of the automatic stay, especially
in Chapter 13 cases -- animated the precursor to § 362(c)(3)(A).
In 1998, Congress explained that the amendment aimed to "reduce
abuses of the bankruptcy system by reducing the incentive to file
for bankruptcy repeatedly without completing the bankruptcy
process." S. Rep. No. 105-253, at 39 (1998). As the 1998 House
report described, echoing the Commission, "Some debtors file
successive bankruptcy cases to prevent secured creditors from
foreclosing on their collateral. [The change to the automatic
stay] remedies this problem by terminating the automatic stay in
cases filed by an individual debtor . . . if his or her prior case
was dismissed within the preceding year." H.R. Rep. No. 105-540,
at 80 (1998).
Significantly for present purposes, the proposed 1998
amendment was substantially identical to § 362(c)(3)(A). However,
the 1998 version was to apply not only to second-time but also to
third-time and subsequent filers, see S. Rep. 105-253, at 39
(1998), and that alone makes Smith's reading unlikely. The authors
of the 1998 bill, aiming to deter and discipline even the most
egregious abuses, would probably not have designed a provision
with the limited effects of Smith's reading. More likely, and
consistent with MRS's reading of the language, the 1998 Congress
intended to terminate the automatic stay after thirty days for all
repeat filers. Then, in BAPCPA, the 2005 Congress did two things.
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First, it added § 362(c)(4) stating that the stay does not enter
for the worst abusers, third-time and subsequent filers. Second,
for second-time filers, Congress simply imported the language from
the 1998 proposal into § 362(c)(3)(A). If Congress had intended
to change the 1998 language's meaning or scope, we would expect
that shift to be reflected in the BAPCPA House Report, or elsewhere
in BAPCPA's legislative history. Instead, as mentioned, the 2005
Congress described § 362(c)(3)(A) as "terminat[ing] the automatic
stay within 30 days." H.R. Rep. No. 109–31(I), at 69 (2005).
IV.
Based on the provision's text, the statutory context,
and Congress's intent in enacting BAPCPA, we hold that
§ 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the entire automatic stay –- as to
actions against the debtor, the debtor's property, and property of
the bankruptcy estate -- after thirty days for second-time filers.
We affirm the order of the bankruptcy court. Costs are
awarded to MRS.
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