Motta v. INS ( 1995 )


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    O c t o b e r 5 , 1 9 9 5
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ______________________



    No. 95-1112


    ANTONIO JOSE P. MOTTA,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICES,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    _______________

    ERRATA SHEET ERRATA SHEET


    The opinion of this Court issued on August 8, 1995, is
    amended as follows:

    Page 2, line 12: Delete "INS's"




































    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 95-1112

    ANTONIO JOSE P. MOTTA,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICES,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    Charles E. Pazar, Attorney, Office of Immigration, Civil ___________________
    Division, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil _______________
    Division, and Emily Anne Radford, Office of Immigration Litigation, ___________________
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, were on brief for
    appellant.
    Joseph S. Callahan for appellee. __________________

    ____________________

    August 8, 1995
    ____________________






    2













    Per Curiam. Respondent-appellant, the District ___________

    Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

    ("INS"), appeals from the judgment of the district court

    regarding appellee Antonio Jose Pacheco Motta's petition for

    writ of habeas corpus. Motta v. District Director, INS, 869 _____ ______________________

    F. Supp. 80, 98 (D. Mass. 1994). Facing imminent deportation

    under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(I) (Supp. V 1994), Motta

    petitioned for the writ, alleging that his right to Due

    Process under the Fifth Amendment had been violated during

    the course of his earlier deportation proceedings. Although

    the district court did not order his release, it stayed his

    deportation until the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")

    could issue a decision on Motta's pending motion to reopen

    his deportation proceeding, and for ninety days thereafter to

    permit review of that decision, if necessary, by the U.S.

    Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Id. The INS ___

    appealed. The BIA has not yet issued a decision.

    During oral argument, we raised with counsel the

    possibility that a settlement might be in the best interests

    of both parties. Counsel for the INS indicated that the INS

    might be willing to extend to Motta a temporary stay of

    deportation comparable to that ordered by the district court

    if the lower court decision establishing what the INS sees

    as a dangerous and erroneous precedent were vacated.

    Counsel for Motta indicated that this might be a desirable



    -3- 3













    resolution for his client as well, since it removes any risk

    that this Court would agree with the INS and reverse the

    district court's stay of deportation. At the end of

    argument, we directed counsel to discuss a possible

    settlement with their clients and to advise this Court within

    10 days as to whether such an agreement would be possible.

    The INS subsequently informed this Court that the INS would

    stay Motta's deportation during the pendency of his appeal to

    the BIA and for an additional ten days thereafter to afford

    time to file a petition for review before the Court of

    Appeals, if necessary. Motta's counsel has indicated that he

    accepts the tendered INS stay.

    There now being no actual controversy between the

    two parties, we hold that this appeal is moot and vacate the

    lower court's decision. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., _____________ _________________

    340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1951). In vacating the lower court's

    decision, we have taken pains to consider whether this appeal

    falls within the Supreme Court's prohibition against vacatur

    in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 _________________________ _______________________

    S. Ct. 386 (1994). We conclude that it does not. In

    Bancorp, the Court held that "[w]here mootness results from _______

    settlement . . . , the losing party has voluntarily forfeited

    his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or

    certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable





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    remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but

    simply unreviewed by his own choice." Id. at 392. ___

    Here, given the different posture of this case, the

    equities plainly favor vacatur. The INS did not by its own

    initiative relinquish its right to vacatur, as the petitioner

    did in Bancorp. Rather, the INS has at all times sought to _______

    pursue its appeal; it has agreed to consider settlement only

    at the suggestion of this Court, the proposed settlement

    being an inexpensive, simple, and speedy way to accommodate

    the interests of both parties. As the INS has not initiated

    the relinquishment of its right to the remedy, the same

    equitable calculus underlying Bancorp is not present. Nor, _______

    given this Court's involvement and initiative in the

    proceedings, does vacatur in this case implicate the concerns

    expressed by the Bancorp Court about giving parties undue _______

    control over judicial precedents. We see no appreciable harm

    to the orderly functioning of the federal judicial system by

    vacating judgment.

    To be sure, it can be argued that depriving the

    public and the judicial system of the precedential value of

    the district court's opinion works a kind of harm. But we do

    not believe that such a species of harm is entitled to take

    priority over the parties' best interests. Placing the

    former above the latter would be inequitable. This case

    contrasts with the usual appeal, where vacatur is only one



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    consideration among others in a settlement. Here, the INS,

    as a repeat player before the courts, is primarily concerned _________

    with the precedential effect of the decision below. If that

    decision stands, all possibility of a settlement is

    eliminated. If it is vacated, the appellee acquires the

    absolute certainty of not being deported, while the

    government saves the costs and risk of litigation a win

    for both sides. It is true the Bancorp Court discusses and _______

    rejects the possible impact of its rule in discouraging

    settlements. Id. at 393. But it does so in aggregate, ___

    saying in the end that "[w]e find it quite impossible to

    assess the effect of our holding, either way, upon the

    frequency or systemic value of settlement." In this case, by

    contrast, the negative impact on settlement is absolutely

    clear. We think this case presents "exceptional

    circumstances" to which the Court referred in Bancorp. _______

    We accordingly vacate the district court's decision

    and remand with directions to dismiss this suit as moot. We

    also deny, as moot, the INS's pending motion for leave to

    file a supplemental brief. Each party will bear its own

    costs.

    So ordered. __________









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Document Info

Docket Number: 95-1112

Filed Date: 10/5/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015