Cullen v. Janvrin ( 2016 )


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  •                   Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 16-1004
    ANDREW S.F. CULLEN,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    NEAL JANVRIN, individually and in his official capacity as the
    Chief of Police of the Fremont Police Department; ADAM A.
    RAYMOND, individually and in his official capacity as a police
    officer of the Fremont Police Department; TOWN OF FREMONT, NEW
    HAMPSHIRE,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    [Hon. Paul Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Lynch, and Barron,
    Circuit Judges.
    Jacob J.B. Marvelley, with whom Paul McEachern and Shaines &
    McEachern, PA were on brief, for appellant.
    Caroline K. Leonard, with whom Charles P. Bauer and Gallagher,
    Callahan & Gartrell, P.C. were on brief, for appellees.
    September 21, 2016
    Per curiam.   Andrew S.F. Cullen ("Cullen") appeals the
    district court's grant of summary judgment for the Town of Fremont,
    New Hampshire and two of its police officers on his claim, brought
    under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that he was arrested -- for allegedly
    raping a mentally handicapped woman -- without probable cause in
    violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
    Cullen   argued   that   the   officers   intentionally   or
    recklessly (1) crafted an arrest-warrant application that was
    arguably misleading in light of the facts they knew and (2) failed
    to sufficiently investigate for facts they should have known prior
    to seeking and executing the warrant.     He further argued that the
    Town of Fremont was liable for the foregoing because the warrant
    and the arrest were secured by a final municipal policymaker in
    the form of the town's Chief of Police.
    The district court properly found that the officers were
    entitled to qualified immunity.     As to the warrant application,
    the court recognized that any facts the officers misstated were
    insufficiently material under clearly established law to support
    a Fourth Amendment claim, and that any facts they omitted were not
    required to be included by clearly established law.        As to the
    investigation, the court recognized that the officers were not
    - 2 -
    required    to     undertake    additional      investigation    by     clearly
    established law.1
    The district court also properly found that the town
    could not be held liable for the conduct at issue because its Chief
    of Police lacked final municipal policymaking authority over this
    arrest;    in    this   case,   that    authority   was    exercised    by   the
    Rockingham County Attorney as the delegatee of the State's Attorney
    General.
    We agree that the defendants were entitled to summary
    judgment,       substantially   for     the    reasons    articulated   below.
    Without    adopting     the   district    court's   opinion,    we    summarily
    affirm.    See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
    So ordered.
    1    As the district court noted, our recent decision in
    United States v. Tanguay, 
    787 F.3d 44
    (1st Cir. 2015), only
    buttresses this finding. While we clarified in Tanguay that there
    are circumstances under which an officer "has a duty to make
    further inquiry before" applying for a warrant, 
    id. at 53,
    we
    acknowledged that, prior to that point, the scope of that duty was
    "not well understood," 
    id. at 46.
    Thus it cannot be said that
    such a duty was clearly established years earlier in 2011, when
    the conduct at issue here occurred. Accordingly, we need not pass
    on whether the duty as articulated in Tanguay was breached in this
    case.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1004U

Judges: Torruella, Lynch, Barron

Filed Date: 9/21/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024