Dowd v. Town of Dedham , 25 F. App'x 6 ( 2002 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 01-1171
01-1828
01-2157
THOMAS F. DOWD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF DEDHAM, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Thomas F. Dowd on brief pro se.
Douglas I. Louison, James W. Simpson, Jr., Merrick, Louison
& Costello, Kevin G. McIntyre, Rudin, Herzog, Ward & Donovan,
P.C., Joyce Frank and Kopelman and Paige, P.C. on briefs for
appellees.
January 3, 2002
Per Curiam. Thomas Dowd, a prolific pro se
litigant, appeals from separate district court judgments
dismissing a trio of actions he brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. These are only the latest in a series of state and
federal court cases filed by Dowd involving one or both of
two related events: his 1997 eviction from a residence in
Dedham, Massachusetts, and his ensuing inability (because he
is no longer a town resident) to vote in Dedham elections.
We summarily affirm in each instance, deeming it sufficient
to note that each of the three complaints is devoid of
merit.
In No. 01-1828, Dowd alleges that some 17
defendants conspired to seize the Dedham property in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The property transfer,
however, occurred in accordance with a summary-process
action in state court whose legality is not here in
question. Whether the no-trespassing notice was posted
prematurely or otherwise improperly was a matter of
Massachusetts law that should have been (and undoubtedly
was) pursued in state court. The Fourth Amendment is not
thereby implicated.
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In Nos. 01-1171 & 01-2157, Dowd charges the Dedham
Board of Registrars with depriving him of the right to vote
in recent elections, in violation of the Due Process Clause.
We need not decide whether the first of these cases was
subject to dismissal for untimely service of process,
inasmuch as both plainly fail on the merits. It is
undisputed that Dowd is now living in a residence outside of
Dedham. His two key assertions--that he intended to stay in
the Dedham house and that he was wrongfully evicted
therefrom--fail to establish that his domicile remained in
Dedham, at least with the legality of the eviction having
now been confirmed. See, e.g., Mass. G.L. c. 51, § 1
(stating that only city or town "resident" may have name
"entered on the list of voters"); Dane v. Board of
Registrars of Voters of Concord, 374 Mass. 152, 161-63
(1978) (equating "residency" with "domicile" in this context
and defining latter term). Nor did Dowd's deposit of an
escrow ballot in a 2000 election, pursuant to Mass. G.L. c.
51, § 59A, establish any right to vote thereafter; the very
purpose of that procedure is to obviate the need for such a
determination where possible. In any event, these again are
questions of state law that neither implicate a
constitutional right nor otherwise warrant federal court
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intervention. See, e.g., Bonas v. Town of North Smithfield,
265 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that federal courts
are not authorized to resolve "garden variety election
irregularities") (internal quotation marks omitted).
The judgments are affirmed.
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