Kachmar v. Varone , 55 F. App'x 3 ( 2002 )


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  •                   Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 02-1321
    SAFI KACHMAR, d/b/a Security & Communications Center,
    a/k/a Kachmar,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    FRED VARONE, Buildings Inspector, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Morris E. Lasker,           Senior U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Lynch and Howard,
    Circuit Judges.
    Safi Kachmar on brief pro se.
    Jocelyn M. Sedney and Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP on
    brief for appellees Fred Varone, Buildings Inspector, Kevin Nigro,
    Buildings Inspector, and Town of Saugus.
    December 20, 2002
    Per   Curiam.       Safi    Kachmar     brought    this   action
    pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against                Kanaiyalal Patel ("Ken
    Patel"), Mujala Patel, the Town of Saugus, and two Saugus
    officials, claiming due process and equal protection violations
    based on allegations that defendants had "ordered [him] to
    close down his business . . . and [fined him] $1,000 per day."
    We   concur    with   the     district    court's      conclusion   that     the
    allegations in the amended complaint fail to state a claim upon
    which relief can be granted.
    Although Kachmar brought this action in his own name
    d/b/a Security & Communications Center ("S & C"), he concedes
    in his appellate brief that S & C was incorporated long before
    he commenced the action and that Ken Patel was the sole
    director,      officer      and   shareholder         of   the   corporation.
    Kachmar's     amended    complaint       does   not    allege    that   he   was
    authorized to sue on the corporation's behalf and no such
    authority is evident in any of the documents incorporated into
    the complaint.        Kachmar therefore lacks standing to sue on
    behalf of the corporation. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560 (1992).
    Moreover, to the extent Kachmar's claims are based on
    the town defendants' interpretation of the liquor license for
    the commercial site Kachmar sought for S & C, Kachmar fails to
    allege any property interest in the license sufficient to
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    invoke the district court's jurisdiction; to establish standing
    sufficient to maintain a federal claim, a plaintiff must
    demonstrate    (1)       an    "injury-in-fact"           (2)    that     is   fairly
    traceable" to the proceeding below, and (3) is "likely" to be
    "redressed by a favorable decision."                 
    Id.
           Moreover, Kachmar's
    own allegations and the documents annexed to his complaint
    clearly show that Ken Patel was the holder of the license.
    Again, Kachmar       fails      to    allege   an    invasion       of    a    legally
    protected interest and is therefore without standing to pursue
    this litigation.         
    Id.
    In any event, Kachmar's claims are insufficient to
    state a § 1983 claim.                 In the absence of a "fundamental
    procedural irregularity [or] racial animus," a conventional
    zoning dispute does not implicate constitutional concerns.
    Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 
    680 F.2d 822
    , 833
    (1st Cir. 1982); Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 
    811 F.2d 36
    , 41-
    42   (1st   Cir.    1987).           Kachmar   has       not    alleged    any   such
    procedural defect or animus.
    We further note that Kachmar has failed to state a
    claim against Ken and Mujala Patel for the additional reason
    that neither of them is a state actor.                   Malachowski v. City of
    Keene, 
    787 F.2d 704
    , 710 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ("It is
    black-letter       law   that    a     showing      of    interference         with   a
    constitutionally-protected right by someone acting under color
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    of state law is a prerequisite to a § 1983 action.").   Finally,
    Kachmar's claims against the Town of Saugus were also properly
    dismissed because the complaint did not allege that any policy
    or custom of the town was responsible for inflicting any of the
    claimed injuries. See Burrell v. Hampshire County, 
    307 F.3d 1
    ,
    10 (1st Cir. 2002); Kelley v. LaForce, 
    288 F.3d 1
    , 9 (1st Cir.
    2002).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
    summarily affirmed.   See Loc. R. 27(c).
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