Seifart v. Skane ( 1995 )

April 27, 1995
[Not for Publication]
[Not for Publication]
United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
No. 94-2160
JAMES W. SEIFART,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HERBERT R. SKANE, ADMINISTRATOR,
MASSACHUSETTS STATE CARPENTERS PENSION FUND,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Frank J. McGee for appellant.
James F. Grosso with whom Orally & Grosso was on brief for
appellee.
*Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
STAHL, Circuit Judge. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
STAHL, Circuit Judge.
1132(a)(1)(B), James W. Seifart brought this action against
the Administrator of the Massachusetts State Carpenters
Pension Fund ("Fund"), Herbert R. Skane, challenging the
denial of disability benefits. The district court granted
Skane's motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
I.
I.
The parties do not dispute the facts. Seifart, a
carpenter, is a member of the International Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America ("the union"). Until May
31, 1983, Seifart worked for employers who made pension
contributions on his behalf pursuant to collective-bargaining
agreements with the union. During this period, Seifart
accumulated 8.9 pension credits and 9.6 vesting credits.
After May 31, 1983, Seifart began employment with
the Boston Housing Authority ("BHA"). On May 8, 1991, while
still working for BHA, Seifart became disabled. In November
of that year, Seifart applied to the Fund for disability
pension. By letter dated November 14, 1991, Skane denied
disability benefits on the basis that Seifart had not
accumulated 140 hours of pension credits within a thirty-six
month period prior to the date of his disability, as Skane
claimed the union's pension plan ("the Plan") required.
Seifart began the present proceedings in Massachusetts
superior court. Skane removed to federal court. Both
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parties moved for summary judgment and, as noted above, the
district court entered judgment for Skane. This appeal
followed.
II.
II.
Our review of a summary judgment motion is plenary,
taking the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmovants and indulging all reasonable inferences in their
favor. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.
1990). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
Where, as here, the administrator or fiduciary of
an ERISA-regulated plan has "discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms
of the plan," we set aside a fiduciary's decisions only if
they are arbitrary and capricious. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
The benefit provisions of an ERISA-regulated plan
are interpreted under principles of federal substantive law.
Bellino v. Schlumberger Technologies, Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 29
(1st Cir. 1991). Contract language in an ERISA action is to
be given its plain meaning, Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 26 F.3d 264, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1994), and a court must
give reasonable effect to all terms and conditions, see,
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e.g., Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 986 F.2d 580,
586 (1st Cir. 1993).
At the heart of this controversy lies the
interpretation of section 3.10(b) of the Plan. Under that
provision, a participant may retire on a disability pension
if:
He has become disabled, as hereinafter
defined, after he has accumulated at
least 10 Pension Credits or 10 Vesting
Credits, which may include a maximum of
one Pension Credit or one Vesting Credit
granted under Section 4.01(c)(II), of
which 140 hours of such Pension Credit
was accumulated in the 36-month period
prior to the date of disability.
Under the provisions of the Plan, Seifart accrued
vesting credits, but not pension credits, for his years with
BHA. Accordingly, Seifart argues, he has 16.9 vesting
credits -- a point conceded by Skane in his brief -- and thus
qualifies under the language of the Plan. Skane argues,
however, that section 3.10(b) sets out a two-prong test: (1)
a participant must accumulate the requisite pension or
vesting credits, and (2) 140 hours of pension credits must
have been earned within the thirty-six months prior to the
date of disability.1 Skane argues that, because Seifart
earned no pension credits while working for the BHA, he fails
the second prong.
1. The district court apparently agreed with Skane's
interpretation of the Plan's language.
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We think Skane's reading flies in the face of the
plain language of the Plan. Under the Plan, a participant
may qualify for disability retirement benefits by earning
pension credits or vesting credits; if a participant
qualifies by means of pension credits, then the 140-hour
requirement obtains. Here, the parties agree that Seifart
has earned more than ten vesting credits. Under the language
of the Plan, then, Seifart qualifies without reference to the
pension credit requirements.
Interpreting a contract in a manner contrary to its
clear language is arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., De
Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1188 (4th Cir. 1989).
Skane did just that in this case, and accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the district court. That said, we note that
the district court appears to have addressed this case on the
premise that the 140-hour requirement applied to the
appellant. There is even a trace of this assumption in the
appellant's brief on appeal, and the appellee takes this
position for granted. We find the purpose and
interconnection of the pertinent provisions difficult to
discern. We have decided this case in light of what appears
to us to be the plain language of the plan, but the fact that
the parties have not discussed the seemingly crucial language
on which we base our holding leads us to invite a petition
for reconsideration if there is some reason why the language
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should be taken to mean something that it does not appear to
say.
III.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
district court is
reversed.
reversed.
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