Figueroa-Perea v. Commissioner of Social Security , 78 F. App'x 134 ( 2003 )


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  •                Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 03-1469
    GILBERTO FIGUEROA-PEREA,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Selya and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Salvador Medina De La Cruz on brief for appellant.
    H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, Camille Velez-Rive,
    Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Robert J. Triba, Regional Chief
    Counsel, on brief for appellee.
    October 16, 2003
    Per Curiam.      Claimant Gilberto Figueroa-Perea appeals
    from the district court's judgment affirming the denial of Social
    Security disability benefits. The Commissioner of Social Security,
    in denying such benefits, first determined that although claimant
    could not return to his past (heavy) work as a laborer, he
    (claimant) nonetheless retained the capacity for the full range of
    light work.     Then, using the Medical Vocational Guidelines (the
    "Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, as a framework, the
    Commissioner concluded that claimant was not disabled.               The only
    issue   on    appeal   is    whether,    given     claimant's   nonexertional
    impairments -- pain and an adjustment disorder -- reliance on the
    Grid was appropriate.
    1. As for his pain, claimant fails to make any developed
    argument concerning the decision of the administrative law judge
    (ALJ) that the pain did not amount to a significant nonexertional
    impairment. As we have warned, "issues averted to in a perfunctory
    manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,
    [will be] deemed waived for purposes of appeal."                 F.D.I.C. v.
    LeBlanc, 
    85 F.3d 815
    , 820 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
    and citations omitted).          In any event, the ALJ's decision is
    supported by substantial evidence.
    That   is,     although    claimant    has   a   condition   that
    reasonably could be expected to produce some pain -- a herniated or
    protruding disc at L5-S1 -- the record does not contain any
    -2-
    evidence that claimant has any neurological deficits or loss of
    strength as the result of this condition.                  Further, claimant's
    motor and sensory systems have remained intact, and, while one
    treating     physician     noted   (unspecified)      muscle     atrophy,    the
    examining    neurologist       found   that   claimant's     muscles   had   not
    atrophied at all.        Finally, the primary limitation in claimant's
    range of motion is that claimant has trouble with forward bending
    due, in part, to his pain.         And, as for this limitation, the ALJ
    did   credit      claimant's    complaints     of   pain     because   the   ALJ
    specifically found that claimant was precluded from activities
    which involved constant bending.
    2.     The issues concerning claimant's mental impairment
    are governed by our decision in Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and
    Human Services, 
    890 F.2d 520
     (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam), in which
    we approved the use of the Grid in circumstances similar to the
    case at hand.          In Ortiz, we held that the use of the Grid is
    appropriate so long as the claimant's mental impairment does not
    "interfere more than marginally with the performance of the full
    range of unskilled work." 
    Id. at 526
    . This determination involves
    two distinct inquiries:        "(1) whether a claimant can perform close
    to the full range of unskilled work, and (2) whether he can conform
    to the demands of a work setting, regardless of the skill level
    involved."       
    Id.
    -3-
    The first inquiry concerns a claimant's abilities to (1)
    cope   with   simple    instructions,    (2)   deal     with   supervision,
    coworkers, and usual work situations, and (3) respond to changes in
    the work setting.         
    Id.
     (citing Social Security Ruling 85-15).
    Here, the mental residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment
    rated claimant as having no significant limitations in his capacity
    (1) to deal with simple instructions, (2) to sustain an ordinary
    routine without special supervision, (3) to remember work-like
    procedures, and (4) to get along with coworkers. And, although Dr.
    Cotto, the consultative psychiatrist, rated claimant as being
    severely limited in his ability to adapt to changes, the RFC
    assessment noted only moderate limits in this area. Such conflicts
    are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. See Rodriguez
    v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
    647 F.2d 218
    , 222 (1st
    Cir. 1981).
    This leaves claimant's capacity to respond to criticism
    from supervisors.      The clinical psychologist who completed the RFC
    assessment form checked the box on the form entitled "Not Ratable
    on Available Evidence."       However, claimant consistently has been
    described as cooperative, and no evaluator has reported that
    claimant   showed   any    difficulty   with   anger,   hostility,   or   in
    accepting directions from the evaluators -- difficulties which
    might indicate problems with responding to supervision.           Thus, we
    think that there is substantial evidence in the record to support
    -4-
    a finding that claimant's mental impairment has not resulted in a
    substantial loss of his capacity to perform the basic work-related
    activities listed in Social Security Ruling 85-15.       See Ortiz, 
    890 F.2d at 526
     (only a "substantial loss of ability to meet any of
    these   basic   work-related   activities   would   severely   limit   the
    potential occupational base").
    In relation to the second inquiry, which involves "a
    claimant's ability to accommodate the demands of a work setting per
    se," the Commissioner has stated that "the mentally impaired may
    cease to function effectively when facing such demands as getting
    to work regularly . . . and remaining in the workplace for a full
    day . . . ."     
    Id. at 527
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).   Here, the mental RFC assessment indicates that claimant
    is moderately limited in (1) performing within a schedule, (2)
    keeping up regular attendance, and (3) completing a normal work
    week without interruptions and without an unreasonable number of
    rest periods; further, both the RFC assessment and Dr. Cotto's
    evaluation noted that claimant had moderate limitations in his
    ability to maintain concentration for extended periods.          Because
    the claimant in Ortiz also was moderately limited in all of the
    these areas, see 
    id. at 527
    , the record supports the finding that
    claimant retained the capacity to accommodate to the demands of any
    work setting, regardless of the skill level of the work involved.
    -5-
    Based   on   the   foregoing,    and    according    the   proper
    deference to the Commissioner's decision, we conclude that reliance
    on the Grid was permitted in this case.             That is, although both
    claimant's pain and adjustment disorder imposed some limitations,
    there   is   substantial    evidence   in    the    record   to   support   the
    Commissioner's decision that these limitations were not significant
    enough to require the testimony of a vocational expert.                     The
    judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-1469

Citation Numbers: 78 F. App'x 134

Judges: Torruella, Selya, Lipez

Filed Date: 10/16/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024