United States v. Tucker , 103 F. App'x 417 ( 2004 )


Menu:
  •                Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 02-2624
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    ANDRE D. TUCKER,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
    Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
    David A.F. Lewis on brief for appellant.
    Donald C. Lockhart and Gerard B. Sullivan, Assistant United
    States Attorneys, and Craig N. Moore, United States Attorney, on
    brief for appellee.
    July 9, 2004
    -1-
    Per     Curiam.        Defendant-appellant     Andre    D.   Tucker
    ("Tucker") appeals the sentence imposed by the district court
    challenging the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
    for possession of a firearm.          We affirm.
    Tucker was arrested at his apartment on February 3,
    2000.1   Agents found a loaded .380 semiautomatic pistol with an
    obliterated serial number and $2,590.00 in cash in Tucker's bedroom
    and 78.13 grams of crack cocaine in a locked case in the basement
    of Tucker's building. Two other tenants lived in Tucker's building
    in separate apartments; all had access to the basement.
    Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Tucker pleaded
    guilty to a 10-count information.            Count Ten charged Tucker with
    possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,
    in   violation    of   
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c).2   At   Tucker's      initial
    sentencing hearing, the district court determined that Tucker's
    base offense level was 32, with a four-level leader/organizer
    enhancement      pursuant    to   U.S.S.G.   §   3B1.1   and   a   three-level
    1
    The arrest occurred after Tucker and several co-conspirators
    made cocaine sales to an undercover officer and an informant
    between June and August 1999.
    2
    Count One charged Tucker with conspiracy to distribute cocaine
    and cocaine base in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    .      Counts Two
    through Seven charged Tucker with distribution of cocaine and
    cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . Count Eight charged Tucker with possession of cocaine base
    with intent to distribute, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1)
    and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . Count Nine charged Tucker with possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).
    -2-
    reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1.     Accordingly, the district court found Tucker's total
    offense level to be 33 and designated a criminal history category
    of V, yielding a guideline range of 210 to 266 months.      The court
    sentenced Tucker to 230 months imprisonment on Counts One through
    Eight, to be served concurrently, 120 months imprisonment on Count
    Nine, to be served concurrently with the sentences for Counts One
    through Eight, and 60 months imprisonment for Count Ten, to run
    consecutive to the other sentences.
    Tucker appealed, arguing that his convictions on Counts
    Eight and Ten should be vacated due to errors during the plea
    colloquy. The government conceded that its recitation of the facts
    in support of the § 924(c) charge was deficient under Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 11(f), primarily because it had stated that the cocaine was
    discovered    in   Tucker's   bedroom.   This   court   accepted   the
    government's concession, vacated Tucker's conviction on Count Ten,
    and remanded the case for further proceedings.     See United States
    v. Tucker, No. 00-2192 (1st Cir. Apr. 1, 2002).
    The government declined to prosecute the § 924(c) count
    after remand.      At the re-sentencing hearing, the district court
    determined that Tucker's base offense level was 32, with a four-
    level leader/organizer enhancement, a two-level enhancement for
    possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and a three-
    level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.       Tucker did not
    -3-
    object to the two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm at
    the sentencing hearing.      The court found Tucker's total offense
    level to be 35 and designated a criminal history category at V,
    yielding a guideline range of 262 to 327 months.              Tucker was
    sentenced to 290 months imprisonment on Counts One and Eight, 240
    months imprisonment on Counts Two through Seven, and 120 months
    imprisonment    on   Count   Nine,   all   sentences     to   be   served
    concurrently.    Tucker appeals once more, now arguing that the
    district court erred in enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm.
    Since Tucker did not object at trial to the two-level
    enhancement, we review for plain error only.     See United States v.
    Connolly, 
    341 F.3d 16
    , 31 (1st Cir. 2003).      Tucker therefore must
    establish "(1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or
    obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial
    rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings."            United States v.
    Sabetta, No. 03-1506, 
    2004 WL 1403353
    , at *3 (1st Cir. June 24,
    2004)(citations omitted).     Because Tucker has failed to meet this
    burden, we affirm.
    Tucker concedes that he possessed the gun.           He argues
    that the government failed to prove the gun was present during the
    charged offense.     He bases this argument on application note 3 to
    -4-
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which states:
    The adjustment should be applied if the weapon
    was present, unless it is clearly improbable
    that the weapon was connected with the
    offense. For example, the enhancement would
    not be applied if the defendant, arrested at
    his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle
    in the closet.
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment n.3.
    Tucker argues that there was no evidence the gun was
    present during the controlled sales he made to the undercover
    officer and informant in the summer of 1999.        Furthermore, he
    argues that the gun found in his apartment was not "present" in
    relation to the cocaine found in the basement because all the
    tenants in the building had access to the basement.    We disagree.
    Factual determinations made in the course of sentencing
    must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.        See United
    States v. McDonald, 
    121 F.3d 7
    , 9 (1st Cir. 1997).      While there
    must be a certain nexus between the weapon and the offense for the
    enhancement to apply, it is well settled in this circuit that "when
    the weapon's location makes it readily available to protect either
    the participants themselves during the commission of the illegal
    activity or the drugs and cash involved in the drug business, there
    will be sufficient evidence to connect the weapon(s) to the offense
    conduct."    
    Id. at 10
     (quoting United States v. Corcimiglia, 
    967 F.2d 724
    , 727 (1st Cir. 1992)(internal quotations omitted)(holding
    that the two-level enhancement was appropriate where drugs, cash
    -5-
    and drug scales were found in defendant's parlor and a gun was
    found in a secret compartment in defendant's bathroom vanity)).
    Tucker was arrested at his home with a significant amount of cash
    and a loaded gun in his bedroom as well as cocaine in the basement
    of his building.    The fact that other tenants had access to the
    basement does not alter the result.      Tucker admitted that the
    cocaine in the basement was his in pleading guilty to possessing
    the cocaine with intent to distribute it.    The gun's location in
    Tucker's bedroom made it readily available to Tucker to protect his
    cash and the drugs in the basement.     See id.; United States v.
    Paulino, 
    887 F.2d 358
     (1st Cir. 1989)(holding that the two-level
    enhancement was appropriate where the gun, cash, and a drug ledger
    were found in one apartment and the drugs were found in a different
    apartment in the same building).
    The two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm
    "reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers
    possess weapons."   U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment n.3; see United
    States v. Almonte (stating that "it is not unreasonable to believe
    that drug distributors who have loaded guns nearby are likely to
    use the guns in committing or attempting to commit drug offenses").
    In this case, the gun in Tucker's bedroom was loaded, readily
    available for Tucker's use should the need arise.        From this
    evidence the district court concluded, amply supported by the
    evidence, that Tucker possessed the loaded gun to protect himself,
    -6-
    his drugs in the basement, and the cash in his apartment.   See
    McDonald, 
    121 F.3d at 7
    .
    Affirmed.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-2624

Citation Numbers: 103 F. App'x 417

Judges: Torruella, Stahl, Lynch

Filed Date: 7/9/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024