Miranda v. United States ( 2004 )

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2044
MICHAEL MIRANDA, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Morris E. Lasker, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Michael Miranda, Jr. on brief pro se.
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, and Eugenia M.
Carris, Assistant U.S. Attorney on Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Disposition.
July 23, 2004
Per Curiam. Michael Miranda, Jr., acting pro se, appeals
the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to
comply with Rules 8(a), 8(e) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. We review the district court's determination for
abuse of discretion. Kuehl v. FDIC, 8 F.3d 905, 908 (1st Cir.
1993).
"Dismissal [for noncompliance with Rule 8] is usually
reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused,
ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861
F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). To the extent the district court found
that the complaint in this case fell into that category, its
determination is unassailable. The complaint is prolix,
disjointed, replete with legal conclusions, and it is often
difficult if not impossible to tell whether the allegations relate
to grievance proceedings Miranda's wife pursued with her employer
or to Miranda's criminal investigation and prosecution. Defendants
could not reasonably have been expected to respond to such
allegations. See 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1281, at 522 (2d ed. 1990)("Unnecessary
prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court
and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to
select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage"). The
district court's choice of sanction, though harsh, was not an abuse
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of discretion given Miranda's apparent desire to stand on his
defective pleading.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).
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