United States v. Brichetto , 121 F. App'x 876 ( 2005 )


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  •                 Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 04-1820
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    THOMAS PAUL BRICHETTO, JR.,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    [Hon. Gene Carter, Senior U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
    Bruce M. Merrill for appellant.
    F. Mark Terison, Senior Litigation Counsel, with whom Paula D.
    Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
    February 15, 2005
    LYNCH,   Circuit   Judge.    A   jury   convicted   Thomas   P.
    Brichetto, Jr. of bank robbery and aiding and abetting bank robbery
    (Count One), and using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during
    and in relation to the commission of a violent felony (Count Two),
    see 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 2113(a), 2113(d).           The jury
    found that on December 12, 2001, he had, with three accomplices,
    robbed at gunpoint a branch of the Gorham Regional Federal Credit
    Union in Gorham, Maine, of $7,079.        The jury also acquitted him on
    a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Count Three),
    see 
    id.
     §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e).       Largely based on what he considers
    to be inconsistency in the jury verdicts, Brichetto appeals from
    his conviction, saying he should have been granted a directed
    verdict or given a new trial.
    His argument is that since the government introduced
    evidence of only one firearm in this case -- a .25 caliber Mauser
    semiautomatic pistol -- "The jury's verdict of Not Guilty on Count
    Three cannot be reconciled with the Guilty verdicts on Counts One
    and Two."     He argues that the jury necessarily found a failure of
    proof as to an essential element of the crimes charged in Counts
    One and Two,1 namely: the use of the firearm in the robbery.
    1
    The armed robbery statute cited in Count One provides:
    (a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by
    intimidation, takes . . . from the person or
    presence of another . . . any property or
    money or any other thing of value belonging to
    . . . any . . . credit union . . . . [and]
    -2-
    "[A] straightforward claim that the jury verdict is
    internally   inconsistent.   .   .   .     is   essentially   unreviewable."
    United States v. Alicea, 
    205 F.3d 480
    , 484 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing
    United States v. Powell, 
    469 U.S. 57
    , 66 (1984), Dunn v. United
    States, 
    284 U.S. 390
    , 393-94 (1932), and United States v. Lara, 
    181 F.3d 183
    , 206 (1st Cir. 1999)).          "In a single, multi-count trial,
    acquittal on one or more counts does not preclude conviction on
    other counts based upon the same evidence, as long as that evidence
    (d) . . . in committing, or in attempting to
    commit, any offense defined in subsection[]
    (a) . . . of this section, assaults any
    person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any
    person by the use of a dangerous weapon or
    device, shall be fined under this title or
    imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or
    both.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
     (emphasis added).         The statute cited in Count Two
    provides:
    [A]ny person who, during and in relation to
    any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a
    firearm . . . shall, in addition to the
    punishment provided for such crime of violence
    . . . if the firearm is brandished, be
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
    less than 7 years . . . .
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).            The statute cited in
    Count Three provides:
    It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who
    has been convicted in any court of, a crime
    punishable   by  imprisonment   for   a   term
    exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in
    or   affecting  commerce,   any   firearm   or
    ammunition . . . .
    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (emphasis added).
    -3-
    is legally sufficient to support a finding of guilt on the count(s)
    of conviction." 
    Id.
     To his credit, Brichetto, ably represented by
    appointed counsel, admits this principle, but says we should factor
    the acquittal into our review of the sufficiency of the evidence
    and of the motion for a new trial.
    Our test, however, is the usual one for sufficiency of
    the evidence.     The reviewing court "must uphold any verdict that
    is 'supported by a plausible rendition of the record.'"             United
    States v. Hernández, 
    218 F.3d 58
    , 64 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
    United States v. Ortiz, 
    966 F.2d 707
    , 711 (1st Cir. 1992)); see
    also United States v. Castellini, 
    392 F.3d 35
    , 44 (1st Cir. 2004)
    ("On challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, we take all the
    evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict
    and   ask   whether   a   rational   factfinder   could   find,   beyond   a
    reasonable doubt, that the prosecution successfully proved the
    essential elements of the crime.").
    There is more than sufficient evidence in the record here
    to allow a jury to find Brichetto guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
    on Counts One and Two.2       The teller at the robbed bank testified
    that she saw the robber pointing a "small black handgun" at her and
    that he threatened to "blow [her] head off."       David Tanguay, one of
    Brichetto's accomplices, testified that he obtained the gun and
    2
    The government proffers a series of reasons for explaining
    why the jury might have acquitted Brichetto on Count Three, which
    we need not address.
    -4-
    brought it to Brichetto before the robbery. Tanguay said Brichetto
    went into the credit union, carrying the gun.      Tanguay testified
    that after the robbery, he told Brichetto to throw away the gun
    during the getaway ride, and he saw Brichetto rolling down the car
    window and throwing the gun away as they drove alongside an area
    "[l]ike a boggy marsh."   The police were unable to recover the gun
    after searching the area.    Brichetto, on Tanguay's evidence, had
    the gun before and after the robbery and went into the bank with
    the gun.    That left the question of whether Brichetto was the
    robber the teller saw.    The teller said the robber had a gun and
    wore a ski mask. Tanguay testified that Brichetto wore a "stocking
    cap" on the day of the robbery.        A knit cap was recovered from
    Tanguay's car, and laboratory analysis of the DNA on the hat band
    showed that it matched Brichetto's DNA. Additionally, a photograph
    taken from the surveillance camera inside the bank during the
    robbery shows the robber wearing a knit ski cap vaulting over the
    counter with an object in his hand that a jury could easily
    conclude was a gun.   Indeed, the jury found by special verdict that
    Brichetto had brandished a firearm in the course of the robbery.
    The fact that no gun was ever found or that the witnesses
    described the gun in different ways does not mean that the evidence
    was insufficient to convict.    For example, it is not uncommon for
    a person who has a gun pointed at her to describe the gun as large,
    even if bystanders would describe it as smaller.
    -5-
    For the same reasons that the evidence was sufficient
    (indeed, ample), there was no abuse of discretion in denying
    Brichetto's motion for a new trial.
    Brichetto has appropriately waived the Booker claim of
    sentencing error he originally pursued on appeal.      See United
    States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 
    125 S.Ct. 738
     (2005).   Brichetto's
    conviction is affirmed.
    -6-