Dávila-Rivera v. Caribbean Refrescos, Inc. ( 2005 )


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  •                 Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 04-2575
    ESTHER DÁVILA-RIVERA, RAFAEL VELEZ-RIVERA,
    and CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP VELEZ-DAVILA,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    CARIBBEAN REFRESCOS, INC. and ABC INSURANCE CO.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Chief Judge,
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    and Siler,* Senior Circuit Judge.
    Roberto Ariel Fernández with whom Juan M. Frontera-Suau was on
    brief for appellants.
    Oreste R. Ramos with whom Jorge I. Peirats was on brief for
    appellees.
    September 16, 2005
    *
    Of the   Sixth     Circuit       Court     of    Appeals,     sitting   by
    designation.
    SILER, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Esther Dávila-Rivera,
    Rafael Velez-Rivera, and the Conjugal Partnership Velez-Davila
    (collectively, “Dávila”) appeal the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to Defendants Caribbean Refrescos, Inc. (“CRI”),
    and ABC Insurance Company on her claim under the Americans with
    Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 
    42 U.S.C. § 12182
     et seq.              In
    addition, Dávila appeals the district court’s decisions to strike
    her response to CRI’s motion for summary judgment and to dismiss
    without prejudice her Commonwealth law claims.              For the reasons
    discussed hereafter, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    is AFFIRMED.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    Dávila was employed by CRI from 1974 until 2002, most recently
    as an Administrative Assistant II in the Finance Department.             In
    2000, she underwent corrective therapies for carpal tunnel syndrome
    (“CTS”).   In   June   of   that    year,   Dávila   told    her   immediate
    supervisor, José Martínez, that she needed to have corrective
    surgery for her CTS.    At that time, Martinez did not express any
    objection to the forthcoming surgery; however, he instructed her to
    inform him of the date in advance.        This surgery was ultimately set
    for December 14, 2000, and Dávila informed Martínez of the date
    through a vacation request made in December.            This request was
    approved, although she alleges that he balked at granting the
    request and initially ordered her to change the date of her
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    surgery.
    Dávila completed the rehabilitation treatment on January 18,
    2001, and her doctor, Dr. Angel Pérez Toro, stated that she could
    return to work on January 22, 2001.      Dr. Pérez Toro completed a
    medical questionnaire on functional capacity for CRI, asserting
    that Dávila could perform both fine and heavy hand manipulation and
    that she could lift, push, or haul up to five pounds.    When Dávila
    returned to work, she also was evaluated by a CRI physician, Dr.
    Carlos A. Canales Quintero, who concluded that Dávila could lift up
    to ten pounds.   The weight restriction therefore was relaxed from
    five pounds to ten pounds.
    Upon her return, Martínez assigned Dávila to digitally scan
    documents.   Although she asserts that she told him that the work
    was repetitive and would affect her CTS, she was not reassigned.
    Two days later, Daisy Meléndez, a CRI company nurse, noted that
    Dávila’s right hand was swollen.      Dr. Canales recommended a hand
    brace, and, in a follow-up visit, noted the swelling had gone away.
    Dávila contends that working conditions at CRI caused her to
    suffer from depression.   On February 27, 2001, CRI referred her to
    the State Insurance Fund to receive medical treatment for her
    depression and other emotional conditions.       She was placed on
    short-term disability leave with a one-year reserve period. Dávila
    also requested long-term disability leave benefits from NATLSCO,
    the company managing CRI’s disability plan.        This request was
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    denied in November 2001. On February 27, 2002, CRI notified Dávila
    that    her   reserve   period   had    ended     and,   therefore,    that   her
    employment had been terminated.
    In October 2002, Dávila filed a complaint in the United States
    District Court for Puerto Rico alleging, inter alia, that CRI
    terminated her employment and failed to reasonably accommodate her
    CTS and emotional depression conditions in violation of the ADA.
    CRI moved for summary judgment in October 2003.             In December 2003,
    Dávila filed her opposition to this motion (“First Opposition”).
    The First Opposition was accompanied by a 43-page brief that
    exceeded the 25-page limit established by Local Rule 7.1(e) and the
    district court’s order.          When CRI moved to strike, the court
    granted Dávila “the opportunity to re-file [the Opposition], after
    pruning it into a twenty five page document.”             Dávila subsequently
    filed    a    revised   opposition     (“Second    Opposition”),      which   was
    slightly less than 25 full pages.         CRI again moved to strike on the
    ground that this Second Opposition violated Local Rule 7.1(e). The
    magistrate judge compared the First and Second Oppositions and
    recommended that the Second Opposition be stricken and CRI’s motion
    for summary judgment be treated as unopposed.             This recommendation
    was adopted by the district court. The magistrate judge noted that
    the two documents were textually virtually identical, with the only
    changes being the removal of footnotes and several paragraphs. She
    determined, in part from this textual analysis, that Dávila’s
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    Second Opposition was printed in a font smaller than allowed by
    Rule 7.1(e).
    In August 2004, the district court granted CRI’s motion for
    summary judgment, dismissing with prejudice Dávila’s ADA claim and
    her other federal claims. In addition, the court dismissed without
    prejudice her Commonwealth law claims. Dávila appeals the district
    court’s decision to strike the Second Opposition, its grant of
    summary judgment to CRI on her ADA claim, and its dismissal of the
    Commonwealth law claims.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    Local Rule Violation
    While this court reviews deferentially a district court’s
    refusal to forgive a local rule violation, see Crowley v. L.L.
    Bean, Inc., 
    361 F.3d 22
    , 25 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal citation
    omitted), we need not rule on this matter because even taking into
    account   the   evidentiary     materials       highlighted   in   the   Second
    Opposition, Dávila’s claims fail.1
    Summary Judgment
    We   review   de   novo    a    district    court’s   entry   of    summary
    judgment, viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to
    the party opposing summary judgment.            See Dávila-Pérez v. Lockheed
    Martin Corp., 
    202 F.3d 464
    , 466 (1st Cir. 2000).              All reasonable
    1
    In all events, Dávila conceded at oral argument that she was
    not prejudiced by the district court’s decision to strike her
    Second Opposition.
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    inferences are made in favor of the non-moving party.           
    Id.
       Summary
    judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of law.”     Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    Dávila appeals the grant of summary judgment only as to her
    ADA   claims.      Because   the   district   court   ordered   the    Second
    Opposition stricken from the record, CRI’s motion for summary
    judgment was unopposed.        However, the district court is “still
    obliged to consider the motion on its merits, in light of the
    record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would
    be legally appropriate.” Kelly v. United States, 
    924 F.2d 355
    , 358
    (1st Cir. 1991).
    “The   ADA   prohibits   discrimination    in   employment      against
    qualified persons with a disability.”         Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 
    294 F.3d 231
    , 237 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 
    42 U.S.C. §12112
    (a)).             Three
    alternative definitions of “disability” are provided: an individual
    is considered to be disabled if (1) she has “a physical or mental
    impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her] major
    life activities,” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (2)(A); (2) she has “a record of
    such an impairment,” 
    id.
     § 12102(2)(B); or (3) she is “regarded as
    having such an impairment,” id. § 12102(2)(C).
    “Major life activities” are “activities that are ‘of central
    importance to daily life.’”         Carroll, 
    294 F.3d at 238
     (quoting
    Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 
    534 U.S. 184
    , 197 (2002)).                 The
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    courts have recognized various “major life activities,” including
    the performance of manual tasks, Toyota Motor Mfg., 
    534 U.S. at 198
    ; lifting, Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 
    283 F.3d 11
    ,
    21 (1st Cir. 2002); and sleeping, Calero-Cerezo v. DOJ, 
    355 F.3d 6
    ,
    21 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Criado v. IBM Corp., 
    145 F.3d 437
    , 442-
    43 (1st Cir. 1998)).         In addition, the Supreme Court and this court
    have assumed, without deciding, that working may be considered a
    major life activity.          See 
    id.
     (citing Sutton v. United Airlines,
    Inc.,   
    527 U.S. 471
    ,     492   (1999)).      We    also   have   noted    that
    concentrating     “may    be    reasonably      subsumed   within      the   broader
    context   of    working        and   learning.”         Whitney   v.    Greenberg,
    Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli, 
    258 F.3d 30
    , 33 (1st Cir. 2001).
    Dávila must show that her impairment substantially limits a
    major life activity.         Therefore, she must demonstrate either that
    she is unable to perform a major life activity that an average
    person in the general population can perform or that she is
    significantly restricted in the performance of a particular major
    life activity as compared to an average person in the general
    population.     See 
    29 C.F.R. § 1630.2
    (j)(1).              “To be substantially
    limiting, ‘[t]he impairment’s impact must . . . be permanent or
    long-term.’”     Carroll, 
    294 F.3d at 238
     (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg.,
    
    534 U.S. at 198
    ).
    Dávila bears the burden of showing that she has a qualified
    disability.     See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20.                She claims two
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    impairments, CTS and severe depression. CTS has been recognized as
    a physical impairment. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., 
    534 U.S. 199
    .
    In addition, “[t]his circuit has recognized depression as a mental
    impairment that may constitute, at least in some circumstances, a
    disability under federal law.”            Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20.
    In   her    Amended      Complaint,    Dávila   asserted      that    her CTS
    “limited her writing and computer activities.”                    She asserts on
    appeal    that   her    CTS    impaired    her    major    life   activities    of
    performing manual tasks and lifting.              Although she points to the
    January 2001 lifting restriction imposed by Dr. Pérez Toro and
    modified by Dr. Canales, this restriction is insufficient to
    demonstrate a substantial limitation, as it was in effect only from
    January    22,   2001    to    February     12,    2001,    for    three    weeks.
    Furthermore, the same form indicated that, at that time, she was
    able to engage in fine and thick hand manipulation.                 Thus, Dávila
    has failed to demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the
    performance of manual tasks or lifting.
    In her Amended Complaint, Dávila asserted that her depression
    prevented her from working.               She asserts on appeal that her
    depression additionally impaired her major life activities of
    sleeping and concentrating.         First, we note that she has failed to
    demonstrate that her depression substantially limited the major
    life activity of working.          The Supreme Court has observed that
    “[w]hen the major life activity under consideration is that of
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    working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ requires . .
    . that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class
    of jobs.”    Toyota Motor Mfg., 
    534 U.S. at 200
     (quoting Sutton, 
    527 U.S. at 491
    ).     Dávila has failed to make such an offering.                In
    addition, she alleges, but has failed to demonstrate, that her
    depression    substantially     limited     her     ability   to     sleep   or
    concentrate. No evidence was introduced that would demonstrate she
    was substantially restricted or that the limitations were permanent
    or long-term.
    As a result, Dávila’s ADA claim fails.           She has not produced
    sufficient    evidence   to   demonstrate    that    she   had   a   qualified
    disability.     Consequently, we need not address the remaining
    grounds upon which the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    was based.    See Carroll, 
    294 F.3d at 238
    .
    Supplemental Jurisdiction
    This court reviews a district court’s refusal to exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.                   Pejepscot
    Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 
    215 F.3d 195
    , 200 (1st
    Cir. 2000).     Jurisdiction in this case is based upon Dávila’s
    federal claims; she therefore requested that the district court
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims.
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (a).        Supplemental jurisdiction exists when
    “the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim
    permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
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    comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’”              Rodriguez v. Doral
    Mortg. Corp., 
    57 F.3d 1168
    , 1175 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United
    Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 
    383 U.S. 715
    , 725 (1966)).
    When the foundational federal question claims are dismissed,
    the   district    court   may   reassess   its    jurisdiction       over   the
    supplemental claims.      See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3); see also Roche
    v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    81 F.3d 249
    , 256-57 (1st
    Cir.1996).     Ordinarily this assessment will “weigh strongly in
    favor of declining jurisdiction over state law claims where the
    foundational federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage
    in the litigation.” Camelio v. American Fed’n, 
    137 F.3d 666
    , 672
    (1st Cir. 1998).      Original jurisdiction in this case rested upon
    the ADA and other federal claims. Thus, because the district court
    properly    granted   summary   judgment   on    the   ADA   claim    and   the
    dismissal of the other federal claims has not been appealed, we
    find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    declining    supplemental   jurisdiction    over   the   Commonwealth       law
    claims.
    AFFIRMED.
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