United States v. Qin ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 21-1832
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
SHUREN QIN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge
Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Michael R. Schneider, with whom Good Schneider Cormier & Fried
was on brief, for appellant.
Karen L. Eisenstadt, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
January 9, 2023
BARRON, Chief Judge. In this appeal, Shuren Qin
challenges his federal convictions in the District of
Massachusetts for conspiracy to commit export violations, visa
fraud, making false statements to federal agents, money
laundering, and smuggling. He does so on the ground that the
government relied on the fruits of what he contends was an
unconstitutional search of his laptop and cellular phone after
those devices were seized upon his re-entry to this country after
traveling to China. Because we conclude that the search
constituted a border search that was supported by reasonable
suspicion that Qin was engaged in the ongoing violation of export
laws, we affirm.
I.
Qin is a Chinese national who lives part of the year in
Massachusetts and part of the year in Qingdao, China. He is
President of LinkOcean Technologies, Ltd. ("LinkOcean"), a company
based in Qingdao, China that imports and resells marine technology
from the United States, Canada, and Europe to customers in China,
including Chinese research institutes and the Chinese Navy.
On November 24, 2017, Qin and his wife returned to the
United States from a trip to China. Soon after their arrival, two
Customs and Border Patrol ("CBP") agents, at the request of agents
from other agencies who had been investigating Qin's export
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activities for roughly seven months, conducted an interview of Qin
in the public baggage claim area in the airport.
The CBP agents asked Qin during the interview about his
export activities and to see shipping documents related to his
exports. According to one of the CBP agents, Qin answered that he
"only" exported items that "attach to buoys."
After Qin indicated that the laptop and phone that he
carried with him were used for business, the CBP agents seized
those electronic devices for a further search and permitted Qin to
leave the airport. Immediately after Qin's devices were seized,
the agents who had been conducting the investigation into Qin's
export activities brought the devices to the Homeland Security
Investigations ("HSI") forensic lab to be imaged and searched.
The laptop contained 776 gigabytes of data, and the phone
contained approximately 55 gigabytes of data. The "overwhelming
majority" of the content on the devices was in Mandarin, and the
language translation tool that the agents conducting the search
had downloaded did not provide adequate translations. No local
agents could read, write, or translate Mandarin, and the agents
searching Qin's devices waited until an agent from New York could
travel to the area to assist them. The agents searching Qin's
devices sought passwords from Qin to access the encrypted items on
his computer, but Qin did not provide them.
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During the Mandarin-speaking agent's second trip to
Boston, near the end of the 60-day period within which the search
took place, the agents searching Qin's devices came across emails
that provided evidence that Qin had illegally exported hydrophones
to Northwestern Polytechnical University ("NWPU"), a Chinese
university with military ties. The agents completed the search of
the electronic devices after 60 days. After the search was
completed, the agents did not return the electronic devices to
Qin. Instead, the agents held the laptop for 11 more days and the
phone for 153 more days as the agents applied for and obtained a
search warrant, which they used to conduct an additional search.
In October 2018,1 Qin was indicted based on the evidence
of illegal exports of hydrophones to NWPU found during the 60-day
warrantless search of his devices. The indictment charged him
with conspiring to illegally export parts from the United States
to China, 50 U.S.C. § 1705; visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a);
conspiring to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371; making
false statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §
1956; and smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 554.
In September 2019, Qin moved to suppress the fruits of
the warrantless search conducted on his laptop and phone. The
Qin was initially served with a three-count indictment on
1
June 26, 2018, before being served with a 14-count superseding
indictment on October 30, 2018.
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District Court issued a memorandum and order denying the
suppression motion. The District Court ruled that the search was
a "non-routine border search" and that the search was lawful
because the agents who searched Qin's devices had reasonable
suspicion at the time of the search that Qin's devices contained
evidence of "export violations."2
After the District Court's ruling, Qin entered into a
plea agreement with the government that "reserv[ed] [his] right to
appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained from
his laptop computer and Apple iPhone." Qin timely appealed for
review of the District Court's decision to deny his motion to
suppress. "In reviewing motions to suppress, we review [the
District Court's] legal determinations de novo" and its "factual
findings for clear error." United States v. Bater, 594 F.3d 51,
55 (1st Cir. 2010).
II.
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. It
2The District Court stated that the agents who searched Qin's
devices had reasonable suspicion "that the electronic devices,
which Qin identified as devices he used for work, would contain
evidence of export violations, including but not limited to causing
the filing of false EEI, visa fraud . . . , and, after his
statements to CBP agents about the limits of his exports (which
the investigating agents reasonably believed to be false), false
statements to federal agents."
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further provides that "no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." Id.Border searches -- which the Supreme Court has described
as searches of travelers and "belongings" "crossing an
international boundary" of the United States, Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) -- have long constituted an
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977). The exception
derives from a recognition of the government's "inherent authority
to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial
integrity." United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153
(2004).
We have distinguished between "routine" and "non-
routine" border searches. The former type of search may be
conducted not only without a warrant upon probable cause but also
without the government having any reasonable basis for suspecting
that it will turn up "contraband, evidence of contraband, or . . .
evidence of activity in violation of the laws enforced or
administered by CBP or ICE." Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 19-
21 (1st Cir. 2021). The latter type of search, though it also may
be conducted without a warrant upon probable cause, must be
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supported by reasonable suspicion that the search will turn up
contraband or evidence of the sort just described.3 Id. at 18.
The required reasonable suspicion must be "objective"
and based on "specific and articulable facts . . . taken together
with rational inferences from those facts." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The evidence needed to support reasonable
suspicion is less than that needed to support probable cause and
"considerably" less than that needed for "proof of wrongdoing by
a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
III.
We begin with Qin's contention that insofar as the
District Court was right to rule both that the search at issue was
a border search and that it was "non-routine,"4 the search still
violated the Fourth Amendment because the District Court erred in
3 Whether a search is "'routine' or 'not routine' often
depends on the 'degree of invasiveness or intrusiveness associated
with' the search." United States v. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 19
(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509,
511-12 (1st Cir. 1988)). "[N]on-routine" border searches involve
a greater "degree of invasiveness or intrusiveness" than "routine"
searches. Id. In assessing whether searches of electronic devices
are routine or non-routine, this court has considered factors
including whether the searches were conducted manually so as to
limit the amount of content reviewed; whether the data reviewed
was "resident on the device;" and whether "deleted or encrypted
files" were viewed. See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 18-19.
4 The government does not dispute on appeal the District
Court's ruling that the type of border search that was conducted
here was a non-routine one.
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finding that the government had demonstrated that the agents who
searched Qin's devices had the required reasonable suspicion. Qin
understands the ruling to rest on the ground that the record
supportably shows that the agents who searched his electronic
devices had reasonable suspicion that the devices would contain
evidence of Qin's ongoing efforts to export controlled marine
instruments to China without proper licensure in violation of U.S.
export laws. But, Qin contends, the record simply does not show
as much. We disagree.
Well before the CBP agents interviewed Qin at the airport
about his export activities concerning China, federal agents from
a number of agencies had been investigating those activities. And
from that investigation, those agents had already generated
evidence of the following kinds.
First, the agents who had been investigating Qin's
export activities had gathered evidence that reasonably led them
to conclude that Qin had shown a past interest in flouting U.S.
export laws while conducting his business with clients in China.
This evidence included Qin's expression of interest in using a
common practice to evade U.S. export laws, namely the establishment
of a front company based in the United States. In Qin's case, the
front company that he expressed interest in creating would purchase
autonomous underwater vehicles ("AUVs") without a U.S. export
license and then unlawfully export the unlicensed AUVs to China.
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An AUV is a type of unmanned underwater vehicle ("UUV") that can
"operate without being 'tethered' to another vehicle." The
evidence of Qin's past interest in flouting U.S. export laws that
the agents investigating his export activities had gathered also
included his request to an undercover agent posing as a U.S. seller
of AUVs not to disclose to a U.S. manufacturer of AUVs -- who bears
responsibility for acquiring an export license when a product is
sold for export to China -- that the end users for the AUVs that
Qin was seeking were in China.
Second, the agents investigating Qin's export activities
had gathered evidence that the clients of Qin's company, LinkOcean,
included entities to which the United States restricted or
prohibited certain kinds of exports. These clients included
Chinese research institutes5 and the PLA Navy, which is the naval
warfare branch of the Chinese Army that oversees the development
and operation of surface warships, submarines, and unmanned
submersible vehicles.
Third, the agents investigating Qin had gathered
evidence that Qin had expressed interest in exporting products to
5Although the research institutes that the agents knew to be
clients of LinkOcean were not on the "Entity List," which
identifies entities that are believed to be involved in "activities
contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of
the United States" and requires additional licensing requirements,
see 15 C.F.R. § 744.16, certain products require a license if they
are shipped to any client in China, including the research
institutes that the agents were aware were Qin's clients.
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China through LinkOcean that require export licenses, including
AUVs. And, relatedly, the agents knew at the time of the search
that Qin had expressed an interest in exporting to China products
that are on the U.S. Munitions List and cannot be exported from
the United States to China under the U.S. Arms Embargo against
China -- namely, sonobuoys, which are defense articles used in
anti-submarine warfare.
Finally, the agents investigating Qin had gathered
evidence concerning Qin's willingness to conceal the nature of his
export activities from authorities. This evidence included
documents filed with the U.S. government concerning approximately
31 of LinkOcean's transactions involving exports that listed
LinkOcean as the "ultimate consignee," even though the company was
a reseller of the exported products and was often or always aware
of the identity of the end users of those exported products. The
evidence also included Qin's having asked a U.S. seller not to
disclose the end user for a product when the seller filled out the
export documents to provide to the U.S. government.
Thus, all that evidence had already been gathered in the
course of the investigation into Qin when the CBP agents questioned
him at the airport as he was returning from China about the nature
of his exports to China. And so, after Qin answered during that
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questioning that he exported "only" items that "attach to buoys,"6
as the District Court found that he did, we conclude that at least
at that point, the agents who then conducted the search of Qin's
electronic devices had reasonable suspicion that Qin was engaging
in the kind of unlawful export activities that he contends the
record fails to show that the agents had reason to suspect. For,
at least as of that point, the agents who conducted the search of
Qin's electronic devices not only had all the information gathered
throughout the investigation into his export activities that we
have described above. Those agents as of that point also had been
informed of what the CBP agents had interpreted as Qin's lie to
them about the nature of his export activities to China. See
United States v. Favreau, 886 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding
that a "patent lie" to agents can, along with other evidence,
support a reasonable suspicion that someone is "in fear of
revealing evidence of wrongdoing"); United States v. Wright, 582
F.3d 199, 213 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that "reasonable suspicion
arises not just from the combination of facts, but from their
progression"); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8-9 (finding that reasonable
suspicion requires reviewing the "totality of the circumstances");
United States v. Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)
6 The agents had evidence that Qin exported remotely operated
side scan sonar systems, UUVs, unmanned surface vehicles, and
hydrophones, which do not attach to buoys.
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(explaining that "individual facts, taken in the aggregate [may
be] sufficient to trigger a reasonable suspicion that some criminal
activity was afoot -- and that the defendant was involved").
Moreover, Qin does not dispute that, if the agents who
conducted the search were armed with the requisite suspicion
concerning his ongoing violations, then they would have had reason
to suspect that evidence of the suspected export violations would
be contained on Qin's electronic devices. Accordingly, we conclude
that the record shows that the agents possessed the requisite
reasonable suspicion to search those devices.
Qin challenges this conclusion in part by arguing that
the agents who searched his devices could not have reasonably
believed that he lied to CBP agents at the airport about whether
he exported "only" items that attach to buoys. In particular, he
argues that the agents who searched his devices had evidence that
he was not very fluent in English and that he said that things
that "attach to buoys" are "the types of things" that he exported
to China rather than the "only" things. But, given the evidence
in the record that Qin spoke "excellent" English and the CBP
agents' reports about Qin's responses to their questions, the
District Court did not clearly err in finding that the agents
reasonably believed that Qin lied to them about the types of
products that he exported. See United States v. Espinoza, 490
F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]hen two or more legitimate
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interpretations of the evidence exist, the factfinder's choice
between them cannot be deemed clearly erroneous.").7
Qin separately argues that there were innocent
explanations for the conduct that the government contends
supported the reasonable suspicion of the agents who searched Qin's
devices and that the agents who searched those devices were aware
of such explanations when they conducted the search. In
particular, Qin argues that the record shows that the agents who
searched his devices were aware that some of the technologies that
he sought were used for academic in addition to military purposes;
that he had financial incentives to conceal the end users of the
7We note as well that our conclusion is not undermined even
if we accept Qin's contention that the diagrams Qin showed to the
CBP agents during the interview portrayed technologies that Qin
exported that do not necessarily attach to buoys, given that Qin
does not contend that the technologies depicted cannot attach to
buoys. We also note that there is no merit to Qin's contention
that the agents who searched Qin's devices could not have had
reasonable suspicion at the time of the search in November simply
because they conceded they did not have such suspicion in October
and nothing happened between October and November. In addition to
the fact that the agents who searched Qin's devices obtained
evidence that Qin had lied to CBP agents at the airport in
November, the agents' subjective experience is not the relevant
inquiry. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
Rather, the relevant inquiry is an objective one based on all "the
cumulative information available to [the agents]" at the time of
the search. Id. And, because the inquiry is an objective one, we
also reject Qin's contention that the agents who searched his
devices could not have relied on the lie as a predicate for
determining that they had reasonable suspicion because the agents
had decided to conduct the search weeks before the lie. See id.- 13 -
products he exported on some occasions; and that "some of the
components of the sonobuoys [that Qin was interested in] may have
been made in Canada" and may therefore not be barred for export by
U.S. export controls. Qin relatedly argues that the evidence that
the export documents associated with his transactions did not
disclose who his end users were could not have reasonably generated
suspicion, because disclosure of end users is not legally required
under U.S. export regulations. He further contends that even if
such disclosure was legally required, it was U.S. sellers -- rather
than buyers like Qin -- who were responsible for submitting the
information to the U.S. government and thus for any omissions in
the information submitted.
But, in pressing these specific points, Qin does not
dispute that the agents had evidence of Qin's past expression of
a willingness to violate export laws, the nature of the clients of
his company in China, the products that he was interested in
exporting to China, and his misleading answer to the agents at the
airport about his export activities with China. Nor does Qin
dispute that the agents possessed evidence that the export
documents associated with approximately 31 of his export
transactions did not disclose the end users of the items exported
in those transactions or that Qin asked one seller not to disclose
the end user for a product when the seller filled out the export
documents to provide to the U.S. government. Thus, Qin's focus on
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the favorable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence
that the agents who searched his devices had is ultimately a
contention that those agents knew from that evidence that there
existed "the possibility of innocent conduct." Wright, 582 F.3d
at 205 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)). But, the agents
need not have ruled out that possibility to have reasonably
suspected that the conduct was not innocent, id., and, for the
reasons explained above, the unique "factual mosaic" that the
collection of evidence in this case created, see United States v.
Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2011), gave rise to the required
reasonable suspicion of ongoing export violations.
Qin does also highlight evidence in the record that he
contends shows that the agents who searched his devices knew of
his past honesty and lawfulness in some contexts concerning his
export activities, as if that evidence suffices to establish that
the agents did not have reason to suspect his ongoing violation of
export laws. For example, Qin notes that he listed the Chinese
Navy as one of LinkOcean's clients on the LinkOcean website; he
was "very open" with some prospective business partners about who
his clients were; he "repeatedly asked" a U.S. seller and an
undercover agent to submit the paperwork required to obtain export
licenses; and he decided not to purchase sonobuoys because he
believed that sonobuoys "require[d] an exporting license or
permit."
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But, this evidence at most shows that the agents who
searched Qin's devices knew that Qin sometimes revealed who his
clients were and sometimes chose to abide by the law. Such
evidence does not show -- indeed, does not even purport to
show -- that the agents lacked all the evidence that the record
supportably shows they also had, which included evidence of his
past expression of interest in violating the export laws, the
nature of his clients, the products he was interested in exporting,
his lie to the agents at the airport, and the concealment of his
end users.
Thus, here, too, Qin is necessarily equating evidence
that might support a conclusion that his conduct was innocent with
evidence that could refute other evidence that, based on a "broad-
based consideration of all the attendant circumstances," United
States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2007), including
"objective observations" coupled with "consideration of the modes
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers," United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), supports a reasonable
suspicion that the conduct is not innocent. But, evidence that
can support the possibility of innocent conduct is not evidence
that, on its own, suffices to show that there was no evidence of
the required reasonable suspicion.
We thus find that, given the specific facts of this case,
taken all together, the agents conducting the search of Qin's
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devices had reasonable suspicion that Qin was exporting controlled
marine instruments to China without proper licensure, in violation
of U.S. export laws. And, Qin does not dispute that, insofar as
the agents had such suspicion, they also had a reasonable basis to
suspect that evidence of this unlawful activity was contained on
the electronic devices searched by the agents. Accordingly, we
reject Qin's contention that the record shows that the agents who
conducted the search of Qin's electronic devices did not possess
the requisite reasonable suspicion needed to justify a non-routine
border search of those devices.
IV.
Qin next argues that, even if we were to assume that the
agents who conducted the search of his electronic devices had the
reasonable suspicion required for a non-routine border search, the
search of those devices did not constitute a border search at all.
Qin is right that if the search at issue was not a border search
at all, then it would require both a warrant and probable cause,
rather than merely reasonable suspicion that the electronic
devices would contain evidence of his ongoing export violations.
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). The District
Court rejected the arguments that Qin makes to us as to why the
search did not constitute a border search, however, and we do so
as well.
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Qin rests his argument that the search at issue did not
constitute a border search in part on its "duration," which he
contends was so long that the search became disconnected from
efforts to regulate the border and prevent border-related crime
and therefore no longer fell into the border search exception.
Qin notes that the search of his devices lasted 60 days and so
fell beyond the 22-day search of a laptop that was upheld in
Molina-Gómez as "not unreasonable" but that "seem[ed] lengthy."8
United States v. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 2015).
The search was also longer, Qin points out, than the 14-day search
that at least one other court found not to be a border search given
its length and scope, see United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d
32, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2015), as well as the "presumptive" 30 days
allotted for a search under HSI policy.
The search at issue in this case certainly pushes the
bounds of what may reasonably fall into the border search
exception, and we by no means hold categorically that a search
that lasts sixty days and otherwise qualifies as a border search
falls within the border search exception. The inquiry is context
8 To the extent Qin did not waive the argument that, after
the 60-day search concluded, the government impermissibly detained
his computer for an additional eleven days and his phone for an
additional 153 days while seeking a warrant, we do not see how
that argument bears on the only issue before us in this appeal,
namely whether the District Court erred in denying Qin's motion to
suppress the evidence gathered during the preceding 60 days.
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specific and fact dependent. We hold only that, on this record,
the duration of the search did not in and of itself render it so
disconnected from the purpose of the border search exception that
it falls outside the scope of that exception, given the District
Court's findings that the length of the search was justified by
the amount of data that the electronic devices contained, as well
as the language barriers and encrypted files that impeded access
to that data.
The Supreme Court has "consistently rejected hard-and-
fast time limits" on border searches and has instructed that,
"[i]nstead, 'common sense and ordinary human experience must
govern over rigid criteria.'" United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)). And, while the search did
exceed the 30 days that HSI policy identifies as presumptively
reasonable for a border search, it did not exceed the 60 days that
HSI policy itself has identified as permissible when, as in this
case, extensions beyond 30 days are merited by the fact-specific
challenges that the search being conducted poses.
Qin contends in response that the justifications the
government puts forth for the length of the search do not in fact
justify the length. On this score, he first contends that much of
the content on the laptop was in English and thus did not require
translation. But, he does not contest that much of the content on
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the laptop was also in Chinese. And, searching this content
required a Mandarin-speaking agent who could not assist with the
search for several weeks.
Qin also argues that the agents' contention that they
needed to detain his devices while waiting for Qin to provide them
with passwords is undermined by the fact that the advanced
encryption mechanisms that the agents were most concerned about,
including PGP, Keychain, and Bitlocker, were not used on the
laptop. Qin does not suggest, however, that the laptop did not
contain any relevant encrypted items for which a password was
needed, so his argument does little to call into doubt the District
Court's finding that the encrypted items -- and the wait for the
passwords -- helped justify the length of the search.
Qin separately argues that, independent of the length of
the search, it was sufficiently intrusive to be not a border search
but rather "a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence
of a crime might be found." See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931). Qin argues in this connection
that the government used keyword searches to look for a broad array
of business records, financial documents, and technical documents
and schematics.9
We note that Qin acknowledges that, under Alasaad, border
9
searches can include searches not only for "contraband or evidence
of contraband," but also for evidence of border-related crime, see
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But the fact that the agents used keywords to search for
such records, documents, and schematics does not, on its own, show
that the search fell outside the scope of a border search, given
the nature of the suspected criminal activities concerning the
conduct of Qin's business. After all, such records, documents,
and schematics can contain "contraband, evidence of such
contraband, or . . . evidence of activity in violation of the laws
enforced or administered by CBP or ICE," all of which can be
searched for during a border search. Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 21.
Moreover, Qin does not point to any specific keywords that, he
says, were used for the purpose of a general exploration rather
than a search for information about the ongoing export violations
of which the agents were suspicious. Thus, we do not see how Qin's
assertion about the keywords used by the agents turns this search
into a general exploratory search.
Qin does also advance the related contention -- in
arguing that the search was too intrusive to constitute a border
search -- that, while searching his laptop, the government looked
"broadly for evidence of past and future crime," not "ongoing or
imminent" criminal conduct. To support this contention, Qin points
988 F.3d at 21, and that Alasaad governs our decision in this case.
And while Qin argues that we should revisit Alasaad en banc and
hold that border-related searches should not include evidence of
border-related crime, that contention has no bearing on how we
must rule as a panel.
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out that the agents continued to search for evidence even after
they saw that the last email on the laptop was from May 2017.
But, the record shows that the laptop did contain
evidence created after May 2017, and there is nothing in the record
to indicate that the agents were not searching this later evidence.
Moreover, old emails can shed light on future actions, so the
agents could have reasonably believed that the old emails were
relevant to their search for ongoing conduct. Thus, we do not see
how Qin's contention about the date of the last email on the laptop
supports a finding that the agents only searched for past criminal
conduct.
Accordingly, we conclude that neither the length nor
scope of the search at issue placed it outside the scope of a
border search and thus that neither probable cause nor a warrant
was required for the search to be lawful under the challenges posed
and the Fourth Amendment. And that is so in this case, even taking
into consideration both how long the search lasted and how
comprehensive it was, given the suspicion that the agents who
searched Qin's electronic devices reasonably had that a search of
those devices would turn up evidence of his ongoing export
violations.10
Because we conclude that the agents in this case had
10
reasonable suspicion to conduct the search at issue, we need not
address Qin's argument that, if the agents' search was not
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V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is affirmed.
supported by reasonable suspicion, the fruits of their search
should be suppressed because the agents did not act in good faith.
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