United States v. Melendez-Orsini , 709 F. App'x 706 ( 2017 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-2535
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANGEL MELÉNDEZ-ORSINI, a/k/a Gelo, a/k/a Cerebro, a/k/a Primo,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Stahl and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
John T. Ouderkirk, Jr., on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Mariana
E. Bauzá-Almonete, Assistant United States Attorney Chief,
Appellate Division, and Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United
States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
September 27, 2017
STAHL, Circuit Judge. Appellant Angel Meléndez-Orsini
("Meléndez-Orsini") seeks to vacate his conviction on a guilty
plea for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute a
controlled substance within a protected location and possession of
a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico,
Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, District Judge, accepted Meléndez-Orsini's
plea and sentenced him to a prison term of 180 months. In this
appeal, Meléndez-Orsini challenges the voluntariness of his change
of plea. We AFFIRM.
I. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings
We recite here the relevant facts. Meléndez-Orsini was
indicted on three counts: (1) conspiracy to possess with the
intent to distribute at least 5 but less than 15 kilograms of
cocaine within a protected location, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 860 and 841(b)(1)(A); (2) possession of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A); and (3) criminal forfeitures, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 853. There were 94 co-conspirators involved in the drug
trafficking organization whose members distributed heroin,
cocaine, crack and marijuana within one thousand feet of a public
housing project. Often, members of the conspiracy would carry and
brandish firearms in connection with their activities.
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On December 11, 2014, pursuant to a plea agreement, Meléndez-
Orsini pled guilty to Counts One and Two of the indictment. The
plea agreement contained a waiver of the right to appeal if the
district court sentenced Defendant to the parties' joint
recommendation of 120 months on Count One, and 60 months on Count
Two, to be served consecutively to Count One. At the change of
plea hearing, the district court inquired into Meléndez-Orsini's
competence, the voluntariness of his plea and the sufficiency of
defense counsel. The court also reviewed the relevant charges in
the indictment, the statutorily mandated minimum and maximum
sentences, the government's evidence and the signed plea
agreement.
At Meléndez-Orsini's sentencing on November 20, 2015, for the
first time he asked the court to review the evidence as to Count
Two because he had not wanted to plead guilty to that count. The
district court denied Defendant's request to review the facts as
to Count Two and sentenced Defendant to a total of 180 months
incarceration.1 This timely appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Meléndez-Orsini claims the district court violated Rule
11 by accepting his change of plea because it was not voluntary,
1 The court sentenced Defendant to a term of 120 months on Count
One, and 60 months on Count Two, to be served consecutively to
Count One.
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intelligent and knowing. Rule 11 provides that "[b]efore accepting
a plea of guilty . . . the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary
and did not result from force, threats, or promises . . . .”
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(2). On appeal, we consider the totality of
circumstances to determine if a violation of Rule 11 occurred.
See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1220 (1st
Cir. 1995).
A. Waiver
Before addressing the merits of Meléndez-Orsini's
argument, we acknowledge that the plea agreement contains a waiver
of appeal provision, which generally "forecloses appellate review
of many claims of error." United States v. Chambers, 710 F.3d 23,
27 (1st Cir. 2013). "But where, as here, a defendant enters a
guilty plea and agrees to waive his right to appeal . . . a
reviewing court must 'address the merits of [his] appeal because
his claim of involuntariness, if successful, would invalidate both
the plea itself and the waiver of his right to appeal.'" Id.(alteration in original)(quoting United States v. Santiago
Miranda, 654 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2011)).
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B. Rule 11 Plea Proceedings
We review Meléndez-Orsini's underlying Rule 11 claim for
plain error because Defendant failed to object previously.2 "In
order to establish plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) an
error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected
the defendant's substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." United States v. Ortiz-Garcia, 665 F.3d
279, 285 (1st Cir. 2011)(alteration in original)(citation
omitted). Defendant maintains that the district court erred in
accepting his change of plea because there was evidence showing
that his change of plea was neither knowing nor voluntary. We
find no such error.
First, the record reflects that during the colloquy the
court asked Meléndez-Orsini on two separate occasions if anyone
forced, threatened or harassed him to accept the plea offer, to
which he responded "No." The district court also reviewed aloud
paragraph 19 of the written plea agreement, which provided that no
2 At sentencing, Meléndez-Orsini asked the district court to "see
the evidence as to [Count 2] and make a decision", but at no point
did Defendant seek to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. See
United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2005)
("[B]ecause [defendant] failed to call the district court's
attention to the alleged errors in the plea proceedings . . . for
example, by seeking to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing
. . . his claim is subject only to plain error review on direct
appeal.").
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threats were made to force Meléndez-Orsini to plead guilty and
that he is pleading guilty freely and voluntarily because, in fact,
he is guilty.
While the above facts support that the plea was not
coerced, we acknowledge that at the beginning of the colloquy,
Meléndez-Orsini did express some apprehension about the timing of
the plea, conveying that if he had more time, he would think more
about his decision to plead guilty.3 However, Meléndez-Orsini's
minor apprehension does not render his guilty plea involuntary.
See United States v. Negron-Narvaez, 403 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir.
2005) ("The mere fact that the appellant at one point took a
contradictory position as to his culpability . . . neither alters
our conclusion nor dispels the factual basis for the plea.").
Second, the district court adequately reviewed the facts
as to Counts One and Two. As to Count Two, the court described a
conspiracy, where members knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully
possessed and used firearms. The district court inquired, "is
that what you did as to Count II?" Meléndez-Orsini responded
"Yes." Defendant expressed no confusion as to these facts.
3 The district court asked Defendant if he had enough time to
consult with counsel and his wife before pleading guilty.
Meléndez-Orsini explained that he did, but if there was more time,
"one would even think more about it." The court explained that
even with more time, the options would still be the same, either
go to trial or plead guilty. The Defendant agreed with the court's
statement.
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Meléndez-Orsini maintains that the court should have realized
his change of plea was not voluntary based on his confusion over
the government's weapons evidence. During the plea colloquy, the
government explained that full discovery was provided to
Defendant, including photographs and recordings, which would have
been used at trial to prove that Meléndez-Orsini acted as a leader
in the drug trafficking organization and routinely possessed
firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy. When asked by the
court if he agreed with the evidence in possession of the
government as to Counts One and Two, Meléndez-Orsini explained
that his attorney had viewed the evidence, but that he had not
seen the videos.4 The court then again asked the Defendant whether
he participated in the conspiracy as to Counts One and Two, noting,
"the fact that you had not seen any videos . . . doesn't preclude
you from pleading guilty." Meléndez-Orsini responded, "Yes I'm
going to plead guilty." At no point did Defendant deny his
involvement as to Counts One or Two.
Although Meléndez-Orsini did not view personally all of the
discovery provided by the government, he signed the plea agreement,
repeatedly agreed to the statement of facts as summarized by the
district court at the plea colloquy and acknowledged on multiple
4 Meléndez-Orsini told the court that he was unable to view the
videos, although his counsel had informed him that he did not
appear in the videos.
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occasions that his decision to plead guilty to Counts One and Two
was voluntary. Viewed in totality, Defendant's statements at the
colloquy5 negate a claim that his change of plea was neither
unknowing nor involuntary.
Upon a thorough review of the record and consideration
of the totality of the circumstances, we uphold the district
court's finding that Meléndez-Orsini understood the nature of the
change of plea and voluntarily pleaded guilty. Meléndez-Orsini
failed to meet his burden as to the first prong of plain error
review; therefore, we need not address the other factors. The
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
5 At the sentencing hearing, Defendant explained, "I didn't really
want to plead guilty [as to Count Two] because I had nothing to do
with weapons or giving protection to the drugs or anything like
that." This statement, albeit clear, occurred almost a year after
Meléndez-Orsini's change of plea. This change of position is
insufficient to warrant a finding of error based on the
voluntariness of the plea.
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