Prosper v. Mukasey ( 2008 )


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  •                     Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 07-1751
    KETTLY PROSPER,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
    OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges,
    and Besosa**, District Judge.
    Susana L. Schafer, on brief for petitioner.
    Ronald B. Seely, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    Ahn-Thu P. Mai, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, Jeffrey S. Bucholz, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
    Department of Justice, on brief for respondent.
    October 20, 2008
    *
    Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
    BESOSA, District Judge.            The Board of Immigration Appeals
    (“BIA”) adopted and affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial
    of Kettly Prosper’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection     under      the    Convention      Against      Torture      (“CAT”).
    Ms. Prosper, a native and citizen of Haiti, petitions this court
    for a review of the BIA’s denial of her claims.                      We deny the
    petition for review.
    I.   Background
    The IJ made an adverse credibility finding because of material
    inconsistencies between Ms. Prosper’s testimony before the IJ and
    her prior testimony. This adverse credibility determination is the
    basis   for   our    denial      of   Ms.   Prosper’s       claims   for   asylum,
    withholding of removal and protection under CAT.
    Ms. Prosper arrived in or around Miami, Florida from Haiti on
    or about January 16, 2001.            She did not pass through any kind of
    immigration control.           On September 6, 2001, Ms. Prosper filed a
    Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal.                    In
    the form she claimed that if she returned to Haiti she would be
    persecuted on account of her political opinions and her membership
    in a particular social group known by its acronym as “MDN.”                      An
    Asylum Officer (“AO”) interviewed Ms. Prosper on April 4, 2002,
    which lead to the referral of her application to the immigration
    court   because     the   AO    determined     that   her    testimony     was   not
    credible.     On April 18, 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization
    - 2 -
    Service (“INS”) served Ms. Prosper with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”)
    in person, charging her with removability, and placed her in
    removal proceedings.
    Ms. Prosper appeared at four hearings.   On September 6, 2002,
    she appeared pro se at the Miami Immigration Court, requested a
    continuance, and informed that court that she would file a change
    of venue motion.   On March 5, 2003, Ms. Prosper appeared at the
    Boston Immigration Court where she admitted the factual allegations
    of the NTA and conceded removability.     On March 10, 2005, she
    appeared once again before the Boston Immigration Court, at which
    time the court found that Ms. Prosper’s application was timely
    filed.   Finally, on June 2, 2005, Ms. Prosper appeared before the
    Boston Immigration Court again and testified concerning the factual
    background to her claims.     The following is a summary of her
    June 2, 2005 testimony, except where a statement is specifically
    attributed to a different source.
    Ms. Prosper testified that she suffered persecution in Haiti
    because she was a member of a political party called “MDN.”    She
    testified that MDN stands for “National Democratic Movement.”
    After being informed that MDN actually stands for Mobilization for
    National Development, Ms. Prosper responded that some people call
    the organization National Democratic Movement.   There is no other
    support for this dual name, however, in the record.   She initially
    said that she joined MDN in October 1990.     When asked if party
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    leader    Hubert    de   Ronceray    left   Haiti     between   1990    and   2001,
    Ms. Prosper answered no.       When Ms. Prosper was told affirmatively
    that Ronceray was expelled from Haiti in 1990 and that he went into
    exile in 1997, she admitted that she was unaware of Ronceray’s
    departures, but she explained this by saying that she did not join
    the MDN until October 1999, not 1990.               She said she misunderstood
    the earlier question concerning her joinder of MDN.                       Her MDN
    membership card was dated 1995 and had an illegible seal.                       To
    explain why her card was dated 1995, when she later claimed to have
    joined MDN in 1999, Ms. Prosper stated that the card was pre-made.
    Ms. Prosper was also unaware of other significant political
    events impacting the MDN.           On May 21, 2000, there was a disputed
    election in Haiti, after which opposition parties, including the
    MDN,     joined    together   to     form     the    Democratic       Convergence.
    Nonetheless,       Ms.   Prosper     did    not     identify    the    Democratic
    Convergence, was unable to state whether MDN joined any coalitions,
    and could not recall if there were elections in Haiti in the year
    2000 prior to the election held in November 2000.
    Ms. Prosper said that she invited people to meetings on behalf
    of MDN and then listened to speakers at those meetings.                  She said
    that once she arrived in the United States, she stopped all
    involvement in MDN or any other political organization.                   She did
    not know the date MDN was founded.                She was also unaware of the
    name of the current president of Haiti.
    - 4 -
    Ms. Prosper also testified that she was attacked on two
    separate occasions because of her membership in MDN.        The first
    alleged attack occurred on November 27, 2000.     She testified that,
    as she was walking along a street, she was surrounded by five men
    who accused her of working for MDN.      The men told her that she had
    to work for Lavalas or die.     The men pushed her into a car; when
    the car broke down a few miles later, the men argued over what to
    do with her.    One man wanted to kill her whereas another man said
    to let her go because they would be able to find her again and kill
    her later.     The men then threw her out of the car, kicked her
    several times and left.       She laid on the ground until people
    passing by gave her water and helped her get into a taxi.         The
    attackers worked for Aristide, according to Ms. Prosper, because
    they referred to Lavalas and used violence against her.
    Ms. Prosper’s recollection of events seemed to vary with each
    telling.   In her interview with the AO she did not mention that the
    men who grabbed her were Aristide supporters, and did not say that
    they told her to “work for Lavalas or die.”     In that interview she
    said they told her she would “find out” and that they said “kill
    the bitch.”     In the Form I-589 submitted on September 6, 2001,
    however, Ms. Prosper claimed that she was “arrested” by “Lavalas
    government” workers who told her “[y]ou are in opposition against
    Lavalas.     You lost.   Aristide or death.”    In that same form she
    claimed that the car only drove three blocks before running out of
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    gas.    This also differs slightly from her June 2005 affidavit, in
    which she stated that the car went five blocks, before she was
    thrown from the car and landed on her head, but in which she made
    no mention of being kicked.         In that affidavit Ms. Prosper said
    that she thought she was attacked because she did not vote in the
    November 2000 presidential elections and she made no mention of her
    membership in MDN.
    The second alleged attack occurred on December 3, 2000.            At
    11:30 p.m., five men entered her house by breaking down the door.
    They shouted her name, asked where she was and accused her of
    working for MDN.      They blindfolded a few people that were in her
    house   and   then   she   was   beaten,    raped   and   left   unconscious.
    Ms. Prosper’s mother treated her with herbal medicine but she began
    to vomit blood so her mother took her to a hospital in Aux Cayes,
    where she stayed for three days.           She did not tell the doctor at
    that hospital that she had been raped because she felt embarrassed
    and traumatized. Upon leaving the hospital, she went to a friend’s
    house because she was afraid to go home.            From there she went to
    Gonaives and boarded a boat for the United States.           She left Haiti
    - 6 -
    on   January       12,   2001   and     arrived     in    the    United    States   on
    January 16, 2001.2
    As with Ms. Prosper’s testimony concerning the earlier attack,
    there       are    inconsistencies          between      her    accounts     of     the
    December 3, 2000 attack.             In her June 2005 affidavit, Ms. Prosper
    states      that   everyone     in   her    house   was    blindfolded.       In    her
    statement to the AO, however, Ms. Prosper said that her brother and
    father were tied up and blindfolded, and that she was kicked and
    beaten unconscious, but she did not mention that she was raped.
    She also failed to mention that she was raped in her Form I-589
    submitted on September 6, 2001.               She also failed to tell the AO
    that she was hospitalized.             Nor did she mention in her September
    2001 Form I-589 that she was hospitalized.                     Although psychiatric
    evaluation did report Ms. Prosper as saying she was hospitalized,
    the evaluation notes that she said that her cousin, not her mother,
    took her to the hospital in Aux Cayes.                   Ms. Prosper submitted no
    documentation related to her hospital visit.
    Ms. Prosper further testified that she became HIV positive as
    a result of the rape on December 3, 2000.                 She said that she first
    2
    Ms. Prosper testified that she paid $2,000 to someone who
    arranged her transport to the United States. She said that she
    left Haiti on a large boat, then transferred to a small boat that
    took her ashore in Miami. She then met a Haitian person who drove
    her to her aunt’s house.      She did not mention any of this
    information in her September 2001 Form I-589. In her June 2005
    affidavit, she stated that she arrived in the United States at the
    “Port of Miami” and requested asylum.         The IJ noted that
    Ms. Prosper struggled to provide any more detail upon request.
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    discovered she was HIV positive between 2001 and 2002, but she has
    no record of the diagnosis at that time.        A letter submitted by her
    treating   physician   to   the   court    states   that   Ms.   Prosper   was
    diagnosed as HIV positive in July 2004.
    Despite Aristide’s ouster in 2004, Ms. Prosper claims that she
    fears returning to Haiti because Aristide supporters still abound
    and she believes those supporters will find her and kill her.              She
    heard from a friend that MDN still exists and she said that she
    would continue to be active in MDN if she returned to Haiti.
    II.    Standard of Review
    Ordinarily this court reviews the decision of the BIA, but
    where the BIA adopts the opinion of an IJ, we then must also review
    the decision of the IJ.      Romilus v. Ashcroft, 
    385 F.3d 1
    , 5 (1st
    Cir. 2004).     In this case, the BIA adopted and affirmed the
    decision of the IJ, although it also briefly explained why it did
    not find the Petitioner’s appeal persuasive.
    We review the BIA’s findings of fact under the “substantial
    evidence” standard which applies to claims of asylum, withholding
    and protection under CAT.         
    Id.
         The BIA’s findings, including
    credibility determinations, must be upheld as long as they are
    “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
    the record considered as a whole.”         Pan v. Gonzales, 
    489 F.3d 80
    ,
    85 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    481, 
    112 S.Ct. 812
     (1992) (citation omitted)).             This deferential
    - 8 -
    standard permits reversal of a BIA decision on sufficiency grounds
    only where the record evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder
    to make a contrary determination.                Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 
    168 F.3d 565
    , 569 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. at
    481 &
    n.1.).
    III.     Discussion
    On   appeal   Ms.      Prosper     argues      that    the     BIA   should    have
    overturned the IJ’s credibility determination as clearly erroneous
    and not based upon substantial evidence.                     In ruling against her,
    Ms.    Prosper    argues,      the   IJ       relied    upon    illusory       or    minor
    inconsistencies that do not touch upon the heart of the asylum
    claim.      While true that the credibility determination may not rest
    on    trivial    discrepancies,         Pan    v.    Gonzales,       
    489 F.3d at 86
    (citations omitted), many of the discrepancies in this case are
    material to Ms. Prosper’s claim, and the numerous seemingly minor
    discrepancies     also     undermine       Ms.      Prosper’s    credibility.            
    Id.
    (“Some of these inconsistencies, in isolation, may seem like small
    potatoes. What counts, however, is that their cumulative effect is
    great.”) (citation omitted).
    To    establish     eligibility        for    asylum,     an    alien    such     as
    Ms. Prosper must demonstrate that she is a refugee.                          
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1); 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (a).               Refugee is defined by the act as
    a    person    unable    or    unwilling       to    return     to    her   country      or
    nationality (or country of last habitual residence) “because of
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    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group,       or   political     opinion.”           
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A).
    Ms.    Prosper      bears   the      burden    of    proof    for       establishing   her
    eligibility for asylum. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i). To show past
    persecution, she must provide “conclusive evidence” that she has
    suffered      persecution       on     one    of    the    five    protected      grounds.
    Romilus,      
    385 F.3d 1
         at   6     (citation      omitted).        To    show   a
    well-founded fear of future persecution, Ms. Prosper must show both
    that her fear is genuine and that it is objectively reasonable,
    Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 
    168 F.3d 565
    , 572 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing
    Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 
    909 F.2d 1
    , 5 (1st Cir. 1990)), or she may
    benefit from a regulatory presumption based upon proof of past
    persecution.        Khalil v. Ashcroft, 
    337 F.3d 50
    , 55 (1st Cir. 2003).
    To    meet    the   objective      prong      of    the   well     founded    fear   test,
    Ms. Prosper need only show a “reasonable possibility” that, if
    denied asylum (and thereafter removed to her homeland), she will be
    persecuted on account of a protected ground. Aguilar-Solis v. INS,
    
    168 F.3d 565
    , 572 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
    
    480 U.S. 421
    , 440 (1987)).                    This showing requires “credible,
    direct, and specific evidence.”                Khalil, 
    337 F.3d at 55
     (citation
    omitted).
    To     qualify   for     withholding         of     removal,      which    provides
    mandatory relief, Ms. Prosper must meet a higher standard than that
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    required for asylum:      she must show that, more likely than not, she
    faces   persecution      on    account    of    race,    religion,      nationality,
    membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,
    should she return to her homeland.               INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 
    526 U.S. 415
    , 419 (1999).
    Relief under the CAT, unlike asylum or withholding of removal,
    does not require Ms. Prosper to prove the reason for torture.
    Romilus, 
    385 F.3d at 8
    .         Instead, an applicant must prove that it
    is more likely than not that she will be tortured if she is
    returned to the proposed country of removal.                 
    Id.
       To establish a
    prima facie claim, Ms. Prosper must offer specific objective
    evidence showing that she will be subject to “(1) an act causing
    severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally
    inflicted;   (3)    for    a    proscribed      purpose;     (4)   by    or   at   the
    instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
    official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5)
    not arising from lawful sanctions.” 
    Id.
     (citing Elien v. Ashcroft,
    
    364 F.3d 392
    , 398 (1st Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)).
    On appeal Ms. Prosper argues that many of the inconsistencies
    perceived    by    the    IJ    were     actually       differences     in    detail,
    differences in word choice, or indicative of a misunderstanding by
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    the IJ.3   She adds that the IJ and the BIA failed to evaluate the
    materiality of the inconsistencies in Ms. Prosper’s testimony.
    This second assertion is simply not true; the IJ specifically
    stated that the discrepancies and inconsistencies in Ms. Prosper’s
    testimony were material to her claims for relief.          We agree.    We
    also note, as we have before, that a witness’s demeanor may be a
    critical factor in determining her truthfulness.             Laurent v.
    Ashcroft, 
    359 F.3d 59
    , (1st Cir. 2004).          “Where, as here, the
    judicial officer who saw and heard the witness makes an adverse
    credibility determination and supports that determination with
    specific   findings,   an   appellate    court    should    treat      that
    determination with great respect.”      
    Id.
       (citations omitted).
    The IJ grouped the discrepancies in Ms. Prosper’s testimony
    into six different categories: (1) her involvement in MDN; (2) the
    3
    For example, Ms. Prosper notes on appeal that the IJ found
    her testimony concerning the November 27, 2000 attack to be
    inconsistent because she asserted at one point that she was
    attacked because she did not vote in the November 2000 elections,
    whereas she asserts at another point that she was attacked because
    of her membership in MDN. Ms. Prosper argues that this difference
    in testimony reflects a difference in detail rather than a
    difference in substantive testimony because she explained at
    another point in her testimony that only Lavalas party members
    voted in the November 2000 election. Therefore when she said that
    she was attacked for not voting in the election, it was implicit
    that she was attacked for not being a Lavalas supporter, although
    this does not mean that she was necessarily a MDN member (as MDN
    did not represent all non-Lavalas supporters).             Although
    Ms. Prosper’s explanation of this inconsistency cited by the IJ may
    be persuasive, there are still numerous other inconsistencies that
    abound in the record which Ms. Prosper has not addressed to our
    satisfaction.
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    November 27, 2000 attack; (3) the December 3, 2000 attack; (4) her
    hospitalization subsequent to the December 3, 2000 attack; (5) her
    arrival in the United States; and (6) her diagnosis as being HIV
    positive.   The most important of these six categories is the first
    one, which is the basis for Ms. Prosper’s claims for asylum and
    withholding of removal.
    Ms. Prosper claims that she was persecuted in the past because
    of her involvement with MDN, thus thrusting her involvement with
    MDN to the forefront of this case.          She erroneously believed that
    the acronym MDN stands for National Democratic Movement, when it
    actually stands for Mobilization for National Development. She was
    unaware that the leader of the MDN left Haiti twice in the 1990s.
    She claimed that she joined MDN in 1990, later claimed that she did
    so in 1999, and submitted a MDN membership card that appears to
    have been issued in 1995.       Finally, and perhaps      most importantly,
    Ms. Prosper failed to recall two watershed events in MDN history:
    the disputed May 2000 election and MDN’s subsequent joinder of
    other   opposition    parties    to   create    a   coalition    called   the
    Democratic Convergence.         Altogether, Ms. Prosper’s inconsistent
    statements, and apparent lack of awareness concerning MDN-related
    matters,    provide   ample     ground   to    support   the    IJ’s   adverse
    credibility finding.
    Although we have previously noted other discrepancies in
    Ms. Prosper’s testimony, they are not as striking or significant as
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    those concerning MDN and do not merit additional examination here.
    Nevertheless, they further support the IJ’s adverse credibility
    determination.
    The discrepancies in Ms. Prosper’s testimony, especially those
    regarding events giving rise to her claims for asylum, withholding
    of removal and protection under CAT, provide substantial evidence
    to support the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.           This
    adverse credibility determination is fatal to all three claims
    (asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT) because they all rely on
    the same discredited testimony.4   See, e.g., Desna v. Gonzales, 
    454 F.3d 896
    , 898-99 (8th Cir. 2006).       Accordingly, we conclude that
    the IJ did not err in determining that Ms. Prosper was not
    credible.
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, we deny the petition for review
    and affirm the decision of the BIA.
    4
    We note that in so deciding, we have not stated that an
    adverse credibility finding that defeats a request for asylum a
    fortiori defeats a CAT claim. See Settenda v. Ashcroft, 
    377 F.3d 89
    , 94-95 (1st Cir. 2004). Rather, Ms. Prosper does not point to
    any other evidence in the record outside of her discredited
    testimony that supports her CAT claim.
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