Perez-Tolentino v. Iancu ( 2020 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1432
JUAN C. PEREZ-TOLENTINO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ANDREI IANCU, Director of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office;
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Lipez, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Juan A. Vélez-Méndez on brief for appellant.
W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney; Mariana E. Bauzá-
Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division; and Antonio L. Perez-Alonso, Assistant United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
December 21, 2020
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant Juan C. Perez-Tolentino
("Perez") challenges the dismissal of his disability
discrimination suit against the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO") and its director. The district court held that
the action could not proceed because Perez waived his
discrimination claim in a settlement agreement that allowed him to
resign from his job in lieu of being terminated. Although Perez
acknowledges the waiver, he argues that it is void because he did
not knowingly and voluntarily agree to it. He claims that the
district court erred in finding implausible his allegation of an
unenforceable waiver.
Having carefully reviewed the complaint and related
materials in the record, we agree with the district court's
analysis of the circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement
and the court's conclusion that the waiver is binding. See Beddall
v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) ("When
. . . a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked
to -- and admittedly dependent upon -- a document (the authenticity
of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into
the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)."). We add only the
following comments in response to Perez's arguments to this court.
(1) Perez's primary contention on appeal is that the
district court erred by failing to consider his psychiatric
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disability when reviewing the factors relevant to his waiver.
However, Perez neither alleges in his complaint nor argued in his
opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss that his ability
to understand and evaluate the settlement agreement or the waiver
was compromised by his mental state. Indeed, Perez's complaint
emphasizes his intellectual capability, alleging that his "medical
condition" -- described as "major stress" -- would not prevent him
from performing "the essential job functions of his position" on
a part-time basis. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 20.
Perez first reported his "recent" diagnosis of
depression and anxiety, and his "pharmacologic treatment for his
mental disorders," in his motion to alter and amend the district
court's judgment,1 but even then did not explain how those
conditions impaired his ability to consider the three-page
settlement agreement (a deficiency that persists on appeal).
Moreover, Perez was not left to his own devices in deciding whether
to sign the agreement; significantly, he was assisted throughout
the settlement process by his union representative, who also was
a signatory to the agreement.
Our caselaw clearly rejects the sufficiency of a bald
assertion of a psychiatric condition to void a waiver where the
surrounding circumstances otherwise demonstrate voluntariness.
1 Perez presents no argument on appeal concerning the denial
of this post-judgment motion.
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See Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 277
(1st Cir. 2002) (emphasizing precedent holding that "an incapacity
to knowingly and voluntarily execute a release will not be inferred
simply from the showing, standing alone, that the party suffered
from some psychiatric disorder"); Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp.
Union Emps. Supplemental Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 714 (1st Cir.
1999) (stating that "[t]he fact that [the employee] suffered from
various disorders, including depression, and was on medication is
insufficient, without more, to invalidate the Agreement"); Rivera-
Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9, 12-13 (1st
Cir. 1997) (stating that it is not "enough [for an employee] to
assert that the nature of [his] disability was psychiatric" because
"not all psychiatric disabilities inherently involve a question
about capacity to act knowingly and voluntarily" (emphasis
omitted)). Having failed to explain the relevance of his condition
to the district court, Perez waived this theory of involuntariness
as a basis for invalidating his express relinquishment of the
discrimination claim. See, e.g., Morais, 167 F.3d at 712.
(2) Perez also contends that, in evaluating the validity
of his waiver, the district court improperly disregarded guidance
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on
waivers of employment discrimination claims. Putting aside the
question of whether courts must adhere to such guidance, Perez is
simply wrong about the district court's analysis. As the court
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correctly explained in its order denying Perez's post-judgment
motion, its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis was fully
consistent with the EEOC guidelines as well as this court's
precedent. See EEOC, Understanding Waivers of Discrimination
Claims in Employee Severance Agreements, EEOC-NVTA-2009-3,
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_severance-agreements.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2020); Melanson, 281 F.3d at 276 & n.4
(identifying the "non-exclusive set of six factors" used to
determine the validity of a release). The court noted, inter alia,
the clarity of the agreement's language, Perez's ability as a
patent examiner to read documents, the time allowed for his review
of the agreement,2 and the content "incorporat[ing] exactly what
[Perez] requested from the USPTO."3 Although it acknowledged that
Perez was not represented by counsel and "had no input regarding
[the agreement's] terms," the court pointed out that the agreement
itself encouraged Perez to consult an attorney and that his union
representative also signed the agreement. Moreover, the court
observed, Perez "did not ask for assistance, clarification, or
2 Perez stated in his opposition to the USPTO's motion to
dismiss that he was given six days to consider the three-page
settlement agreement.
3 After he received notice of his termination, Perez asked
for, and was given, the benefit of resigning with a release of
claims.
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different terms," and the record does not indicate that the USPTO
"denied [him] an opportunity to negotiate."
(3) We deem meritless Perez's assertion that his
administrative claim of disability discrimination, pursued after
he signed the settlement agreement, shows that he did not
understand the waiver. Where all other factors point to Perez's
knowing and voluntary consent to the waiver, we cannot reasonably
give weight to his disregard of the agreement. Otherwise, as
appellees point out, a party could intentionally void an agreement
simply by breaching it.
In sum, the district court properly concluded that
Perez's allegations "fail[ed] to plausibly show that he did not
sign the [s]ettlement [a]greement 'knowingly and voluntarily.'"
Accordingly, the agreement precludes his disability claim, and the
district court properly dismissed his complaint.
Affirmed.
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