In Re GRAND JURY , 566 F.3d 12 ( 2009 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 08-1880
    IN RE: GRAND JURY
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Stahl, and Howard,
    Circuit Judges.
    Andrew Good, with whom Philip G. Cormier and Good & Cormier,
    were on brief for appellant.
    Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief for
    appellee.
    May 11, 2009
    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.           This appeal arises from an
    ongoing grand jury investigation.            The appellant, a non-target,
    testified before the grand jury concerning highly technical and
    ancient   subject   matter.        After    approximately   three   hours   of
    testimony, during which the government reminded the appellant
    repeatedly that a failure to testify truthfully would be subject to
    possible perjury charges, the government continued its examination
    to a later date.    In the interim, the appellant sought access to a
    transcript of his prior testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E)(i).           The district court denied the
    request, finding that the appellant failed to provide a strong
    showing of a particularized need for access to the transcript. The
    appellant refused to testify further, and, on the government's
    motion, the district court found the appellant in contempt.             This
    appeal followed.      After careful consideration, we reverse and
    remand.
    I.    Background
    To avoid compromising the grand jury investigation, we
    only discuss the bare minimum of facts necessary to dispose of this
    appeal.
    In May 2008, the government issued a subpoena to the
    appellant to testify before a federal grand jury sitting in the
    District of Massachusetts, and subsequently issued a subpoena
    -2-
    directing him to produce documents related to the subject matter of
    his testimony.
    After receipt of the subpoenas, the appellant indicated
    through counsel that he would assert his Fifth Amendment right
    against    self-incrimination      and   would     refuse     to    testify.      In
    response, the government applied for and obtained an order granting
    the appellant use immunity pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 6002
     & 6003,
    and compelled him to testify before the grand jury.
    About a week later, in June 2008, the appellant testified
    before the grand jury for approximately three hours and fifteen
    minutes.     During his examination, which was conducted by three
    assistant U.S. attorneys simultaneously, the prosecutors warned the
    appellant multiple times that the use immunity order did not
    protect him from prosecution for testifying falsely.                      In some
    instances,    the    prosecutors     asked       repetitive        questions,    and
    suggested inconsistencies in the appellant's testimony.                         Other
    times, the prosecutors verbally abused the appellant. However, the
    prosecutors did not indicate that they were planning to indict the
    appellant on perjury or obstruction of justice charges.                  Moreover,
    the   appellant     was   questioned     about    events    and      documents    of
    significant complexity.        A number of these events and documents
    dated back to 1999.1
    1
    We note that during the course of this appeal we requested a copy
    of the transcript and exhibits from the appellant's appearance for
    our own independent review.
    -3-
    The   government        did    not       complete    its     examination.
    Consequently, the government ordered the appellant to return and
    complete his testimony the following week.                        At the appellant's
    request, the government agreed to continue his return to the grand
    jury for an additional two weeks, until early July 2008.
    In the interim, counsel for the appellant sent a letter
    to the government seeking an opportunity for the appellant to
    review the transcript of his grand jury testimony in advance of his
    second day of testimony.            The government declined the request.
    As a result, the appellant filed an emergency motion for
    access to a transcript of his grand jury testimony pursuant to Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i), which authorizes a court to order
    disclosure     of     grand    jury    materials         "preliminarily        to   or    in
    connection with a judicial proceeding."                   In particular, appellant
    sought to review his transcript at the U.S. Attorney's office or a
    similar location, and further requested that his lawyer accompany
    him and that the appellant be allowed to take notes.
    In support of his motion, the appellant cited a recent
    D.C. Circuit decision, In re Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d 978
     (D.C. Cir.
    2007), in which the court held that grand jury witnesses are
    entitled under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) to review transcripts of their
    own   grand    jury    testimony.           See    
    id. at 980, 990
    .         In   the
    alternative,        the      appellant      argued       that     he     has    shown      a
    particularized        need    for   access        to   the     transcript      given     the
    -4-
    prosecutors' warnings of possible perjury prosecution and the
    complexity of the subject matter of his testimony.   The government
    opposed, and argued that, under First Circuit law, the appellant
    must provide "a strong showing of particularized need" to obtain
    access, see In re Special Proceedings, 
    373 F.3d 37
    , 47 (1st Cir.
    2004) (quotation marks omitted), and that the appellant had failed
    to do so.
    A hearing was held on the same day as the filing of the
    emergency motion, which, as the district court noted, did "not
    provide[] a great deal of time for reflection."   In ruling on the
    motion, the district court first acknowledged that "at least at
    first reading I agree with the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit case."
    In particular, the district court noted that the benefit to the
    witness of access far outweighs the "very mild burden on grand jury
    secrecy, so mild as to be close to nonexistent," since a witness is
    not bound to keep his testimony secret, and could easily debrief
    his or her attorney after testifying.       Moreover, although the
    district court recognized the "potential administrative burden"
    caused by the D.C. Circuit rule in permitting access, it concluded,
    in its own view, that "the benefit to the witness greatly outweighs
    the burden to the government."
    Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it was
    bound by First Circuit precedent, and thus required the appellant
    to provide a strong showing of a particularized need for the
    -5-
    transcript in order to obtain access.        In examining whether the
    appellant had made a showing of particularized need, the district
    court stated:
    I do not find that there is a particularized
    need here, that is, as I interpret the case
    law, as to what is required to show a
    particularized need; that there are three
    unusual aspects to this:    The first is that
    the testimony spread over two days or more
    than one day; the second is that the witness
    was confronted by the prosecutor and given
    perjury warnings about the accuracy of some of
    his statements; and the third is that the
    subject matter is quite complex.     While to
    some extent those facts are unusual, they're
    not highly unusual, and I don't think under
    the [In re] Bianchi [
    542 F.2d 98
     (1st Cir.
    1976)] and In Re: Special Proceedings line of
    cases are enough to show particularized need.
    Accordingly, the district court denied the motion.
    One week later, in mid-July 2008, the appellant appeared
    before the grand jury but refused to answer questions.       That same
    day, the government petitioned the district court to hold the
    appellant in civil contempt pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1826
    .        Still
    that same day, the district court conducted a hearing during which
    it allowed the government's petition for contempt in an oral ruling
    and written order.    However, the district court stayed that order
    during the pendency of any appeal.
    Counsel for the appellant also pointed out that the
    transcript of the appellant's first day of grand jury testimony was
    now available, and moved the district court to order the government
    to   file   the   transcript   with   the   court.   After   initially
    -6-
    entertaining the request, the district court denied the motion,
    because    it    was   concerned    about    the   "mechanical     difficulties
    involved," and since it was "not relying on what the transcript
    said, I don't feel I need to see the transcript.             I won't make it
    part of the record."
    II.     Discussion
    On appeal, the appellant contends that the district court
    erred in denying his request to review a transcript of his grand
    jury testimony prior to his second day of examination.               We review
    any rulings of law de novo, and, to the extent we find no legal
    error, any denial of disclosure for abuse of discretion.              See In re
    Grand Jury Proceedings, 
    580 F.2d 13
    , 18 (1st Cir. 1978).
    A.     Standard That Applies to a Request for Access
    The appellant first contends that the district court
    erred as a matter of law in requiring him to provide a "strong
    showing of particularized need" in order to obtain access to his
    transcript.       Instead, the appellant argues that a "less demanding"
    standard of particularized need applies when a grand jury witness
    seeks only access to a transcript of his testimony, rather than a
    copy.    For support, appellant relies on In re Grand Jury, a recent
    D.C.    Circuit    decision   where    the   court   held   that    grand   jury
    witnesses are entitled "to review transcripts of their own grand
    jury testimony in private at the U.S. Attorney's Office or a place
    agreed to by the parties or designated by the district court."              490
    -7-
    F.3d at 990.      Given its importance to the appellant's claims, we
    discuss the D.C. Circuit's decision in some detail.
    1.   The D.C. Circuit Decision
    Grand Jury involved a grand jury investigation into a
    company and its employees.          Id. at 980.        Two employees of the
    company testified before the grand jury, and were subpoenaed to
    testify an additional time.            Id.     Both moved for access to a
    transcript of their prior grand jury testimony before testifying
    further,   "in    order   to   avoid     the   possibility    of   inconsistent
    statements occasioned by the passage of years since the events in
    question and many months" since they last testified, as well as the
    possible need "to take advantage of recantation pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 1623
    ."       
    Id. at 984
    .         The district court denied both
    motions,   finding    that     neither    employee    provided     a   sufficient
    showing    of    "particularized       need"    for   the    transcripts     that
    "outweighed the interests in maintaining grand jury secrecy."                 
    Id.
    at 984 & n.4.
    On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, addressing the issue for the
    first time, see 
    id. at 987
    , noted that the district court, in
    requiring a showing of particularized need, relied on Supreme Court
    precedent that concerned third parties seeking copies of such
    materials.       See 
    id.
     at 984 & n.3 (citing, among other cases,
    Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 
    441 U.S. 211
    , 222-23
    (1979)).     However, in contrast to a third party, a grand jury
    -8-
    witness is under no obligation to maintain the secrecy of grand
    jury proceedings.       Id. at 985; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6,
    Advisory Committee Notes, 1944 Adoption, Note to Subdivision (e)
    ("[R]ule does not impose any obligation of secrecy on witnesses.").
    With this background in mind, the D.C. Circuit addressed
    "when courts should" provide access.         Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 986
    .
    Noting that the text of Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) is "open-ended," and
    following the "general analytic approach" of other circuits that
    have addressed the issue, the court "weigh[ed] the competing
    interests of the Government and grand jury witnesses." 
    Id. at 987
    .
    As to witnesses, the district court identified two interests in
    obtaining    access:     (1)    the   need    to   "ensur[e]    that      their
    recollections are accurately reflected in the transcripts," and
    (2)   for   those   witnesses   who   "may   testify   again   in   the   same
    investigation . . . to help prepare for the upcoming testimony."
    
    Id. at 988
    .         As to the government, the court identified two
    competing interests: (1) to maintain grand jury secrecy, and (2) to
    prevent witness intimidation.         
    Id.
    The court concluded that the witness interests in access
    outweighed the government's interests in prohibiting such access.
    As to secrecy, the court noted that the secrecy rationale was meant
    to prevent "the public or others from learning what a grand jury
    witness said to the grand jury."             
    Id.
       Thus, while preventing
    access to a third party was necessary to maintain the secrecy of
    -9-
    grand jury witness testimony, preventing access to the witness
    himself "makes little sense," since a witness already knows the
    content of his testimony and, in any event, has the right to
    broadcast the substance of his testimony if he so desired.               
    Id. at 988-89
     (noting that "the witness can stand on the courthouse steps
    and   tell    the    public    everything   the   witness   was    asked   and
    answered"). The D.C. Circuit therefore concluded that "the Supreme
    Court's 'particularized need' standard, which the Court crafted to
    deal with third-party requests for secret transcripts of other
    witnesses' testimony, does not apply in this first-party context."
    
    Id. at 989
    .
    As to witness intimidation, the court found compelling
    the concern that providing copies to a witness would result in
    third   parties      forcing   disclosure   of    the   copies    and   thereby
    "deter[ring] witnesses from testifying freely and candidly in the
    first place."       
    Id. at 989
    .   However, the concern with intimidation
    "lacks force with respect to a witness's merely reviewing the
    transcript in private at the U.S. Attorney's office or a place
    agreed to by the parties or designated by the district court."             
    Id. at 990
    .      The court, in particular, saw little difference between
    pressure to divulge the contents after a private review of the
    transcript and pressure to "recall their testimony from memory."
    
    Id.
       Based on this weighing of interests, the court concluded that
    -10-
    first-party witnesses are entitled to access of their transcripts
    under Rule 6(e).
    2.   Analysis
    The appellant contends that the D.C. Circuit's reasoning
    in Grand Jury supports his claim of a less demanding standard,
    since he seeks the same access to a transcript of his own testimony
    that the D.C. Circuit permitted.     We agree.   To be clear, we do not
    adopt the D.C. Circuit's holding that a grand jury witness is
    entitled to access to a transcript of his grand jury testimony.
    Instead, we hold that, in light of the considerations supporting
    the D.C. Circuit decision and our own review of our precedent, a
    less demanding requirement of particularized need applies when a
    grand jury witness demands access to a transcript, rather than a
    copy of the transcript.2
    Admittedly, we have held that "a grand jury witness has
    no general right to the transcripts of his testimony."        Bianchi,
    
    542 F.2d at
    100 (citing In re Bottari, 
    453 F.2d 370
     (1st Cir.
    1972)).   Instead, in this circuit a witness must provide "a strong
    2
    The dissent unfortunately misconstrues our decision by stating
    that "[t]he panel majority adopts an approach based on the
    reasoning and rationale of a recent D.C. Circuit opinion, which
    permits relatively unfettered access even for non-defendant
    witnesses." (Dissent at 25). As the decision makes clear, we do
    not adopt the D.C. Circuit approach, and although we discuss the
    D.C. Circuit at great length, we base our decision on a review of
    our precedent as well as our independent assessment of the
    interests at stake, many of which were not addressed by the D.C.
    Circuit.
    -11-
    showing of particularized need" in order to obtain a copy of a
    transcript.       Special Proceedings, 
    373 F.3d at 47
     (quotation marks
    omitted).
    However, as the appellant correctly points out, our prior
    case law has solely concerned grand jury witnesses seeking copies
    of    their   transcript,       while   the     appellant       seeks    only   access,
    understood as an opportunity to review the transcript. In Bottari,
    our    earliest    case    on    the    issue,       the   witness      sought,    as   a
    precondition      to   testifying,      a     copy    of   "a   transcript        of   the
    questions and answers following his appearance before the grand
    jury."    
    453 F.2d at 371
    .        Likewise, in Bianchi, the witness sought
    "copies of his prior grand jury testimony."                        
    542 F.2d at 100
    (emphasis added).         And in Special Proceedings, a case outside the
    grand jury context, but involving what we determined an analogous
    situation, a special investigation, we rejected a witness's claim
    for a copy of his deposition transcript.3                  
    373 F.3d at 47
    .
    3
    The dissent points out that in Special Proceedings we stated the
    following:
    Taricani may be arguing that as a witness he has an
    elevated right to copies of his own deposition
    transcript.   However, in this circuit "a grand jury
    witness has no general right to transcripts of his
    testimony." In re Bianchi, 
    542 F.2d 98
    , 100 (1st Cir.
    1976). Similarly, a majority of circuits hold that a
    non-defendant witness seeking access to his own
    deposition transcript must make "a strong showing of
    particularized need" for such disclosure.
    
    373 F.3d at 47
     (emphasis added). According to the dissent, the use
    of the word "access" above means that our precedent equally
    -12-
    In none of these cases did we have the occasion to
    address whether a demand for access, which imposes a lesser burden
    on the governmental interests of grand jury secrecy and witness
    intimidation, still requires a strong showing of particularized
    need.   Nor has the Supreme Court opined on the issue.   However, the
    Supreme Court, in articulating a standard of particularized need
    for third parties, has noted that its "standard is a highly
    flexible one, adaptable to different circumstances and sensitive to
    the fact that the requirements of secrecy are greater in some
    requires a "strong showing of particularized need" for requests for
    a review of a transcript. (Dissent at 26-28).
    We disagree. First, the sentence in which "access" appears
    only describes what the "majority of circuits" have held. More
    importantly, it notes that such a holding is only "[s]imilar[]" to
    our own rule, which, described in the previous sentence, does not
    deal with "access" but with copies, or, to borrow the words of the
    Bianchi court, with "a general right to transcripts." 
    542 F.2d at 100
     (emphasis added).
    Second, the dissent relies upon Awuah v. Coverall N. Am.,
    Inc., 
    554 F.3d 7
     (1st Cir. 2009), for the proposition that we give
    effect to the language of a prior panel decision even if it is
    "perhaps broader than the precise controversy at issue." (Dissent
    at 27). In Awuah, however, we gave effect to broader language in
    a prior decision because, although broader, it "constitute[d] the
    rationale for the decision." 
    554 F.3d at 11
    . In contrast, the
    broader statement in Special Proceedings did not "constitute the
    rationale for the decision," but was a description of the holdings
    of a "majority of circuits." In fact, and as discussed below, had
    the court in Special Proceedings intended to reach access as
    defined here, it would have at least expressed some disapproval
    with the district court's sua sponte offer of access. Instead, the
    court in Special Proceedings cited the option with approval. 
    373 F.3d at 47
    .
    -13-
    situations than in others."       United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 
    481 U.S. 102
    , 112 (1987).     We take the same approach.
    We begin by discussing the significant interest a witness
    has in reviewing a transcript of his or her grand jury testimony.
    As the D.C. Circuit recognized, even witnesses who intend to
    testify truthfully have an interest in avoiding inaccuracies and
    inconsistencies that may subject them to a potential perjury
    prosecution.      See Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 988
     (noting that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1623
    (a) provides for "inconsistent statements as [a] basis
    for a perjury conviction").        The interest in avoiding inaccuracies
    and inconsistencies increases significantly when a grand jury
    witness has to testify over multiple days, and thus has to prepare
    for upcoming testimony.     
    Id.
    Moreover,     federal     law    "strongly     reinforces"     that
    interest. 
    Id.
          A grand jury witness has a statutory right to
    recant, one that would be difficult to exercise without a review of
    the transcript.    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1623
    (d); see also Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 988
     ("A witness would have difficulty taking full advantage
    of the statutory recantation provision . . . without obtaining
    prompt   access   to   transcripts    of    their   own   testimony.").    In
    addition, the federal rules contemplate the disclosure of grand
    jury transcripts.      See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i) ("The court
    may authorize disclosure . . . of a grand jury matter . . .
    preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding").
    -14-
    Finally, the government is subject to a higher burden of proof to
    establish perjury, which lessens the risk of perjury prosecution
    and, therefore, allows witnesses to be less evasive and more
    forthcoming in answering questions.4
    We   also   stress    that    the   interest    a   witness   has   in
    maintaining the accuracy of his or her testimony is not just
    personal to the witness.        It is systemic, as both the courts and
    the government have a substantial interest in ensuring the accuracy
    of grand jury testimony.
    With the witness's interests in mind, we consider the
    interests of the government, particularly how those interests are
    affected in the access context as compared to the copy context.                As
    the D.C. Circuit points out, there are significant differences
    between   the   access   and    copy    context   with    respect   to   witness
    intimidation.    Specifically, "if a witness could routinely obtain
    a copy of the grand jury transcript . . . an interested party could
    in turn pressure the witness to obtain the transcript and to give
    it to that third party."        Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 989
    .        Likewise a
    "witness's fear of being forced to disclose the transcript to a
    threatening third party could deter witnesses from testifying
    4
    The dissent only views these protections as "abundant . . . for
    all grand jury witnesses," and thus concludes that we "vastly
    overstate[] a witness's interest in access to prior grand jury
    testimony."    (Dissent at 32-33).       Instead, we view these
    protections as a recognition of the significant interest a witness
    has in maintaining the accuracy of his testimony, such that we do
    not overstate it, but simply take it into account.
    -15-
    freely and candidly in the first place."                
    Id.
         Both of these
    concerns     are    alleviated    significantly     when      only    access   is
    permitted.       Unlike in the copy context, a witness granted only
    access could, in the face of intimidation, simply decline to reveal
    his testimony.       See 
    id. at 990
     (noting that, in general, a grand
    jury witness could decline to discuss his or her testimony, and
    that this option "is not realistically affected by whether the
    witness    can     review   the   transcript   at   a   secure       location").5
    Moreover, because of this option, the witness will feel less
    inclined to withhold truthful testimony.
    Although the D.C. Circuit did not address it, the access
    context also differs from the copy context with respect to grand
    jury secrecy.       As both the D.C. Circuit and the district court in
    this case point out, a grand jury witness is under no obligation to
    maintain the secrecy of his or her testimony.           To use the colorful
    5
    The D.C. Circuit, in fact, found this difference so significant
    that it expressly reserved the issue of whether "the possibility of
    witness intimidation would justify denying copies of transcripts."
    
    Id. at 989-90
    .
    The dissent contends that our conclusion is "naive," because
    "[t]he same people who would cajole a witness to obtain a copy of
    his testimony and reveal it would be able to use similar methods to
    coerce the witness into reviewing his testimony and reporting its
    contents." (Dissent at 30). However, the dissent does not fully
    take into account the evasive measures a witness can undertake if
    he only obtains access. After all, a witness, even after review,
    could be less than forthcoming about his testimony, and a third
    party would never know to cajole further. If the witness obtains
    a copy, however, no amount of evasion can hide his testimony,
    printed in black and white, from a determined third party.
    -16-
    example of the district court, a grand jury witness has the right
    to "put up that information on a billboard on the Mass. Pike."
    Thus, any concern with maintaining grand jury secrecy is already
    diminished in the grand jury witness context.6 However, permitting
    access does not exacerbate the situation in the way making a copy
    available does.   Unlike access, a copy can take on a life of its
    own, and, despite the efforts of a well-intentioned grand jury
    witness, a copy can float around and land in the wrong hands.
    Accordingly, the access context better maintains grand jury secrecy
    vis-a-vis the copy context.
    Finally, although we have not had the occasion to address
    the issue, our decision in Special Proceedings lends some support
    to the distinction we make between granting access and granting a
    copy.   There, we found that a deponent in a special investigation
    failed to articulate, let alone show, a particularized need for a
    copy of his deposition transcript, in part because "the district
    court took steps to accommodate any need [the witness] might have
    for the transcript by offering [the witness] and his counsel access
    to the deposition testimony as long as they agreed to keep the
    6
    In fact, our precedent has failed to acknowledge the fact that a
    grand jury witness is not under any obligation to maintain grand
    jury secrecy. Some courts, most notably the D.C. Circuit, have
    viewed this fact as cutting in favor of witness access.      Other
    courts have not. See, e.g., Bast v. United States, 
    542 F.2d 893
    ,
    896 (4th Cir. 1976) (requiring a showing of particularized need,
    but "recogniz[ing] that Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 imposes no condition of
    secrecy on the witness.").
    -17-
    transcript confidential."      
    373 F.3d at 47
    .            Not only did we cite
    the option of access with approval, but we also indicated that a
    greater showing of need was required to move from the access
    context to the copy context.
    We   also   recognize   one    other       important   interest   not
    discussed by the D.C. Circuit but cited by the district court
    below,   efficiency.         Articulating          a     lesser    standard   of
    particularized need with respect to access may increase the burdens
    on the government in grand jury proceedings.                 However, we agree
    with the district court that "the benefit to the witness greatly
    outweighs the burden to the government."                  As the D.C. Circuit
    noted, "the Federal Rules . . . mandate that grand jury proceedings
    be transcribed or taped," with such records being kept by the
    government.      Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at
    986 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P.
    6(e)(1)).   Thus, the cost of providing a transcript, which must be
    created anyway, and the slight delay caused by the review of the
    transcript would not impede an investigation significantly.                   In
    fact, there is no evidence that the D.C. Circuit's more lenient
    rule has had any detrimental affect on grand jury investigations in
    that circuit.
    We conclude by noting that our "less demanding" standard
    of particularized need does not apply to appellant's request to
    take notes.       Permitting notetaking blurs the line between the
    access and copy contexts, since one can imagine an appellant
    -18-
    transcribing his transcript and, in effect, creating a copy. Thus,
    our requirement of a strong showing of particularized need applies
    equally to the notetaking context.7
    For all of the above reasons, we find that the district
    court committed error in applying our precedent, which has solely
    involved requests for copies, to the appellant's request for access
    to a transcript of his grand jury testimony.
    B.   Showing of Particularized Need
    Because the district court did not make any factual
    findings, but assumed as true the contentions in support of the
    appellant's request for access, we address whether appellant has
    made   a   showing   of   particularized   need   in   light   of   the   less
    demanding standard we articulated above.8
    7
    Permitting the appellant's counsel to be present during the
    review, which the appellant also requests, is a closer call. Thus,
    following the D.C. Circuit, we leave it up to the "sound
    discretion" of the district court on remand to determine whether
    appellant's counsel can be present. See Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 990
    .
    8
    Because we hold that our former standard of "a strong showing of
    particularized need" still applies to the appellant's request to
    take notes, we still must review the district court's finding of no
    particularized need.      In our view, there was no abuse of
    discretion.     The district court, assuming the appellant's
    contentions as true, ultimately determined that the appellant's
    circumstances, which included the prosecutors' perjury warnings and
    the   complexity   of  his   testimony,   were   not   sufficiently
    particularized to meet our standard. Given that we have not found
    a sufficiently particularized need where only an "ill-defined"
    potential for perjury prosecution exists, see, e.g., Bianchi, 
    542 F.2d at 100
    , we do not see how the district court abused its
    discretion in denying notetaking.
    -19-
    The   appellant    argues   that    his     need      for    access   is
    sufficiently particularized to justify access for two reasons: (1)
    the threats of perjury prosecution given by the prosecutors during
    his examination, and (2) the complexity of the subject matter of
    his testimony, which involved "ancient activity."                 We agree.
    The appellant contends that his need was particularized
    because he was "threatened by . . . powerful authorities with life-
    wrecking perjury convictions and years of imprisonment."                    Our own
    review of the grand jury transcript supports his claim.                     In some
    instances the prosecutors made pointed comments to the appellant,
    asking in places if he "ha[d] a hearing problem" or whether he
    "speak[s] the English language."
    Under our case law in the copy context, we have held that
    potential    perjury   prosecution      alone        does   not     arise    to   a
    particularized    need.       In   Bottari,    for    example,      we    found   no
    particularized need due to potential perjury prosecution because
    that potential alone made "th[e] appellant . . . no different from
    any other witness who testifies before a grand jury, or elsewhere."
    
    453 F.2d at 371
    .     Likewise in Bianchi, where the witness also had
    use immunity under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 6002
     and 6003, we found no
    Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
    making the transcript a part of the record, as the appellant
    claims.   In examining whether the appellant provided a strong
    showing of particularized need, the district court assumed as true
    the appellant's contentions in support of why his need was
    particularized.   Thus, the appellant would have received little
    benefit from having the district court review the transcript.
    -20-
    particularized need where the witness's "ill-defined fear" of a
    "'slight inconsistency' between past and present testimony [that]
    might subject him to perjury prosecution [wa]s unfounded."                  542
    F.2d at 100.
    In this context, however, it is a close call whether the
    strongly worded, even abusive warnings of the prosecutors alone
    suffice to demonstrate a particularized need under our lesser
    standard for access.       Some circuits have permitted access based
    upon such conduct, although they did so on other grounds.                   See,
    e.g., Bursey v. United States, 
    466 F.2d 1059
    , 1080 (9th Cir. 1972)
    (holding that "the concepts of fundamental fairness inherent in due
    process require that a grand jury witness be given some protection
    from the[] risks [of perjury] before he is compelled to answer
    repetitious questions").         However, we do not need to address the
    issue, because the threats of perjury prosecution, combined with
    the    complexity     of   the    appellant's      testimony,     sufficiently
    establishes a particularized need. As the witness attested to, and
    as the grand jury transcript and exhibits bear out, the subject
    matter of his testimony was significantly complex, involving not
    only   complex   technical       material,   but   also    events   and    dates
    occurring    nearly    a   decade    ago.       Thus,     any   concerns    with
    inconsistencies in his testimony (concerns which were repeatedly
    inflamed by the prosecutors) were magnified by the potential traps
    posed by the highly technical and ancient nature of his testimony.
    -21-
    Accordingly, the threats of perjury prosecution, combined with the
    complexity of the witness's testimony, supplies the necessary
    particularized need to permit access.
    We conclude by discussing our application of this lesser
    demand for "particularized need" going forward.             In this case we
    have found such a need satisfied given the abusive warnings of the
    prosecutors during testimony and the complexity of the appellant's
    testimony. We emphasize that, based upon our review of the record,
    the   warnings    were   not   only   strongly    worded,   but    were   also
    buttressed   by    repetitious    questions      and   insulting   language.
    Moreover, the subject matter of the testimony concerned complex,
    nearly decade-old technical material that was integral to the
    examination.9
    9
    The dissent disagrees, and contends that our rule "is likely
    satisfied in many -- if not most -- grand jury investigations."
    (Dissent at 34). The dissent misstates the basis of our finding
    for a particularized need.    Prosecutor's warnings combined with
    testimony only "involv[ing] complex subjects that occurred some
    time in the past" are not sufficient to establish a particularized
    need under our lower standard, as the dissent suggests. (See id.
    at 35). Something more is required, and we articulated above what
    that more was in this case.
    Moreover, we disagree with the dissent's characterization of the
    warnings made during the examination.    The dissent quotes four
    warnings during the examination to show that they were innocuous,
    ignoring other warnings as "infrequent[] and inconsequential[]."
    (Dissent at 39-41). It is the third quoted warning on which we
    disagree.   The dissent seeks to explain that the warning is
    justifiably strongly worded because the appellant was being
    "evasive."   (Id. at 40).     However, we read the exchange as
    supporting our view that the examination was highly technical, as
    the government immediately stated after giving the warning that
    "Okay. So stop playing games with us. This jury is composed of a
    -22-
    We are also cognizant of the effect the application of
    our rule will have on grand jury proceedings, since we do not want
    to "saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings
    [that] would assuredly impede its investigation." United States v.
    Dionisio, 
    410 U.S. 1
    , 17 (1973).   However, the lesser standard of
    particularized need we apply here would not impose undue hardship
    on grand jury investigations.   A district court in its discretion
    can utilize procedures, such as the expedited hearing the district
    court conducted in this case, to minimize any undue effect on the
    grand jury investigation.   Moreover, although we had the advantage
    of reviewing the transcript in this case, nothing we say here
    requires the government to submit one in response to a motion for
    access.   To the extent that the transcript is not available, a
    grand jury witness can testify (or make a proffer) in camera as to
    his or her examination to support his or her claim, with the
    government having an opportunity to rebut.10 Finally, to the extent
    group of laymen. . . . so talk to us like we're regular people and
    stop playing word games with us." Moreover, the dissent dismisses
    the other warnings given during this exchange, such as "Now I'm
    telling you to answer the questions straightforwardly and
    truthfully," followed shortly thereafter by "Okay. Can you answer
    the question straightforwardly?," and still later by "Again, answer
    the question that's asked of you. Answer is directly. Answer it
    truthfully. All right?" and, after a five minute break, "I remind
    you that you're still under oath." From here, the government's
    warnings took an abusive turn: "Please, again, do you have a
    hearing problem?" and "And you speak the English language, that's
    your first language, right?"
    10
    Thus, we disagree with the dissent that under our rule "a district
    court will abuse its discretion if it fails to review the
    -23-
    that   a   grand    jury    witness    games   the    system   to   establish   a
    particularized need, a district court can take evidence of that
    into account.        A witness cannot establish a need, let alone a
    particularized one, if the purported need was self-induced.11
    III.   Conclusion
    For    the     foregoing   reasons,      we   reverse   the   district
    court's finding of contempt, and, on remand, direct the district
    court to permit the appellant access to a transcript of his grand
    jury testimony consistent with this opinion.
    Reversed.
    "Dissenting opinion follows"
    transcript."       (Dissent at 36 n.23).
    11
    The dissent claims that we "too quickly dismisses the witness's
    obstreperous conduct." (Dissent at 41 n.28). Our own review of
    the transcript does not suggest to us that the appellant was being
    obstreperous during the examination given the highly technical
    nature of the questions asked.       Moreover, the appellant has
    proceeded in good faith throughout the course of these proceedings.
    As the district court found in staying its contempt order pending
    appeal, the appellant's claims were "not frivolous" and that the
    appellant was not "being contumacious in the way [of an] ordinary
    grand jury witness, who simply refuses to testify without good
    reason."
    -24-
    HOWARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.        Neither the Federal
    Rules     of     Criminal   Procedure        nor   Supreme   Court   precedent
    specifically address the circumstances in which a non-defendant
    grand jury witness may access his testimony, regardless of the
    format of such access. The panel majority adopts an approach based
    on the reasoning and rationale of a recent D.C. Circuit opinion,
    which permits relatively unfettered access even for non-defendant
    witnesses.        Were we writing on a blank slate, I believe this
    approach would be problematic.          But we are not writing on a blank
    slate; an unbroken line of our cases going back over thirty years
    forecloses the majority's result.              Thus, because the majority's
    conclusion is contrary to our precedent, unwise as a matter of
    policy, and insupportable on this record, I respectfully dissent.
    I.
    Since at least 1972, we have made clear that grand jury
    witnesses have no general right of access to transcripts of their
    prior grand jury testimony.       See In Re Bottari, 
    453 F.2d 370
     (1st
    Cir.    1972).    We have since elaborated on this rule, making just as
    clear that fear of future perjury prosecution cannot constitute a
    cognizable reason for a witness to have access to a transcript of
    his testimony.      See In Re Bianchi, 
    542 F.2d 98
    , 100 (1st Cir. 1976)
    (citing United States v. Chevoor, 
    526 F.2d 178
    , 181 (1st Cir.
    1975)).        We later confirmed our adherence to the majority rule
    among the circuits that a "non-defendant witness seeking access to
    -25-
    his own [grand jury] transcript must make a 'strong showing of
    particularized    need'     for   such   disclosure."12      In   Re    Special
    Proceedings, 
    373 F.3d 37
    , 47 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting In Re Grand
    Jury Subpoena, 
    72 F.3d 271
    , 274 (2d Cir. 1995)) (emphases added).
    It is true that during the course of In Re Special
    Proceedings, we noted that the district court afforded the witness
    seeking access to his testimony the opportunity to review it, so
    long as the witness kept the information confidential.                 
    Id.
       But
    that comment was made in the context of explaining why the witness
    failed to make the requisite "strong showing of particularized
    need."    The majority attempts to treat this summary comment as
    lending   "some   support    to   the    distinction"   it   draws     "between
    granting access and granting a copy."           Maj. Op. at 17; see also
    Maj. Op. at 12-13 n.3.       But this short aside did not (and indeed
    could not) change the ratio decidendi of our decision in In Re
    Special Proceedings, which requires that even a non-defendant
    witness make a "strong showing of particularized need" for "access"
    to his own grand jury testimony.
    12
    The panel majority attempts to avoid the full scope of this
    holding by highlighting the fact that In Re Special Proceedings
    articulated this result as the holding of "a majority of circuits,"
    and that our rule is "similar." Maj. Op. at 12-13 n.3 (quoting In
    Re Special Proceedings, 
    373 F.3d at 47
    ). But the majority neglects
    the next sentence of In Re Special Proceedings, which makes clear
    that we too subscribe to the rule in the majority of circuits: "[a]
    few circuits take a contrary view . . . but are at odds with
    Bianchi."   
    373 F.3d at 47
    .    It is therefore clear that a fair
    reading of In Re Special Proceedings cannot limit its reach merely
    to copies.
    -26-
    Where, as here, the language of a prior panel decision is
    perhaps broader than the precise controversy at issue in that prior
    decision, we still give effect to the language of the prior panel
    decision.     Awuah v. Coverall, N. Am., Inc., 
    554 F.3d 7
    , 11 (1st
    Cir. 2009).    Absent contravening authority from this court sitting
    en banc or the Supreme Court, we must continue to honor the In Re
    Special Proceedings doctrine.          Id.; United States v. Holloway, 
    499 F.3d 114
    , 118 (1st Cir. 2007).13
    Thus,   our   case   law    does   not   permit   the   majority's
    conclusion that a less demanding standard of particularized need is
    appropriate where a witness seeks access to his prior grand jury
    testimony.    The majority attempts to elide decades of case law by
    drawing a distinction between access to prior testimony and the
    availability of copies of prior testimony.             But, for the reasons
    13
    The majority's second attempt to reconcile its holding with our
    precedent is equally unavailing. As explained in note 1, the ratio
    decidendi of In Re Special Proceedings extends to access and does
    not end with the provision of copies. Consequently, both Awuah and
    Holloway require that the panel use the "strong showing of
    particularized need" standard for access as well as copies.
    -27-
    described above, unlike in the D.C. Circuit,14 our precedent does
    not countenance such a distinction.15
    II.
    Even if it were permissible for us to sweep away our
    precedent and to create an entirely new rule regarding a non-
    defendant witness's right to access his grand jury testimony, the
    majority's chosen rule permitting access based on a "less demanding
    requirement of particularized need" is unwise.   First, in creating
    this less demanding standard, the majority fails to give due weight
    to important interests of grand jury secrecy and preventing witness
    intimidation, while at the same time, the majority overemphasizes
    a witness's interest in access to his testimony.       Second, the
    majority's preferred approach will improvidently hamstring the
    operation of grand juries.
    14
    The D.C. Circuit case, In Re Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d 978
     (D.C. Cir.
    2007), is factually distinguishable from the case at bar, and the
    majority has significantly expanded this precedent in order for its
    rule to encompass cases such as the appellant's. Unlike in In Re
    Grand Jury, where witnesses without immunity testified as many as
    three times, with months between such testimony, the appellant in
    this case had immunity. See 
    id. at 980
    . Moreover, the appellant's
    testimony was originally continued for one week, and was later
    continued for another two weeks to accommodate appellant's counsel.
    All other delays in this case have resulted from the appellant's
    protracted efforts to gain access to his prior testimony.
    15
    Our circuit's view of the law finds significant support in the
    "majority of appellate decisions dealing with this issue." In Re
    Grand Jury Subpoena, 
    72 F.3d at
    274-75 (citing Davis v. United
    States, 
    641 A.2d 484
    , 490-91 (D.C. App. 1994); Bast v. United
    States, 
    542 F.2d 893
    , 895-96 (4th Cir. 1976); In Re Bianchi, 
    542 F.2d 98
    ; In Re Bottari, 
    450 F.2d 370
    ).
    -28-
    A.
    1.
    The majority has identified three interests militating
    against witness access to grand jury testimony,16 but has not given
    full weight to those interests.   The majority dismisses the notion
    that grand jury secrecy is an important interest in this context
    because grand jury witnesses have no obligation to keep their
    testimony secret.   Although the majority is correct that a witness
    is under no obligation to keep his testimony secret, Maj. Op. at 10
    (citing In Re Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 988-89
    ), it does not follow
    that permitting a witness access to his own testimony "does not
    exacerbate" the threat to grand jury secrecy.      Maj. Op. at 17
    (emphasis in original).   On the contrary, a witness -- even if he
    is denied the ability to review his testimony with counsel -- will
    now have an additional opportunity to think about his testimony and
    potentially disclose it.17   Moreover, we can expect that a witness
    16
    Because of the profound threat the majority's proposed rule poses
    to the efficiency of grand juries, I discuss this interest in Part
    II.B, infra.
    17
    The majority leaves open the question of whether the appellant is
    entitled to have his counsel review the transcript. Maj. Op. at 19
    n.7.   It suffices here to note the district court's ruling on
    remand from the D.C. Circuit, in which the court held that "the
    expertise of legal counsel is not necessary for the [witness] to
    assess whether the transcripts reflect inconsistencies or
    falsehoods that place [the witness] at risk for a perjury
    prosecution or warrant recantation . . . ." In Re Grand Jury
    Proceeding, 
    520 F. Supp. 2d 61
    , 64 (D.D.C. 2007). Moreover, as the
    district court further noted, since attorneys are not permitted in
    the grand jury room when a witness testifies, it would be anomalous
    -29-
    will be likely to remember a significantly greater portion of his
    testimony during a private review than while undergoing questioning
    before the grand jury, making any subsequent disclosure more
    problematic from the standpoint of the important interest in
    secrecy.    Thus, as a practical matter, the majority's rule will
    have an adverse impact on grand jury secrecy.
    Similarly, witness intimidation will almost certainly
    increase under this new standard.          The majority asserts that "a
    witness granted only access could, in the face of intimidation,
    simply decline to reveal his testimony."       Maj. Op. at 16 (citing In
    Re Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 990
    ).        Respectfully, this assertion is
    naive.   The same people who would cajole a witness to obtain a copy
    of his testimony and reveal it would be able to use similar methods
    to coerce the witness into reviewing his testimony and reporting
    its contents.      The majority's claim that a witness can undertake
    "evasive measures" to avoid commenting on a recollection refreshed
    by   a   lengthy    review   of   the   witness's   prior   testimony   is
    unpersuasive.      See Maj. Op. at 16 n.5.    As the majority correctly
    notes, such evasive measures are unlikely to succeed with respect
    to the existence of a transcript copy; these measures are similarly
    likely to fail when determined individuals demand a witness divulge
    the contents of his testimony. Given that most witnesses will have
    to permit an attorney to be present during a review of                  the
    transcript. 
    Id.
     at 64 n.4.
    -30-
    better recollections of their testimony after the opportunity to
    review it in private, a fact that will not elude those seeking
    additional         information,     the     rule   we    are     now    adopting     will
    exacerbate the threat of witness intimidation.
    2.
    By     contrast,     again     relying     on     the    D.C.    Circuit's
    approach, the majority overemphasizes a witness's interest in
    access to his grand jury testimony.                     The guiding light in the
    majority's balancing is a witness's supposed need to ensure that
    past testimony is accurate, presumably to innoculate him from
    criminal charges of providing false declarations to the grand jury,
    with secondary consideration for a witness's need to prepare for
    future testimony where such testimony is spread over several days.
    Maj. Op. at 14 (citing In Re Grand Jury, 
    490 F.3d at 988
    ); see also
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1623.18
         Though     well-intentioned,          the    majority's
    solicitude for witnesses in this regard is misplaced; although the
    majority      claims      that   "even     witnesses      who    intend       to   testify
    truthfully         have    an    interest     in   avoiding       inaccuracies         and
    inconsistencies           that   may   subject     them    to     potential        perjury
    prosecution," Maj. Op. at 14, federal law already provides ample
    18
    The most obvious and greatest antidote to this concern, of course,
    is that the witness "should testify truthfully in the first
    instance." In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
    520 F. Supp. 2d at 64
    .
    -31-
    protection to such witnesses, which should serve to obviate the
    majority's concern over the plight of these witnesses.19
    The law already provides abundant protections for all
    grand jury witnesses.        Testimony is punishable only when the
    government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it is false, made
    knowingly, and is material to the work of the grand jury.                   
    18 U.S.C. § 1623
    (a); United States v. Silveira, 
    426 F.3d 514
    , 518-19
    (1st    Cir.    2005).    Similarly,   the     relevant     statute   provides
    significant protection to those charged with making inconsistent
    statements.      Such statements are actionable only if the government
    proves beyond a reasonable doubt that they were made (1) knowingly
    and (2) they are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is
    necessarily false.       
    18 U.S.C. § 1623
    (c).         Even then, it is an
    affirmative defense that the defendant "at the time he made each
    declaration believed the declaration was true."             
    Id.
       Furthermore,
    in certain circumstances, witnesses have the right to recant any
    false    declarations.      
    18 U.S.C. § 1623
    (d).20    As   courts   have
    19
    In addition, as a further argument for disclosure, the majority
    correctly notes that in certain circumstances, the Federal Rules of
    Criminal   Procedure   contemplate   disclosure   of   grand   jury
    transcripts.     Maj. Op. at 14 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P.
    6(e)(3)(E)(i)). But the majority neglects to acknowledge that such
    disclosure is only permitted on a strong showing of particularized
    need, see Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 
    441 U.S. 221
    (1979), which the majority concedes is not met in this case. Maj.
    Op. at 19 n.8.    Thus, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
    provide no reason to tip the balance in favor of access.
    20
    The majority's conclusion that it "would be difficult to exercise
    [the statutory right to recant] without a review of the transcript"
    -32-
    recognized, these are copious protections for those who fear
    prosecution for failing to provide less than perfectly accurate
    testimony to the grand jury.           See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
    520 F. Supp. 2d at
    64 (citing Doe v. United States, 
    72 F.3d 271
     (2d
    Cir. 1995)).
    The majority acknowledges the robust protections against
    unwarranted perjury charges afforded grand jury witnesses, see Maj.
    Op. at 14-15, but nevertheless (erroneously in my view) concludes
    that "federal law strongly reinforces" a witness's interest in
    access.     Maj.    Op.    at   14    (internal    quotation     marks    omitted).
    Rather,   the   substantial          protections   available     to   grand      jury
    witnesses   militate      in    favor    of   affording   less    weight    to    the
    witness's interest in obtaining access to grand jury testimony.
    Consequently,      the    majority      has   vastly   overstated     a   witness's
    interest in access to prior grand jury testimony, and as a result,
    does not follow.    Maj. Op. at 14.    As explained above, because
    other provisions of federal law provide witnesses with significant
    protections, recantation is not needed to resolve minor
    inconsistencies or slight errors. A witness will have a better
    memory of the major points of his testimony, and after testifying,
    in consultation with counsel, he will be able to exercise his right
    to recant without a detailed review of the record of his testimony.
    Although we require a witness attempting to recant admit that his
    testimony is false, we have never required any greater level of
    detail in order to permit recantation.      E.g., United States v.
    Scivola, 
    766 F.2d 37
    , 43 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Goguen,
    
    723 F.2d 1012
    , 1018 (1st Cir. 1983).      The majority's continued
    insistence on transcript access for this purpose exalts recantation
    above these other protections available to grand jury witnesses,
    and   unnecessarily   burdens   the   efficiency   of  grand   jury
    investigations.
    -33-
    has created a new rule that will needlessly and unduly interfere
    with the efficient operation of grand juries, contrary to the
    teachings of the Supreme Court.
    B.
    It is axiomatic that grand juries are integral to the
    "fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws." United
    States v. Dionisio, 
    410 U.S. 1
    , 17 (1973) (citations omitted).
    Their   role     is    to    investigate        potential   criminal      violations
    "independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge," and they
    are therefore imbued with "necessarily broad" investigative powers.
    See 
    id. at 13
    , 17 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 
    408 U.S. 665
    , 688
    (1972)). The Supreme Court has therefore long held that grand jury
    proceedings should be free of procedural delays and that "[a]ny
    holding   that       would   saddle   a    grand    jury    with    minitrials   and
    preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and
    frustrate      the     public's    interest        in   fair       and   expeditious
    administration of the criminal laws."               Id. at 17; see also United
    States v. R. Enters., Inc., 
    498 U.S. 292
    , 300-01 (1991); United
    States v. Calandra, 
    414 U.S. 338
    , 350 (1974); Stern v. United
    States Dist. Court, 
    214 F.3d 4
    , 16-17 (1st Cir. 2000).
    The majority's approach of permitting witnesses to access
    their testimony based on a lesser standard of particularized need
    that is likely satisfied in many -- if not most -- grand jury
    investigations threatens to unleash precisely the mischief that the
    -34-
    Supreme Court has warned against.     The majority believes that the
    combination of a prosecutor's use of perjury warnings during
    questioning of a witness and the fact that a witness's testimony
    involves complex subjects that occurred some time in the past is
    sufficient to meet its lower threshold of particularized need.
    Maj. Op. at 20, 22.       But all grand jury investigations are
    necessarily retrospective, and they frequently focus on complex
    matters.21   Moreover, through evasive and unresponsive testimony,
    any witness could elicit perjury warnings from those questioning
    him.22   Thus, under the majority's standard, any witness who
    21
    The majority claims "something more" is required to meet its
    diminished standard, Maj. Op. at 22 n.9, but its opinion refers
    only to perjury warnings, which are appropriate, necessary, and
    encouraged in our case law, see infra note 22, the fact that the
    subject matter involved technical material, and that some events
    occurred less than ten years in the past. But these are common
    circumstances and it is likely that many –- if not most –- grand
    jury investigations will be encompassed in the ambit of the
    majority's new rule.
    22
    The majority's decision to consider perjury warnings in
    determining whether a witness has satisfied a less demanding
    standard will inevitably chill prosecutors' proper use of perjury
    warnings, which is a disservice to prosecutors, witnesses, and the
    grand jury's quest for the truth. The record in this case reveals
    that the prosecutors' perjury warnings were limited and
    appropriate. See infra pp. 39-41.
    These warnings are particularly appropriate in light of our
    previous expressions of strong displeasure with prosecutors in this
    circuit who attempt to skirt warnings to grand jury witnesses.
    See, e.g., United States v. Pancheco-Ortiz, 
    889 F.2d 301
     (1st Cir.
    1989); United States v. Babb, 
    807 F.3d 272
     (1st Cir. 1986). In
    drawing an adverse inference from four reasonable and appropriate
    perjury warnings, we are acting at cross-purposes with our firm
    guidance regarding warnings in grand juries, and unnecessarily
    burdening prosecutors who legitimately offer appropriate perjury
    warnings.
    -35-
    received a perjury warning and testified over several days in a
    complex case about events occurring in the past, can advance at
    least a strong claim for access to his prior testimony, thereby
    creating precisely the kind of procedural delay the Supreme Court
    has warned against.
    The prosecutors responsible for coordinating the grand
    jury investigation will now have to defend these claims, which the
    district courts will need to adjudicate.23   Handling these tasks
    will inevitably distract prosecutors and judges while delaying and
    sometimes even derailing important grand jury investigations. This
    problem is only compounded by the fact that our lenient new test
    will give witnesses every incentive to engage in obstreperous
    23
    The majority claims that its opinion does not require a district
    court to review the transcript of grand jury proceedings in all
    cases, Maj. Op. at 23 & n.10, but, under the logic of the
    majority's analysis, the district court necessarily must review the
    transcript to determine whether the witness can satisfy the "less
    demanding requirement of particularized need."      Without such a
    review, it is difficult to imagine how a district court can
    determine whether perjury warnings were sufficiently numerous and
    abusive or a witness's testimony sufficiently complex to justify
    relief.
    The majority claims that other procedures, such as witness
    testimony or proffers and government rebuttal, might allow the
    district court to determine whether a witness has satisfied the
    majority's lower standard. Maj. Op. at 23. But the district court
    will be unable to accept as true a witness's statements in this
    posture, see Maj. Op. at 19-20 n.8, and as this case demonstrates,
    witnesses and prosecutors will disagree sharply over what
    transpired before the grand jury. Consequently, as a practical
    matter, a district court will abuse its discretion if it fails to
    review the transcript of a witness's grand jury testimony to
    determine whether the less demanding requirement of particularized
    need has been satisfied.
    -36-
    conduct in an effort to cause their testimony to continue over to
    a second day in the hope of gaining access to a transcript.24
    This case is proof that all but the most stringent
    standards of witness access will create slippage that threatens to
    undermine   the   orderly       operation       of   grand   juries.      As   these
    proceedings demonstrate, witnesses, advocates, and even judges can
    and   do    disagree         regarding     a     witness's       evasiveness     and
    obstreperousness,       as    well   as    the       propriety   of    prosecutors'
    questioning.      Because such disagreements have the potential to
    stymie the efficient operation of grand juries and the interests of
    witnesses are protected under other provisions of federal law, the
    Supreme Court and our own precedents require that grand juries be
    permitted to pursue their work without the threat of these types of
    proceedings.
    Moreover,     the    break     in    the     appellant's    testimony,
    occasioned by the need to hear another witness, would have been
    about one week in length had the appellant not delayed it further
    first to accommodate his counsel, and then again, to wage this
    24
    The majority suggests that "[a] witness cannot establish a need,
    let alone a particularized one, if the purported need was self-
    induced." Maj. Op. at 24. The problem, of course, is that the
    need in this case was self-induced.      The witness responded to
    straightforward questions with evasive and sometimes misleading
    responses, which the majority fails to acknowledge. See infra note
    27.   It was these responses to questions (and the prosecutors'
    sensible attempts to follow-up) rather than any particularly
    technical details of the testimony that occasioned the witness's
    unease in this case.
    -37-
    protracted     battle      over    access.      Indeed,    a    transcript   of   the
    appellant's testimony was not available until approximately one
    month after his initial testimony.              The majority claims that such
    a one month delay is "slight" and will not "impede an investigation
    significantly," Maj. Op. at 18, but I simply cannot agree.                    Grand
    juries are normally limited to eighteen month terms, Fed. R. Crim.
    P.    6(g),    and   a     delay    of   one    month     is    hardly   slight    or
    insignificant.       Moreover, the majority's ruling leaves open the
    strong likelihood that there will be multiple witnesses appearing
    before a single grand jury who may be able to assert a right to
    review grand jury transcripts, which will further degrade a grand
    jury's ability to execute its functions in an expeditious manner.25
    Thus, as this case also demonstrates, the majority's rule has
    significant potential needlessly to saddle grand jury proceedings
    with delay and unnecessarily encrust them with precisely the sorts
    of procedural requirements that the Supreme Court has warned
    against.
    III.
    The facts of this case only confirm the adverse effect
    the   majority's     new    standard     will    have   on     the   efficiency   and
    25
    I can take no comfort in the majority's observation that "there
    is no evidence that the D.C. Circuit's more lenient rule has had
    any detrimental [e]ffect on grand jury investigations in that
    circuit," Maj. Op. at 18, because no such evidence was offered by
    either party or requested by this court, and in view of the secrecy
    that properly shrouds grand jury proceedings, such evidence should
    not be readily discernible.
    -38-
    expeditiousness of the grand jury process.          The majority claims
    that threats of perjury prosecution and the complexity of testimony
    jointly suffice to meet its lower threshold.            Maj. Op. at 20, 22.
    But   the   record   reflects   only   four   perjury    warnings   and    no
    particularly outrageous conduct on the part of the prosecutors, nor
    does it bear out the majority's claim of complexity.
    During the course of three hours and fifteen minutes of
    testimony, the record reveals only four perjury warnings.                 The
    first was given at the beginning of the witness's testimony,
    reminding him that the use immunity order does not extend to
    perjury or obstruction of justice:
    PROSECUTOR: [Y]ou also understand that the
    order [granting use immunity] does not protect
    you if you lie, mislead or obstruct this grand
    jury's investigation, do you understand that?
    WITNESS: I do understand that yes.26
    The second warning was given when a different prosecutor
    first began questioning the witness:
    PROSECUTOR: All right. Well you know [name
    redacted] I'm going to caution you, and [the
    other prosecutor] told you this earlier.
    Despite the fact that you have received
    immunity today, if your testimony is designed
    to mislead this grand jury or is evasive or
    equivocal, you can be charged with obstruction
    of justice, do you understand that?
    26
    Ofttimes, a prosecutor will have more than one purpose for this
    introductory perjury warning, including the buttressing of the
    witness's anticipated testimony by suggesting -- through the
    perjury warning -- that the immunized witness has every incentive
    to tell the truth.
    -39-
    WITNESS:   I do understand that.
    The third perjury warning was given after the witness
    offered a series of evasive answers to straightforward questions:
    PROSECUTOR: No, no. Look. Look, [name of
    witness redacted], again let's make a --
    you're here to tell the truth. Okay? This
    isn't a game. All right? You're not here to
    defend [third party] or defend your own
    actions. You have immunity. The only way you
    get into trouble here is if you lie or mislead
    this grand jury.     Do you understand this
    concept?
    WITNESS:   I do.27
    The fourth and final perjury warning was given purely
    prophylactically after a two hour lunch break:
    27
    The majority relies on a prosecutor's admonition that the lawyers
    presenting and the grand jurors hearing the case were "laymen" to
    conclude that the witness's answers were not evasive or
    obstreperous but rather "highly technical." Maj. Op. at 22 n.9.
    What the majority overlooks is that the prosecutors in this case
    were attempting to elicit from the witness basic facts regarding
    whether a third party was warned of a particular danger, and if so,
    when and in what level of detail. The witness claimed that such a
    warning was provided at a meeting at which he was present, but when
    pressed, conceded that the warning was not given at the meeting.
    Unlike the details of a warning, which may be technical, the fact
    of whether a warning was given, and if given, its subject is not
    normally, and in this case was not "highly technical."          The
    witness's failure to address this question in a straightforward or
    even consistent manner is one of many examples of his evasiveness.
    Furthermore, I note that the witness requested and was granted
    the opportunity to consult with counsel shortly after the exchange
    the majority describes. This further reinforces my conclusion that
    the prosecutors were not behaving abusively or attempting to
    overbear the witness.    Instead,   the prosecutors respected the
    witness's rights and were only interested in eliciting the truth,
    which the witness was obfuscating considerably.
    -40-
    PROSECUTOR: [Name redacted], just to remind
    you, can you please acknowledge that you
    understand that you are still under oath?
    WITNESS: I do understand that, yes.
    Other than these warnings reminding the witness that use
    immunity does not extend to perjury or obstruction of justice, the
    words "perjury," "lie," "obstruct," or other similar words and
    phrases   appear   in   the   transcript   only   infrequently   and
    inconsequentially. The record further clarifies that the few times
    the prosecutors acted in a way that could be characterized as
    confrontational, see Maj. Op. at 20, 22 n.9, the witness was
    providing obviously evasive and non-responsive answers.28
    28
    The majority too quickly dismisses the witness's obstreperous
    conduct and his consistently unresponsive and insufficient answers
    to legitimate questions, and the majority further fails to
    acknowledge the obvious systemic harm that flows from such conduct.
    Maj. Op. at 24 n.11. This omission is puzzling in light of the
    majority's concern for systemic benefits that come from access.
    See Maj. Op. at 15. When one considers the appellant's conduct in
    this case, it is clear that any hardship that he has experienced is
    "self-induced," that prosecutors provided him with warnings in
    compliance with our case law, see supra note 22, and that the
    majority's new rule will grant witnesses wide latitude to avoid
    cooperating with grand juries and prosecutors searching for the
    truth.
    Finally, the fact that I disagree so sharply with the majority
    over what transpired in this case and the severity of the
    prosecutors' perjury warnings reaffirms the wisdom of our decisions
    in Bottari, Bianchi, and Special Proceedings -- consistent with
    Supreme Court precedent -- to avoid such disputes altogether by
    applying a rigorous "strong showing of particularized need"
    standard for all access to grand jury transcripts, while relying on
    the other substantial protections found in federal law to protect
    the interests of witnesses.
    -41-
    In addition, it is important to note that although some
    of the substantive subject matter in this case may be technical,
    for the most part, the prosecutors did not dwell on the technical
    complexities. It is also worth noting that the witness admitted to
    having reviewed many of the documents pertinent to his testimony
    with his attorney in the days and weeks prior to his testimony.
    This preparation should substantially ameliorate the majority's
    concern regarding both the technical and the "ancient" nature of
    the testimony.    Moreover, the witness was given the opportunity to
    consult with counsel, who was available outside of the grand jury
    room, and the record reflects that the witness consulted with
    counsel at least twice, which should further palliate concerns that
    anything unfair occurred here.
    IV.
    Because I find that the majority's newly invented lesser
    standard of need is inconsistent with our precedent, significantly
    detracts   from   important   interests   of   grand   jury   secrecy   and
    preventing witness intimidation, substantially overemphasizes the
    interests of a witness, encrusts grand jury proceedings with
    needless procedural complications, and is insupportable on this
    record, I respectfully dissent.
    -42-