United States v. Lewis ( 2020 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1916
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
VAUGHN LEWIS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Inga S. Bernstein, with whom Zoraida Fernández and Zalkind
Duncan & Bernstein LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
June 16, 2020
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Vaughn Lewis was sentenced to
108 months' imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute cocaine
after the district court applied a career-offender enhancement.
Under § 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the
"Sentencing Guidelines"), this enhancement applies where a
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of a
"controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The
commentary to § 4B1.2 provides that such offenses include
conspiracies and other inchoate crimes. Because we have
previously held this commentary authoritative in defining a
"controlled substance offense," we affirm Lewis's sentence.
I.
A.
Lewis's charges stem from an investigation into a drug-
trafficking conspiracy led by Luis Rivera in Brockton,
Massachusetts. 1 Police began investigating Rivera's drug-
supplying operations following a tip provided by a cooperating
witness.
On February 22, 2016, the police intercepted
communications between Lewis and Rivera in which Lewis arranged to
purchase sixty-two grams of cocaine, asking for the "same thing as
1 Rivera was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment with five
years of supervised release and was assessed a $5,000 fine.
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last time." In another intercepted communication, Rivera told
Lewis to meet "where you seen me last" to complete the transaction.
While surveilling the address provided, police observed a
transaction between Rivera and an unidentified individual driving
a gray 2007 Toyota Camry, which turned out to be registered to
Lewis's girlfriend, with whom Lewis lived at the time.
On February 26, 2016, law enforcement intercepted
another communication between Rivera and Lewis about an additional
purchase. The police identified Lewis, who was driving a black
2010 Nissan also registered to his girlfriend, when he met with
Rivera.
On June 9, 2016, police executed a search and arrest
warrant at Lewis's apartment. In a storage area associated with
his apartment, the police found "small amounts of drugs (including
cocaine)" as well as "drug paraphernalia," such as a bag containing
scales and packaging material. The police additionally uncovered
a loaded revolver, three dozen rounds of ammunition, and personal
documents belonging to Lewis. Lewis denied ownership of all the
items seized from the storage area except for his personal
documents. He insisted that the revolver was not his, although
he did not contest the firearm enhancement for purposes of his
Sentencing Guidelines calculation.
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B.
On July 13, 2016, a federal grand jury returned a
one-count superseding indictment charging Lewis with conspiracy to
distribute cocaine powder in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1). Lewis pleaded guilty to the offense,
which carries a statutory maximum term of twenty years'
imprisonment.
The Probation Office's Presentence Investigation Report
("PSR") assigned a base offense level of sixteen, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(12), which it increased by two levels under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) on account of the discovered revolver,
yielding an adjusted offense level of eighteen. The PSR also
determined that Lewis qualified as a career offender under the
Sentencing Guidelines because: He had two prior Massachusetts
felony convictions for controlled substance offenses; he was over
the age of eighteen when he committed the instant offense; and the
instant offense was a "controlled substance offense." See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), (b)(3). The PSR used as predicates Lewis's
1998 conviction for two counts of unlawful distribution of cocaine2
as well as his 2010 conviction for possession with intent to
2
Lewis was sentenced to three to four years of imprisonment
for these charges and was released on February 2, 2002.
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distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine.3 Applying the
career-offender enhancement increased Lewis's offense level to
thirty-two. Finally, the PSR applied a three-level downward
adjustment for "acceptance of responsibility" under U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1, which brought Lewis's total offense level down to twenty-
nine. Based on Lewis's criminal history category ("CHC") of IV,
the PSR calculated Lewis's Guidelines sentencing range ("GSR") to
be 151 to 188 months of imprisonment.
Lewis objected to the PSR on several grounds, most
notably by challenging his career-offender classification. He
argued that his instant conspiracy conviction could not count as
a "controlled substance offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines
and that existing circuit precedent to the contrary should be
reconsidered.
On September 7, 2018, the district court sentenced Lewis
to 108 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of
supervised release. The district court adopted the PSR's
recommendation classifying Lewis as a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Applying circuit precedent, the court overruled
Lewis's objection to the career-offender designation. It agreed
that Lewis's age as well as his instant conviction (conspiracy to
3
Lewis was sentenced to five years of imprisonment for this
charge and was released on July 12, 2013.
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distribute cocaine) and predicate offenses (two prior state
drug-trafficking offenses) triggered the career-offender
enhancement, thus bringing his GSR to a tally of 151 to 188 months
of imprisonment.4
The district court stressed the seriousness of the
offense, including the presence of the gun, and stated that
"[r]egardless of whether [Lewis is] a career offender or not, [he
has] a history of recidivism," and it needed to "send . . . a very
clear message . . . that [Lewis] cannot continue to sell drugs."
The court nevertheless varied Lewis's sentence down to 108 months
because his first predicate offense, the 1998 drug conviction,
involved the sale of $40-worth of drugs when he was seventeen.
The district court judge also stated that "if career offender does
not apply, I want this to come back to me to resentence because I
am using career offender as an anchor."5
4 The parties agree that without the career-offender
designation Lewis's GSR would have been thirty-seven to forty-six
months of imprisonment.
5 Relatedly, the court noted that because Lewis was seeking
to vacate his second predicate offense (the 2009 drug conviction),
which was then on appeal before the Massachusetts Appeals Court,
it wanted the case returned for resentencing if he prevailed.
However, the Appeals Court has since affirmed the denial of Lewis's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the state-law charge of
possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, thereby
foreclosing this avenue for resentencing. See Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 136 N.E.3d 1226 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019).
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On September 14, 2018, Lewis timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo the district court's interpretation
and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v.
Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 24 (1st Cir. 2013).
When determining whether to apply a career-offender
enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing courts
adhere to §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines and their
corresponding enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). Under
§ 4B1.1(a), a defendant qualifies as a "career offender" if
(1) "the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time
[he] committed the instant offense"; (2) the instant offense "is
a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense"; and (3) "the defendant has at least two prior
felony convictions" -- known as predicates -- for "either a crime
of violence or a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(a). Section 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines defines
the term "controlled substance offense" as follows: [A]n offense
under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import,
export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance
. . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent
to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. Id.
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§ 4B1.2(b).6 Crucially for this case, Application Note 1 of the
commentary to § 4B1.2, adopted by the United States Sentencing
Commission (the "Sentencing Commission"), states that for purposes
of applying the career-offender enhancement, both crimes of
violence and controlled substance offenses "include the offenses
of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such
offenses." Id. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.7
Lewis raises five arguments as to why the
career-offender enhancement nevertheless should not apply in his
case: First, Application Note 1 is inconsistent with the text of
the Sentencing Guidelines and their enabling statute, and
therefore following the Application Note amounts to
unconstitutional and "[u]nchecked . . . [d]eference to the
Commission's [i]nterpretation of its [o]wn [r]ules." Second, even
if Application Note 1 is not inconsistent with the definition of
"controlled substance offense" in § 4B1.2, the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its rulemaking authority under § 994(h) by
"enlarg[ing] the definition of 'controlled substance offenses' to
6
By contrast, the definition of "crime of violence" in the
Sentencing Guidelines contemplates the use or "attempted use . . .
of physical force" in its force clause. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(1).
7
See U.S.S.G. amend. 268 (Nov. 1, 1989). Six years later,
the Sentencing Commission re-promulgated the Application Note 1
without change. See U.S.S.G. amend. 528 (Nov. 1, 1995).
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include conspiracies." Third, his state offenses do not count as
predicates for a career-offender enhancement. Fourth, in the
event Application Note 1 commands deference, his conspiracy
conviction is a categorical mismatch with the generic Sentencing
Guidelines conspiracy. And fifth, the district court erred in not
acknowledging that it could vary downwardly based on a disagreement
with the policy underlying § 4B1.2.
Lewis's first two arguments, and the additional points
he makes in support of those arguments,8 run headfirst into our
prior holdings that "controlled substance offenses" under § 4B1.2
include so-called inchoate offenses such as conspiring to
distribute controlled substances. See United States v. Piper, 35
F.3d 611 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Giggey,
551 F.3d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc) (reversing course on
whether burglary of something other than a dwelling is a predicate
offense); see also United States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5
(1st Cir. 2017) (holding that following Piper was not plain error).
8
Lewis maintains that his state drug-trafficking offenses
do not count as predicates for a career-offender enhancement
because they are not specifically listed as controlled substance
offenses triggering sentencing at or near the maximum under
§ 994(h), and that Application Note 1 violates the rule of lenity,
due process, and the separation of powers. These arguments are
also foreclosed by our circuit precedent. See United States v.
Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 619-20 (1st Cir. 1994).
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In Fiore, we encountered as a "question of first impression" the
issue of whether a prior conviction for conspiracy could qualify
as a predicate offense for purposes of the career-offender
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. 983 F.2d at 1, 4. The
defendant in that case contended that his prior convictions for
conspiracy to violate a Rhode Island controlled substance act and
conspiracy to break and enter a commercial structure did not
qualify as predicate offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines'
career-offender provisions. Id. at 2. We held that they did,
explaining that "[i]n general, we will defer to the Commission's
suggested interpretation of a guideline provision unless [that]
position [was] arbitrary, unreasonable, inconsistent with the
guideline's text, or contrary to law." Id.9
In Piper, we again encountered a challenge to whether a
conspiracy conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense.
The defendant argued both that Application Note 1 was inconsistent
with the career-offender guideline and that inclusion of
9We further explained that Application Note 1
"implement[ed] [the] categorical approach in a sensible fashion,"
and explained that Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990),
which adopted a "'formal categorical approach' for determining
whether an offense was a violent felony" for purposes of the Armed
Career Criminal Act, was "entirely consistent" with the Sentencing
Commission's approach under the career-offender guideline, and
that it allows consideration of the object of the conspiracy in
its analysis. Fiore, 983 F.2d at 3.
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conspiracy exceeded the Sentencing Commission's statutory
authority. 35 F.3d at 617. As to the first claim, we applied
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). Piper, 35 F.3d
at 617. In Stinson, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing
Guidelines commentary constitutes the Sentencing Commission's
"interpretation of its own legislative rules," and that so long as
it does not "violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it
must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the [the Guidelines].'" 508 U.S. at 45
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)). Under that framework, if any inconsistency arises
between the commentary and the guideline it interprets -- i.e., if
"following one will result in violating the dictates of the other"
-- the guideline supersedes the commentary. Id. at 43. We held
that a conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute over one hundred kilograms of marijuana could serve as
a triggering offense for career-offender purposes so long as a
"crime of violence" or a "controlled substance offense" was the
object of the conspiracy. Piper, 35 F.3d at 613, 619. We reasoned
that "[b]ecause [Application Note 1] neither excludes any offenses
expressly enumerated in the guideline, nor calls for the inclusion
of any offenses that the guideline expressly excludes, there is no
inconsistency" between the two. Id. at 617; see also id.
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(reasoning that Application Note 1 "comports sufficiently with the
letter, spirit, and aim of the guideline to bring it within the
broad sphere of the Sentencing Commission's interpretive
discretion").
We also determined in Piper that Application Note 1 did
not "contravene[] 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)." Id. at 617–18. We based
this conclusion on our understanding that the legislative history
showed that Congress intended § 994(h) to be "a floor[] describing
the irreducible minimum that the Sentencing Commission must do by
way of a career offender guideline," not "a ceiling" of what
offenses may be included. Id. at 618.
Finally, in Nieves-Borrero we relied on Piper to hold
that it was not plain error for the district court to count a
conviction for the crime of attempt to possess with intent to
distribute a controlled substance as a "controlled substance
offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines. 856 F.3d at 9.
This circuit precedent forecloses Lewis's arguments as
to the authority of Application Note 1, including his contention
that Application Note 1 is inconsistent with the text of the
career-offender guideline, and that its promulgation exceeded the
Sentencing Commission's statutory authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h). Under the "law of the circuit" doctrine, "newly
constituted panels in a multi-panel circuit court are bound by
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prior panel decisions that are closely on point." United States
v. Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d 43, 57 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United
States v. Wurie, 867 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2017)).
Two exceptions exist to the law of the circuit doctrine,
neither of which applies to Lewis's case. We recognize a first
exception when "[a]n existing panel decision [is] undermined by
controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion
of the Supreme Court, an en banc opinion of the circuit court, or
a statutory overruling." Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d
588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995). A second exception applies "in those
'rare instances in which authority that postdates the original
decision, although not directly controlling, nevertheless offers
a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light of
fresh developments, would change its collective mind.'"
Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 57-58 (quoting Wurie, 867 F.3d at 34).
These "exceptions to the law of the circuit doctrine are narrowly
circumscribed" to preserve the "stability and predictability"
essential to the rule of law. United States v. Barbosa, 896 F.3d
60, 74 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400,
2422 (2019) ("Adherence to precedent is 'a foundation stone of the
rule of law.'" (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572
U.S. 782, 798 (2014))).
There is plainly no subsequent contrary controlling
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authority on the question at hand. Neither our court nor the
Supreme Court has considered the relationship between § 4B1.2 and
Application Note 1 since our decisions in Fiore, Piper, and
Nieves-Borrero. So the first exception to the law of the circuit
doctrine cannot apply here.
Lewis, therefore, relies primarily on the second
exception. He submits that the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, which issued three months
after Lewis filed his opening brief in this appeal, compels us to
reexamine our precedent. 10 In his view, Kisor, even if not
directly controlling, "offers a sound reason for believing that
[our] former panel[s], in light of fresh developments, would change
10 Lewis also argues that the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997), casts doubt on
Piper's statutory holding that the Sentencing Commission may rely
on its "lawfully delegated powers" under § 994(a) to include
offenses in the career-offender guideline beyond those listed in
§ 994(h). Piper, 35 F.3d at 618 (holding that § 994(h) sets a
"floor" and not a "ceiling"). But LaBonte addressed an entirely
different issue: the meaning of § 994(h)'s direction to the
Sentencing Commission to prescribe a career-offender penalty "at
or near the statutory maximum." 520 U.S. at 752–53. In
interpreting that language, the Court applied the principle,
established long before Piper, that the Sentencing Commission
cannot adopt a guideline that conflicts with the plain text of the
enabling statute. See id. at 757. As such, nothing in LaBonte
undermines our holding in Piper, which itself recognized "the
primacy of the statute" and considered its text in light of its
legislative history. 35 F.3d at 617 n.3, 618.
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[their] collective mind[s]." Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 57-58
(quoting Wurie, 867 F.3d at 34). We disagree.
In Kisor, the Supreme Court considered, but rejected, a
challenge to the Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine, which reflects the
long-standing practice of deferring to "agencies' reasonable
readings of genuinely ambiguous regulations," 139 S. Ct. at 2408,11
and which serves in part as the foundation for our circuit's prior
precedents concerning Application Note 1. See Piper, 983 F.2d at
617 (citing Stinson, 508 U.S. 36 (citing Seminole Rock, 325 U.S.
at 414)). See generally Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997);
Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 410. It is nevertheless fair to say
that Kisor sought to clarify the nuances of judicial deference to
agency interpretations of regulations. In the Court's words,
Kisor aims to recall the limits "inherent" in the Auer/Seminole
Rock doctrine and to "restate, and somewhat expand on, those
principles." Id. at 2414–15. As the Court put it, when reviewing
an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, "a court should
not afford Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely
ambiguous," and after deploying the full interpretive "legal
11 In Kisor, the Supreme Court considered deference afforded
by the Federal Circuit to the Board of Veterans' Appeals'
interpretation of the meaning of the term "relevant" records in a
VA regulation providing retroactive benefits. See 139 S. Ct. at
2423.
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toolkit" to "resolve . . . seeming ambiguities out of the box."
Id. at 2415. Then, "[i]f genuine ambiguity remains," a court must
ensure that "the agency's reading [is] 'reasonable,'" id. (quoting
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)),
meaning that it "must come within the zone of ambiguity the court
has identified after employing all its interpretive tools," id. at
2416.
We see nothing in Fiore, Piper, and Nieves-Borrero to
indicate that the prior panels in those cases viewed themselves as
deferring to an application note that strayed beyond the zone of
ambiguity in the Sentencing Guidelines. Nor did those panels
suggest that they regarded Auer deference as limiting the rigor of
their analysis of whether the guideline was ambiguous. And it is
also plain that those panels viewed their analyses as considering
both the letter of the text and its purpose. So we fail to find
a sound basis for concluding with sufficient confidence that our
prior panels would have found in Kisor any reason to "'change
[their] collective mind[s]'" with respect to the deference owed to
Application Note 1. Wurie, 867 F.3d at 35 (quoting United States
v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 2008)). At least three
circuits have, post-Kisor, adhered to prior circuit holdings akin
to our own concerning § 4B1.2 and inchoate offenses. See, United
States v. Tabb, 949 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v.
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Lovelace, 794 Fed. App'x 793, 795 (10th Cir. 2020); United States
v. Crum, 934 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh'g
denied, No. 17-302 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2019), cert denied, No. 19-
7811, 2020 WL 1496759 (Mar. 30, 2020) (mem.). And Kisor itself
expressly denied any intent to "cast doubt on many settled
constructions of rules" and inject "instability into so many areas
of law." 139 S. Ct. at 2422. Simply put, we do not find anything
in our prior opinions suggesting that those panels understood
themselves as straying beyond the zone of genuine ambiguity in
deeming Application Note 1 consistent with § 4B1.2.
Lewis also points us to United States v. Soto-Rivera,
811 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2016), another case which he argues casts
doubt on the durability of the Fiore, Piper, and Nieves-Borrero
panel decisions. The court's holding in Soto-Rivera, however, was
necessarily limited to the issue presented there: whether
Application Note 1 properly categorized the offense of being a
felon in possession of a machine gun as a "crime of violence" under
§ 4B1.2(a) "shorn of the residual clause." Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d
at 54, 60–62. The court wrote that without the residual clause,
"[t]here [was] simply no mechanism or textual hook in the
[g]uideline that allow[ed] us to import offenses not specifically
listed therein into § 4B1.2(a)'s definition of 'crime of
violence.'" Id. at 60. But it had no need to address § 4B1.2(b)
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or the portion of Application Note 1 that defines conspiracies as
"controlled substance offense[s]." So, Soto-Rivera could not have
modified Piper, Fiore, or Nieves Borrero.
Finally, Lewis calls our attention to the D.C. Circuit's
decision in United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
2018),12 the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Havis,13
927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc), and the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Crum, 934 F.3d 963. These cases do not constitute
controlling authority in this circuit. See Igartúa v. United
States, 626 F.3d 592, 604 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that the
second exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine has been
interpreted narrowly and should be applied when recent Supreme
Court precedent calls into question a prior panel opinion); United
States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) ("The law of the
circuit rule does not depend on whether courts outside the circuit
march in absolute lock step with in-circuit precedent.").
12 In Winstead, the D.C. Circuit held that the inclusion of
inchoate offenses in Application Note 1 was inconsistent with
§ 4B1.2(b), reasoning that "Section 4B1.2(b) presents a very
detailed 'definition' of controlled substance offense that clearly
excludes inchoate offenses," and applying the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius canon. 890 F.3d at 1091.
13 In Havis, the Sixth Circuit held that "[t]he text of
§ 4B1.2(b) controls, and it makes clear that attempt crimes do not
qualify as controlled substance offenses," after finding that "the
Commission used Application Note 1 to add an offense not listed in
the guideline." 927 F.3d at 386-87.
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Moreover, these cases raise arguments that, in any event, mirror
those considered by the prior panels in this circuit that we have
already discussed. See United States v. Hudson, 823 F.3d 11, 15
(1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting an argument where the defendant offered
"no new or previously unaddressed reason to deviate from our prior
holdings").
None of this is to say how we would rule today were the
option of an uncircumscribed review available. That the circuits
are split suggests that the underlying question is close. We hold
only that the case for finding that the prior panels would have
reached a different result today is not so obviously correct as to
allow this panel to decree that the prior precedent is no longer
good law in this circuit. We are a court of six sitting members,
on which it customarily takes four votes to sit en banc. Were
panels of three too prone to reverse prior precedent, we would
lose the benefits of stability and invite litigants to regard our
law as more unsettled than it should be.
III.
Lewis presents two additional arguments on appeal,
neither of which he preserved in the district court. We review
each only for plain error. See United States v. Ortíz-Mercado,
919 F.3d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 2019). In order to establish plain
error, a defendant must show that: "(1) there was error; (2) the
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error was plain; (3) the error affected [his] substantial rights;
and (4) the error adversely impacted the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v.
Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 69
(1st Cir. 2007)). Plain error is a "high hurdle," requiring
demonstration both "that an error occurred and that it was clear
or obvious." United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 95-96 (1st Cir.
2002).
Lewis first contends that the district court erred by
not exercising discretion to vary downwardly from his calculated
Guidelines sentence and thereby, as he puts it, "disagree" with
the commentary's inclusion of conspiracy as a predicate offense on
policy grounds. Under Kimbrough v. United States, district courts
have discretion to vary downwardly from a sentence on the basis of
a policy disagreement with the relevant guideline. 552 U.S. 85,
109–10 (2007). Lewis argues that certain comments made by the
district court in applying the career-offender enhancement
indicate that the district court did not believe that it had
discretion to disagree with the application of that enhancement.
We find this argument unpersuasive.
For starters, Lewis expressly petitioned the district
court to vary from the career-offender guideline based on policy
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reasons in his sentencing memorandum. In response, the district
court declined to do so, as was clearly its prerogative. See
United States v. Ekasala, 596 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[T]he
mere fact that a sentencing court has discretion to disagree with
the guidelines on policy grounds does not mean that it is required
to do so." (citation omitted)); United States v. Aquino-
Florenciani, 894 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]he district court's
broad discretion obviously includes the power to agree with the
guidelines." (quoting United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 90 (1st
Cir. 2009))).
The knowledgeable district court judge said nothing to
suggest that she thought she lacked the ability to vary downwardly
based on a disagreement with the application note. The judge made
clear that she anchored her decision on the Sentencing Guidelines
as our court had interpreted them. And she made clear that if our
view changed she would want to resentence. But that is simply to
say that she intended to anchor her sentence on a clear-cut
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, whatever that may be.
It offers no suggestion that the judge thought that she could not
vary if she disagreed with the Sentencing Guidelines. Nor did
Lewis at the time say anything to suggest that he understood the
court to see itself unduly constrained. There was no clear or
obvious error here.
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Second, Lewis contends that his conviction under 21
U.S.C. § 846 is a "categorical mismatch" with the generic
definition of conspiracy set out in the guideline commentary.
Lewis contends that in order to determine whether a conspiracy
offense under § 846 can constitute a "controlled substance
offense" under § 4B1.1, courts must look, per the categorical
approach, to the "generic" definition of the offense of conspiracy
within "contemporary usage of the term," and then to whether the
offense of conviction satisfies the offense in the Sentencing
Guidelines. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990).
He notes that a number of state statutes as well as the federal
conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, require an overt act for
conspiracy, see United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 535
(9th Cir. 2014), § 846, and therefore § 846 punishes more conduct
than the generic offense of conspiracy referenced in Application
Note 1.
Whether Lewis's own offense of conviction under 21
U.S.C. § 846 is a categorical mismatch with the generic definition
of conspiracy is, in this case, a question that we do not have
occasion to decide. There is no controlling authority on this
issue in this circuit, and the other circuits remain divided in
their response to it. Compare United States v. McCollum, 885 F.3d
300, 303–09 (4th Cir. 2018) (conspiracy to murder in aid of
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racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), is not a
"crime of violence" for career-offender purposes because it does
not require an overt act), United States v. Whitley, 737 F. App'x
147, 148-49 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) (finding
that a conviction violating § 846 does not qualify as a "controlled
substance offense" for purposes of the career-offender
enhancement), and United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 836 F.3d 1305,
1314 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that § 846 was "a categorical
mismatch for the generic definition of 'conspiracy'" in the
commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 because the general requirements of
conspiracy include an overt act, while § 846 does not), with United
States v. Rivera-Constantino, 798 F.3d 900, 902-06 (9th Cir. 2015),
United States v. Sanbria-Bueno, 549 F. App'x 434, 438-39 (6th Cir.
2013) (unpublished), and United States v. Rodriguez-Escareno, 700
F.3d 751, 753-54 (5th Cir. 2012). Therefore, any error, if there
was one, could not have been "clear or obvious" as required to
establish plain error. See United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797
F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2015); Diaz, 285 F.3d at 96 ("If a circuit
conflict exists on a question, and the law is unsettled in the
circuit in which the appeal was taken, any error cannot be plain
or obvious.").
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court's sentence.
- Concurring Opinion Follows -
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TORRUELLA AND THOMPSON, Circuit Judges (Concurring).
We join the court's opinion but write separately to express our
discomfort with the practical effect of the deference to
Application Note 1, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1, that our
precedent commands: The Sentencing Commission has added a
substantive offense (here, the inchoate crime of conspiracy) to
the relevant career-offender guideline through its commentary as
opposed to the statutorily prescribed channel for doing so.
"[C]ommentary, though important, must not be confused with
gospel." Piper, 35 F.3d at 617. This is as true for us (the
reviewing court) as it is for the Sentencing Commission.
Therefore, like the Ninth Circuit, were we "free to do so," we
"would follow the Sixth and D.C. Circuits' lead" and hold that
Application Note 1's expansion of § 4B1.2(b) to include
conspiracies and other inchoate crimes does not warrant deference.
Crum, 934 F.3d at 966.
Indeed, we have already held that "there is simply no
mechanism or textual hook in the Guideline that allows us to import
offenses not specifically listed therein into § 4B1.2(a)'s
definition of 'crime of violence.'" Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d at 60.
In our view, the same is true of § 4B1.2(b)'s definition of
"controlled substance offense." See Havis, 927 F.3d at 386–87
(concluding that "no term in § 4B1.2(b) would bear th[e]
-25-
construction" Application Note 1 purports to give it); Winstead,
890 F.3d at 1091 (explaining that § 4B1.2(b)'s definition "clearly
excludes inchoate offenses" like attempt and conspiracy). Neither
the government nor any circuit court to address the question has
identified any "textual hook" in the guideline to anchor the
addition of conspiracy offenses. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d at 60.
The government's late-breaking suggestion at oral
argument that the offense of conspiracy to commit a controlled
substance offense (which forbids only the agreement to commit such
an offense plus, sometimes, an overt act in furtherance)
"prohibits" the acts listed in § 4B1.2(b), see United States v.
Richardson, 958 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v.
Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018), would take any modern
English speaker (not to mention any criminal lawyer) by surprise.
In ordinary speech, criminal laws do not "prohibit" what they do
not ban or forbid. And if conspiracy laws "prohibit" the acts
listed in § 4B1.2(b) because they "hinder" those acts (as the
Second and Eleventh Circuit have reasoned), then it is hard to see
why simple possession offenses would not also be "controlled
substance offense[s]" under § 4B1.2(b); certainly, laws against
possessing drugs hinder their distribution or manufacture. But
we know that § 4B1.2(b) does not cover simple possession offenses.
See Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 188, 188 (2006). On the
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other hand, if the Sentencing Commission wanted to give § 4B1.2(b)
a more expansive interpretation, it had obvious alternatives at
its disposal that would not have required straining the guideline's
words past their breaking point. See Winstead, 890 F.3d at 1091;
United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43-45 (1st Cir. 2006)
(reading the ACCA's definition of "serious drug offense," as "an
offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled
substance," to include conspiracies (emphasis added)). As the
Supreme Court recently clarified, a court's duty to interpret the
law requires it to "exhaust all the 'traditional tools' of
construction" "in all the ways it would if it had no agency to
fall back on" before it defers to an agency's "policy-laden choice"
between two reasonable readings of a rule. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at
2415. In our view, we could not "bring all [our] interpretive
tools to bear" on the text of § 4B1.2(b) and still find that
conspiracies are "controlled substance offense[s]" as the
guideline defines them. Id. at 2423.
By relying on commentary to expand the list of crimes
that trigger career-offender status, which may well lead judges to
sentence many people to prison for longer than they would otherwise
deem necessary (as the district judge indicated was the case here),
our circuit precedent raises troubling implications for due
-27-
process, checks and balances, and the rule of law. The Sentencing
Commission is an unelected body that exercises "quasi-legislative
power" and (unlike most other agencies) is located within the
judicial branch. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393
(1989). Thus, it can only promulgate binding guidelines, which
influence criminal sentences, because they must pass two checks:
congressional review and "the notice and comment requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act." Havis, 927 F.3d at 385 (citing
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 394). "Unlike the Guidelines themselves,
however, commentary to the Guidelines never passes through the
gauntlets of congressional review or notice and comment." Id. at
386. Thus, the same principles that require courts to ensure that
agencies do not amend unambiguous regulations in the guise of
"interpretation" ("without ever paying the procedural cost"),
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420-21, apply with equal (if not more) force
to the Sentencing Guidelines and their commentary. Id.
If it were otherwise, the Sentencing Commission would be
empowered to use its commentary as a Trojan horse for rulemaking.
See Havis, 927 F.3d at 386-87. This it is surely not meant to do,
especially when the consequence is the deprivation of individual
liberty. See Winstead, 890 F.3d at 1092 ("This is all the more
troubling given that the Sentencing Commission wields the
authority to dispense 'significant, legally binding prescriptions
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governing application of governmental power against private
individuals -- indeed, application of the ultimate governmental
power, short of capital punishment.'" (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting))). The Sentencing Guidelines are
no place for a shortcut around the due process guaranteed to
criminal defendants. If it so desires, the Sentencing Commission
should expand the definition of "controlled substance offense" to
add conspiracies by amending the text of § 4B1.2(b) through the
statutorily prescribed rulemaking process. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h), (p), (x).
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