Gomez-Medina v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 19-2280
    JEPSEL ENRIQUE GÓMEZ-MEDINA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    WILLIAM P. BARR,
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
    THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Lynch, Selya, and Barron,
    Circuit Judges.
    Ogor Winnie Okoye and BOS Legal Group, LLC on brief for
    petitioner.
    Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
    U.S. Department of Justice, Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director,
    Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, and
    Raya Jarawan, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    U.S. Department of Justice on brief for respondent.
    September 15, 2020
    LYNCH,   Circuit   Judge.      An    Immigration    Judge    ("IJ")
    denied      Jepsel   Enrique   Gómez-Medina's      application     for    asylum,
    withholding of removal ("WOR"), and protection under the United
    Nations      Convention   Against    Torture      ("CAT").       The   Board   of
    Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissed his appeal, and Gómez-Medina
    now petitions for review of the BIA's decision.                    We deny the
    petition.
    I.
    Gómez-Medina was born in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, in
    1992.       He entered the United States near Laredo, Texas, without
    inspection on April 7, 2014; the Department of Homeland Security
    ("DHS") detained him on April 16, 2014 and charged him with
    inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
    Gómez-Medina said he feared returning to Honduras.               On
    April 22, 2014, he was screened by an asylum officer who determined
    his   fear     was   credible.      During   his    screening,     Gómez-Medina
    explained that his problems in Honduras began after an incident in
    2010, roughly four years before his entry into the U.S.                   He said
    he witnessed four men come to his grandfather's house, ask for his
    father by name, enter the house, then fire five gunshots at his
    father.1     One shot hit his father in the neck.        Gómez-Medina stated
    1 He stated that his father was probably attacked because
    of his gang affiliation.   His father would often disappear for
    weeks at a time, sometimes returning "beat up" and looking like
    "he was in a fight." More specifically, Gómez-Medina testified
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    that the gunmen left because they thought they had killed him, but
    his father survived the attack.   Gómez-Medina believed the attack
    was motivated by his father's gang affiliation.   Gómez-Medina did
    not share that affiliation.
    Two years later, in 2012, Gómez-Medina began receiving
    threatening phone calls from men who he said were the men who had
    attacked his father wanting to know where his father was.   Gómez-
    Medina reported the threatening calls to the police and stated
    that the police did nothing.   By the end of 2012, Gómez-Medina had
    received so many threatening calls that he decided to move from
    San Pedro Sula, Honduras, to Santa Barbara, Honduras, to live with
    an uncle.   He said the men followed him there and attacked him in
    July 2013 and November 2013.   He eventually returned to San Pedro
    Sula, but the men followed him back and beat him again in January
    2014.   Every time the men encountered Gómez-Medina, they asked
    where his father was.    The last time Gómez-Medina saw the men --
    when they beat him in San Pedro Sula in January 2014 -- they
    accosted him in the middle of the afternoon.   They did not believe
    his statements that he did not know where his father was, threw
    him to the ground, and threatened that they would kill him if he
    that when he was six or seven years old, he and his mother watched
    from a window as his father argued with someone outside while
    wielding a knife. His father told Gómez-Medina to leave the window
    and not look, then disappeared out of sight. A few minutes later,
    he returned with the knife covered in blood; the next morning,
    Gómez-Medina found a body lying outside the house.
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    did not tell them where to find his father.         The men stopped when
    they heard police sirens and told Gómez-Medina that he was "saved
    this time but next time we will kill you."      Fearing for his safety,
    Gómez-Medina left Honduras in February 2014.
    DHS served Gómez-Medina with a Notice to Appear on April
    28, 2014, and in May 2014 he was released on bond by an IJ in San
    Antonio, Texas. Four years later, in October 2018, he was arrested
    in Massachusetts after a motor vehicle crash and charged with
    driving under the influence of alcohol.        In January 2019, Gómez-
    Medina was arrested outside of his home and taken into custody.
    In   April   2019,   he   conceded   removability   and   later   filed   an
    application for asylum, WOR, and CAT relief.
    In June 2019, an IJ held a hearing on removal and his
    application for relief.       DHS conceded that because Gómez-Medina
    was found to have a credible fear of persecution but did not
    receive notice from DHS about the one-year filing deadline for
    asylum applications, he was a member of a class certified in
    Mendez-Rojas, see Mendez-Rojas v. Johnson, 
    305 F. Supp. 3d 1176
    ,
    1188 (W.D. Wash. 2018), and the IJ deemed his application for
    asylum timely filed.       Based on the testimony at the hearing, the
    IJ found that Gómez-Medina was a credible witness because his
    testimony -- which was largely similar to what he had told the
    asylum officer in 2014 -- was corroborated by police reports and
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    hospital records.2     The judge also found that the harm Gómez-Medina
    experienced was sufficient to rise to the level of persecution.
    The IJ determined that Gómez-Medina was part of a "particular
    social group" as a member of a nuclear family, see 8 U.S.C.
    § 1101(a)(42)(A), but also found that "animus against the family
    per se was not established" and there was insufficient evidence of
    a nexus between Gómez-Medina's membership in his family and the
    actions of the men threatening him.          The IJ reasoned that Gómez-
    Medina was attacked not based on his family status but because his
    attackers wanted to locate his father.        Finally, the IJ found that
    Gómez-Medina failed to show that the government of Honduras would
    be unable or unwilling to protect him and gave three reasons: (1)
    the police were willing to create and had created police reports
    about the January 2014 beating of Gómez-Medina; (2) the police
    intervened when he was attacked in January 2014; and (3) Gómez-
    Medina's attackers fled when they heard the police approaching,
    and so evidenced that they believed the police would arrest and
    prosecute them.    The IJ denied Gómez-Medina's petition for asylum
    and ordered that he be removed to Honduras.
    The     IJ   also   denied   his   applications   for   WOR   and
    protection under CAT.         Withholding requires an "even higher"
    2    Gómez-Medina filed police reports after the third
    beating; he was admitted to the hospital after his first and second
    beatings.
    - 5 -
    standard than asylum, see Villalta-Martinez v. Sessions, 
    882 F.3d 20
    , 23 (1st Cir. 2018), and there was insufficient evidence that
    Gómez-Medina would likely be tortured in Honduras.
    Gómez-Medina appealed to the BIA.      The BIA gave three
    reasons for dismissing Gómez-Medina's petition for asylum and WOR:
    (1) it (mistakenly)3 "agree[d] with the Immigration Judge that the
    respondent ha[d] not demonstrated that his mistreatment rises to
    the level of past persecution under the Act"; (2) it determined
    that the IJ's finding that Gómez-Medina had not shown that Honduras
    was unwilling or unable to protect him was not clearly erroneous;
    and (3) it observed that Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G.
    2019), decided after the IJ found that Gómez-Medina was part of a
    "particular social group," held that "most nuclear families are
    not inherently socially distinct" and therefore Gómez-Medina would
    not have been eligible for asylum even if the IJ had found that
    there was a nexus between his family status and the actions of the
    men   threatening   him.
    Id. at 589
      (internal   quotation   marks
    omitted).    The BIA also denied Gómez-Medina's application for
    protection under CAT because there was no clear error in the IJ's
    finding that Gómez-Medina had not established that he would be
    tortured in Honduras if he were to return. This petition followed.
    3   In fact, the IJ found that Gómez-Medina had shown that
    his mistreatment rose to the level of past persecution.
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    II.
    Where, as here, the BIA "adopts and affirms the IJ's
    ruling" but nevertheless "examines some of the IJ's conclusions,"
    we review both the BIA and IJ opinions as a unit.            Perlera-Sola v.
    Holder, 
    699 F.3d 572
    , 576 (1st Cir. 2012).               This Court reviews
    findings     of     fact   and     credibility   under      the   deferential
    "substantial evidence" standard, see, e.g., Avelar-Gonzalez v.
    Whitaker, 
    908 F.3d 820
    , 826 (1st Cir. 2018), which means that we
    will uphold factual findings unless "any reasonable adjudicator
    would   be        compelled   to     conclude    to   the     contrary,"   8
    U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
    Gómez-Medina raises five issues in his petition.           Four
    relate to his asylum application, while the fifth concerns his
    applications for WOR and CAT protection.          As to asylum, he argues
    that the BIA erred by (1) upholding the IJ's determination that
    Gómez-Medina did not meet his burden of showing that Honduras's
    government would be unwilling or unable to protect him; (2)
    mischaracterizing the IJ's findings and thus mistakenly concluding
    that Gómez-Medina did not suffer past persecution;            (3) concluding
    that Gómez-Medina's family did not constitute a social group; and
    (4) upholding the IJ's determination that there was an insufficient
    nexus between Gómez-Medina's familial relationship with his father
    and his persecution.       Because we find the first issue dispositive,
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    we need not reach Gómez-Medina's other arguments.4             See Khan v.
    Holder, 
    727 F.3d 1
    , 7 (1st Cir. 2013) (refusing to reach challenges
    to alternative, independent grounds for the BIA's decision when
    one issue was dispositive).         With respect to the other relief
    requested in his petition, he argues that the BIA failed to
    consider his eligibility for relief via WOR or CAT.
    To be eligible for asylum, Gómez-Medina bears the burden
    of showing that he is a refugee.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
    A refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such
    person's nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to return
    to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
    protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
    founded   fear   of   persecution    on     account   of   race,   religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion."    8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
    4    Gómez-Medina is correct to point out that the BIA
    mistakenly claimed to "agree" with the IJ when it found that Gómez-
    Medina had not suffered past persecution. The BIA erred, but it
    gave other, independent grounds for dismissing Gómez-Medina's
    appeal. Because we hold that the BIA did not err in finding that
    Gómez-Medina has not met his burden of showing Honduras is unable
    or unwilling to protect him, any error was harmless. See Conteh
    v. Gonzales, 
    461 F.3d 45
    , 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the BIA's
    error was harmless when it "had no effect on the outcome of the
    proceeding"); see also Nadal-Ginard v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 61
    , 69 n.7
    (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that the court "need not reach the
    BIA's other rationale for its decision" because even "[i]f this
    finding constituted error . . . there was no prejudice").
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    We agree with the IJ and BIA that Gómez-Medina did not
    meet his burden of showing that the government of Honduras is
    unable or unwilling to protect him.            To demonstrate that the
    government is unable or unwilling to protect Gómez-Medina requires
    him to show either "acquiescence in the persecutor's acts" or an
    "inability or unwillingness to investigate and punish those acts";
    it is insufficient to show "a general difficulty preventing the
    occurrence     of   particular   future    crimes."   Ortiz-Araniba   v.
    Keisler, 
    505 F.3d 39
    , 42 (1st Cir. 2007).             Indeed, "the most
    telling datum is [whether] . . . the local authorities responded
    immediately to each incident."      Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 
    421 F.3d 64
    , 68 (1st Cir. 2005).
    Gómez-Medina argues that Honduras is unable or unwilling
    to protect him because: (1) the police department failed to record
    the names of Gómez-Medina's attackers in the police reports he
    filed after the January 2014 attack even though Gómez-Medina
    asserts in his petition to us that he gave them this information;
    (2) the police did not protect Gómez-Medina after he reported the
    ten threatening phone calls he received; and (3) Honduras's country
    report "demonstrates the futility of hoping for protection from a
    police force riddled with corruption and impunity."       None of these
    compel the conclusion that Honduras was unwilling or unable to
    protect Gómez-Medina.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).      "That the
    record supports a conclusion contrary to that reached by the
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    [agency] is not enough to warrant upsetting the [agency]'s view of
    the matter . . . the record must compel the contrary conclusion."
    Hincapie v. Gonzales, 
    494 F.3d 213
    , 218 (1st Cir. 2007).
    On the first point, there is uncertainty in the record
    about whether Gómez-Medina ever gave his attackers' names to the
    police on at least one occasion.             He testified that, although he
    thinks he gave the police this information, he was "very nervous"
    and "[didn't] recall if [he] said the names or not."                Next, Gómez-
    Medina's assertion that the Honduras police did in fact fail to
    protect him goes nowhere.            See 
    Ortiz-Araniba, 505 F.3d at 42
    ;
    Burbiene v. Holder, 
    568 F.3d 251
    , 255 (1st Cir. 2009) (denying a
    petition    for   review      when    "the     record     does    not     indicate
    [petitioner's home country's] inability to stop the problem is
    distinguishable from any other government's struggles to combat a
    criminal element").     To the contrary, the evidence in the record
    -- such as the police reports and the fact that police sirens
    dispersed Gómez-Medina's attackers in 2014 -- supports the BIA and
    IJ's   conclusion   that   the       police    were     willing    and    able   to
    investigate and prosecute the threats and attacks against Gómez-
    Medina.    Cf. 
    Ortiz-Araniba, 505 F.3d at 42
    ("Where the police are
    willing    to   investigate    incidents       of   violence      and    institute
    criminal proceedings against the perpetrators, we have held that
    the requisite connection between government inaction and fear of
    future persecution could not be shown."); see also Harutyunyan,
    - 10 
    - 421 F.3d at 68
    .     Indeed, Gómez-Medina himself testified that "if
    it . . . [weren't] for the police, they would have killed me."
    Finally, the IJ balanced the generalized country condition report
    evidence against specific, individualized evidence that the men
    who were threating Gómez-Medina were sufficiently afraid of the
    police that they fled the scene upon hearing sirens.          See Amouri
    v. Holder, 
    572 F.3d 29
    , 35 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[E]ven though country
    conditions     reports   are   deemed     generally    authoritative   in
    immigration proceedings, the contents of such reports do not
    necessarily override petitioner-specific facts."). Overall, then,
    we conclude that the IJ and BIA's determinations were “supported
    by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
    considered as a whole.”    
    Hincapie, 494 F.3d at 218
    (quoting I.N.S.
    v. Elias–Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992)).             There is ample
    evidence to support the denial of asylum.
    The same is true for the denial of Gómez-Medina's WOR
    and CAT claims.    The WOR standard is "even higher" than the well-
    founded fear of future persecution standard used in determining
    refugee status in petitions for asylum.         See 
    Villalta-Martinez, 882 F.3d at 23
    ; 
    Harutyunyan, 421 F.3d at 68
    .          Because, as we have
    explained, the BIA and IJ's conclusion that Gómez-Medina has not
    shown that Honduras is unable or unwilling to protect him was
    supported by substantial evidence, he cannot satisfy the higher
    WOR standard.
    - 11 -
    As to CAT, Gómez-Medina bears the burden of establishing
    that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if
    removed to Honduras.        See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Ramirez-Perez
    v. Barr, 
    934 F.3d 47
    , 52 (1st Cir. 2019).                   For CAT purposes,
    torture requires the "consent or acquiescence of a public official
    or   other   person   acting      in    an   official   capacity,"       8    C.F.R.
    § 1208.18(a)(1),      and   "acquiescence"       requires    that    a       "public
    official,     prior   to    the   activity      constituting   torture,         have
    awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal
    responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity," 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.18(a)(7).      The same evidence that supports the IJ and BIA's
    determination that Gómez-Medina failed to show that Honduras is
    unable or unwilling to protect him also supports the determination
    that he has not shown that it is more likely than not that the
    government of Honduras has consented or acquiesced to the attacks
    on him by private actors.              Nor has he shown that he would be
    tortured.
    The petition for review is denied.
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