Trout v. Org. Mundial de Boxeo, Inc. ( 2020 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1068
AUSTIN TROUT,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Lipez, and Dyk,
Circuit Judges.
Miguel J. Ortega Nuñez, with whom Cancio, Nadal, Rivera &
Diaz, P.S.C., was on brief, for appellant.
Edward Ricco, with whom David W. Bunting, Rodey, Dickason,
Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Joseph C. Laws, Jr., Joseph Laws PSC,
Andrew W. Horn, and Law Offices of Andrew W. Horn, P.A., were on
brief, for appellee.
July 10, 2020

Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
BARRON, Circuit Judge. In 2015, Austin Trout, a
professional boxer of some renown who was then residing in New
Mexico, sued the World Boxing Organization1 ("WBO"), which is based
in Puerto Rico, in New Mexico state court. His complaint alleged
that the WBO's decision to remove him from its rankings for a
certain weight class cost him a chance to pursue the world
championship in that class. The complaint included a claim under
the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act ("MABRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d),
as well as claims under Puerto Rico law for breach of contract,
fraud, and negligence.
The WBO removed the case to federal court in the District
of New Mexico and then, pursuant to a clause in the WBO's
Championship Regulations ("Championship Regulations"),
successfully moved to transfer the case from there to the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Once there,
the WBO moved to compel arbitration pursuant to another clause in
the Championship Regulations and the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). The District Court granted the motion and dismissed
Trout's claims without prejudice on that basis.
Trout now appeals from the District Court's decision to
grant the WBO's motion to compel arbitration and the denial of his
motion for reconsideration of that ruling. We vacate and remand.
1
"World Boxing Organization" is the English translation of
"Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc."
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I.
The WBO relied on section 35(d) of the Championship
Regulations to move to transfer Trout's case to the District of
Puerto Rico. That subsection states:
These Regulations are to be interpreted in
conformity with the Laws of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. All WBO Participants agree
and consent that the exclusive venue for any
or all action in which the WBO is made a party,
whether it is to enforce, interpret or declare
the application of these Regulations or to
appeal from any determination of the WBO,
including, but not limited to a determination
of the Complaints and Grievance Committee, may
be maintained only in the Superior Court of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or, if
applicable, in the U.S. District Court for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations then
follows. That subsection states:
All WBO participants acknowledge and agree
that the mandatory resort to the WBO Appeal[]
Regulation is the sole and exclusive remedy
for any claim, appeal or contest that arises
from any right or status that is or could be
subject to these Regulations or which results
or could result from or relate to the
interpretation or application of these
Regulations. These WBO Appeals and Grievance
Committee determinations are arbitrations.
The WBO Appeal Regulations ("Appeal Regulations")
provide that disputes arbitrated pursuant to section 35(e) of the
Championship Regulations, if not first resolved informally by the
WBO President, will be submitted to the "WBO Grievance Committee."
That committee is made up of "[t]hree persons designated by the
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President" of the WBO, none of whom may be members of the WBO
"Executive Committee."
The Executive Committee, however, must confirm the
nominations of those candidates whom the President puts forward to
serve on the Grievance Committee. Members of the Grievance
Committee serve for "indeterminate terms and . . . are subject to
replacement by the nomination of the President of the WBO."
Once a complaint is filed and referred to the Grievance
Committee, the chairman of that committee has the discretion to
determine the necessary hearing, if any, for resolution of the
dispute. The Appeal Regulations provide that "the Grievance
Committee shall act as a fair and independent arbitrator of any
grievance arising out of WBO Participation and it shall conduct
all of its proceedings as Amiable Compositeur, Ex Aequo et Bono."
The Grievance Committee, after a majority vote of its
members, issues its final decision in writing and transmits it to
all interested parties. That decision, according to the Appeal
Regulations, "is a final Arbitration[] within the contemplation
of" Puerto Rico and federal law.
Following the transfer of Trout's case against the WBO
on July 5, 2017, to the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico, the WBO, on August 28, 2017, filed its
answer to Trout's complaint. The WBO included with it a motion to
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compel arbitration pursuant to section 35(e) of the Championship
Regulations. Trout then filed an opposition to that motion.
Trout relied in part on section 35(d) of the Championship
Regulations. He contended that the provision's plain terms
required that his claims be heard by a local or federal court in
Puerto Rico and not by an arbitral tribunal. Trout also argued
that the WBO waived its right to compel arbitration pursuant to
section 35(e) by waiting to file a motion to compel arbitration
until after his case had been transferred to a district court in
the District of Puerto Rico. He further contended that his claim
under MABRA was not subject to arbitration as a matter of federal
law because no claim under that statute was subject to arbitration.
And, finally, he contended that, in any event, neither his MABRA
claim nor his Puerto Rico law claims could be arbitrated because
the Appeal Regulations gave the power to select the members of the
Grievance Committee -- and thus the arbitral tribunal -- solely to
the WBO.
While the WBO's motion to compel arbitration was
pending, Trout began to conduct discovery. The WBO did not move
to stay discovery during the pendency of its motion to compel
arbitration. Instead, the WBO answered Trout's discovery motions
while filing some discovery motions of its own. Then, on September
30, 2018, about ten months after the parties had fully briefed the
WBO's motion to compel arbitration, the District Court granted the
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motion. Less than a month later, on October 29, 2018, Trout filed
a motion for reconsideration. In it, he restated his previous
objections to the motion to compel arbitration and also argued,
for the first time, that the WBO impliedly waived its right to
compel arbitration by participating in discovery before the
District Court.
The District Court denied Trout's motion to reconsider
on November 26, 2018. This timely appeal followed.
II.
Trout first argues that section 35(d) of the
Championship Regulations precludes any of his claims from being
arbitrated, even though the text of section 35(e) would appear to
establish that all of them may be arbitrated. He argues that this
surprising result is required by section 35(d) because it provides
that "any or all action in which the WBO is made a party, whether
it is to enforce, interpret or declare the application of these
Regulations or to appeal from any determination of the WBO" can be
brought "only in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico or, if applicable, in the U.S. District Court for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Trout reads this language to provide
that, regardless of what section 35(e) provides, no such "action"
may be maintained in an arbitral tribunal.
The parties agree that Trout's contention raises a
question of contract interpretation that, because it concerns a
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pure question of law, we must review de novo. See Cullinane v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2018). Applying that
standard of review, we reject Trout's proposed construction of the
Championship Regulations, because we conclude that the
regulations' plain text, read as a whole, reveals Trout's argument
to be implausible. See López & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc.,
667 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2012) ("[W]e are cognizant that where a
contract's wording is explicit and its language unambiguous, the
parties are bound by its clearly stated terms and conditions, with
no room for further debate.").2
Trout asks us to read section 35(d) to render section
35(e) a nullity, as he identifies no case that could fall within
the latter provision that would not also be encompassed by the
former. But, we do not assume that contract drafters do such poor
work, see 11 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:5 (4th ed. 2019),
and there is no reason to depart from that sensible assumption
here, when section 35(d) and section 35(e) may readily be construed
to coexist peacefully.
2 We note that the WBO does not dispute that this
question -- as well as each of the other questions that we address
about whether Trout's claims, in whole or in part, must be
arbitrated -- is properly resolved by a court and was not instead
delegated to the arbitrator to resolve. We thus face no dispute
over the arbitrability of this issue or any of the other issues we
address.
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The plain text of section 35(d) encompasses some matters
that the plain text of section 35(e) does not. For example,
section 35(e) does not, and cannot, subject to arbitration
questions that concern the validity of the agreement to arbitrate
that section 35(e) reflects. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) ("[A] gateway dispute about whether
the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a
'question of arbitrability' for a court to decide.").
For that reason, it is natural to read section 35(d) not
to oust section 35(e) altogether, but instead to do the useful
work of a typical forum-selection clause. So understood, section
35(d) merely provides that local or federal courts in Puerto
Rico -- rather than local or federal courts anywhere else -- are
the only ones that may hear those matters to which it applies and
that section 35(e) does not itself provide must be heard by an
arbitral tribunal.
At the same time, on this reading, section 35(e) does
the useful work of a typical arbitration clause. It identifies
the matters that the parties have agreed to have decided by
arbitration rather than in court and, so understood, it addresses
only those matters for which the forum-selection clause set forth
in section 35(d) has no application. We thus reject Trout's first
basis for reversing the District Court's decision, as it
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implausibly treats provisions that may comfortably be read to work
together as if they were intended to be at loggerheads.
III.
Trout next contends that the District Court erred in
granting the WBO's motion to compel arbitration because the WBO
impliedly waived its right to invoke arbitration as to his
claims -- whether arising under MABRA or Puerto Rico law -- through
its conduct in the litigation. In deciding whether a party has
impliedly waived its right to invoke arbitration through its
litigation conduct, "we ask whether there has been an undue delay
in the assertion of arbitral rights and whether, if arbitration
supplanted litigation, the other party would suffer unfair
prejudice." Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945,
948 (1st Cir. 2014). The inexhaustive list of factors that guide
us in making that determination include:
[T]he length of the delay, the extent to which
the party seeking to invoke arbitration has
participated in the litigation, the quantum of
discovery and other litigation-related
activities that have already taken place, the
proximity of the arbitration demand to an
anticipated trial date, and the extent to
which the party opposing arbitration would be
prejudiced.
Id.
We review de novo a preserved claim of implied waiver
based on litigation conduct. See Creative Sols. Grp., Inc. v.
Pentzer Corp., 252 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, "[a]s
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federal policy strongly favors arbitration of disputes, a
'[w]aiver is not to be lightly inferred,' [and] thus reasonable
doubts as to whether a party has waived the right to arbitrate
should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Tyco Int'l Ltd. v.
Swartz (In re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig.), 422 F.3d 41, 44 (1st
Cir. 2005) (second alteration in original) (quoting Restoration
Pres. Masonry, Inc. v. Grove Eur. Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir.
2003)).
Trout first attempts to locate an implicit waiver in the
WBO's decision to respond to his complaint in New Mexico state
court by seeking to remove his case to the District of New Mexico
and then to transfer it to the District of Puerto Rico without
moving to compel arbitration in taking either action. But, the
WBO's decision to conduct the litigation in this manner cannot be
treated as an implied waiver of its right to compel arbitration.
To do so would be to require the WBO to relinquish its bargained-
for right to select the forum in which to have its motion to compel
arbitration adjudicated as the price for enforcing its bargained-
for right to make that very same motion. Trout identifies no
precedent that would support that perverse result.
Trout separately argues that the WBO impliedly waived
its right to arbitrate by participating in discovery after filing
its motion to compel arbitration with the District Court. Trout
identified this ground for finding waiver for the first time in
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his motion for reconsideration of the District Court's decision to
grant the WBO's motion to compel arbitration. We review the denial
of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, see
Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir.
2011), and we find none.
Because Trout's argument for finding an implied waiver
on this ground "could have been raised before" the District Court
granted the WBO's motion to compel, the District Court was
justified in denying the motion for reconsideration on that basis
alone. Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GmBh & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc.,
455 F.3d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2006) ("A motion for reconsideration
'does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural
failures and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new
evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been
presented to the district court prior to the judgment.'" (quoting
Emmanuel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 25, 426 F.3d
416, 422 (1st Cir. 2005))).
In any event, the "quantum of discovery" that the WBO
engaged in during the pendency of its motion to compel arbitration
was not of a kind or of a scope that made it an abuse of discretion
for a district court not to find an implicit waiver based on
litigation conduct. And that is especially so, given that we are
not supposed to lightly infer one. See Tyco, 422 F.3d at 44.
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The WBO filed its motion to compel arbitration as soon
as the case reached the proper forum. It participated in the
discovery process only occasionally during the nearly year-long
period that its motion was pending, and, even then, the WBO did so
only after Trout himself had initiated discovery.3 See Gray
Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 460 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting
that a court must "focus[] on the amount and scope of discovery in
which the parties engaged prior to the request for arbitration"
when considering whether a party waived its right to compel
arbitration (emphasis added)). That Trout himself did not see fit
to argue that the WBO's discovery-related conduct was a ground for
finding implied waiver until after the District Court had ruled on
the motion to compel arbitration further supports the conclusion
that the WBO's litigation conduct in the interim was not of a scope
or kind that impliedly waived its then-pending motion to compel
arbitration. See Joca-Roca Real Estate, 772 F.3d at 948.
IV.
We come, then, to Trout's contention that MABRA bars any
claims that are brought under it from being arbitrated. Reviewing
de novo, see Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
3 We note that there is no bar imposed by federal law on the
use of the already-completed discovery in any possible subsequent
arbitration. See GEA Grp. AG v. Flex-N-Gate Corp., 740 F.3d 411,
418 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (leaving it up to German courts
and arbitrators to decide whether discovery completed in a district
court may be used in related proceedings taking place in Germany).
- 12 -
Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999), we find no merit to this
argument.
The Supreme Court has explained that there is no
categorical bar to the arbitration of federal-statutory claims.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
("It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of
an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."). The
Court has observed that "all statutory claims may not be
appropriate for arbitration," as Congress retains the power to
"preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for" a given statutory
claim. Id.
Trout bears the burden to show that Congress evidenced
an intent to preclude such a waiver under MABRA -- and thus to
preclude the arbitration of his claim under it -- either expressly
or impliedly through its "text . . . , its legislative history, or
an 'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the [statute's]
underlying purposes." Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)). He has not met that burden.
Trout points to the statute's text, which provides that
"[a]ny boxer who suffers economic injury as a result of a violation
of any provision of this chapter may bring an action in the
appropriate Federal or State court and recover the damages
suffered, court costs, and reasonable attorneys fees and
expenses." 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d) (emphasis added). He interprets
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this language to vest "[j]urisdiction for private claims under"
MABRA exclusively in "state court or federal court."
But, under Gilmer, Trout must point to text in MABRA
that "explicitly precludes arbitration," not merely text that
creates a cause of action. 500 U.S. at 26 ("[W]e have held
enforceable arbitration agreements relating to claims arising
under the Sherman Act, . . . § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, . . . the civil provisions of [RICO], . . . and
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.").4 The text in MABRA to
which Trout points does merely the latter. Nor does Trout identify
anything about arbitration that, in and of itself, creates an
irreconcilable conflict with MABRA's purposes. Thus, this aspect
of his challenge fails.
V.
That brings us to Trout's last challenge, in which he
takes aim at the District Court's ruling by focusing solely on the
arbitrator-selection provision that the Appeal Regulations set
forth. Trout contends -- correctly -- that this provision grants
the WBO exclusive control over the appointment of the arbitrators
4 See also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627
(2018) (noting that "[i]n many cases over many years, this Court
has heard and rejected efforts to conjure conflicts between the
Arbitration Act and other federal statutes," including "statutes
ranging from the Sherman and Clayton Acts to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, the Credit Repair Organizations Act, the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act").
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who will decide his claims. Under its plain terms, the WBO could
even appoint its own employees -- including direct aides to the
head of the WBO -- to the arbitration panel with no input from
Trout. In consequence, Trout argues that the arbitration agreement
does not provide him with a "fair opportunity" to pursue either
his claim under MABRA or his claims under Puerto Rico law because
the arbitrator, in virtue of the method of selection, would be
inherently biased.
Trout supports this contention in part by invoking the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's decision in Unisys P.R., Inc. v.
Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 1991 WL 735351, 128 P.R. Dec. 842
(1991). But, that case merely enumerates a series of factors that
determine whether Puerto Rico contract law permits a
forum-selection clause to be enforced, id. at 855, and Trout fails
to explain how that case bears on whether his claims are, under
Puerto Rico contract law, subject to arbitration pursuant to the
Appeal Regulations. Thus, this aspect of his challenge to the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement fails, as the District
Court found and as the WBO contends, at a minimum for lack of
adequate development. See Mills v. U.S. Bank, NA, 753 F.3d 47, 54
(1st Cir. 2014).
But, Trout's contention that the arbitration agreement
is "unreasonable and unjust" because the arbitrator-selection
provision permits the WBO to act as both "party and judge" has
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obvious force, notwithstanding that he does not identify any direct
authority to support his contention that the arbitral agreement
may not be enforced in consequence.5 Nor does the WBO contend that
Trout has forfeited or waived any argument under Puerto Rico law
against enforcement of the arbitration agreement beyond the
contention that he makes in that regard based on Unisys. Instead,
the WBO takes on Trout's argument about the problem with the
arbitrator-selection provision on the merits.
In doing so, the WBO -- understandably -- treats Trout's
challenge to this aspect of the arbitration agreement as a
contention that it creates such an inherent risk of bias in the
5 See In re Cross & Brown Co. v. Nelson, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573,
575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957) ("A well-recognized principle of 'natural
justice' is that a man may not be a judge in his own cause. . . .
[T]he law presumes that a party to a dispute cannot have that
disinterestedness and impartiality necessary to act in a judicial
or quasi-judicial capacity regarding that controversy."); see also
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999)
(invalidating an arbitration agreement under the good faith and
material breach doctrines of contract law prior to enforcement, in
large part, because the agreement effectively gave the employer
total "control over the entire [arbitration] panel and place[d] no
limits whatsoever on whom [the employer] [could] put on the list"
of potential arbiters); cf. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 242 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting
that an arbitration agreement "appoint[ing] as an arbitrator an
obviously biased person," such as "the CEO of" the defendant, could
violate "the rule against prospective waivers of federal rights");
McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (holding that where an arbitration agreement "grants one
party to the arbitration unilateral control over the pool of
potential arbitrators," the resulting arbitral forum cannot be "an
effective substitute for a judicial forum because it inherently
lacks neutrality").
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WBO's favor that it renders the arbitration agreement
"unconscionable as a matter of law."6 And, given the choice of
law provision in the Championship Regulations, we understand the
WBO to be referring, thereby, to the doctrine of unconscionability
under Puerto Rico contract law. See P.R. Elec. Power Auth. v.
Action Refund, 515 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Puerto Rico law
recognizes" unconscionability as a basis for "judicial
intervention where a contract exhibits an 'excessively onerous
quality that reaches the point of bad faith, and defeats those
rules of collective conduct that must be observed by every honest
and loyal conscience.'" (quoting López de Victoria v. Rodríguez,
13 P.R. Offic. Trans. 341, 349, 113 P.R. Dec. 265 (1982))). But, as
we will explain, we are not persuaded by the WBO's arguments for
rejecting this unconscionability challenge. See Beazer E., Inc.
v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 437 n.11 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that
6
The District Court rejected Trout's "unreasonable and
unjust" argument on the ground that proceedings provided for in
the Appeal Regulations "meet the essential requirements of
fairness" under Ramirez-De-Arellano v. American Airlines, Inc.,
133 F.3d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1997), because the regulations require
the Grievance Committee members to act neutrally, grant Trout the
right to present evidence, and provide Trout with some kind of
hearing. Even if we set aside the question of whether the
"fundamental fairness" standard in Ramirez-De-Arellano is
applicable in a pre-enforcement challenge to an arbitration
agreement, as we will explain, we disagree with the District
Court's conclusion that the Appeal Regulations provide for "an
impartial decision by the arbitrator." Id. (quoting Sunshine
Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir.
1987)).
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"the appellee 'waives, as a practical matter anyway, any objections
not obvious to the court to specific points urged by the
[appellant]'" (alteration in original) (quoting Hardy v. City
Optical Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 1994))).
To counter Trout's contention that the agreement is
"unreasonable and unjust" because it permits the WBO to act as
"party and judge," the WBO relies solely on an aspect of the
reasoning set forth in two out-of-circuit district court cases,
see Willis v. Nationwide Debt Settlement Grp., 878 F. Supp. 2d
1208, 1224-25 (D. Or. 2012); Davis v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC, No.
3:10-CV-322-H, 2011 WL 4738547, at *1-3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 7, 2011),
which upheld arbitration agreements against challenges that they
were unconscionable because they gave one party the exclusive right
to select the arbitrator, see Willis, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25;
Davis, 2011 WL 4738547 at *3-4. But, even assuming that these
cases -- which construe, respectively, the law of contract in
Oregon and Kentucky, see Willis, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-25; Davis,
2011 WL 4738547 at *1-3 -- reflect the law of contract in Puerto
Rico, their reasoning fails to show that the agreement here is not
unconscionable due to its provision allowing the WBO virtually
unfettered discretion to select the members of the arbitral
tribunal.
Notably, the WBO relies solely on the portions of the
substantive unconscionability analyses in each of these district
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court cases that emphasize that the defendants had promised in the
arbitration agreements to select an "independent" arbitrator to
decide the plaintiffs' claims. Willis, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1224
(noting the agreement required the defendant to select a "qualified
independent arbitrator"); Davis, 2011 WL 4738547 at *3 (noting the
agreement required the defendant to select "an arbitrator that is
'qualified and independent'"). That is significant for present
purposes, because, in both Willis and Davis, the district courts
determined that this contractual limitation on the defendants'
selection discretion made it premature to decide that the
agreements permitted the defendants to choose an arbitrator who
was not "independent" of the defendants. Willis, 878 F. Supp. 2d
at 1225; Davis, 2011 WL 4738547 at *4.
Indeed, in Davis, the court raised the prospect that the
plaintiff might even have a claim for breach of contract in the
event that the arbitrator selected was not "qualified and
independent," 2011 WL 4738547 at *4, and thus that there was no
reason to invalidate the agreement itself as being unconscionable,
id. (noting that "Defendants' bad faith exercise of the provision
would be unreasonable and grounds for an objection. On its face,
the provision provides that Defendants must choose an independent
and qualified arbitrator. In theory, Defendants will comply, and
the clause will not result in injustice to Plaintiffs"). It
further concluded that, in consequence, the FAA's after-the-fact
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review of arbitral awards sufficed to protect against concerns
about bias. See id.; 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (permitting a district
court to vacate an arbitral award when a party can show "there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them").
The arbitration agreement here, however, does not
require the WBO to appoint only "qualified" and "independent"
individuals to the Grievance Committee. In fact, at oral argument
the WBO conceded that the Appeal Regulations give the WBO's
president the power to nominate his or her own assistant to serve
on the Grievance Committee.
The WBO does point out that, under the Appeal
Regulations, "the Grievance Committee shall act as a fair and
independent arbitrator." (Emphasis added). But, that bare
instruction about how the Committee must "act" once in place does
not address the concern that the WBO is entitled to choose
Grievance Committee members under the direct control of the head
of the WBO itself and that anyone so chosen is for that reason
presumptively not "independent" in the least. Cf. McMullen v.
Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(invalidating an arbitrator-selection provision, as an
impermissible prospective waiver of a federal-statutory right,
where the arbitration agreement "grant[ed] one party to the
arbitration unilateral control over the pool of potential
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arbitrators" and thus created a "risk of bias" in favor of the
defendant-employer that was "inherent in the arbitrator-selection
process").7 Thus, we agree with Trout that the arbitration may
not proceed under the Appeal Regulations, as we are not persuaded
by the WBO's only arguments as to why, by permitting the WBO to
act as -- in Trout's words -- "party and judge," the arbitration
agreement is not so "unreasonable and unjust" as to be
unconscionable under Puerto Rico contract law.8
That said, as the WBO points out, the Championship
Regulations contain a savings clause, which provides that "[i]f
7 In light of our holding, we have no occasion to consider
whether the arbitration agreement, in consequence of the Appeal
Regulations' arbitrator-selection provision, operates as an
unenforceable "prospective waiver" of Trout's federal-statutory
claim under MABRA. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (noting
that "in the event [an arbitration agreement] operated . . . as a
prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies
for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy" (emphasis
added)); see also McMullen, 355 F.3d at 488, 494 (holding that even
where the arbitration agreement required the defendant-employer to
include within the arbitration pool only "neutral and experienced"
lawyers who were "unemployed by and unaffiliated with the company,"
the plaintiff's employment discrimination claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, could not be
arbitrated in conformity with the arbitration agreement because
the agreement "grant[ed] one party to the arbitration unilateral
control over the pool of potential arbitrators").
8 The WBO does not assert that Puerto Rico contract law would
"interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
create[] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA," AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011), if it were construed to treat
the arbitrator-selection provision in the Appeal Regulations as
unconscionable.
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any of these Rules are determined to be unenforceable, the balance
of these Rules shall remain in full force and effect." As a
result, it thus may be that, as the WBO contends, the
arbitrator-selection provision is severable from the remainder of
the arbitration agreement.
If that is the case, then, as the WBO also points out,
the arbitration could move forward as to all of Trout's
claims -- whether he brings them under MABRA or Puerto Rico
law -- pursuant to section 35(e) and the Appeal Regulations, albeit
with an arbitrator appointed by the District Court, pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 5. For, that provision gives district courts the power
to "designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire,
as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement
with the same force and effect as if he or they had been
specifically named therein" when the arbitration agreement fails
to provide for the selection of an arbitrator.
In determining whether "the [arbitration agreement]
should be enforced absent the invalid arbitrator-selection
mechanism and, if it should, how to select an arbitrator," however,
we must consider "the parties' intent," the "[f]ederal policy
favoring arbitration," and "the interplay between state law and
that federal policy." McMullen, 355 F.3d at 495. But, the parties
have not fully engaged with those factors or the applicability of
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the savings clause in the Championship Regulations in their
briefing to us.
We therefore leave it to the District Court to determine
in the first instance whether the arbitrator-selection provision
at issue here is severable from the remainder of the arbitration
agreement. In doing so, we express no opinion as to whether the
savings clause in the Championship Regulations can be triggered by
the invalidation of a provision in the Appeal Regulations or any
of the other matters that bear on the severability determination.
VI.
We vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. No costs awarded.
-Concurring Opinion Follows-
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DYK, Circuit Judge, concurring. Although I join the
majority's well-reasoned opinion in full, I write to separately
note that there is a potentially significant issue here not raised
or addressed by the parties: namely, whether arbitration-clause-
specific issues of unconscionability (and certain related
defenses) are governed by individual state law9 or federal common
law. The WBO failed to argue this point, and the result reached
here does not depend on resolution of that question, since the
arbitrator selection clause would be unconscionable under either
state law or federal law.
Section 2 of the FAA includes what is known as the
"saving clause." It provides that an agreement to arbitrate "shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2. The saving clause permits the application of state
law "if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987)). But in
several cases, the Supreme Court has held that state law "defenses
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from
9
The WBO Regulations provide: "These Regulations are to be
interpreted in conformity with the Laws of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico." Puerto Rico is also the forum state.
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the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue" are preempted.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting
Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687); Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd.
P'ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017); Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).
There is a difference of view as to whether these Supreme
Court cases hold that arbitration-specific state law is entirely
preempted (for example, with respect to unconscionability) or only
state law that conflicts with the purposes of the FAA.10 If state
law is entirely preempted, it seems to follow that federal common
law (drawing on general principles of state law) governs the issue
of unconscionability with respect to arbitration clauses. In other
10 Compare Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184,
218 (2013) (Liu, J.) ("[S]tate-law rules that do not 'interfere[]
with fundamental attributes of arbitration' do not implicate
Concepcion's limits on state unconscionability rules." (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Concepcion,
563 U.S. at 344)), and Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d
916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013) ("The Supreme Court's holding [in
Concepcion] that the FAA preempts state laws having a
'disproportionate impact' on arbitration cannot be read to
immunize all arbitration agreements from invalidation no matter
how unconscionable they may be, so long as they invoke the shield
of arbitration."), with Sonic-Calabasas, 311 P.3d at 231 (Chin,
J., dissenting) ("Concepcion explains[ that] 'a [state] court may
not rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as the
basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be
unconscionable.'" (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341)).
A third possibility alluded to by the majority is that,
despite the Supreme Court's decision in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013), federal law
embodied in the substantive statutes may play a role.
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areas where section 2 has been held to displace state law, it
appears to have created federal common law.11 Federal common law
would invalidate the one-sided arbitration here looking to general
state-law principles.
We appropriately leave to another day the question
whether the issue of unconscionability as to arbitration clauses
is governed by state law (if consistent with the purposes of the
FAA) or by federal common law.
11 For example, the question whether a particular agreement
contemplates "arbitration" is governed by federal law. See Fit
Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 2004); Salt Lake Tribune Publ'g Co., LLC v. Mgmt.
Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2004). Federal
substantive law also governs the issues of waiver and severability.
See Rankin v. Allstate Insurance Co., 336 F.3d 8 n.3 (1st Cir.
2003) (waiver); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.
440, 447 (2006) (severability). And under chapter 2 of the FAA,
"'federal common law provides the determinative rules of
decision'" "governing the recognition and enforcement of
international arbitration awards." InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344
F.3d 134, 143 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs
v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2000)).
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