NH Lottery Commission v. Rosen ( 2021 )


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  •              United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 19-1835
    NEW HAMPSHIRE LOTTERY COMMISSION;
    NEOPOLLARD INTERACTIVE LLC; POLLARD BANKNOTE LIMITED,
    Plaintiffs, Appellees,
    v.
    JEFFREY ROSEN, Acting U.S. Attorney General;*
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; UNITED STATES,
    Defendants, Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch and Kayatta,
    Circuit Judges.**
    Jeffrey E. Sandberg, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil
    Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Ethan P. Davis,
    Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Hashim M. Mooppan,
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Scott R. McIntosh,
    *  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
    Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen has been substituted for
    former Attorney General William P. Barr.
    **  Judge Torruella heard oral argument in this matter and
    participated in the semble, but he did not participate in the
    issuance of the panel's opinion in this case. The remaining two
    panelists therefore issued the opinion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 46
    (d).
    Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, were on brief, for
    appellants.
    Anthony J. Galdieri, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Civil
    Bureau, with whom Gordon J. MacDonald, Attorney General, was on
    brief, for appellee New Hampshire Lottery Commission.
    Matthew D. McGill, with whom Theodore B. Olson, Lochlan F.
    Shelfer, Joshua M. Wesneski, Debra Wong Yang, and Gibson, Dunn &
    Crutcher LLP were on brief, for appellees NeoPollard Interactive
    LLC and Pollard Banknote Limited.
    Charles J. Cooper, David H. Thompson, Brian W. Barnes, J.
    Joel Alicea, Nicole Frazer Reaves, and Cooper & Kirk, PLLC on brief
    for Coalition to Stop Internet Gambling and National Association
    of Convenience Stores, amici curiae.
    Jonathan F. Cohn, Peter D. Keisler, Joshua J. Fougere,
    Daniel J. Hay, Derek A. Webb, and Sidley Austin LLP on brief for
    International Game Technology PLC, amicus curiae.
    A. Jeff Ifrah, Andrew J. Silver, and Ifrah PLLC on brief for
    iDevelopment and Economic Association, amicus curiae.
    Kevin F. King, Rafael Reyneri, and Covington & Burling LLP,
    on brief for Association of Gaming Equipment Manufacturers, amicus
    curiae.
    A. Michael Pratt, Elliot H. Scherker, Nicole Leonard Cordoba,
    Greenberg Traurig, LLP and Greenberg Traurig, P.A. on brief for
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, amicus curiae.
    Glenn J. Moramarco, Assistant Attorney General, John T.
    Passante, Deputy Attorney General, and Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General of New Jersey, on brief for the State of New Jersey, amicus
    curiae.
    Dana Nessel, Michigan Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud,
    Solicitor General, Melinda A. Leonard, Mark G. Sands, Donald S.
    McGehee, Assistant Attorneys General, Jason Ravnsborg, Attorney
    General, State of South Dakota, Dave Yost, Attorney General, State
    of Ohio, Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, State of Delaware,
    Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, State of North Carolina, Mark
    R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, T.J. Donovan, Attorney
    General, State of Vermont, Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General,
    State of Alaska, Josh Kaul, Attorney General, State of Wisconsin,
    Mary R. Harville, Senior Vice President, General Counsel &
    Corporate Secretary, Kentucky Lottery Corporation, Phil Weiser,
    Attorney General, State of Colorado, Keith Ellison, Attorney
    General, State of Minnesota, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General
    of Idaho, Valerie Morozov, Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Dept. of
    Revenue, Division of Lottery, William Tong, Attorney General of
    Connecticut, Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of
    Columbia, Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Alonda W.
    McCutcheon,   General   Counsel,   Tennessee    Education   Lottery
    Corporation, on brief for the State of Michigan, Michigan Bureau
    of State Lottery, and South Dakota, Ohio, Delaware, North Carolina,
    Virginia, Vermont, Alaska, Wisconsin, Colorado, Minnesota, Idaho,
    Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maryland, the Rhode Island
    Department of Revenue, Division of Lottery, the Kentucky Lottery
    Corporation, and the Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation,
    amici curiae.
    January 20, 2021
    KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.       In 2018, the Office of Legal
    Counsel ("OLC") of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued
    a legal opinion, adopted by DOJ, that all prohibitions in the Wire
    Act of 1961, save one, apply to all forms of bets or wagers (the
    "2018 Opinion").    The 2018 Opinion superseded an OLC opinion from
    2011 concluding that the Wire Act's prohibitions were uniformly
    limited to sports gambling (the "2011 Opinion").           Suffice it to
    say, the more expansive construction of the Wire Act adopted in
    2018 caused great consternation among the many states and their
    vendors who, as the 2018 Opinion acknowledged, had "beg[u]n selling
    lottery tickets via the Internet after the issuance of [the] 2011
    Opinion."    Not eager to scrap or shrink its lottery, the New
    Hampshire Lottery Commission and one of its vendors, NeoPollard,1
    commenced this action in February 2019, seeking relief under the
    Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.
    The district court granted both requests, ruling that the Wire Act
    is limited to sports gambling, as OLC initially opined.
    The   Attorney   General,   DOJ,   and   the   United   States
    (collectively "the government") appealed the district court's
    judgment.   For the following reasons, we hold that the controversy
    1  We refer to both Plaintiffs NeoPollard Interactive LLC and
    its fifty-percent owner, Pollard Banknote Limited, collectively as
    "NeoPollard."
    – 4 –
    before us is justiciable and that the Wire Act's prohibitions are
    limited to bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.                     We
    depart from the district court only by deciding that relief under
    the Declaratory Judgment Act alone is sufficient.
    I.
    A.
    In 1961, Congress passed the Wire Act.             See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
     (codifying Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2, 
    75 Stat. 491
    , 491
    (1961)).       The       subsection     relevant      for    our     purposes,
    section 1084(a), reads:
    Whoever being engaged in the business of
    betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire
    communication facility for the transmission in
    interstate or foreign commerce of bets or
    wagers or information assisting in the placing
    of bets or wagers on any sporting event or
    contest, or for the transmission of a wire
    communication which entitles the recipient to
    receive money or credit as a result of bets or
    wagers, or for information assisting in the
    placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined
    under this title or imprisoned not more than
    two years, or both.
    The question the parties present to us is whether the
    phrase "on any sporting event or contest" (the "sports-gambling
    qualifier") qualifies the term "bets or wagers" as used throughout
    section 1084(a).
    Although Congress enacted the Wire Act in 1961, this
    question   seems   not    to   have    raised   its   head   until    after    a
    – 5 –
    substantial amount of commerce had moved to the internet four
    decades later.      In 2002, the Fifth Circuit opined in a private
    civil suit that "[a] plain reading of the statutory language [of
    the Wire Act] clearly requires that the object of the gambling be
    a sporting event or contest."          In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., 
    313 F.3d 257
    , 262 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002) (second alteration in original)
    (quoting In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., Internet Gambling Litig.,
    
    132 F. Supp. 2d 468
    , 480 (E.D. La. 2001)).        In May 2005, the Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General of DOJ's Criminal Division begged to
    differ,   issuing    a   letter   to     inform   the   Illinois   Lottery
    Superintendent that DOJ believed that prospective legislation
    pending in the Illinois Senate to create a website where people
    could purchase lottery tickets over the internet would violate
    section 1084.    DOJ explained its view that, although the purchase
    of lottery tickets might be lawful in Illinois, "the acceptance of
    wagers through the use of a wire communication facility by a
    gambling business, including [one] operated by . . . a state, from
    individuals located . . . within the borders of the state (but
    where transmission is routed outside of the state) would violate
    federal law."    The letter equated the sale of lottery tickets with
    the acceptance of wagers and deemed the interstate transmission of
    such wagers violative of the Wire Act regardless of whether they
    were placed on sporting events or contests.
    – 6 –
    Four years later, in December 2009, authorities from New
    York and Illinois requested the views of DOJ's Criminal Division
    on the legality of the states' plans to use the internet and
    out-of-state    transaction    processing      systems   to   sell   lottery
    tickets to adults within their states.              The states pointed out
    that their proposals had been designed to comport with the Unlawful
    Internet Gambling Enforcement Act ("UIGEA"), 
    31 U.S.C. §§ 5361
    -
    5367, and argued that the Wire Act did not bar their proposed
    systems because section 1084(a) was limited to sports-related
    gambling.     In response, and in keeping with its 2005 letter to
    Illinois, the Criminal Division opined that section 1084(a) was
    not so limited and that the Act would prohibit the use of the
    internet to transmit bets or wagers of any kind, even if the
    transactions originated and ended within a single state.                The
    Criminal Division nevertheless noted the tension that this reading
    of the statute created with the UIGEA, which explicitly excludes
    from its prohibition of "unlawful Internet gambling" the "placing,
    receiving, or otherwise transmitting a bet or wager where . . .
    the bet or wager is initiated and received or otherwise made
    exclusively    within   a   single   State,"   
    31 U.S.C. § 5362
    (10)(B),
    despite "[t]he intermediate routing of electronic data" through
    other states, 
    id.
     § 5362(10)(E).        The Criminal Division noted the
    "potential oddity" whereby the Wire Act's reference to "the use of
    – 7 –
    interstate commerce" would criminalize otherwise lawful state-run,
    in-state lottery transactions.        For these reasons, the Criminal
    Division sought guidance from OLC on whether the use of the
    internet for in-state lottery sales with out-of-state processing
    violated the Wire Act.
    In its 2011 Opinion, OLC agreed with the Fifth Circuit,
    concluding     that   "the   Wire   Act     does   not   reach   interstate
    transmissions of wire communications that do not relate to a
    'sporting event or contest'" and ultimately concluded that the
    states' lottery-related proposals did not violate the Wire Act.
    See Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 
    35 Op. O.L.C. 134
    , 151 (2011) ("2011 Opinion").
    So matters stood until 2017, when the Criminal Division
    asked OLC to reconsider its position, which OLC did in a formal
    opinion published in November 2018, superseding and replacing the
    2011 Opinion.     See Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to
    Non-Sports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C. __, at *23, 
    2018 WL 7080165
    , at
    *14 (Nov. 2, 2018) ("2018 Opinion").2          In the 2018 Opinion, OLC
    2  Unlike in the 2011 Opinion, the Criminal Division's reasons
    for requesting OLC's advice are not detailed in the 2018 OLC
    Opinion itself. See 2018 Opinion at *1-2, 
    2018 WL 7080165
    , at *1.
    NeoPollard's complaint states that news sources had reported that
    OLC's 2018 Opinion came on the heels of lobbying efforts by the
    Coalition to Stop Internet Gambling, an organization participating
    as amicus curiae on behalf of the government in this case. See
    Byron Tau & Alexandra Berzon, Justice Department's Reversal on
    – 8 –
    found the statutory language in section 1084(a) unambiguous and
    its prohibitions plainly not limited to sports gambling, save for
    the second prohibition contained in the first clause, which bars
    "us[ing] a wire communication facility for the transmission in
    interstate or foreign commerce of . . . information assisting in
    the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest."
    
    Id. at *2, *14
    , 
    2018 WL 7080165
    , at *1, *9 (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
    (a)).3    OLC justified its reversal on the grounds that the
    2011 Opinion did not devote adequate attention to either the text
    of the statute or the canons of statutory construction, was "of
    relatively     recent   vintage,"   and     departed   from   DOJ's   former
    position.      
    Id.
     at *21—22, 
    2018 WL 7080165
    , at *13.            The 2018
    Opinion noted that some reliance interests would be affected:
    "Some States, for example, began selling lottery tickets via the
    Internet after the issuance of our 2011 Opinion."              
    Id. at *22
    ,
    
    2018 WL 7080165
    , at *14.       But OLC concluded that "such reliance
    interests [we]re [in]sufficient to justify continued adherence to
    the 2011 opinion."      
    Id. at *23
    , 
    2018 WL 7080165
    , at *14.
    Online Gambling Tracked Memo from Adelson Lobbyists, Wall St. J.
    (Jan. 18,      2019),       https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-
    departments-reversal-on-online-gambling-tracked-memo-from-
    adelson-lobbyists-11547854137.
    3  The 2018 Opinion also found that the UIGEA, which Congress
    enacted in 2006, did not modify or otherwise alter section 1084(a).
    2018 Opinion at *18, 
    2018 WL 7080165
    , at *12.
    – 9 –
    In a subsequently issued memorandum, the Deputy Attorney
    General   instructed     DOJ   attorneys   to    "adhere       to   OLC's
    interpretation, which represents the Department's position on the
    meaning of the Wire Act."      Rod Rosenstein, U.S. Dep't of Just.,
    Applicability of the Wire Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
    , to Non-Sports
    Gambling (2019) ("January 2019 Memo").      Addressing the reliance
    interests, the memo stated:
    As an exercise of discretion, Department of
    Justice attorneys should refrain from applying
    Section 1084(a) in criminal or civil actions
    to persons who engaged in conduct violating
    the Wire Act in reliance on the 2011 OLC
    opinion prior to the date of this memorandum,
    and for 90 days thereafter. A 90-day window
    will give businesses that relied on the 2011
    OLC opinion time to bring their operations
    into compliance with federal law. This is an
    internal     exercise     of     prosecutorial
    discretion; it is not a safe harbor for
    violations of the Wire Act.
    
    Id.
       DOJ subsequently extended the forbearance period several
    times, most recently until December 1, 2020.
    After   this   lawsuit   commenced,   the   Deputy    Attorney
    General issued yet another memorandum, this time stating that the
    2018 Opinion in fact "did not address whether the Wire Act applies
    to State lotteries and their vendors" but that DOJ was "now
    reviewing that question."      Rod Rosenstein, U.S. Dep't of Just.,
    Notice Regarding Applicability of the Wire Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
    ,
    to State Lotteries and Their Vendors (2019) ("April 2019 Memo").
    – 10 –
    Accordingly, DOJ granted a separate ninety-day forbearance period
    specific to state lotteries and their vendors, which will begin
    when DOJ publicly announces its position on the applicability of
    the Wire Act to them.      DOJ has not yet made such an announcement.
    B.
    Government-run lotteries apparently harken at least as
    far back as colonial America, where the lottery "flourished as a
    substitute     for   conventional    methods    of   public   and    private
    finance."     Nat'l Inst. of L. Enf't & Crim. Just., U.S. Dep’t of
    Justice, The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776–1976, at 660
    (1977).      Forty-eight   states    or    territories   currently   operate
    lotteries.     New Hampshire is among them.          Through its Lottery
    Commission ("NHLC"), it runs a traditional retailer-based lottery
    at 1,400 sites across the state.           Its business does not involve
    placing bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.          The NHLC's
    profits are earmarked for the state's Education Trust Fund.             See
    N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 6-b; 
    N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 284:21
    -j.            In
    the 2018 fiscal year, the NHLC contributed $87.2 million to this
    fund. 4   All of the NHLC's lottery-related activities use the
    4 Many other states, represented as amici in this case, rely
    on substantial profits earned from lotteries that operate like New
    Hampshire's.   The Michigan Bureau of State Lottery along with
    forty-six   other   government-operated   lotteries   collectively
    generated more than eighty billion dollars in gross revenues in
    2017, which went to fund a myriad of state programs.
    – 11 –
    internet     or   interstate       wires.       For    its    brick-and-mortar
    operations, the state lottery relies on computer gaming and back-
    office systems that manage lottery inventory and sales, which in
    turn depend on out-of-state backup servers.                 Via its website and
    various     social   media   platforms,       the   NHLC     communicates     draw
    results,     advertises      lottery      games,      and    provides   general
    information.
    After OLC issued the 2011 Opinion, New Hampshire began
    operating its iLottery system, developed by NeoPollard.                       The
    system allows players to engage in various types of games online.
    Players pay for their wagers through an online account into which
    they can deposit funds only when they are within the state's
    borders.    While the players themselves must be physically located
    in New Hampshire for the entirety of the transaction, intermediate
    routing of data or information ancillary to the transaction may
    cross state lines.
    The iLottery system is projected to generate six to eight
    million dollars in revenue for New Hampshire in fiscal year 2021.
    The NHLC predicts sales would drop precipitously if it could not
    rely   on   the   internet   for    its   operations.        It   estimates   its
    withdrawal from multi-jurisdictional games like "Powerball" alone
    would cost the state forty million dollars per year in education
    funding.     Without further guidance from DOJ, the NHLC expects
    – 12 –
    banks       to    become   unwilling    to    accept   and    process     iLottery
    transactions.
    For its part, NeoPollard has invested tens of millions
    of dollars into building its iLottery system, which it has also
    configured for deployment in Michigan and Virginia.5                     NeoPollard
    claims that "the only way to ensure full compliance with the
    interpretation of the Wire Act outlined in the . . . [2018 Opinion]
    is to suspend the entirety of its iLottery operations in New
    Hampshire, costing NeoPollard millions of dollars in investment-
    backed expectations and player goodwill."                   If it continues to
    operate iLottery in New Hampshire, "NeoPollard believes . . . it
    faces imminent prosecution."
    C.
    On   February 15,   2019,    the   NHLC   filed   its    complaint
    against the government along with a motion for summary judgment.
    The NHLC requested a declaratory judgment that the Wire Act does
    not extend to state-conducted lottery activities, an order setting
    5
    Other states, appearing before us as amici, have expanded
    their online platforms further, legalizing and licensing
    additional forms of online gambling. New Jersey, for example, has
    rolled out the online gambling platform, iGaming.      New Jersey
    notes that from 2013 through 2016 the iGaming platform generated
    $998.3 million in sales and $124.4 million in tax revenue.
    Meanwhile, Pennsylvania represents that, because of the 2018
    Opinion, it scaled back its online gaming infrastructure, leading
    to an estimated one billion dollars in lost revenue for the state.
    – 13 –
    aside the 2018 Opinion pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
    Act ("APA"), 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A), and injunctive relief.                 The
    NHLC       advanced   two   basic   arguments:   (1) the   prohibitions    of
    section 1084(a) do not even apply to states; and (2) section 1084
    is limited to sports gambling and thus does not extend to state-
    conducted lottery activity.
    On the same day the NHLC filed suit, NeoPollard also
    filed a complaint and a concurrent motion for summary judgment.
    NeoPollard sought a judgment declaring that the Wire Act is limited
    to gambling on sporting events.           The district court consolidated
    the cases.6
    The government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
    of standing and for failure to state a claim.              See Fed. R. Civ.
    6The district court denied motions from the iDevelopment
    and Economic Association and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to
    intervene as plaintiffs, as well as from the Coalition to Stop
    Internet Gambling and the National Association of Convenience
    Stores which sought to intervene as defendants, though the district
    court allowed them to participate as amici curiae, along with the
    State of New Jersey and the Michigan Bureau of State Lottery.
    The Kentucky Lottery Corporation, the Tennessee Education
    Lottery Corporation, the Virginia Lottery, the Rhode Island
    Lottery, the Colorado State Lottery Division, the North Carolina
    Education Lottery, the State of Delaware, the State of Idaho, the
    State of Vermont, the State of Mississippi, the State of Alaska,
    and the District of Columbia supported the Michigan Bureau of State
    Lottery's memorandum of law, which in turn supported the
    plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment.
    – 14 –
    P. 12(b)(1), (6).       With the parties' consent, the district court
    converted    the     motion    into     one   for     summary    judgment.       The
    government, however, did not address the NHLC's argument that the
    Wire Act does not even apply to states.                      Rather, in its reply
    memorandum before the district court, the government attached the
    Deputy Attorney General's April 2019 Memo, penned that same day,
    which stated that the "[2018] OLC Opinion did not address whether
    the Wire Act applies to State lotteries and their vendors" and
    that DOJ was "now reviewing that question."                     April 2019 Memo.7
    The April 2019 Memo also instructed DOJ attorneys to "refrain from
    applying     Section 1084(a)          to      State     lotteries     and      their
    vendors . . .      until      the   Department        concludes     its     review,"
    following which states would have ninety days to conform their
    operations to federal law.          
    Id.
         Nevertheless, upon inquiry by the
    district court, the government argued orally that states are
    subject to the prohibitions of the Wire Act.
    The   district     court      denied     the    government's    motion,
    instead    granting    summary      judgment    to     the    plaintiffs.     After
    concluding that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, the court
    determined    that    the     2018 Opinion      "constitute[d]      final    agency
    7  Twenty months later, the DOJ has not yet completed its
    review, explaining at oral argument that it has had other
    priorities.
    – 15 –
    action without an adequate alternative to APA review."                    N.H.
    Lottery Comm'n v. Barr, 
    386 F. Supp. 3d 132
    , 146 (D.N.H. 2019).
    The court also found that section 1084(a) applies only to bets or
    wagers on sporting events or contests.         
    Id. at 157
    .     The court did
    not address the NHLC's alternative argument that the Wire Act does
    not apply to states.     As for the remedy, the district court granted
    the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief and declared that
    "§ 1084(a) of the Wire Act applies only to transmissions related
    to bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest."              Id. at 160.
    It proceeded to "set aside" the erroneous 2018 Opinion under
    section 706(2)(A) of the APA, as requested by the NHLC (and several
    amici).   Id. at 158–59.       Finally, the court denied injunctive
    relief.   Id. at 159–60.
    The   government   timely      appealed.     We   have    appellate
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    II.
    A.
    We    first   consider   whether      this   case    presents     a
    justiciable case or controversy.          See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
    Pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute implicates doctrines
    of standing, ripeness, and (sometimes) mootness.                    This court
    – 16 –
    reviews these threshold questions de novo.               Mangual v. Rotger-
    Sabat, 
    317 F.3d 45
    , 56 (1st Cir. 2003).
    1.
    "The    doctrine    of   standing   gives    meaning    to   the[]
    constitutional limits [of Article III] by 'identify[ing] those
    disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
    process.'"     Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
    573 U.S. 149
    , 157
    (2014) ("SBA List") (third alteration in original) (quoting Lujan
    v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560 (1992)).
    The burden lies with the plaintiff to show an injury in
    fact that is "fairly traceable to the challenged action" and that
    likely "will be redressed by a favorable decision."           Massachusetts
    v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 
    923 F.3d 209
    , 221–22 (1st
    Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560
    ).             This case primarily
    concerns the injury-in-fact requirement, there being no question
    that injury, if any, can be traced directly to the government's
    threatened enforcement of the Wire Act and can be redressed in
    this action.        See, e.g., SBA List, 573 U.S. at 158.           To satisfy
    standing, the injury in fact "must be concrete and particularized
    and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."                 Reddy
    v. Foster, 
    845 F.3d 493
    , 500 (1st Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (quoting SBA List, 573 U.S. at 158).             "[A] future
    injury"   is   imminent    "if    the   threatened   injury    is    certainly
    – 17 –
    impending, or [if] there is a substantial risk that the harm will
    occur."     Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (quoting SBA List, 573 U.S. at 158).
    "In certain circumstances, 'the threatened enforcement
    of a law' may suffice as an 'imminent' Article III injury in fact."
    Id. (quoting SBA List, 573 U.S. at 158–59).                "When an individual
    is subject to such a threat, an actual arrest, prosecution, or
    other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging the
    law."     SBA     List,   573   U.S.   at   158   (first    citing   Steffel   v.
    Thompson, 
    415 U.S. 452
    , 459 (1974); and then citing MedImmune,
    Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 
    549 U.S. 118
    , 128–29 (2007)).                We do not
    "require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing
    suit to challenge the basis for the threat."               MedImmune, 
    549 U.S. at 129
    .   Although a plaintiff must demonstrate a "specific threat
    of prosecution . . . , just how clear the threat of prosecution
    needs to be turns very much on the facts of the case and on a
    sliding-scale judgment that is very hard to calibrate."               N.H. Hemp
    Council, Inc. v. Marshall, 
    203 F.3d 1
    , 4–5 (1st Cir. 2000).
    The     plaintiffs     here      satisfy       the   injury-in-fact
    requirement.       It is uncontested that the plaintiffs use wire
    communication facilities for the interstate transmission of bets
    and wagers in the running of the New Hampshire lottery and iLottery
    platform.       The 2018 Opinion, which adopted a broad reading of
    – 18 –
    activities prohibited by section 1084(a), expressly mentions such
    lotteries, suggesting that Congress need amend the statute if it
    wishes to protect reliance interests, including those of the
    states.     Removing any doubt regarding the enforcement of its new
    view, DOJ's subsequent memoranda made clear that DOJ attorneys
    must "adhere" to that view, and that any discretionary forbearance
    was limited to a brief window of time.
    We know, too, that when DOJ attorneys last held the view
    expressed in the 2018 Opinion (between 2005 and 2011), DOJ had
    prosecuted seventeen cases involving non-sports betting under the
    Wire Act.      That history of past enforcement against the same
    conduct supports a finding of injury in fact for pre-enforcement
    standing.    See SBA List, 573 U.S. at 164 (finding that history of
    "past enforcement against the same conduct is good evidence that
    the threat of enforcement is not 'chimerical'" and therefore
    reflects a substantial risk of harm (quoting Steffel, 
    415 U.S. at 459
    )).    While the government points out that none of those pre-
    2011 enforcement actions were brought against state lotteries, the
    government has not articulated any reason why this is a distinction
    that makes a difference.    As NeoPollard puts it, the 2018 Opinion
    did not "expressly state that it applies in northeastern states or
    that it applies to corporations whose names end in 'd,' either,
    but [DOJ] has given no reason to think that being a [lottery]
    – 19 –
    vendor is any more useful a defense" against enforcement under the
    government's reading of the statute.
    In any event, the lack of current prosecutions against
    state lotteries is not dispositive.       See R.I. Ass'n of Realtors
    v. Whitehouse, 
    199 F.3d 26
    , 32 (1st Cir. 1999).        As evidenced by
    DOJ's   other   prosecutions   of   non-sports   betting,   "the   record
    contains no realistic basis for a suggestion that the statutory
    provision . . . has fallen into desuetude."           
    Id.
         Here, DOJ
    affirmatively warned a state that it believed selling lottery
    tickets over the internet violated the Wire Act and, in the lead-
    up to the 2011 Opinion, provided similar advice to inquiring
    authorities from two states.
    The government alternatively argues that even if DOJ had
    effectively announced that the Wire Act applies to state lotteries,
    that would not lead to a credible threat of prosecution against
    New Hampshire's lottery specifically.      We disagree, and our prior
    decision in Hemp Council offers a helpful illustration.
    There, Derek Owen, a New Hampshire state legislator, had
    sought to pass a bill that would allow cultivation of "industrial
    hemp" from the cannabis sativa plant.       Hemp Council, 
    203 F.3d at 3
    .   An official from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
    ("DEA") testified during a hearing on the bill that the DEA viewed
    the cultivation of cannabis sativa plants, regardless of the
    – 20 –
    grower's purpose, as the illegal manufacture of marijuana under
    federal law.    
    Id.
         After the bill was defeated, Owen and the New
    Hampshire    Hemp     Council    sought   a   declaratory   judgment     that
    interpreted the Controlled Substances Act, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),
    as not criminalizing "non-psychoactive" cannabis sativa.               
    Id.
     at
    3–4.   This court found pre-enforcement standing because the DEA
    had expressed its view that the conduct Owen sought to engage in
    violated federal law.      
    Id. at 5
    ; accord Monson v. U.S. Drug Enf't
    Admin., 
    589 F.3d 952
    , 958 (8th Cir. 2009).
    The government attempts to distinguish Hemp Council
    because here there is no history of prosecuting state lotteries.
    But this court did not require the Hemp Council plaintiffs to prove
    that Owen or industrial hemp producers more generally had been
    previously prosecuted.          
    203 F.3d at 5
    ; see also Blum v. Holder,
    
    744 F.3d 790
    , 798 n.11 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting "the assumption
    that the state will enforce its own non-moribund criminal laws,
    absent evidence to the contrary").             Accordingly, we find the
    situation before us analogous to Hemp Council, except that, unlike
    in Hemp Council, the plaintiffs here have been openly engaging in
    the conduct deemed criminal by OLC.           The plaintiffs already have
    it all on the line, so to speak.          See MedImmune, 
    549 U.S. at 134
    ("The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the
    farm, or . . . risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of
    – 21 –
    its business before seeking a declaration of its actively contested
    legal rights finds no support in Article III.").
    In   a   similar   vein,   the   government     argues   that    the
    plaintiffs cannot prove standing (or ripeness) because, according
    to it, the April 2019 Memo clarifies that DOJ has no position on
    whether section 1084(a) applies to state lotteries and that DOJ
    making up its mind on this question is an unsatisfied precondition
    to enforcement.       See Reddy, 845 F.3d at 502 (finding a precondition
    to enforcement -- a third party demarcating a buffer zone -- was
    a "contingent future event[] that might not occur as anticipated,
    or indeed may not occur at all" (alteration in original) (quoting
    Texas v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 296
    , 300 (1998))).            The government
    attempts to equate its newly professed uncertainty about the Wire
    Act's application with an "unambiguous disclaimer of coverage,"
    which can undermine standing in pre-enforcement cases.                       Hemp
    Council, 
    203 F.3d at 5
    ; see also, e.g., Blum, 744 F.3d at 799 ("For
    its part, the Government has disavowed any intention to prosecute
    plaintiffs for their stated intended conduct because, in its view,
    that conduct is not covered by [the statute].").
    The April 2019 Memo does not undermine the plaintiffs'
    claim of standing.         The April 2019 Memo leaves in place all
    provisions of the 2018 Opinion and the January 2019 Memo, but
    grants   a   separate     forbearance    period   to   the    enforcement      of
    – 22 –
    section 1084(a) against state lotteries, "until [DOJ] concludes
    its review," from which date the plaintiffs will have only ninety
    days within which to comply.            The government vaguely alludes to
    the additional questions that would arise from enforcing the Wire
    Act against state lotteries instead of a wholly private business.
    Yet, in the district court, the government "rejected the only
    argument put forward by the Lottery Commission that states are not
    covered by the [Wire] Act, and it . . . otherwise failed to
    identify any alternative legal theory as to why state actors might
    be exempt."         N.H. Lottery Comm'n, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 143.             Most
    notably, the government sticks to its position that the Wire Act
    is unambiguous in its application to non-sports betting, and offers
    no hint as to why that supposedly unambiguous text would not apply
    to, for example, a private actor such as NeoPollard.
    The    government   exacerbates    the   threat   posed   by    its
    prolonged coyness by limiting its professed forbearance to ninety
    days   from    whatever    date   it   decides   to    opine.   A   state-wide
    operation integrating over a thousand retailers and multi-state
    relationships to produce almost 100 million dollars in net revenue
    does not strike us as an operation that can be easily wound-up in
    ninety days.        Nor can a state legislature plan sensibly if such a
    relied-upon revenue stream finds itself suddenly subject to a
    three-month closure notice.             On such a record, the government
    – 23 –
    "must proffer more than a conclusory assertion of inapplicability
    to convince us that the [plaintiffs] no longer face[] a credible
    threat of prosecution."   R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, 
    199 F.3d at 35
    .
    2.
    We next turn to ripeness.     While standing is concerned
    with "who" is bringing the challenge, ripeness is concerned with
    "when" the challenge is brought.     See McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med.
    Ctr., 
    319 F.3d 63
    , 69–70 (1st Cir. 2003).    In the pre-enforcement
    context, however, the doctrines of standing and ripeness tend to
    overlap, so the preceding discussion largely applies here too.
    See SBA List, 573 U.S. at 157 n.5; R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, 
    199 F.3d at 33
    .
    Ripeness analysis requires consideration of "fitness"
    and "hardship."8   See Reddy, 845 F.3d at 501 (citing Texas v.
    United States, 
    523 U.S. at
    300–01).      Fitness involves issues of
    "finality, definiteness, and the extent to which resolution of the
    8  The fitness prong has both jurisdictional and prudential
    components, while the hardship prong is solely prudential. Reddy,
    845 F.3d at 501 (citing Roman Cath. Bishop of Springfield v. City
    of Springfield, 
    724 F.3d 78
    , 89–90 (1st Cir. 2013)). The Supreme
    Court has expressed doubt about whether the doctrine of prudential
    ripeness is consistent with the settled principle that a federal
    court has a "virtually unflagging" obligation to hear and decide
    cases within its jurisdiction. SBA List, 573 U.S. at 167 (quoting
    Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
    572 U.S. 118
    , 125–26 (2014)). We need not weigh in on this issue though,
    because, as we will explain, the plaintiffs here have satisfied
    the fitness and hardship prongs. See 
    id.
    – 24 –
    challenge depends upon facts that may not yet be sufficiently
    developed,"    while   hardship   "typically    turns      upon   whether   the
    challenged action creates a direct and immediate dilemma for the
    parties."     R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, 
    199 F.3d at 33
     (quoting Ernst
    & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 
    45 F.3d 530
    , 535 (1st
    Cir. 1995)).    In the pre-enforcement context, a party's "concrete
    plans   to   engage    immediately   (or    nearly   so)    in    an   arguably
    proscribed activity" gives a "precise shape to disobedience" and
    provides a "specific legal question fit for judicial review," and
    a showing that a "challenged statute, fairly read, thwarts" those
    plans can demonstrate hardship.       
    Id.
    Having maintained in its January memorandum that its
    temporary discretionary forbearance is not "a safe harbor for
    violations of the Wire Act," the government now argues that this
    case was unripe when filed and that the April 2019 Memo confirmed
    it.     We disagree.      As we have explained above, there is a
    "substantial controversy" over the meaning of the Wire Act, as it
    applies to the plaintiffs, "of sufficient immediacy and reality" --
    prompted by DOJ's decision to seek reversal of OLC's 2011 position
    on the Wire Act and to adopt in full the 2018 Opinion -- "to
    warrant the issuance of the judicial relief sought."               Reddy, 845
    F.3d at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lab. Rels.
    – 25 –
    Div. of Constr. Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Healey, 
    844 F.3d 318
    , 326
    (1st Cir. 2016)).
    New Hampshire and its vendors should not have to operate
    under    a   dangling   sword   of   indictment    while   DOJ   purports   to
    deliberate without end the purely legal question it had apparently
    already answered and concerning which it offers no reason to expect
    an answer favorable to the plaintiffs.            According to NeoPollard's
    affidavit, it would be impossible for it to comply with the plain
    language of the 2018 Opinion without entirely shutting down the
    NHLC's iLottery platform.        Given the unequivocal position in the
    2018 Opinion, and the pre-2011 response given by DOJ to inquiring
    states, we cannot see why the plaintiffs should be forced to sit
    like Damocles while the government draws out its reconsideration.
    See Hemp Council, 
    203 F.3d at
    5–6.
    3.
    Finally, we agree with the district court that the April
    2019 Memo did not moot the case.            See N.H. Lottery Comm'n, 386 F.
    Supp. 3d at 143.         The April 2019 Memo does not rescind the
    government's adoption of the 2018 Opinion, nor does it offer the
    plaintiffs solace that the credible threat of prosecution has
    subsided.9     DOJ is explicit that the forbearance period is not a
    9  Citing Anderson v. Green, 
    513 U.S. 557
    , 559 (1995) (per
    curiam), the government frames the issue as one primarily about
    – 26 –
    "safe harbor for violations of the Wire Act," but merely an
    "internal exercise of prosecutorial discretion."                 January 2019
    Memo; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
    461 U.S. 95
    , 101
    (1983); R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, 
    199 F.3d at 36
     ("[T]he only thing
    standing in the way of a criminal prosecution is the State's
    litigation   position     that    it     will   voluntarily     refrain   from
    enforcing the statute according to its plain language." (quoting
    N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 
    168 F.3d 705
    , 711 (4th Cir.
    1999))); 
    id.
     ("[T]he only practical way for the Attorney General
    to assuage a reasonable fear of prosecution would be to disclaim,
    in   categorical        terms,         any   intent    to       enforce    the
    prohibition . . . .").           The     government   refuses     to   disavow
    prosecuting state lotteries and their vendors for the conduct they
    currently engage in.
    ripeness as opposed to mootness. The government argues that the
    district court only considered the April 2019 Memo as to mootness
    and not as to ripeness, which the government says was improper
    since it maintains that there was never a credible threat of
    enforcement of section 1084(a) against the plaintiffs (and
    therefore nothing to moot). Whatever one makes of this argument,
    the district court did consider the April 2019 Memo as to standing,
    which it noted overlaps with ripeness in the pre-enforcement
    context. N.H. Lottery Comm'n, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 141 n.5, 143.
    We have made similar observations, and, having already detailed
    why there was a credible threat of prosecution against the
    plaintiffs, we see no need to entertain this argument further.
    – 27 –
    For    the    foregoing    reasons,    we   find   the    plaintiffs'
    pre-enforcement challenge justiciable and turn next to the merits
    and the relief granted.
    B.
    Both    NHLC    and   NeoPollard      brought   claims     under   the
    Declaratory Judgment Act and the APA.                Because we conclude that
    the plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief, we focus first
    on that claim before briefly addressing the disposition of the APA
    claim.
    1.
    The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "[i]n a case
    of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of
    the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal
    relations    of     any    interested    party     seeking   such     declaration,
    whether or not further relief is or could be sought."                   
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
    .     "In Declaratory Judgment Act cases where jurisdiction is
    exercised based on a threat of future injury," as here, "the
    potential injury is typically legal liability on a set of already
    defined facts, so that the Act merely 'defin[es] procedure' to
    enable judicial resolution of a case or controversy that might
    otherwise be adjudicated at a different time or in a slightly
    different form."          In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 
    916 F.3d 98
    , 112 (1st Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting
    – 28 –
    Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Haworth, 
    300 U.S. 227
    , 240
    (1937)).   Having already explained why the current controversy is
    justiciable, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's
    willingness to entertain and resolve this controversy.        So we
    pivot to the merits of that controversy, which turn entirely on a
    question of statutory interpretation, calling for our de novo
    review.    See Hernández-Miranda v. Empresas Díaz Massó, Inc., 
    651 F.3d 167
    , 170 (1st Cir. 2011).
    2.
    The parties invite us to view the text of the Wire Act
    as having two key clauses, each defining two prohibited uses of
    wire communication facilities:
    Clause One
    The transmission in interstate or foreign
    commerce of bets or wagers or information
    assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on
    any sporting event or contest (emphasis
    added).
    Clause Two
    The transmission of a wire communication which
    entitles the recipient to receive money or
    credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
    information assisting in the placing of bets
    or wagers.
    The parties' disagreement trains on how broadly to apply
    the prepositional phrase "on any sporting event or contest" that
    appears at the end of Clause One.     The government argues that the
    – 29 –
    phrase qualifies only the second use of "bets or wagers" in
    Clause One.    The plaintiffs contend that the phrase qualifies both
    uses of "bets or wagers" in Clause One, and that the term "bets or
    wagers" as used in Clause Two is shorthand for that qualified
    meaning in Clause One.
    "[T]he plain meaning of a statute's text must be given
    effect," though "[w]e focus on 'the plain meaning of the whole
    statute, not of isolated sentences'" or phrases.            Colón-Marrero
    v. Vélez, 
    813 F.3d 1
    , 11 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Arnold v. United
    Parcel Serv., Inc., 
    136 F.3d 854
    , 858 (1st Cir. 1998)).          Words in
    a statute are not islands but "must be read in their context and
    with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme."           Food
    & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
    529 U.S. 120
    ,
    133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 
    489 U.S. 803
    , 809 (1989)).
    Each party argues that application of its preferred
    canon of construction requires its desired result.          The government
    supports its position for a limited application of the sports-
    gambling   qualifier   by   reference    to   the   "rule   of   the   last
    antecedent."     "The rule provides that 'a limiting clause or
    phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun
    or phrase that it immediately follows.'"            Lockhart v. United
    States, 
    136 S. Ct. 958
    , 962 (2016) (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas,
    – 30 –
    
    540 U.S. 20
    , 26 (2003)); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
    Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 144 (2012); Jama v.
    Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 
    543 U.S. 335
    , 342–43 (2005) (invoking the
    last antecedent rule to prevent "stretch[ing] the modifier too
    far" to apply to other numbered clauses within a subparagraph).
    But see 2A Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland on Statutes
    and Statutory Construction § 47:33 (7th ed. 2020) ("[W]here the
    sense of an entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase
    apply   to   several     preceding   or   even   succeeding   sections,   the
    qualifying word or phrase is not restricted to its immediate
    antecedent.").      According to the government, because the sports-
    gambling qualifier only appears in Clause One, and even then only
    once, after the words "information assisting in the placing of
    bets or wagers," it is limited to qualifying "bets or wagers" in
    that one instance.
    This   is   certainly    a   plausible   proposition   in    the
    abstract.     But it does not end our inquiry.         The last antecedent
    rule is "not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other
    indicia of meaning."       Paroline v. United States, 
    572 U.S. 434
    , 447
    (2014) (quoting Barnhart, 
    540 U.S. at 26
    ); see also Cyan, Inc. v.
    Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 
    138 S. Ct. 1061
    , 1076–77 (2018)
    ("[W]e have not applied the rule when the modifier directly follows
    a concise and 'integrated' clause." (quoting Jama, 
    543 U.S. at
    344
    – 31 –
    n.4)); Buscaglia v. Bowie, 
    139 F.2d 294
    , 296 (1st Cir. 1943)
    (declining to apply the last antecedent rule where doing so would
    result in a construction "contrary to the natural or common sense
    meaning of the statute").          Indeed, even the government's position
    implicitly accepts the proposition that we should not apply the
    rule   "in   a   mechanical   way    where    it   would   require    accepting
    'unlikely premises.'"        Paroline, 572 U.S. at 447 (quoting United
    States v. Hayes, 
    555 U.S. 415
    , 425 (2009)).                Thus, for example,
    even the government concedes that, in the phrase "bets or wagers
    on any sporting event or contest," the sports-gambling qualifier
    applies not just to "wagers" (the actual last antecedent) but also
    to "bets."
    For their part, the plaintiffs put forth the series-
    qualifier canon to argue that "on any sporting event or contest"
    should not be read as so confined and instead applies to both
    prohibited transmissions in the first clause:                  "bets or wagers"
    and "information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers."
    § 1084(a).       According    to    the   plaintiffs,      a   natural   reading
    suggests that "on any sporting event or contest" is as applicable
    to the first reference to "bets or wagers" as it is to the second.
    See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 447 ("When several words are followed by
    a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words
    as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands
    – 32 –
    that the clause be read as applicable to all." (quoting Porto Rico
    Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 
    253 U.S. 345
    , 348 (1920))).10    From
    there, the plaintiffs posit that the statute's structure confirms
    that the term "bets or wagers" as used throughout section 1084
    means the same thing, i.e., "bets or wagers on any sporting event
    or contest."
    As the district court correctly concluded, the language
    and syntax of section 1084(a) "prevents the first clause from being
    a textbook application of either canon," and a third canon -- the
    punctuation canon -- fails to save the day.     N.H. Lottery Comm'n,
    386 F. Supp. 3d at 150; see also id. at 149–50 ("Punctuation in a
    legal text . . . will often determine whether a modifying phrase
    or clause applies to all that preceded it or only to a part."
    (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 161)).        The district court
    explained:
    10  The government's opening brief concedes that            the
    series-qualifier rule operates elsewhere in the statute:
    [I]n the phrase "sporting event or contest,"
    the word "'sporting' modifies both 'event' and
    'contest.'" Likewise, within Offense 2, the
    phrase "on any sporting event or contest"
    modifies both "bets" and "wagers" within the
    phrase: "assisting in the placing of bets or
    wagers on any sporting event or contest."
    See also 2011 Opinion at 150 n.11 (examining whether
    "sporting" modifies only "event" and not "contest" and concluding
    that it modifies both).
    – 33 –
    [A]   comma   before  the   conjunction   "or"
    separating the phrases "bets or wagers" and
    "information assisting in the placing of bets
    or wagers" would demonstrate that the rule of
    the last antecedent applies.          See 1A
    Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 21:15
    (comma separating two members of a list
    indicates they are to be treated separately
    rather than as a whole); cf. Lockhart, 
    136 S. Ct. at 962
     (applying rule of last antecedent
    to statute that had commas separating each
    antecedent). Without it, the appropriateness
    of the last antecedent canon is unclear.
    Conversely, a comma placed directly before the
    phrase "on any sporting event or contest"
    would confirm that the series-qualifier canon
    applies.    See 2A Sutherland on Statutory
    Construction § 47:33 ("A qualifying phrase
    separated from antecedents by a comma is
    evidence that the qualifier is supposed to
    apply to all the antecedents instead of only
    to the immediately preceding one.").
    Id. at 150; see Hayes, 
    555 U.S. at 423
     (explaining that imprecise
    punctuation did not counsel against the Court's decision to eschew
    the last antecedent rule).
    The   fact   that   the   text    of   Clause One   accommodates
    several possible readings does not mean that the statute entirely
    lacks clarity on the issue at hand.        To affirm the district court's
    reading of the statute, we would need to find, among other things,
    that Clause Two also can be read as limited to betting on sporting
    events or contests.
    – 34 –
    Clause Two    prohibits   the   transmission   of   a   wire
    communication that entitles the recipient to "receive money or
    credit" either "as a result of bets or wagers" or "for information
    assisting in the placing of bets or wagers."    
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
    (a).
    The government argues that even if the sports-gambling qualifier
    can be construed to apply to both prohibitions in Clause One,
    Clause Two is safe from the qualifier's reach because there is no
    reference to sporting events or contests within it and because
    Clause Two is "grammatically independent of the first clause."
    We have, however, what appears to be a clear example in
    this very statute of Congress using shorthand to carry over a
    phrase from Clause One to Clause Two, which may suggest a broader
    pattern of borrowing by shorthand.      The phrase "in interstate or
    foreign commerce" qualifies "transmission" in Clause One but is
    omitted from the text of Clause Two:
    Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or
    wagering knowingly uses a wire communication
    facility for the transmission in interstate or
    foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information
    assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any
    sporting event or contest, or for the transmission
    of a wire communication which entitles the
    recipient to receive money or credit as a result of
    bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the
    placing of bets or wagers . . . .
    
    Id.
     (emphases added).   Few though -- and certainly not this court
    -- would hesitate to find that Clause Two's "transmission" is
    shorthand for "transmission in interstate or foreign commerce."
    – 35 –
    To read the statute otherwise would be to presume that Congress
    understandably did not seek to prohibit use of the wires for
    intrastate bets yet inexplicably sought to prohibit intrastate
    activities necessary to such betting.
    The government's only counter to this conclusion is that
    Congress may have eliminated the interstate commerce qualifier in
    Clause Two since that clause "more clearly" relates to economic
    activity, making the phrase unnecessary to ensure the statute's
    constitutionality.        This argument, to put it mildly, gives the
    statute a "curious reach."           United States v. Bass, 
    404 U.S. 336
    ,
    340 (1971) (finding the phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce"
    to apply beyond its nearest antecedent to all versions of the
    offenses listed).         Accepting it would require us to think that
    Congress doubted that placing a bet was commerce that it could
    regulate,     yet   was    certain    that     an   intrastate    communication
    entitling a bettor to be paid was commerce that Congress could
    regulate.     We think it much more likely, indeed obvious, that
    Congress intended the term "transmission" in Clause Two to be
    shorthand for the "transmission in interstate or foreign commerce"
    described in Clause One.          And that makes it more plausible that
    the   same   drafters     could   have   intended      "bets     or   wagers"   in
    Clause Two to be a reference to the "bets or wagers on any sporting
    event or contest" described in Clause One.
    – 36 –
    The government nevertheless maintains that, even if
    Congress    intended     the    interstate-commerce          qualifier      to   apply
    throughout section 1084(a), that intention is of limited relevance
    to the sports-gambling qualifier because the two are "not parallel
    phrases."        The government emphasizes that, even assuming the
    interstate-commerce       qualifier         is   jurisdictional,      the     sports-
    gambling qualifier is not and therefore the rationale for carrying
    over that phrase is weaker.            But our point here does not turn on
    the particular rationale for finding that Congress must have
    intended Clause Two to apply only to interstate transmissions.
    The point instead is that Congress implemented that intent with
    language that relies on an understanding of at least one Clause Two
    term as a shorthand reference to a more fully described and
    qualified    Clause One        term.        In   short,    Congress's      consistent
    syntactic approach anticipated that a term, which is explicitly
    qualified in one instance, could be read as similarly qualified in
    other instances, at least where necessary to avoid odd and unlikely
    results.    Cf. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
    United States ex rel. Wilson, 
    545 U.S. 409
    , 418 (2005) (finding
    evidence that Congress used a term "imprecisely" in one subsection
    to reflect term's meaning in another).
    So    we   turn    next    to    another      principle   of    statutory
    construction:      We do indeed prefer "the most natural reading" of
    – 37 –
    a statute, one that "harmonizes the various provisions in [it] and
    avoids     the    oddities       that    [a   contrary]       interpretation    would
    create."     Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 
    139 S. Ct. 1048
    , 1057,
    1060 (2019); see also Lockhart, 
    136 S. Ct. at 965
     ("This Court has
    long   acknowledged           that   structural    or    contextual      evidence   may
    'rebut the last antecedent inference.'" (quoting Jama, 
    543 U.S. at
    344 n.4)).       Indeed, we have previously noted section 1084(a)'s use
    of "somewhat imprecise, conversational, language" and rejected a
    construction       of    it     that    "would    lead   to    totally    impractical
    results."     Sagansky v. United States, 
    358 F.2d 195
    , 201 (1st Cir.
    1966).      Here,       the    government's      impractical     interpretation     of
    section 1084 must give way to the plaintiffs' more natural reading.
    The government's reading poses unharmonious oddities at
    two levels.         Take first Clause One.                Under the government's
    reading, anyone can transmit over the wires information assisting
    someone in placing a bet or wager over the wires on a non-sporting
    event, but the person receiving the assistance commits a crime if
    he then places the bet or wager.                 In short, there is no congruity
    between the two prohibitions in Clause One under the government's
    reading.     Conversely, if we read "on any sporting event or contest"
    as qualifying both antecedents, harmony is restored:                       You cannot
    use the wires to place a bet or wager on a sporting event, and you
    – 38 –
    cannot use the wires to send information assisting in placing that
    bet or wager.
    The government struggles to imagine some reason why
    Congress would have opted for the asymmetry of broadly barring the
    placing of bets or wagers while only narrowly barring assistance
    in placing bets or wagers.       The government goes so far as to hazard
    that maybe information on how to place a bet or wager on a sporting
    event is more important to placing the bet or wager.         How that is
    so (e.g., how one needs more assistance to bet on an NFL game than
    on the Oscars) the government does not say.           Instead, it rather
    obscurely     references   "speech-related"      concerns,       implicitly
    suggesting that gambling on a basketball game raises fewer "speech-
    related" issues than gambling on whether it will snow on Christmas.
    That the government posits such strained explanations in order to
    make sense out of its reading tells much.
    But, says the government, even if it would strain common
    sense   not   to   apply   the    sports-gambling    qualifier    to   both
    antecedents in Clause One, there is no reason to carry it down to
    Clause Two.     That brings us to the second level of oddity posed
    by the government's reading of the statute:         a lack of parallelism
    between Clause One and Clause Two.          If Clause One is limited to
    sports betting (i.e., if it does not prohibit placing a bet on a
    lottery outcome), why in the world would Congress in the very next
    – 39 –
    clause outlaw telling the winning lottery participant that he is
    entitled to payment?     Or to pay someone to assist lottery bettors?
    The plaintiffs' reading (and the 2011 OLC reading) avoids any need
    to answer such questions.       Rather, reading the entire subsection
    as related to sports gambling, each prohibition "serve[s] the same
    end, forbidding wagering, information, and winnings transmissions
    of the same scope."     2011 Opinion at 144.         The sensible result is:
    No person may send a wire communication that
    places a bet on a sporting event or entitles
    the sender to receive money or credit as a
    result of a sports-related bet, and no person
    may send a wire communication that shares
    information assisting in the placing of a
    sports-related bet or entitles the sender to
    money or credit for sharing information that
    assisted in the placing of a sports-related
    bet.
    
    Id.
    The    lack   of   coherence   in    the   government's   proposed
    reading becomes even more apparent when we return to the text and
    consider the rest of section 1084.         Section 1084(b) exempts from
    liability transmissions "for use in news reporting of sporting
    events or contests," and "transmission[s] of information assisting
    in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest
    from a State or foreign country where betting on that sporting
    event or contest is legal into [one] in which such betting is
    [also] legal."    
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
    (b).        Were the government correct,
    this exemption's exclusive focus on sporting events would seem
    – 40 –
    odd.   Why, for example, is there no exception for news reporting
    on other events upon which people might bet?            The government offers
    no   reason    to   explain   such    a   distinction.         Conversely,   this
    question does not even arise if one reads section 1084(a) as
    limited to wagers and bets on sporting events and contests.
    The   government   instead       argues   that    section 1084(b)
    supports its position because Congress repeated a sports-gambling
    qualifier three times in section 1084(b), but only included the
    qualifier once in section 1084(a).             Thus, reasons the government,
    Congress clearly intended a difference in meaning.                      See 
    id.
    (excluding "transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of
    information for use in news reporting of sporting events or
    contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the
    placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a
    State or foreign country where betting on that sporting event or
    contest is legal" (emphases added)).            Furthermore, the government
    argues, had the scope of section 1084(a) been restricted to sports
    gambling,     the   inclusion    of   the   sports-gambling       qualifiers   in
    section 1084(b) would have been superfluous.
    We agree with the government's premise that we should
    "presume[] that Congress intended a difference in meaning" when it
    "includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
    it in another."       Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct.
    – 41 –
    767, 777 (2018) (quoting Loughrin v. United States, 
    573 U.S. 351
    ,
    358 (2014)).        But that presumption carries little force when the
    text   itself     offers    a   ready    syntactic     explanation   for   using
    different language in different sections.               As the district court
    explained, unlike the consistent use of a single term ("bets or
    wagers")    in    section 1084(a),       section 1084(b)    employs    "diverse
    phrases [that] are not susceptible to an abridged reference,"
    thereby "requir[ing] that the modifier be repeated."             N.H. Lottery
    Comm'n, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 154.             Section 1084(b) refers to "news
    reporting of sporting events or contests," "bets or wagers on a
    sporting event or contest," and "betting on that sporting event or
    contest."     § 1084(b) (emphases added).            "[T]he varied syntax of
    each item in the list makes it hard for the reader to carry
    the . . . modifying clause across all three."                Lockhart, 
    136 S. Ct. at 963
    .
    Even    less   convincing      is   the    government's    broader
    argument that if the sports-gambling qualifier truly applied to
    all prohibitions of section 1084(a), then any reference to sports
    gambling in section 1084(b) would be superfluous.              The government
    does not explain how one could avoid reference to sports gambling
    in section 1084(b) altogether.              We struggle to imagine a way
    ourselves.       Such a task seems especially difficult when part of
    section 1084(b) permits the transmission of information which
    – 42 –
    assists betting on a sporting event or contest but only where
    "betting on that sporting event or contest" is legal.      § 1084(b)
    (emphasis added).     In any event, while avoiding surplusage is
    definitely preferred, "avoid[ing] surplusage at all costs" is not,
    particularly where, as is the case here, syntax offers a good
    reason for why the qualifier was repeated in section 1084(b) (and
    we can't say we mind the added clarity).   See Lockhart, 
    136 S. Ct. at 966
     (quoting United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 
    551 U.S. 128
    ,
    137 (2007)).
    The government offers a couple of other reasons why we
    should prefer its reading over the plaintiffs'.           Neither is
    persuasive.     The government states that it is "difficult to
    credit" that Congress employed a shorthand when referring to "bets
    or wagers."    It proposes obvious alternatives Congress might have
    used to more clearly express that "on any sporting event or
    contest" applied to each reference to "bets or wagers."   Of course,
    we agree that there are many ways to improve the clarity of
    section 1084(a), but that is true of most statutes.        Bass, 
    404 U.S. at 344
     ("[W]e cannot pretend that all statutes are model
    statutes.").
    Finally, the government points to Kellogg Brown & Root
    Services, Inc. v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 1970
     (2015), as support
    for rejecting a consistent reading of "bets or wagers" throughout
    – 43 –
    section 1084(a).      There,   the    Court   rejected    the   petitioners'
    argument to depart from the ordinary meaning of the term "pending"
    as used in the False Claims Act, and to instead construe the word
    as shorthand for "first-filed."        Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 
    135 S. Ct. at
    1978–79; see also 
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b)(5) ("When a person
    brings an action . . . no person other than the Government may
    intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying
    the pending action." (emphasis added)).             The Court pointed out
    that a shorthand term typically provides an expedient way to
    express "a lengthy or complex formulation" and "first-filed" is
    "neither lengthy nor complex."        Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 
    135 S. Ct. at 1979
    .    Presaging our focus on avoiding odd and unlikely
    readings, the Court found that a reading applying the shorthand
    "would lead to strange results that Congress is unlikely to have
    wanted" and that the proposed definition "d[id] not comport with
    any known usage of the term 'pending.'"          
    Id.
         Here, by contrast,
    "bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest" is a lengthier
    term more readily calling for use of a shorthand reference.               And,
    more importantly, reading section 1084(a) as employing such a
    reference   avoids,   rather   than   creates,      "strange    results   that
    Congress is unlikely to have wanted."         
    Id.
    – 44 –
    3.
    As the foregoing discussion explains, we find the text
    of section 1084 not entirely clear on the matter at hand, and we
    find that the government's resolution of the Wire Act's ambiguity
    would lead to odd and seemingly inexplicable results.            Under the
    government's view, either Congress outlawed lottery betting over
    the   wires    while   simultaneously    allowing   lotteries   to   provide
    assistance over the wires in placing lottery bets, or Congress
    allowed lottery betting over the wires while outlawing use of the
    wires to tell the winner the results of his bet.            Of course, if
    Congress clearly enacted such an oddly designed statute, we would
    have a different case.       But the ambiguity we have discussed does
    not provide sufficient comfort that Congress intended such a
    dubious result.
    The legislative history provides further support for our
    judgment that Congress likely did not intend the strange results
    inherent in the government's reading.          In fact, the legislative
    history contains strong indications that Congress did indeed train
    its efforts solely on sports gambling.         The statute as originally
    presented to Congress plainly aimed only at sports gambling.            The
    language then contained only one clause, and it used commas to
    clearly indicate its focus on sports gambling.          See S. 1656, 87th
    Cong. § 2 (Apr. 18, 1961) ("the transmission in interstate or
    – 45 –
    foreign commerce of bets or wagers, or information assisting in
    the placing of bets or wagers, on any sporting event or contest");
    The    Attorney   General's    Program   to   Curb   Organized   Crime   and
    Racketeering: Hearings on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1655, S. 1656,
    S. 1657, S. 1658, S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
    87th Cong. 277-79 (1961) (statement of Herbert Miller, Assistant
    Att'y Gen., Crim. Div.) ("This bill, of course, would not cover
    [gambling on other than a sporting event or contest] because it is
    limited to sporting events or contests."); see also 2011 Opinion
    at 141–47.    The government argues that Congress broadened its aim
    beyond sports gambling when the original draft was amended, most
    particularly when the commas bracketing the words "or information
    assisting in the placing of bets or wages" disappeared.             But as
    the district court explained, the absence of both commas merely
    created an ambiguity.         N.H. Lottery Comm'n, 386 F. Supp. 3d at
    150.    The Senate report describing the amendments offered no hint
    that a major change was made or intended.        See S. Rep. No. 87-588,
    at 1-2 (1961); cf. City of Chicago v. Fulton, No. 19-357, 
    2021 WL 125106
    , at *4 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2021) (stating that "it would have
    been odd for Congress to accomplish [an important change to a
    statute] by simply adding" a short phrase that did "not naturally
    comprehend" the suggested new meaning); Kellogg Brown & Root
    Servs., 
    135 S. Ct. at 1977
     ("Fundamental changes in the scope of
    – 46 –
    a statute are not typically accomplished with so subtle a move.").
    And there is nothing in any of the committee reports to suggest
    any reason at all for the inconsistent scope of the prohibitions
    that the government's present position would require us to assume.
    Such "silence in the legislative history . . . cannot defeat the
    better   reading   of   the   text    and     statutory   context."     Encino
    Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 
    138 S. Ct. 1134
    , 1143 (2018).
    4.
    We come to the end of our analysis.              The text of the
    Wire Act is not so clear as to dictate in favor of either party's
    view.    The government's reading of the statute, however, would
    most certainly create an odd and unharmonious piece of criminal
    legislation.   Neither common sense nor the legislative history
    suggests that Congress likely intended such a result.                 Like the
    Fifth Circuit, and the district court in this case, we therefore
    hold that the prohibitions of section 1084(a) apply only to the
    interstate transmission of wire communications related to any
    "sporting event or contest."
    C.
    We now turn to the relief granted by the district court.
    By way of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the district court declared
    "that § 1084(a) of the Wire Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
    (a), applies only
    to transmissions related to bets or wagers on a sporting event or
    – 47 –
    contest."     N.H. Lottery Comm'n, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 160.                     The
    district court specified that the declaration "binds the United
    States     vis-à-vis   NeoPollard    and     the    [NHLC]        everywhere   the
    plaintiffs operate or would be otherwise subject to prosecution."
    Id. at 158.       Neither party contests the scope of the district
    court's declaration, and we agree that it is "responsive to the
    pleadings and issues presented."          Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 
    451 F.3d 13
    , 42 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
    Co. v. Lawson Bros. Iron Works, 
    428 F.2d 929
    , 931 (10th Cir.
    1970)).
    The     government   urges     the     court   to      exercise    its
    discretion to withhold declaratory relief for many of the same
    reasons it argues the case is non-justiciable.                    Having already
    rejected    these    arguments   above,    we    decline     to    do   so.    See
    MedImmune, 
    549 U.S. at 129
     ("The dilemma posed by that coercion -
    - putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his
    rights or risking prosecution -- is 'a dilemma that it was the
    very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate.'"
    (quoting Abbott Lab'ys v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 152 (1967))).
    The district court also granted the plaintiffs relief
    under the APA.       While actions under the Declaratory Judgment Act
    and the APA can be maintained together, see Abbott Lab'ys, 
    387 U.S. at 153
    ; Bos. Redev. Auth. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 
    838 F.3d 42
    ,
    – 48 –
    48 (1st Cir. 2016), we find it unnecessary here to determine
    whether to "hold unlawful and set aside [an] agency action,"
    
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2), where the remedy provided by the Declaratory
    Judgment Act is adequate under the circumstances, see 
    id.
     § 704
    (providing for judicial review of "final agency action for which
    there is no other adequate remedy in a court" (emphasis added)).11
    Therefore, we vacate the district court's order only to the extent
    that it grants relief under the APA.
    III.
    In conclusion, we find that the plaintiffs' claims are
    justiciable and that the Wire Act applies only to interstate wire
    communications related to sporting events or contests.           Therefore,
    we affirm the district court's grant of the plaintiffs' motions
    for summary judgment and its denial of the government's motion to
    dismiss    and   motion   for     summary    judgment,   but,   given     that
    declaratory      relief   under    the   Declaratory     Judgment   Act     is
    sufficient, we vacate the district court's grant of relief under
    the APA.   Costs are awarded in favor of the appellees.
    11  Recognizing that relief under the Declaratory Judgment
    Act is discretionary, we make no comment on whether the statute
    would provide an "other adequate remedy" if the district court had
    declined to grant relief under it.
    – 49 –