United States v. Perez ( 2020 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1950
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANDRES PEREZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Daniel J. Cloherty, by appointment of the Court, with whom
Maria Davis and Todd & Weld LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief,
for appellee.
October 9, 2020
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Andres Perez,
appeals from the district court's denial of a motion to suppress
drug evidence which was seized without a warrant as a result of an
automobile stop and drug evidence from a subsequent visual body
cavity search conducted at the Revere police station. The
defendant argues that the police officers lacked reasonable
suspicion to perform the initial stop of his vehicle and the
requisite level of suspicion to perform the visual body cavity
search of his person and so violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We
hold that the facts establish that the police had reasonable
suspicion to perform the automobile stop and particularized
reasonable suspicion to perform the visual body cavity search. We
affirm.
I.
A. Facts
On the morning of October 31, 2017, Lieutenant Maria
Lavita and Detective Douglas Zingali of the Revere Police
Department were driving in an unmarked police cruiser through
Revere, Massachusetts. Lt. Lavita had twenty-two years of
experience with the Revere Police Department, including experience
with drug distribution crimes and undercover drug buys during her
years as a detective. She was also the head of the Criminal
Investigation Division at the Revere Police Department, which
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included the drug crime unit. Det. Zingali had twenty-one years
of experience with the Revere Police Department, including six
years as a detective.
As the officers were driving south on a residential
street near Route 1A, they observed a white male pacing back and
forth along the street and talking on a cell phone. The officers'
attention was drawn to the unidentified man because they believed
he was inappropriately dressed in shorts and a T-shirt given the
cool weather and time of year. The officers testified that the
man appeared agitated and kept looking down the side streets as
though he was waiting for somebody or giving directions.
The officers observed the man turn hurriedly onto one of
the side streets. They saw the man lean into the passenger side
window of a parked brown Mercedes for no more than fifteen seconds
and then walk away. The officers could not see whether anything
was exchanged between the man and the vehicle's occupants, nor
could they see anything in the man's hands as he walked away from
the Mercedes. But based on their training and experience, the
officers believed that a street-level drug transaction had just
transpired.
The Mercedes immediately drove off as the man walked
away and the officers decided to follow the vehicle. As the
officers followed in their unmarked cruiser, the Mercedes made a
series of turns onto various streets until the vehicle had
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basically traveled in a circle. This unusual route, together with
the vehicle's strict adherence to the motor vehicle laws, led the
officers to believe that the driver of the Mercedes was aware that
he was being followed by police. The officers activated their
lights and sirens and the Mercedes pulled over into a residential
driveway.
The officers parked behind the Mercedes and got out of
the cruiser. As they approached the Mercedes, the officers saw
the driver and passenger exchange cell phones in the vehicle. Det.
Zingali approached the driver's side and asked the driver for his
license and registration, while Lt. Lavita approached the
passenger's side to speak to the passenger. The driver, who
identified himself as Andres Perez, provided the vehicle
registration and stated that he did not have his license with him.
Det. Zingali asked Perez why he had pulled into the driveway, and
Perez answered that he was visiting a friend at that house and
provided a name for the "friend."
The officers radioed the dispatch center to request the
status of Perez's license and registration. The dispatch center
informed them that Perez's license had been revoked. The officers
called for a marked police cruiser to place Perez under arrest for
operating after revocation. When the marked cruiser arrived, Det.
Zingali ordered Perez out of the Mercedes and Det. Zingali
conducted a pat frisk of Perez. Det. Zingali discovered some money
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and other items but found no weapons or drugs from the pat frisk.
As that was happening, the passenger, Cesar Alicea, suddenly jumped
out of the passenger side of the vehicle and fled. Lt. Lavita and
one of the officers who had arrived in the marked cruiser pursued
Alicea on foot while Det. Zingali handcuffed Perez and placed him
in the back of the marked cruiser. As they were running, the
backup officer saw Alicea reach into his waistband and toss an
object over a fence into a residential backyard. The officer
placed Alicea under arrest.
Detective Lieutenant Robert Impemba arrived to help the
officers search for the object that Alicea had thrown over the
fence. Lt. Impemba was a supervisor of the Narcotics and Gang
Unit of the Revere Police Department and was also a task force
officer assigned to the FBI North Shore Gang Task Force, with about
ten years of experience in gang and drug investigations. Lt.
Impemba recovered a loaded semiautomatic firearm and ammunition
from a garden in one of the yards near where Alicea had thrown the
object. The condition of the soil and the gun indicated that the
gun had not been there very long.
After Alicea had been arrested and the firearm
recovered, the other officers returned to the Mercedes. Lt.
Impemba saw Perez in the back of the marked cruiser and recognized
him from a previous drug investigation. Lt. Impemba had arrested
Perez for distribution of crack cocaine and heroin after undercover
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purchases had been made from him on numerous occasions. Lt.
Impemba also knew Perez to be an affiliate of the drug-distributing
East Side Money Gang out of Chelsea, Massachusetts.
Perez and Alicea were transported to the Revere police
station for booking while Lt. Lavita and Det. Zingali awaited the
arrival of a K-9 narcotics dog to search the Mercedes for evidence
of drug distribution. During that vehicle search, the officers
recovered a small, clear plastic baggie containing a white, rock-
like substance from the floor between the driver's side door and
seat. The officers believed the white substance to be crack
cocaine. Lt. Impemba testified that, based on the single
distribution-size baggie recovered from the vehicle and his
experience, Perez likely would have been carrying numerous baggies
packaged for distribution. The parties agree that three cell
phones were also recovered during the search of the vehicle. The
officers discovered a revoked license plate in the trunk of the
Mercedes.
Lt. Impemba booked Perez at the Revere police station
with Det. Zingali and one other uniformed officer present. During
the booking process, $269 in various denominations were removed
from Perez's pocket. Lt. Impemba testified that the amount of
money in various denominations was consistent with street-level
drug distribution. Lt. Impemba informed Det. Zingali of Perez's
arrest history for narcotics distribution. Based on the
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information that Perez was a known drug dealer, Det. Zingali's
belief that he and Lt. Lavita had witnessed a drug transaction,
the single small baggie of suspected drugs found on the driver's
side of the Mercedes in between the driver's seat and door, the
money found on Perez, the fact that no other drugs were discovered
from the pat down of Perez, and their experience and training, Lt.
Impemba and Det. Zingali concluded that Perez was likely concealing
more drugs on his body. They decided that a strip search and a
visual body cavity search were necessary to recover those drugs.
Perez was instructed to pull down his pants and underwear
and to bend over at the waist. After initial hesitation, Perez
bent over and Det. Zingali lowered himself and looked up towards
Perez's buttocks. Det. Zingali saw a clear plastic baggie
protruding from between Perez's buttocks and removed the baggie
with a gloved hand. The plastic bag was found to contain ten
smaller plastic baggies of crack cocaine and three smaller plastic
baggies of heroin. The strip search and visual body cavity search
were not performed pursuant to a standard written policy of the
Revere Police Department.
B. Procedural History
Perez was indicted on one count of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
On July 11, 2018, Perez filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained from the warrantless stop and search of the Mercedes and
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the warrantless strip search and visual body cavity search. The
district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on October
31, 2018, and issued a memorandum and order denying that motion on
January 11, 2019. United States v. Perez, Criminal Action No. 17-
10391-RGS, 2019 WL 181283, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 2019).
The district court held that, based on the officers'
observations and experience, they had reasonable suspicion to
conduct the initial stop of Perez's vehicle. Id. at *4.
Specifically, the court found that the following observations
reasonably supported an inference that a drug transaction had taken
place: (1) "an agitated man inappropriately dressed for the weather
pacing on a public street while speaking on a cellular phone"; (2)
that same man "after several minutes of pacing and talking, walked
around the street corner where he approached a Mercedes vehicle
idling in the middle of the street, having come from the direction
of Route 1A"; (3) "th[at] man then leaned into the passenger window
for 10 or 15 seconds and then walked away"; and (4) " the unusual
and circuitous route that the Mercedes took while driving away
from the scene, a route that an experienced officer would have
recognized as consistent with counter surveillance and/or an
attempt to evade police." Id. The court also held that Perez's
arrest and the search of the Mercedes were lawful. Id. at *4-5.
With respect to the strip and visual body cavity
searches, the district court first cited Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
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520 (1979), for the proposition that "[s]earches of persons jailed
after arrest, including strip searches and visual body cavity
searches, may be conducted with less than probable cause if the
search is reasonable in scope, manner, and purpose." Perez, 2019
WL 181283, at *4 (emphasis added) (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
558-60). Neither party had cited Wolfish for that precise
proposition in their briefs to the district court. The district
court then cited our decision in Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 1997), for the proposition that to be reasonable under
Wolfish, "strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified
by at least a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing
contraband or weapons." Perez, 2019 WL 181283, at *4 (quoting
Swain, 117 F.3d at 7).
Ultimately, the district court held that
[t]he search of Perez incident to booking was
lawful, including the strip and visual body
cavity search of his person . . . [because]
[a] detainee who is jailed pursuant to a valid
arrest, regardless of the nature or degree of
the crime, may be subjected to a visual body
cavity search on reasonable suspicion (or
less).
Id. at *5 (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S.
318, 336-38 (2012)). The district court cited this rule even
though neither party had cited Florence to the court and the
government had never argued that a standard less than
particularized reasonable suspicion should apply. Rather, the
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government had argued only that the booking officers had
particularized reasonable suspicion to justify the search.
Perez entered a conditional plea agreement, reserving
his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion
to suppress, and he was sentenced to seventy-two months'
imprisonment. He timely appealed.
II.
On appeal, Perez challenges only whether the officers
had reasonable suspicion to perform the automobile stop and
particularized reasonable suspicion to perform the visual body
cavity search. He does not assert that the search of his vehicle,
once stopped, was unlawful or that the scope or manner of the
visual body cavity search was overly intrusive.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we
evaluate legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear
error. United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 819-20 (1st Cir.
2011). We assess the record evidence in the light most favorable
to the suppression ruling. United States v. Arnott, 758 F.3d 40,
43 (1st Cir. 2014). We need not rely solely on the district
court's reasoning and may affirm a suppression ruling on any basis
apparent in the record. Id.; see also United States v. Adams, 971
F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2020) ("[W]e construe the record in the light
most congenial to the district court's ruling and will affirm the
court's denial of a suppression motion 'as long as that denial is
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supported by any particularized and objectively reasonable view of
the evidence.'" (quoting United States v. Tanguay, 811 F.3d 78, 81
(1st Cir. 2016))).
A. The Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Perez's Vehicle
Perez argues that Lt. Lavita and Det. Zingali may have
had a "hunch" that criminal activity had taken place, but that
they lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Perez's
vehicle. A police officer can conduct a brief investigatory stop
of a person or vehicle where the officer has a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002). A reviewing court must consider the
"totality of the circumstances" in determining whether the officer
had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal
activity, which may include inferences drawn from the officer's
specialized training and experience. Id.; see also United States
v. Dubose, 579 F.3d 117, 121-22 (1st Cir. 2009).
We agree that the officers' observations of the
activities of both the man and the Mercedes and its passengers
justified the stop of Perez's vehicle. Lt. Lavita and Det. Zingali
observed a man inappropriately dressed for the weather pacing back
and forth and looking up and down various streets while on a cell
phone, before finally rushing towards an arriving vehicle. Those
observations could support an inference that this was a planned
meeting. That, together with the nature of the man's brief
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interaction with the occupants of the Mercedes, could reasonably
have led Lt. Lavita and Det. Zingali, who both had extensive
training and experience in narcotics distribution, to conclude
that a street-level drug transaction had just occurred. See
Dubose, 579 F.3d at 121-22 (finding reasonable suspicion of a drug
transaction based on the brief nature of the interaction between
the defendant and the occupants of the vehicle, the fact that the
defendant leaned his body into the vehicle during the interaction,
the fact that the defendant's conduct was similar to conduct in
other drug transactions in the area, and the expertise of the
observing officer); United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 112
(1st Cir. 1987).
The officers' reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
was further supported by the strange and circuitous route the
Mercedes took once the unmarked cruiser began to follow, which
reasonably led Lt. Lavita and Det. Zingali to believe that the
driver was attempting to evade police surveillance. See Florida
v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (stating that the defendant's
"strange movements in his attempt to evade the officers [inside
the airport] aroused further justifiable suspicion" for the stop);
United States v. Vargas, 633 F.2d 891, 893, 895-96 (1st Cir. 1980)
(finding reasonable suspicion to justify an automobile stop based,
in part, on the vehicle's "seemingly evasive driving pattern").
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B. The Officers Had Particularized Reasonable Suspicion to
Conduct the Visual Body Cavity Search
Perez also argues that the district court erred in
finding that the visual body cavity search was permissible. Perez
argues that the district court erred in applying the Supreme
Court's decision in Florence to the context of an arrestee being
booked in a police station.1 See 566 U.S. at 325, 333-34, 338;
see also Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-60.
This case was never presented to the district court as
one involving the rule of Florence and Wolfish. Indeed, the
government never even cited Florence in its briefs to the district
court, but rather relied solely on the particularized reasonable
suspicion standard from United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58 (1st
Cir. 2007), and Swain to justify the visual body cavity search.2
No evidence relevant to whether the rule of Florence and Wolfish
1 Florence and Wolfish were both decided in the specific
context of detention facilities, such as prisons or jails, in which
correctional officers conducted suspicionless searches, pursuant
to a standard policy, of all detainees entering or reentering the
general population and which were motivated by the special safety
and security concerns that inhere to those facilities. See
Florence, 566 U.S. at 322-23, 325-28, 330-38; Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
546-48, 558-60.
2 The government does not dispute that the search here
involved a visual body cavity search, rather than a mere strip
search. See Barnes, 506 F.3d at 62 (distinguishing the level of
particularized suspicion necessary for a visual body cavity search
from that necessary for a less-intrusive strip search). We accept
the parties' characterization of this search as involving a visual
body cavity search.
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applies in this context was ever presented to the district court,
such as the conditions of the holding cells or the particular
safety or security concerns at the Revere police station. The
district court simply cited Florence without explaining why it
applies to the circumstances of this case. See Perez, 2019 WL
181283, at *4-5. That was error.3
Nonetheless, the parties agree that we can decide the
particularized reasonable suspicion issue on this record applying
our decisions in Barnes and Swain. See Barnes, 506 F.3d at 62;
Swain, 117 F.3d at 7.4 In Barnes, we reaffirmed that "the
reasonable suspicion standard governs strip and visual body cavity
searches in the arrestee context" and "[t]he suspicion must be
specific to the individual being searched." 506 F.3d at 62(alteration omitted) (first quoting Swain, 117 F.3d at 7; then
citing Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 2001));
3 On appeal, the government does not defend the visual
body cavity search on Florence grounds, but rather focuses its
arguments on whether the visual body cavity search was justified
by particularized reasonable suspicion.
4 The district court did not cite Barnes anywhere in its
opinion, nor did it cite Swain's reasonable suspicion standard in
the portion of its opinion deciding the permissibility of the strip
and visual body cavity search of Perez. Perez, 2019 WL 181283, at
*5. Rather, it merely cited Florence for the broader rule that
the visual body cavity search of Perez could be justified on
reasonable suspicion or less. Id. The district court thus failed
to analyze specifically whether the officers had particularized
reasonable suspicion to conduct the visual body cavity search of
Perez under Barnes.
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see also id. (holding that because "a visual body cavity search
involves a greater intrusion into personal privacy[,] . . . prior
to conducting a visual body cavity search, we require a more
particularized suspicion that contraband is concealed").5
Lt. Impemba and Det. Zingali were aware that Perez was
a known drug dealer, and Lt. Impemba had personally been involved
in the investigation and arrest of Perez for narcotics
distribution. A small baggie appearing to contain crack cocaine
and sized for an individual sale was found on the floor between
the driver's seat and the driver's side door. Based on their
training and experience, it was reasonable for the officers to
believe that Perez had more than that single distribution-size
baggie and, given that the search of the vehicle and the pat frisk
did not turn up any more drugs, they were likely concealed on his
body. It was also reasonable for the officers to conclude that
Perez had dropped the baggie on the driver's side floor while
attempting to conceal drugs on his body. We have recognized before
the propensity for drug dealers to hide bags of drugs under their
clothing. See United States v. Rasberry, 882 F.3d 241, 250 (1st
5 The particularized reasonable suspicion standard of
Barnes does not require particularized reasonable suspicion that
weapons or contraband are to be found in a specific body cavity as
opposed to other body cavities. See Barnes, 506 F.3d at 62(stating that "prior to conducting a visual body cavity search, we
require a more particularized suspicion that contraband is
concealed," but not stating that the suspicion must be with respect
to a specific body cavity).
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Cir. 2018) ("This suspicion [that the defendant was concealing
drugs in his underwear] was heightened by [the officer]'s knowledge
that drug dealers frequently conceal drugs in their
undergarments."); United States v. Cofield, 391 F.3d 334, 337 n.2
(1st Cir. 2004) (noting that, in discussing the reasonableness of
a strip search, "[i]t is common knowledge that controlled
substances often are concealed on the person of users and dealers
alike" (alteration in original) (quoting Burns v. Loranger, 907
F.2d 233, 238-39 (1st Cir. 1990))). Perez was found with a few
hundred dollars, several cell phones in the vehicle, and a
passenger carrying a firearm with an obliterated serial number,
all of which were also indicative of street-level drug dealing and
reaffirmed the suspicion that Perez likely had more drugs
concealed.
Moreover, Perez had driven in an evasive manner while
being followed by police, Perez and Alicea had been observed
quickly exchanging cell phones as the officers approached the
Mercedes, and Perez's passenger had fled the scene while attempting
to discard a firearm, all of which supported reasonable suspicion
of attempts to conceal evidence of criminal activity. Taking the
booking officers' observations, knowledge, and experience
collectively, it is apparent from the record that they collectively
had particularized reasonable suspicion to justify the visual body
cavity search for drugs. See Barnes, 506 F.3d at 62 (explaining
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that reasonable suspicion can be established by the "collective
knowledge" of the officers involved in the investigation).
It is true that in Barnes we held that the government
had not shown adequate evidence that the officers had
particularized reasonable suspicion to conduct a visual body
cavity search, despite a tip from an informant that the defendant
was known to conceal drugs between his buttocks. Id. at 63-64(remanding to determine whether the informant's tip had sufficient
indicia of reliability to support particularized reasonable
suspicion). Perez argues that because the booking officers here
lacked even a tip or other information indicating that Perez had
a reputation for concealing drugs in his buttocks, they could not
possibly have had the sort of particularized and individualized
suspicion necessary for a visual body cavity search. He also
argues that under Barnes, particularized reasonable suspicion for
a visual body cavity search is not satisfied by the mere fact that
the arrestee has a history of drug-related offenses or that some
drugs were found in the vehicle the arrestee was driving.
To the extent that Perez suggests officers can establish
particularized reasonable suspicion only where they have a tip or
other information indicating that the suspect has a reputation for
concealing drugs in his buttocks, that argument is wrong. A
determination of particularized reasonable suspicion is based on
the totality of the circumstances known to the investigating
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officers at the time of the search, and our cases establish that
this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. See
Barnes, 506 F.3d at 62 ("[I]n evaluating whether the suspicion was
reasonable, we 'look at the totality of the circumstances of each
case to see whether the detaining officer ha[d] a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.'" (second
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S.
at 273)); see also Rasberry, 882 F.3d at 250-51 (focusing on the
particular facts of the case); Swain, 117 F.3d at 7-9 (same).
There are facts here that were not present in Barnes,
including the presence of a distribution-size baggie of suspected
drugs on the floor next to the driver's seat and the indications
that Perez and his passenger were attempting to conceal evidence,
which support a particularized and individualized suspicion that
Perez was concealing more drugs on his body. Cf. Barnes, 506 F.3d
at 60 (explaining that the officers discovered a large bag of
marijuana and small bag of marijuana in the trunk of the vehicle,
but no bags of drugs in the driver's compartment and reciting no
facts indicating an attempt to conceal evidence). The officers
were not relying solely on the mere presence of suspected drugs in
the vehicle or Perez's history of drug dealing to justify the
visual body cavity search. Once the officers had particularized
reasonable suspicion that Perez was concealing drugs on his body,
they were not required to have a more particularized suspicion
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that Perez was or had a reputation for concealing drugs in his
buttocks or some other specific body area. See id. at 62.
III.
We affirm the district court's denial of Perez's motion
to suppress, but as to the visual body cavity search, we do so for
reasons different than the district court.
Affirmed.
-Concurring Opinion Follows-
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring). I write
separately to emphasize "the severe if not gross interference with
a person's privacy that occurs when guards conduct a visual
inspection of body cavities." Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556,
564 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 887
(1st Cir. 1983)); see also Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107,
110 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[W]e consider such searches an 'extreme
intrusion' on personal privacy and 'an offense to the dignity of
the individual.'" (quoting Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st
Cir. 1996))). "Even when carried out in a respectful manner, and
even absent any physical touching, such searches are inherently
harmful, humiliating, and degrading." Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 345 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted); see id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring)
(describing strip and body cavity searches as "undoubtedly
humiliating and deeply offensive to many"). Accordingly, we have
required "a more particularized suspicion that contraband is
concealed" for body cavity searches than for strip searches.
United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2007); see
Florence, 566 U.S. at 343 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining
that searches involving "close observation of the private areas of
a person's body . . . constitute a far more serious invasion of
that person's privacy" than do searches involving that person
"undressing and taking a shower" under supervision).
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"[W]hen 'privacy-related concerns are weighty enough' a
'search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished
expectations of privacy of [an] arrestee.'" Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 392 (2014) (quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435,
463 (2013)). Given the intrusiveness of body cavity searches,
absent exigency, I believe a judicial order ought to be obtained
before such searches are conducted. See Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2187 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
part) ("Both before and after a person has been arrested, warrants
are the usual safeguard against unreasonable searches . . . .");
cf. Florence, 566 U.S. at 342 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The Court
does not address whether it is always reasonable, without regard
to the offense or the reason for detention, to strip search an
arrestee before the arrestee's detention has been reviewed by a
judicial officer."); id. at 354–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting the same).
Nevertheless, because the majority's decision comports
with our precedent that "the reasonable suspicion standard governs
strip and visual body cavity searches in the arrestee context,"
Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997), and that the
circumstances of this case provide particularized reasonable
suspicion, see Barnes, 506 F.3d at 62–64, I join the decision.
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