Mercado-Salinas v. Bart Enterprises International, Ltd. ( 2011 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 10-2359
    WALTER MERCADO-SALINAS; ASTROMUNDO, INC.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    BART ENTERPRISES INTERNATIONAL, LTD; WALTER INTERNATIONAL
    PRODUCTIONS, INC.; WALTERVISION PRODUCTIONS, INC.; WALTER MERCADO
    RADIO PRODUCTIONS, INC.; WALTER MERCADO ENTERPRISES CORP.;
    GUILLERMO BAKULA; ARCANE CREATIVE, LLC; WATERVISION, INC.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
    María D. Bertólez and María D. Trelles-Hernández, with
    whom Néstor M. Méndez-Gómez, Pietrantoni Méndez & Alvarez LLP, John
    F. Nevares, Pedro Quiñones Suárez, and John F. Nevares and
    Associates PSC were on brief, for appellants.
    Laura Beléndez-Ferrero, with whom Cristina Arenas Solís,
    and Ferraiuoli LLC were on brief, for appellees.
    December 20, 2011
    LYNCH, Chief Judge.         In 1995, Walter Mercado-Salinas, a
    popular psychic and astrologer, and Bart Enterprises entered into
    a contract (the "Agreement") for the production and distribution of
    materials featuring Mercado's psychic and astrological services.
    Under the Agreement, Mercado granted Bart the right to use the
    "Walter Mercado" trademark, as well as Mercado's name and likeness.
    In 2006, however, a dispute arose when Mercado ceased
    providing    services    and     Bart   ceased    to    pay   Mercado's   monthly
    compensation.       This led to litigation in federal court in Florida
    in which a jury, inter alia, rejected Mercado's claim that he had
    validly terminated the Agreement, found that he had violated the
    Agreement, and found that Bart owed Mercado no compensation.
    In 2009, both parties sought injunctive relief from the
    U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to prevent the
    other party from using the "Walter Mercado" trademark.                    Finding
    that   Mercado   assigned      Bart     the    rights    to   the   trademark   in
    perpetuity    and    that   Mercado     had     not    validly   terminated     the
    Agreement,    the     district    court       denied    Mercado's   request     for
    preliminary injunctive relief and granted preliminary injunctive
    relief to Bart.      Mercado-Salinas v. Bart Enters. Int'l, Ltd., 
    747 F. Supp. 2d 265
     (D.P.R. 2010).
    We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in doing so.        We affirm.
    -2-
    I.
    A.             The Agreement
    On August 4, 1995, Mercado and Bart signed the Agreement,
    under       which    Bart   would   develop      and   distribute    materials    and
    products related to Mercado's psychic and astrological services.
    As part of the Agreement, Mercado granted Bart several rights
    "during the Term and throughout the Territory" of the Agreement.
    The Agreement defines "Territory" as the universe.                   See Agreement
    § 4, at 5.          It defines "Term" to mean "in perpetuity," subject to
    a termination provision which, inter alia, allows Mercado to
    terminate the Agreement after fifteen days' written notice if Bart
    fails to pay Mercado any agreed compensation within sixty days of
    the due date.1         Id. § 5, at 5; § 12(a)(iii), at 13-14.
    First, Mercado "irrevocably assign[ed] to Bart throughout
    the Territory during the Term, all right, title and interest,
    including all copyrights" in certain "Preexisting Materials" that
    Mercado had previously created for the business entity Jamie Shoop
    & Associates Inc.           See id. § 1(a), at 2.
    Second, Mercado "grant[ed] to Bart the exclusive right
    and license          during   the   Term   and throughout      the    Territory   to
    develop, produce, distribute and copyright in its own name new
    1
    The termination provision also provides that "Mercado
    shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately . . .
    in the event of a material breach by Bart which remains uncured for
    a period of ten (10) days following written notice thereof."
    Agreement § 12(a)(ii), at 13.
    -3-
    materials, in any language, relating to Mercado's psychic and
    astrological services" (the "New Materials").     Id. § 1(b), at 3.
    Most    pertinently,   the   parties   to   the   Agreement
    "acknowledge[d] that the mark 'Walter Mercado' has . . . attained
    the status of a common law trademark and service mark" by virtue of
    its "use and associat[ion] with the Preexisting Materials."       Id.
    § 2(a), at 3.    The Agreement then states:
    Mercado hereby irrevocably assigns to Bart
    throughout the Territory during the Term, all
    right, title and interest in and to the Mark,
    together with that part of the goodwill of
    Mercado's   business   connected    with   and
    symbolized by said Mark, for use in connection
    with the Pre-existing Materials and the New
    Materials, if any. Such assignment includes
    but is not limited to the right to use the
    Mark in connection with Preexisting Materials
    and the New Materials in any and all media now
    known or hereafter developed . . . , the right
    to merchandise and the right to utilize the
    Mark in all advertising, promotion and
    publicity created in connection therewith.
    Id. § 2(b), at 4.    Additionally, the Agreement provides:
    Bart shall have all rights in the Mark which
    are afforded to owners of trademarks and
    service marks, including but not limited to
    the right to seek and obtain trademark
    protection and/or registration of the Mark in
    its name, and the right to enforce or defend
    Bart’s rights against third parties.2
    2
    On October 8, 1996, Bart filed an application for the
    "Walter Mercado" trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
    Office (PTO). Mercado executed an affidavit in connection with
    that application on July 11, 1997, stating that he authorized Bart
    to register "Walter Mercado," "Walter," and "Walter Mercado
    Salinas" as trademarks and that he "granted to [Bart] all rights of
    ownership and authority to any and all of the [aforementioned]
    -4-
    Id. § 2(c), at 4.
    Mercado also "grant[ed] to Bart the right and license
    during the Term and throughout the Territory to use Mercado's
    performance,      name,    signature,         photographs,    voice,      picture,
    likeness, or other indicia of his identity . . . subject, however,
    to Mercado's right to prior approve any such use."                Id. § 3(b), at
    5.    The   parties    agreed    that    "such    approval    [is]   not    to   be
    unreasonably      withheld"   and    that      "[i]f   such   approval     is    not
    communicated to Bart within forty-eight (48) hours of Mercado's
    receipt of the materials, such right of approval shall be deemed
    waived."    Id.
    Finally,      Mercado    agreed       to    provide    psychic       and
    astrological services for the creation of the New Materials during
    an   "Additional      Services      Period,"      a    ten-year    term    to    be
    "automatically extended for additional two (2) year periods at the
    option of Bart."      Id. § 6(b)(i)-(ii), at 6.          "The parties agree[d]
    that any and all New Materials or parts thereof created or supplied
    trademark names." In October 1997, Mercado also filed with the
    Mexican Patent Office an affidavit granting Bart the right to
    register the trademark in Mexico. On December 4, 2004, the PTO
    cancelled the trademark application "because [the] registrant did
    not file an acceptable declaration."         See U.S. Trademark
    Application Serial No. 75-185030 (filed Oct. 8, 1996).       A few
    months later, on May 5, 2005, Mercado executed and filed with the
    PTO a "Consent of Living Individual" on the "understand[ing] that
    consent of a living individual is required in order for a personal
    name to be used and registered as a trademark."      Bart filed a
    second application for the "Walter Mercado" trademark on May 14,
    2007. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77-180667 (filed
    May 14, 2007). The application is still pending. Id.
    -5-
    by Mercado shall be deemed works made for hire as such term is
    defined pursuant to the United States Copyright Law . . . or
    relevant jurisdiction copyright law . . . ."        Id. § 6(b)(iii), at
    7.     United States copyright law, in turn, provides that the
    copyright in a "work made for hire" vests in the employer rather
    than the employee.   
    17 U.S.C. § 201
    (b).     The parties further agreed
    that "[i]n the event that any of the results of Mercado's services
    are not copyrightable . . . or for any reason are deemed not to be
    works made for hire, then . . . Mercado hereby assigns all right,
    title and interest in and to the results of his services to Bart."
    Agreement § 6(b)(iii), at 7.
    In   return,   "Bart   agree[d]   to   pay   to    Mercado,   in
    consideration of all services rendered by Mercado and the use of
    the results thereof and all rights granted by Mercado to Bart,"
    compensation consisting of a $25,000 base salary per month, $5,000
    per month for costumes, $2,000 per month for up to twenty-five
    three-minute segments per month, and additional fees contingent
    upon gross income from sales in foreign countries.           Id. § 6(c), at
    7-8.
    At the same time, the parties agreed that Mercado "shall
    be in no way hereunder prohibited or restricted, for his personal
    benefit, from conducting his present business endeavors consisting
    of radio, newspaper, magazines and personal consultation related to
    psychic activities."      Id. § 6(c)(v), at 8.
    -6-
    Finally, the Agreement provides that "all grants granted
    or assigned by this agreement shall be irrevocable under all or any
    circumstances, and shall not be subject to rescission, termination
    or injunction.     In the case of breach of this agreement by Bart,
    Mercado's sole remedy shall be limited to an action at law for
    damages."     Id. § 13, at 15-16.      The parties further agreed that any
    disputes under the Agreement would be governed by Puerto Rico law.
    Id. § 20(d), at 19.
    B.          The Florida litigation
    In the fall of 2006, Mercado ceased to provide services
    for new materials as provided under the Agreement and failed to
    appear for scheduled appearances.            In November 2006, Bart halted
    its compensation payments to Mercado.            Mercado formally attempted
    to terminate the Agreement by a letter dated November 22, 2006,
    citing Bart's failure to pay compensation.              Mercado's company,
    Astromundo, Inc., also filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
    Office an application for the "Walter Mercado" trademark. See U.S.
    Trademark Application Serial No. 77-047157 (filed Nov. 17, 2006).
    This is one of the activities which ultimately caused Bart to seek
    injunctive relief against Mercado.
    On January 17, 2007, Bart filed suit against Mercado in
    the federal court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging
    breach   of    contract      and    tortious    interference     with   Bart's
    third-party     contracts.         Mercado   counterclaimed    for   breach   of
    -7-
    contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good
    faith,   violation         of    copyright     and    trademark     laws,     unjust
    enrichment, and requested injunctive relief and a declaratory
    judgment that the Agreement was invalid because its term was "in
    perpetuity."
    In the meantime, on February 8, 2007, Mercado filed suit
    against Bart in the federal court for the District of Puerto Rico.
    Mercado again alleged violation of copyright and trademark laws,
    and sought injunctive relief and a declaration that the Agreement
    was invalid. In October 2008, the Puerto Rico case was transferred
    to the Florida district court, and on November 18, 2008, the two
    cases were consolidated.
    On    cross-motions         for    summary    judgment,    the    Florida
    district court held that the Agreement was valid. See Walter Int'l
    Prods., Inc. v. Mercado Salinas, No. 07-cv-20136, slip op. at 6-8
    (S.D. Fla.     Nov.    24,      2008).      Importantly,     the   district    court
    determined that the Agreement contains two different durational
    terms: (1) the term for which Mercado was obligated to provide
    services to Bart (the "Additional Services Term"), consisting of
    ten years plus optional two-year extensions; and (2) the term
    applicable to the assignment of the trademark and other rights (the
    "Term"), which        is   in   perpetuity     or    until   termination    of   the
    Agreement.     Id. at 7.         The district court then determined that
    because the trademark was "irrevocably assign[ed] to Bart . . .
    -8-
    during the Term" and because "the Term of the Agreement ends if
    Bart or Mercado exercise their rights to terminate the Agreement,"
    the trademark rights would revert to Mercado upon termination. Id.
    at 15-16.     The district court concluded that the question of
    whether the Agreement was properly terminated had to be decided by
    a jury before the court could determine who owned the trademark.
    Id. at 17.
    The consolidated case was tried to a Florida jury in
    January 2009.     On January 26, 2009, the jury returned a special
    verdict finding that Mercado had breached the Agreement by (1)
    failing to perform after November 22, 2006; (2) hiring another
    exclusive agent; and (3) improperly terminating the Agreement. The
    jury further found that Bart had not failed to pay any owed
    compensation to Mercado and thus had not breached the Agreement.
    On February 4, 2009, the Florida district court entered judgment in
    favor of Bart.3
    The court did not reach the trademark infringement claim,
    stating that    "[o]nce   the   jury   found   that   Mercado,   not   Bart,
    3
    The jury also found that Mercado had interfered with
    Bart's contracts with third parties.      The jury did not find,
    however, that Bart had suffered any damages resulting either from
    this interference or from Mercado's breach of contract. Therefore,
    the district court awarded no damages to Bart. Bart moved for a
    new trial on the issue of damages, but the district court denied
    the motion. See Walter Int'l Prods., Inc. v. Mercado Salinas, No.
    07-cv-20136 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2009). Bart appealed the district
    court's decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which
    affirmed the decision not to award Bart damages. See Walter Int'l
    Prods., Inc. v. Salinas, 
    650 F.3d 1402
     (11th Cir. 2011).
    -9-
    breached the contract and that Mercado had not properly terminated
    the contract, the claim for trademark infringement became moot
    because,   as    stated   in   the   order    on   the   motions   for   summary
    judgment, the trademark rights revert to Mercado upon a valid
    termination of the agreement."               Walter Int'l Prods., Inc. v.
    Mercado Salinas, No. 07-cv-20136, slip op. at 22 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
    26, 2009).
    C.         The Puerto Rico litigation
    Despite the ruling against him by the Florida court, on
    March 20, 2009, Mercado sent Bart a letter demanding payment within
    fifteen days of $25,000 per month for the twenty-seven months that
    had elapsed between November 2006 and January 2009, amounting to a
    total of $675,000. Mercado's letter asserted that "the $25,000 per
    month [is] due and payable pursuant to clause 6(c)(i)" of the
    Agreement, and that "[t]he obligation to pay such amounts is
    independent of any service provided by Mr. Mercado."                     Mercado
    stated he reserved the right to declare the Agreement null and void
    pursuant to the termination clause if Bart did not make payment
    within fifteen days.
    On March 30, 2009, Bart notified Mercado by letter that
    it would not pay the requested compensation. Bart asserted that no
    compensation was due because, as the Florida court had held,
    Mercado had ceased to provide services and thus had breached the
    Agreement.      Bart also asserted its right to the "Walter Mercado"
    -10-
    trademark    and requested   that    Mercado    stop     using   the   mark   to
    unilaterally create new psychic and astrological materials.
    On May 15, 2009, Mercado sent Bart a letter declaring the
    Agreement null and void pursuant to the termination clause of the
    Agreement because Bart had not paid the requested compensation.
    Having done so, Mercado also declared that the trademark and
    publicity rights reverted back to him.           Mercado ordered Bart to
    cease and desist from using the trademark or Mercado's name or
    likeness.
    Three days later, on May 18, 2009, Mercado4 brought suit
    against Bart5 in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance.              Mercado
    alleged     breach   of   contract,        trademark     infringement,        and
    infringement of publicity rights. Upon Bart's motion, the case was
    removed to the Puerto Rico federal district court.                The parties
    filed cross-motions for preliminary injunctive relief, each seeking
    to prevent the other from using the "Walter Mercado" trademark.
    The district court referred the motions to a magistrate
    judge for a report and recommendation.                 The magistrate judge
    determined that because the provisions granting trademark and
    4
    Plaintiffs are Mercado and Astromundo, Inc., a Puerto
    Rico corporation. Mercado is the president of Astromundo, Inc. We
    refer to the plaintiffs collectively as "Mercado."
    5
    Defendants are seven business concerns and their
    principal, Guillermo Bakula. All of the defendants in the case are
    citizens of Florida, except Bart Enterprises International, Ltd.,
    which is a citizen of the Bahamas. We refer to the defendants
    collectively as "Bart."
    -11-
    publicity rights contain limiting language such as "in connection
    with    Mercado's     astrological      and    psychic   activities,"      Bart's
    trademark and publicity rights are limited to those materials
    developed by or with Mercado during the Additional Services Term.
    Once    the   Additional     Services    Term    ended   and    Mercado    ceased
    providing services, the magistrate judge concluded, Bart could no
    longer create new products using the trademark.                  The magistrate
    judge recommended that the court grant Mercado's motion for a
    preliminary injunction against Bart's use of the trademark or
    Mercado's name or likeness in connection with any product that was
    created after the end of the Additional Services Term without
    Mercado's contribution or approval.            Bart could, however, continue
    to use the trademark in connection with products or materials
    created with Mercado's approval during the Additional Services
    Term.
    Both   parties    filed    objections      to    the   report     and
    recommendation.        On review, the district court denied Mercado's
    motion    for   a    preliminary   injunction      because     Mercado    had   not
    established that he was entitled to trademark protection. Mercado-
    Salinas, 
    747 F. Supp. 2d at 274
    .          First, based on the plain text of
    the    contract,     the   district   court     concluded     that   Mercado    had
    perpetually assigned to Bart full rights to the trademark.                 
    Id. at 271-72
    . Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the district
    court acknowledged the Florida district court's determination that
    -12-
    Mercado's assignment of rights was subject to reversion upon
    termination of the Agreement.        
    Id. at 272-73
    .            Next, the district
    court    determined   that   Mercado   did        not   validly      terminate    the
    Agreement.    
    Id. at 273-74
    .    Because Mercado had ceased to provide
    services, Bart had no obligation to pay him compensation and he
    therefore had no basis for terminating the Agreement.                     
    Id.
        The
    court denied Mercado's request for injunctive relief against Bart's
    use of the trademark and Mercado's request for injunctive relief
    regarding his publicity rights.        
    Id. at 274
    .
    Finding a likelihood of success regarding Bart's claim to
    the    trademark,   the   district   court        granted    Bart's     motion   for
    preliminary   injunctive     relief.        
    Id. at 275
    .      The   injunction
    prohibited Mercado from "using the Mark, 'Walter Mercado,' in
    relation to all forms of business enterprise, and from representing
    to    third-parties   that   Plaintiffs      own    the     Mark."      
    Id.
          This
    injunction was further narrowed.
    On motion for reconsideration, the district court amended
    the preliminary injunction to bar Mercado from "(1) using the Mark,
    'Walter Mercado,' in relation to all forms of business enterprise,
    except for business arrangements that commenced prior to June 7,
    1995, and (2) representing to third parties that Plaintiffs own the
    Mark."    Mercado-Salinas v. Bart Enters. Int'l, Ltd., 
    747 F. Supp. 2d 275
    , 279 (D.P.R. 2010).      The district court's opinion and order
    expressly states that "the court's injunctive order relates only to
    -13-
    commercial use of the trademark."6    
    Id.
       It is this more limited
    injunction, with that understanding, which is before us on appeal.
    Mercado has appealed from the grant of this preliminary
    injunction and from the denial of his request for preliminary
    injunctive relief.
    II.
    Before granting a preliminary injunction, a "court must
    consider (1) the likelihood of the movant's success on the merits;
    (2) the anticipated incidence of irreparable harm if the injunction
    is denied; (3) the balance of relevant equities (i.e., the hardship
    that will befall the nonmovant if the injunction issues contrasted
    with the hardship that will befall the movant if the injunction
    does not issue); and (4) the impact, if any, of the court's action
    on the public interest."   Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading
    Corp., 
    443 F.3d 112
    , 115 (1st Cir. 2006).     "In a trademark case,
    the key issue is the likelihood of success on the merits because
    the other decisions will flow from that ruling."     Keds Corp. v.
    Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 
    888 F.2d 215
    , 220 (1st Cir. 1989).7
    6
    Bart agrees, acknowledging that Mercado "can use his own
    name to identify himself."
    7
    In a series of cases, this court has employed a
    presumption that irreparable harm exists if a trademark holder
    demonstrates a likelihood of success in establishing infringement.
    See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 
    163 F.3d 27
    , 33
    (1st Cir. 1998). We have recognized there is a question as to
    whether this presumption can co-exist with a more recent Supreme
    Court case, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
    547 U.S. 388
     (2006).
    See Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645
    -14-
    A district court's conclusions on these factors and its
    determinations     regarding     their       relative    weighting   engender
    deferential appellate review.         See Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v.
    Baccarat, Inc., 
    102 F.3d 12
    , 16 (1st Cir. 1996).            Thus, a decision
    to grant a preliminary injunction will stand unless the district
    court "mistook the law, clearly erred in its factual assessments,
    or otherwise abused its discretion in granting the interim relief."
    McGuire   v.   Reilly,   
    260 F.3d 36
    ,    42   (1st   Cir.   2001);   accord
    Massachusetts v. Watt, 
    716 F.2d 946
    , 947 (1st Cir. 1983) ("[A
    party] challenging the issuance of a preliminary injunction must
    F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2011).
    In eBay, the Supreme Court held that in considering whether to
    issue injunctive relief against use of a patent or copyright,
    courts may not "replace traditional equitable considerations with
    a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination
    that a copyright has been infringed." eBay, 
    547 U.S. at 392-93
    .
    Instead, the Court explained that "the decision whether to grant or
    deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the
    district courts, and . . . such discretion must be exercised
    consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent
    disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards."
    
    Id. at 394
    .
    Although eBay dealt with the Patent Act and with permanent
    injunctive relief, we have stated that "the traditional equitable
    principles discussed by the Supreme Court in eBay apply" in
    trademark infringement cases where preliminary injunctive relief is
    sought. Voice of the Arab World, 645 F.3d at 31 (concluding that
    the principles of eBay applied to a request to preliminarily enjoin
    alleged trademark infringement, but declining to decide whether
    such principles precluded a presumption of irreparable harm).
    We need not decide here whether eBay precludes a presumption
    of irreparable harm because Bart has demonstrated enough
    irreparable harm that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. In any event,
    Mercado has not challenged the district court's finding of
    irreparable harm, so this argument is waived.
    -15-
    carry the heavy burden of proving that the district court abused
    its discretion.").
    Applying this deferential standard at this preliminary
    stage of the case, we cannot say the district court abused its
    discretion in granting Bart the preliminary injunction entered and
    denying Mercado's motion for a preliminary injunction against
    Bart's use of the trademark and publicity rights.                We do not say
    that the issue of the scope of the trademark transferred has been
    resolved,   only    that   there   was    no   abuse   of    discretion   as   to
    preliminary injunctive relief.
    Both parties claim ownership of the trademark while
    disputing the other's ownership of the same.                 Specifically, the
    parties disagree over whether Mercado licensed or fully assigned
    the trademark to Bart under the Agreement.8
    We describe the different views.                The district court
    adopted Bart's view that Mercado fully assigned the trademark to
    Bart because the Agreement plainly uses the term "assign."                     See
    
    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3471
     ("If the terms of a contract are
    clear and leave no doubt as to the intentions of the contracting
    parties,    the    literal   sense       of    its   stipulations    shall     be
    observed.").      Section 2(b) of the Agreement states that "Mercado
    hereby irrevocably assigns to Bart . . . all right, title and
    8
    The parties agree that Mercado granted Bart a license to
    use his publicity rights in connection with the Preexisting and New
    Materials.
    -16-
    interest in and to the Mark, together with that part of the
    goodwill of Mercado's business connected with and symbolized by
    said Mark."    This unequivocal language is contrasted with Section
    3(b), in which Mercado "grants to Bart the right and license . . .
    to use Mercado's . . . Name and Likeness."
    This contrast in language, the district court noted,
    suggests that the parties intended to grant Bart a full assignment
    of the trademark.    See Russello v. United States, 
    464 U.S. 16
    , 23
    (1983) (applying the presumption that the use of different words in
    different provisions is purposeful and evinces an intention to
    convey a different meaning); Nat'l Tax Inst., Inc. v. Topnotch at
    Stowe Resort & Spa, 
    388 F.3d 15
    , 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining
    that language discrepancies between different contract provisions
    "may cast light on meaning").
    Still,    the    district       court    acknowledged    language
    suggesting    otherwise:   the   text   of    Section   2(b)   includes   the
    subsidiary phrase "for use in connection with the Pre-existing
    Materials and the New Materials."            The district court reasoned,
    however, that this language is merely purposive and does not
    restrict the scope of the assignment.          See 
    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3475
     (providing that unclear language must be construed to
    effectuate the meaning of the contract read as a whole).                  The
    magistrate judge had a different view.
    -17-
    The     district    court     also   noted      that   the    Agreement
    stipulates that Bart has the right to register the trademark in its
    own name and the right to enforce the trademark in court.                    Such
    rights typically inure to assignees, not licensees.               See, e.g., 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 1051
    (a)(1), 1127 (allowing an assignee to register a
    trademark under its own name with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
    Office); Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 
    567 F.2d 154
    , 159
    n.6 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that an "assignee would have the right
    to sue infringers in his own name," whereas a licensee has no
    exclusive right to sell a product associated with a trademark and
    cannot sue on his own behalf).
    There     was    evidence     that   the   parties     took    actions
    consistent   with   this     reading.        Not   only    did   Bart    file   an
    application for the "Walter Mercado" trademark with the U.S. Patent
    and Trademark Office (PTO) in 1996, but Mercado filed at least
    three documents that ratified Bart's right to do so.                    In 1997,
    Mercado filed an affidavit with the PTO authorizing Bart to use and
    register the names "Walter Mercado," "Walter," and "Walter Mercado
    Salinas" as trademarks, and "grant[ing] to [Bart] all rights of
    ownership and authority to any and all of the [aforementioned]
    trademark names."         Mercado filed a similar affidavit with the
    Mexican Patent Office in 1997 and a "Consent of Living Individual"
    with the PTO in 2005.        The district court read these actions as
    evidence of Mercado's intention to assign the trademark perpetually
    -18-
    to Bart.     See 
    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3472
     ("In order to judge as
    to   the    intention    of     the   contracting         parties,       attention     must
    principally be paid to their acts, contemporaneous and subsequent
    to the contract.").
    Mercado,       however,   urges    adoption           of   the   magistrate
    judge's reading that the Agreement grants Bart only a limited
    license to use the trademark.            The magistrate judge concluded that
    because the Agreement consistently limits the use of the trademark
    to uses "in connection with" the Preexisting and New Materials, the
    grant is a limited license.             See Agreement §§ 1(a), 1(b), 2(b),
    3(b).      Consistent with this interpretation, Section 6(c)(v) of the
    Agreement allows Mercado to retain several independent business
    ventures in "radio, newspaper, magazines and personal consultation
    related      to    psychic    activities."          See    3    Callmann       on    Unfair
    Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 20:63 (4th ed. 2011) ("The
    transfer      of   a   trademark      also   will    not       be    inferred       from   an
    assignment of a business where the assignor continues in the same
    line of business after the assignment.").
    For our purposes, however, the issue is not whether
    Mercado licensed or fully assigned the trademark to Bart, but
    whether      the   district     court   abused      its     discretion         in   issuing
    -19-
    preliminary injunctive relief.     It did not because under either
    interpretation, Bart is entitled to an injunction.9    We explain.
    The district court plainly did not abuse its discretion
    in applying collateral estoppel to the Florida district court's
    determination that Mercado's assignment under the Agreement is
    subject to reversion upon termination.      See Berríos-Romero v.
    Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 
    641 F.3d 24
    , 26 (1st Cir. 2011)
    ("Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, forecloses relitigation
    in a subsequent action of a fact [or issue of law] essential for
    rendering a judgment in a prior action between the same parties,
    even when different causes of action are involved." (quoting Puerto
    Ricans for P.R. Party v. Dalmau, 
    544 F.3d 58
    , 69 (1st Cir. 2008))
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Collateral estoppel applies when "(1) the issue sought to
    be precluded in the later action is the same as that involved in
    the earlier action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the
    issue was determined by a valid and binding final judgment; and (4)
    the determination of the issue was essential to the judgment."
    Rodríguez-García v. Miranda-Marín, 
    610 F.3d 756
    , 770 (1st Cir.
    2010) (quoting Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Día, Inc., 490
    9
    Mercado's failure to validly terminate the Agreement also
    renders unsuccessful his claim that he is entitled to preliminary
    injunctive relief to prevent Bart from using his name and likeness.
    Like the rights to the trademark, Bart's rights to license
    Mercado's name and likeness were granted in perpetuity and Bart
    does not lose those rights without a valid termination of the
    Agreement.
    -20-
    F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
    cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 1016
     (2011).          Mercado and Bart litigated
    the issue of reversion upon termination before the Florida district
    court, and the Florida court's determination was final at the
    summary judgment stage.      The issue was essential to the court's
    determination that Mercado's trademark claims were moot because
    Mercado had not terminated the Agreement.         In order to even assert
    a claim of injunctive relief, Mercado must demonstrate that he
    terminated the Agreement and that the trademark rights reverted to
    him.
    The district court reasonably concluded that Mercado did
    not validly terminate the Agreement.           Section 12(a)(iii) of the
    Agreement entitles Mercado to terminate the Agreement after fifteen
    days' written notice if Bart fails to pay Mercado any agreed
    compensation within sixty days of the due date.              Mercado argues
    that he was entitled to terminate the Agreement in 2006 after Bart
    ceased to pay Mercado's monthly stipend.             However, under Puerto
    Rico law, a party must comply with its own contractual obligations
    before it can demand compliance from the other party.                  See 
    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3052
    .        A party's breach effectively suspends
    the nonbreaching party's duty to tender performance.                   See 
    id.
    § 3017.
    Both   the     magistrate    judge   and    the   district      court
    reasonably   concluded     that    Bart's   obligation      to   pay    Mercado
    -21-
    compensation is reciprocal with Mercado's obligation to provide
    services.    The compensation provisions are embedded within Section
    6, which discusses Mercado's services, rather than earlier sections
    of    the   Agreement,   which    discuss      the   granting     of   rights.
    Structurally,    Section   6     begins   by   cancelling       Mercado's   prior
    services obligations with Shoop & Associates. It then provides for
    the   "Additional   Services"      that   Mercado     is   to    render   and    it
    concludes with a compensation structure.             Read as a whole, Section
    6 links Mercado's compensation and Mercado's services as reciprocal
    obligations.
    Mercado has rendered no services to Bart since November
    2006. Because Puerto Rico law demands that Mercado comply with his
    contractual obligation to provide services in order to demand
    compensation, the district court reasonably concluded that Bart is
    relieved from its obligation to pay Mercado compensation. This, in
    turn, means that Mercado had no right to terminate the Agreement
    and that the trademark rights have not reverted to him.                         The
    district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Mercado's request for preliminary injunctive relief.
    Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by
    granting Bart's request for preliminary injunctive relief.10                    All
    10
    Section 13 of the Agreement does not bar Bart from
    seeking injunctive relief in this case. Section 13 states that
    "all grants granted or assigned by this agreement shall be
    irrevocable under all or any circumstances, and shall not be
    subject to rescission, termination or injunction. In the case of
    -22-
    four factors support the district court's decision, even if Bart
    only has a license.        See Borinquen Biscuit, 
    443 F.3d at 115
    .
    First,     as    the   district    court    explained,   Bart     has
    demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits by showing (1)
    that the "mark merits protection" and (2) "that the allegedly
    infringing use is likely to result in consumer confusion."             
    Id. at 116
    .   Consumer confusion is established by reference to eight
    guiding principles: "(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the
    similarity of the goods; (3) the relationship between the parties'
    channels of trade; (4) the relationship between the parties'
    advertising;    (5)   the    classes    of    prospective   purchasers;      (6)
    evidence   of   actual     confusion;   (7)    the    defendant's   intent    in
    adopting its mark; and (8) the strength of the plaintiff's mark."
    
    Id. at 120
    .     This list is merely illustrative; the purpose of the
    inquiry is to determine whether "the allegedly infringing conduct
    carries with it a likelihood of confounding an appreciable number
    breach of this agreement by Bart, Mercado's sole remedy shall be
    limited to an action at law for damages."
    By its plain terms, this provision precludes Mercado from
    seeking to enjoin Bart from using the very trademark that Mercado
    granted to Bart.     Bart, on the other hand, granted no such
    trademark rights to Mercado. Because the provision is limited to
    "grants granted" under the Agreement, it cannot operate to prevent
    Bart from seeking injunctive relief here. The provision's express
    limitation of Mercado's remedies to damages, with no corollary
    provision for Bart, bolsters this reading.
    In any event, Mercado did not raise this argument before the
    district court and it is waived. See Anderson v. Hannaford Bros.
    Co., 
    659 F.3d 151
    , 158 n.5 (1st Cir. 2011).
    -23-
    of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care."                        The
    Shell Co. (P.R.) Ltd. v. Los Frailes Serv. Station, Inc., 
    605 F.3d 10
    , 21-22 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
    Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 
    103 F.3d 196
    , 201
    (1st Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The parties each agree that the mark merits protection.
    "[T]o be eligible for trademark protection, a mark must qualify as
    distinctive," Borinquen Biscuit, 
    443 F.3d at 116
    , either inherently
    or through acquired secondary meaning, 
    id. at 116-17
    .                   The parties
    agree that the trademark "Walter Mercado" has a secondary meaning.
    The Agreement itself states that "the Mark has attained the status
    of a common law trademark and service mark."             See Agreement § 2(a),
    at 3.
    Additionally,     there       is   a   likelihood       of    consumer
    confusion.      Bart has alleged that Mercado continues to use the
    trademark to develop new materials and products with third-party
    agents,      including    a   book,   a   CD,    a   website,    and       horoscopes
    distributed in several countries in media including periodicals,
    television,      text    messages,    and    pre-recorded       audio      and   video
    messages.     The district court reasonably concluded that if Mercado
    and   Bart    are   concurrently      producing      psychic    and   astrological
    products using the Mercado name, Mercado's infringing use of the
    trademark is likely to create consumer confusion.                     The products
    rely on the same trademark; they are within the same class of
    -24-
    astrological and psychic products; and they target the same class
    of   Spanish-speaking    astrological        and    psychic    customers.         See
    Borinquen Biscuit, 
    443 F.3d at 120
    .
    Bart has also demonstrated irreparable harm.                     As the
    district court explained, Mercado's continued infringing use of the
    trademark has impaired Bart's marketing of its own astrological
    products and services. Mercado-Salinas, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 274-75.
    Bart also alleges that Mercado has interfered with Bart's use of
    the trademark by continuing to represent to third parties that he
    owns the trademark.      Mercado has, for example, attempted to bill
    Bart's   contractual    partners      directly       for    their    use    of    the
    trademark.
    Third, the court balances "the hardship that will befall
    the nonmovant if the injunction issues" against "the hardship that
    will   befall   the   movant   if   the     injunction      does    not    issue."
    Borinquen    Biscuit,   
    443 F.3d at 115
    .      We     cannot      fault   the
    determination that the balance of hardships tips in Bart's favor.
    We note the district court's preliminary injunction as issued still
    allows Mercado to engage in the same business enterprises allowed
    under the Agreement.
    As to the impact of a preliminary injunction on the
    public interest, concurrent use of the trademark by Bart and
    Mercado may lead to substantial consumer confusion, which is not in
    the public interest.     See 
    id.
    -25-
    Mercado argues that the preliminary injunction is in
    error because it potentially prevents him from using his personal
    name.   However, "[t]here is no doubt that a personal name used as
    a trademark may be expressly assigned to another along with the
    goodwill symbolized by the mark."            3 McCarthy on Trademarks and
    Unfair Competition § 18:32 (4th ed. 2011).             "If a person has sold
    a business which is identified by his personal name, the name is an
    asset which he has sold, and he cannot keep commercial control of
    the name and keep the purchase price too.              Of course, the seller
    can use his own name to identify himself, but he has sold the right
    to use the name as a commercial symbol -- a trademark."                     Id.
    (footnote omitted).
    The    injunction    had   two    narrowing   features:    it   only
    limited use of the trademark "Walter Mercado," and it contained an
    exception.      We have upheld that injunction as not an abuse of
    discretion.     While Mercado argued the original injunction was too
    broad, the court adopted the exception offered and Mercado offered
    no specifics beyond that.       It can hardly be an abuse of discretion
    for the district court not to have sua sponte imposed further
    limitations.
    III.
    We    affirm   the   district     court's   denial   of   Mercado's
    request for preliminary injunctive relief and its grant of Bart's
    -26-
    request for preliminary injunctive relief.   We remand the case for
    trial and further development of the issues.
    -27-