Onebeacon America Insurance v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. , 684 F.3d 237 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 11-2072
    ONEBEACON AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA
    n/k/a AVIVA INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Boudin, and Thompson,
    Circuit Judges.
    Kevin J. O'Connor, with whom Jennifer L. Noe and Hermes,
    Netburn, O'Connor & Spearing, P.C., was on brief for appellant.
    Benjamin L. Hincks, with whom Wynter N. Lavier and Mintz Levin
    Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., were on brief for appellee.
    July 11, 2012
    TORRUELLA,    Circuit       Judge.   This      case    concerns   a
    reinsurance dispute between an American insurance company and a
    Canadian insurance company.            The American company, Plaintiff-
    Appellant OneBeacon America Insurance Company ("OneBeacon"), claims
    that the Canadian company, Defendant-Appellee Aviva Insurance
    Company of Canada ("Aviva"), is obligated to reinsure OneBeacon for
    policies OneBeacon issued to certain entities in the early 1980s.
    Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the
    district court denied summary judgment to OneBeacon and granted
    summary judgment to Aviva. OneBeacon now appeals, challenging both
    summary judgment rulings.        After careful review, we affirm the
    district court's denial of summary judgment to OneBeacon and award
    of summary judgment to Aviva.
    I. Background
    A.   The 1980 OneBeacon Policy and the 1980 Aviva Policy
    In   the   early   1980s,    OneBeacon   and   Aviva    were   both
    affiliated members of the Commercial Union group of insurance
    companies (the two companies are no longer affiliated); OneBeacon
    was based in the U.S., while Aviva was based in Canada.1                     On
    March 28, 1980, OneBeacon issued an insurance policy (the "1980
    OneBeacon Policy") to two U.S.-based subsidiaries of Harrisons &
    Crosfield (Canada) Ltd: Harrisons & Crosfield (America), Inc. and
    1
    During this time period, OneBeacon was known as the Commercial
    Union Insurance Company, and Aviva was known as the Commercial
    Union Assurance Company of Canada.
    -2-
    Harrisons & Crosfield (Pacific) Inc. (collectively, "Harrisons
    US").   The 1980 OneBeacon Policy was effective from March 28, 1980
    through April 1, 1981 and was identified as policy no. C8-9101-002.
    The Policy contained "Endorsement Number 4,"2 (the "1980 OneBeacon
    Endorsement Number 4") which provides:
    It is understood and agreed that this policy
    or any renewal thereof is 100% reinsured by
    [Aviva] policy number 6687287 effective
    3/28/80 to 4/1/81.
    It is further agreed that cancellations of
    this policy C8-9101-002 or any renewal thereof
    or policy 6687287 or any renewal thereof shall
    be reason for automatic cancellations of the
    other policy.
    The premium listed on the 1980 OneBeacon Policy is "Canadian
    $45,530."     The "Producer" code for the 1980 OneBeacon Policy is
    "02-20211."
    Also on March 28, 1980, Aviva issued an insurance policy
    (the "1980 Aviva Policy") to Harrisons & Crosfield (Canada) Ltd.
    ("Harrisons Canada") with the policy no. 6687287.    The 1980 Aviva
    Policy contains a "Differences in Conditions Endorsement" (the
    "1980 Aviva Endorsement"), which states:
    In consideration of the premium charged, the
    Insurer agrees that this policy is placed in
    conjunction with and reinsures Policy No. CL
    C8-9191-002 issued by [OneBeacon], or any
    renewal thereof, in respect of:
    2
    An "endorsement" is "an amendment to an insurance policy."
    Black's Law Dictionary 607 (9th ed. 2009).
    -3-
    Insured: Harrisons & Crosfield(America)Inc.,
    Harrisons & Crosfield(Pacific)Inc.
    . . .
    Exceptions: This insurance differs from the
    policy which it follows in the following
    particulars:
    (a) Premium: $45,530 (Canadian Funds-Deposit)
    The Limit of Liability under either or both
    policies shall not exceed $1,000,000.00 as set
    forth in Policies 6687 and CL C8-9101-002 or
    any renewal policies issued by this Insurer.
    On      November   26,    1980,     Aviva   issued   to   OneBeacon
    "reinsurance     certificate         No.     9009419"    (the    "Facultative
    Certificate")3 for the "reinsurance term" of March 28, 1980 to
    April 1, 1981.        The Facultative Certificate states that Aviva
    reinsures policy no. C8-9101-002 (the 1980 OneBeacon Policy), and
    the   reinsurance    premium   listed      is   $45,530.00   Canadian.     The
    Facultative Certificate's policy period was never extended, nor
    does a separate facultative certificate exist for any subsequent
    policy period.       The Facultative Certificate is the only direct
    written agreement between Aviva and OneBeacon on the record.
    Aviva sent the Facultative Certificate to OneBeacon via
    a letter dated November 26, 1980, along with a check for $4,553
    Canadian.   The letter states: "Further to yours of July 1st, 1980.
    Attached is our Reinsurance Certificate along with our cheque in
    3
    A "facultative certificate" is a "contract of reinsurance
    separately negotiated to cover risk under a single insurance
    policy." Black's Law Dictionary 631 (8th ed. 2004).
    -4-
    the amount of $4,553.00 Canadian being your override commission of
    10% of the premium which was $45,530.00 Canadian."
    B. The 1981 Aviva Endorsement and the 1981 and 1982 OneBeacon
    Policies
    In 1981, OneBeacon issued a policy to Harrisons US,
    effective April 1, 1981 to April 1, 1982, with the policy no. C8-
    9138-002 (the "1981 OneBeacon Policy").           Above the phrase "renewal
    of or previous no." is the policy number C8-9101-002, which
    corresponds to the 1980 OneBeacon Policy.             The named insureds on
    the 1981 OneBeacon Policy are Harrisons US and Harcros Inc.,4 and
    the listed "Additional Insureds" are Harrisons & Crosfield Ltd. and
    Wilkinson Linatex.5      The Producer code for the 1981 OneBeacon
    Policy is "02-20020."          The premium amount listed on the 1981
    OneBeacon Policy is $24,000 U.S.             The 1981 OneBeacon Policy does
    not contain the 1980 OneBeacon Endorsement Number 4 or any similar
    provision indicating that the 1981 OneBeacon Policy was reinsured
    by any Aviva policy.
    Around the same time, Aviva issued an endorsement (the
    "1981 Aviva Endorsement") to the 1980 Aviva Policy that extended
    the   policy   period   from   March    28,    1981   to   March   28,   1982.
    4
    In 1979, Harrisons Canada formed Harcros Inc., a brokerage house
    that placed insurance for Harrisons US and Harrisons Canada between
    1979 and 1986.
    5
    The Additional Insureds are only insured "in respect of their
    direct sales into the United States of America, its territories and
    possessions."
    -5-
    Significantly, the 1981 Aviva Endorsement explicitly excluded
    Harrisons US from coverage under the 1980 Aviva Policy.              The 1981
    Aviva Endorsement provided:
    It is further understood and agreed that the
    following   Corporations   are   specifically
    excluded from this policy which shall not
    inure to their benefit in any way:
    ...
    Harrisons & Crosfield (America) Inc.
    ...
    Harcros Inc.
    ...
    Harrisons & Crosfield (Pacific) Inc.
    In 1982, OneBeacon issued a policy to Harrisons US with
    the   policy   no.   C8-9138-007     (the    "1982     OneBeacon   Policy").
    OneBeacon has not located a copy of the 1982 OneBeacon Policy, but
    the parties agree that the 1982 OneBeacon Policy was a renewal of
    the 1981 Policy.     In addition, in 1982, Aviva again extended the
    term of its policy issued to Harrisons Canada by one year, to
    March 28, 1983.
    C. Premium Evidence
    The   record   contains    a     "ledger"    from   OneBeacon   that
    includes entries pertaining to payments received in connection with
    the Harrisons US policies.     The ledger entry for policy no. 9101-
    002, the 1980 OneBeacon Policy, shows that OneBeacon received a
    premium of $4,252 U.S., even though the premium amount listed on
    -6-
    the 1980 OneBeacon Policy was $45,530 Canadian.         In addition, the
    "reinsurer" column in the entry for the 1980 OneBeacon Policy lists
    a reinsurer identified as "C44."      However, the "reinsurer" column
    of the entry for policy no. 9138-002, the 1981 OneBeacon Policy, is
    left blank, showing no reinsurer at all for the 1981 OneBeacon
    Policy.     This entry also indicates that OneBeacon received a
    $24,000 premium, which corresponds exactly with the premium amount
    listed on the 1981 OneBeacon Policy.       The "reinsurer" column for
    the entry corresponding to the 1982 OneBeacon policy is also blank.
    The ledger does not indicate that OneBeacon ever shared any of the
    premiums it received for the 1981 or 1982 OneBeacon Policies with
    Aviva.
    D. Procedural History
    In 1998, OneBeacon received notice of lawsuits against
    Harrisons   US   for   asbestos-related   injuries.      Based   upon    the
    coverage it issued to Harrisons US under the 1980, 1981, and 1982
    OneBeacon Policies, OneBeacon entered into a defense cost-sharing
    arrangement with Harrisons US's other insurers for claims arising
    from the covered period.      In November 2007, OneBeacon requested
    that   Aviva   fully   indemnify   OneBeacon   for    costs   incurred    in
    connection with the Harrisons US claims.       Aviva responded that it
    would reimburse OneBeacon for only one-third of defense expenses
    and indemnity payments.
    -7-
    On February 2, 2010, OneBeacon filed suit against Aviva
    in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
    OneBeacon   sought   a   declaration   that    Aviva   had   a   contractual
    obligation to reinsure the 1980, 1981, and 1982 OneBeacon Policies
    issued to Harrisons US, and also sought damages for Aviva's alleged
    breach of contract.      On June 24, 2011, OneBeacon and Aviva filed
    cross-motions for summary judgment.            On August 18, 2011, the
    district court denied OneBeacon's motion and granted Aviva's.           See
    OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 
    804 F. Supp. 2d 77
     (D. Mass. 2011).     The court pointed out that the Facultative
    Certificate was the only contract on the record between the two
    parties.    See 
    id. at 87
    .     The court then held that because the
    Facultative Certificate unambiguously stated that the term of
    reinsurance ended after April 1, 1981, Aviva did not reinsure the
    1981 or 1982 OneBeacon Policies.       
    Id.
        The court further concluded
    that the other evidence on the record also suggested that Aviva
    reinsured only the 1980 OneBeacon Policy.         
    Id. at 86-88
    .
    OneBeacon now appeals both the denial of its motion for
    summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment to Aviva.
    II.   Discussion
    A.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law
    We review a grant or denial of summary judgment by the
    district court de novo.     Sarsfield v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
    
    335 F. App'x 63
    , 65 (1st Cir. 2009).         "[W]e are not married to the
    -8-
    trial   court's    reasoning   but,    rather,   may   affirm    on   any
    independently sufficient ground made manifest by the record."
    Cahoon v. Shelton, 
    647 F.3d 18
    , 22 (1st Cir. 2011).             Where, as
    here, we are presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, we
    "must view each motion, separately," in the light most favorable to
    the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in that
    party's favor.    Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 
    602 F.3d 34
    , 40
    (1st Cir. 2010).     "The presence of cross-motions neither dilutes
    nor distorts [the de novo] standard of review," Mass. Museum of
    Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 
    593 F.3d 38
    , 52 (1st Cir.
    2010)(internal quotation marks omitted), and thus we are obligated
    to make a determination "based on undisputed facts whether either
    the plaintiffs or the defendants deserve judgment as a matter of
    law."   Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co. (Europe) Ltd, 
    633 F.3d 50
    , 53 (1st Cir. 2011).
    In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the
    moving party must show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any
    material fact" and that it "is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law."   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Baltodano v. Merk, Sharp, and
    Dohme (I.A.) Corp., 
    637 F.3d 38
    , 41 (1st Cir. 2011).        "A fact is
    material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome
    of the suit under applicable law."       Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial
    P.R. Wireless Corp., 
    217 F.3d 46
    , 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). On issues where the movant does not have
    -9-
    the burden of proof at trial, the movant can succeed on summary
    judgment by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to
    support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 325 (1986).
    Both parties applied Massachusetts law in their arguments
    before the district court, and both apply Massachusetts law in
    their arguments before this Court. "[A] diversity court is free to
    honor the parties' reasonable agreement" regarding which state's
    law applies.     Artuso v. Vertex Pharms., Inc., 
    637 F.3d 1
    , 5 (1st
    Cir. 2011) (citing Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 
    935 F.2d 370
    , 375 (1st Cir. 1991)).      Thus, we apply Massachusetts law in
    this case.
    Under Massachusetts law, the insured bears the burden of
    demonstrating that a claim falls within a policy's affirmative
    grant of coverage.    Markline Co. v. Travelers Inc. Co., 
    424 N.E.2d 464
    , 465 (Mass. 1981).     Therefore, as the party seeking insurance
    coverage, it is OneBeacon's burden to prove that Aviva agreed to
    reinsure the 1981 and 1982 OneBeacon Policies.
    "The interpretation of an insurance contract and the
    application of policy language to known facts present questions of
    law for the judge to decide."        Sarsfield, 335 F. App'x at 65
    (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Merchs. Ins. Co. v.
    U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 
    143 F.3d 5
    , 8 (1st Cir. 1998).           The
    interpretation of an insurance contract should be "according to the
    -10-
    fair and reasonable meaning of the words in which the agreement of
    the parties is expressed."       Allmerica Fin. Corp.    v. Certain
    Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 
    871 N.E.2d 418
    , 425 (Mass. 2007)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, every word in an
    insurance contract "must be presumed to have been employed with a
    purpose and must be given meaning and effect whenever practicable."
    
    Id.
    B.    OneBeacon's Motion for Summary Judgment
    To prevail on summary judgment, OneBeacon must show that
    there are no material facts in dispute and that as a matter of law
    Aviva provided reinsurance coverage for both the 1981 OneBeacon
    Policy and the 1982 OneBeacon Policy. As the district court noted,
    the only direct agreement between OneBeacon and Aviva in the record
    is the Facultative Certificate, which clearly indicates that the
    term of Aviva's reinsurance obligation was from March 28, 1980 to
    April 1, 1981.   OneBeacon argues that the agreement between it and
    Aviva was created by the 1980 OneBeacon and Aviva Policies rather
    than by the Facultative Certificate.    OneBeacon contends that the
    1980 Aviva Policy reinsures the 1980 OneBeacon Policy and any
    renewals, and that the Facultative Certificate, which was issued
    several months after the 1980 Policies, was a mere confirmation of
    the reinsurance relationship that already existed between the two
    insurance companies.
    -11-
    However, even if we assume arguendo that the 1980 Aviva
    and OneBeacon Policies formed the parties' agreement in 1980, this
    does   not   help    OneBeacon.       For    if   the    various    1980   policies
    established the original agreement between the parties, the record
    makes clear that the parties changed the terms of their agreement
    in 1981.
    The 1981 Aviva Endorsement explicitly changed the scope
    of Aviva's obligations.        The Differences in Condition Endorsement
    in the original 1980 Aviva Policy stated that Aviva would reinsure
    OneBeacon's coverage to Harrisons US.                   However, the 1981 Aviva
    Endorsement stated that Harrisons US was "specifically excluded
    from this policy which shall not inure to [its] benefit in any way"
    (emphasis    added).        OneBeacon       suggests     that   the    1981   Aviva
    Endorsement only eliminated Aviva's direct insurance obligations to
    Harrisons    US     while   leaving   undisturbed         Aviva's     agreement   to
    reinsure the 1980 OneBeacon policy and its renewals.                   But the 1981
    Aviva Endorsement explicitly states that it "form[s] part of Policy
    No. 6687287" (i.e., the 1980 Aviva Policy) and that it excludes
    Harrison US from that policy entirely.             Moreover, OneBeacon claims
    in its reply brief that "the very heart of [OneBeacon's] case" is
    that Policy No. 6687287 and the 1980 OneBeacon policy combine to
    "provide the terms of the Reinsurance Agreement between OneBeacon
    and Aviva."       Yet given that Harrisons US is excluded from Policy
    No. 6687287, and given that Aviva is not a party to the 1980
    -12-
    OneBeacon policy, it defies logic to say that the two policies in
    combination      create   an   ongoing    obligation   that   Aviva      reinsure
    OneBeacon with respect to Harrisons US.             As amended, Policy No.
    6687287 has nothing to do with Harrisons US (Harrisons US is
    "specifically excluded from this policy"), and the 1980 OneBeacon
    policy on its own cannot bind Aviva (a non-party to that policy).
    Moreover, the 1981 OneBeacon Policy, which OneBeacon
    claims is a renewal of its 1980 Policy, does not contain the 1980
    OneBeacon Endorsement Number 4 or any similar provision indicating
    that the 1981 OneBeacon Policy was reinsured by Aviva.                         This
    omission is consistent with Aviva terminating its reinsurance
    relationship with OneBeacon and OneBeacon taking on the ultimate
    insurance risk for Harrisons US in the 1981 policy period.
    Similarly, there is no indication that the 1982 OneBeacon Policy
    had   the   1980    OneBeacon    Endorsement    Number    4   or   any    similar
    provision.       Thus, in contrast to the 1980 OneBeacon policy, the
    1981 and 1982 OneBeacon Policies did not tell Harrisons US that
    Aviva was standing behind OneBeacon as the reinsurer.
    Furthermore, if there is some ambiguity regarding the
    meaning of the 1981 Aviva Endorsement and the 1981 OneBeacon
    Policy, Massachusetts law allows us to examine the extrinsic
    evidence    to     determine    whether   the   parties   intended       for    the
    reinsurance arrangement to continue after the end of the first
    year.   See Den norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank, 
    75 F.3d 49
    , 52
    -13-
    (1st Cir. 1996) ("Although not admissible either to contradict or
    alter express terms, extrinsic evidence is admissible to assist the
    factfinder in ascertaining the intent of the parties as imperfectly
    expressed in ambiguous contract language." (citing Robert Indus.,
    Inc. v. Spence, 
    291 N.E.2d 407
    , 410 (Mass. 1973))).                       Here, the
    extrinsic evidence on the record convinces us that the reinsurance
    arrangement did not continue.
    Firstly,     the     fact    that     there     is    no    Facultative
    Certificate between Aviva and OneBeacon for the second and third
    policy   years   suggests     that     the    relationship      between    the   two
    companies changed after the first year.                    Secondly, and most
    importantly, the evidence regarding the flow of premium payments
    supports the view that Aviva terminated its reinsurance obligation
    after the first year.         In the first year, in which both parties
    agree that Aviva reinsured OneBeacon, Aviva received a premium
    payment of $45,530 Canadian and remitted a 10% fee to OneBeacon.
    Moreover, the OneBeacon ledger shows that there was a reinsurer for
    the 1980 OneBeacon policy -- identified with the code "C44."                        In
    the second year, however, the OneBeacon ledger reflects that
    OneBeacon directly received the full $24,000 U.S. premium payment.
    Furthermore,     the   ledger   does     not    indicate    that      there   was   a
    reinsurer for the 1981 or 1982 OneBeacon Policies.                         Further,
    OneBeacon has not pointed to any evidence that it shared the
    second- or third-year premium with Aviva.                OneBeacon would have
    -14-
    this Court reach a result that OneBeacon kept all of the premiums
    for the 1981 and 1982 policy years, but that it bore none of the
    risk.   Such a conclusion would defy economic sense.
    Because there is no evidence that Aviva agreed to provide
    reinsurance beyond the term of the first policy year, OneBeacon is
    not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.          Accordingly, we
    affirm the district court's denial of OneBeacon's summary judgment
    motion.
    C.   Aviva's Motion for Summary Judgment
    As discussed above, the Facultative Certificate, which is
    the only direct agreement between the parties on the record,
    unambiguously    provides   that    Aviva's   reinsurance   obligation
    terminated after April 1, 1981.           Further, also as previously
    discussed, even if we assume arguendo that the 1980 Aviva and
    OneBeacon Policies, rather than the Facultative Certificate, formed
    the original agreement between the parties, OneBeacon cannot show
    that the original agreement lasted beyond the end of the first
    policy year.    As explained above, both the language of subsequent
    documents (the 1981 Aviva Endorsement and the 1981 OneBeacon
    Policy) and the extrinsic evidence (the premium payments and the
    lack of additional facultative certificates) show that whatever
    reinsurance arrangement between OneBeacon and Aviva that existed in
    the first policy year terminated at the end of that year.
    -15-
    Since   it   is   OneBeacon's   burden   to   prove   Aviva's
    reinsurance obligation, which OneBeacon cannot do, summary judgment
    for Aviva was appropriate.     Accordingly, we affirm the grant of
    summary judgment to Aviva.
    III. Conclusion
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    -16-