United States v. Antoine ( 1997 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 95-2246
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
GUILIANO ANTOINE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Hill and John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judges.
Charles P. McGinty, Federal Defender Office, for appellant.
James
F.
Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Donald K. Stern
, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
September 15, 1997
Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
HILL,
Senior Circuit Judge
. Guiliano Antoine was charged
with conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing in firearms
without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, and with the
substantive offense of engaging in the business of dealing in
firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
S 922(a)(1)(A). At trial, the court admitted evidence of flight
and instructed the jury regarding that evidence. Antoine was
convicted. This appeal ensued.
I.
The government's principal witness at trial was Roy
Boone. Boone testified that he cooperated with Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agents as required by his plea
agreement on firearms charges against him. The government believed
Antoine had been illegally purchasing guns from Boone. Boone
agreed to offer to sell more guns to Antoine and to allow the
government to record his conversations with Antoine and set up the
arrangements for the "buy."
Boone contacted Antoine and offered to sell him nine
millimeter handguns. Boone told Antoine to meet him at a motel
near Boston to see the guns. A video camera hidden in the room
recorded the events. Antoine and two companions arrived and
examined the guns (provided by the ATF). Boone and Antoine
negotiated a price for the guns. Antoine stated that he was low on
cash, but gave Boone a $250 deposit for several of the guns and
promised to pay the rest and collect the guns later that night.
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As soon as Antoine and his companions left the motel
room, ATF agents and Boston Police officers moved in to arrest
them. An ATF agent testified without objection that Antoine ran
across the parking lot "attempting to flee." The agent gave chase,
and Antoine was apprehended.
Antoine was indicted and charged with conspiracy to deal
in and dealing in firearms without a license. On the fifth day of
his trial, just prior to the closing arguments, the court held a
brief charge conference (having held a more lengthy conference the
day before). The court indicated sua
sponte that it was
considering giving a consciousness of guilt instruction based on
the testimony that Antoine had fled from police immediately prior
to his arrest. After much discussion with counsel, the court gave
the following instruction:
In determining whether the government met
its burden of proving the defendant acted
wilfully--remember we discussed this
before--how do you decide someone's state
of mind? You may consider the direct
evidence before you, as well as the
circumstantial evidence as to his state of
mind.
The one thing that you can also consider
is you've heard testimony that Mr. Antoine
at one point fled right after the purchase
of--well, right after whatever happened in
that motel room.
The government claims that the flight or
the--
(Pause.)
Well, let me just say, if you do find that
the defendant did flee, if you find that
he fled, you're permitted to consider
whether such actions indicate feelings of
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guilt by Mr. Antoine and whether in terms
of feeling guilt might tend to show actual
guilt on these charges.
You are not required to draw such
inferences and you should not do so unless
they appear to be reasonable in light of
all the circumstances of the case.
If you decide that such inferences are
reasonable, it will be up to you to decide
how much importance to give them. But you
should always remember that there may be
many reasons why an innocent person might
flee. Such conduct does not necessarily
reflect feelings of guilt. Please bear in
mind that a person who's innocent might
flee and a person having feelings of guilt
is not necessarily guilty in fact.
Because such feelings are sometimes found
in innocent people.
If you find that the defendant did flee,
the government has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, in order to divert
suspicion or for any other reason that you
find reflect feelings of guilt, you may,
but are not required to, infer that Mr.
Antoine believed that he was guilty. You
may not, however, infer on this basis
alone that the defendant is, in fact,
guilty of the crime for which he is
charged. Whether or not the evidence as
to the defendant's statements--excuse me,
to the defendant's fleeing shows that Mr.
Antoine believed that he was guilty and
the significance, if any, to be attached
to any such evidence of flight are matters
for you, the jury, to decide.
But first you have to decide beyond a
reasonable doubt whether or not the
government has proven that he fled and
then you have to decide what inference, if
any, to draw from that.
At the conclusion of the charge, defense counsel objected
to the consciousness of guilt instruction, noting that while the
court had cautioned the jury that an innocent person might flee, it
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had not also stated that a person "might flee from something he
perceived as a crime, which conduct doesn't bear on" the charged
offense. After consultation, the court gave the following
supplemental instruction:
[O]n the tail-end of the charge, I talked
to you briefly about what weight, if any,
you were going to give to flight. And I
just want to point out to you, that not
only do sometimes innocent people flee,
but sometimes people can be guilty of a
crime or think that they are guilty of a
crime and flee. But that crime may have
absolutely nothing to do with the crime
charged here.
So that you have to decide whether or not
the government has proven flight and
whether or not there's any inference to be
drawn from that, given the crime charged
here. Not some other crime or some other
perception, but the crime charged here.
Following the supplemental instruction, the court
inquired whether either party had any further concerns about the
charge. Both counsel said that they had none.
II.
Antoine raises only one issue on appeal--whether the
district court abused its discretion by giving a consciousness of
guilt jury instruction that was based on his attempt to flee from
the arresting officers. We hold that it did not.
Evidence of flight may be admitted at trial as indicative
of a guilty mind, so long as there is an adequate factual predicate
creating an inference of guilt of the crime charged.
United States
v. Camilo
Montoya, 917 F.2d 680, 683 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting
United
States v. Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir.
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1988)). There was an adequate factual predicate for the charge
given in this case.
The evidence at trial established that Antoine and Boone
had an agreement whereby Boone would purchase handguns in Georgia,
transport them to Boston, and sell them to Antoine. Pursuant to
this agreement, Boone purchased guns in Georgia which he
subsequently sold to Antoine in Boston. After being confronted by
ATF agents and agreeing to cooperate with their investigation,
Boone had one electronically monitored meeting and several
telephone conversations with Antoine in which they discussed
Antoine's purchase of additional handguns from Boone. Antoine went
to Boone's motel room for the express purpose of viewing the
handguns. In the room, Antoine and two companions viewed the guns,
selected certain of them for purchase, and Antoine made a partial
payment to Boone for the weapons. Antoine told Boone he would pay
for and take custody of the remaining guns later that same night
after he acquired more money. After exiting the room, Antoine and
the other two men attempted to flee on foot from the agents. The
flight evidence was admitted without objection.
These facts establish a completely adequate factual
predicate for the crimes charged against Antoine. Under these
facts, the jury could reasonably infer that Antoine was guilty of
illegal dealing in arms. The jury could also reasonably infer that
Antoine ran from authorities because he believed his conspiratorial
gun dealing activities with Boone had been discovered, i.e., that
he was conscious of his guilt. Based on the presence of numerous
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agents and police officers outside the motel room, a reasonable
jury could have inferred that Antoine fled because he recognized
that he had been "set up" by Boone and that the authorities were
well aware of their prior course of illegal conduct. See, e.g.,
United
States v. Romero-Carrion, 54 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1995)
(attempt to flee evidences a keen consciousness of guilt); United
States v.
Luciano-Mosquero, 63 F.3d 1142, 1156 (1st Cir. 1995) (as
long as there is an adequate factual predicate supporting an
inference of guilt on the crime charged, evidence of flight may be
admitted to show consciousness of guilt).
Antoine argues that his flight merely reflected knowledge
that he had just left a motel room full of guns, not that he
intended to buy any. If so, the fact of flight would not support
any inference of guilt as to the offenses charged.
The court, however, very carefully and fully instructed
the jury that Antoine's flight may have been for innocent reasons.
The court reminded the jury that they need not draw any conclusions
from the flight evidence and to weigh the importance of such
inferences should they find them reasonable. This instruction did
not invite the jury to convict based upon an inference of guilt as
to another crime, and was not an abuse of discretion. See United
Antoine also argues that the court's instruction allowed the jury
to infer from flight that he knew of the federal license
requirement for dealing in firearms--a necessary component of the
willfulness element of the gun-dealing charge. This argument is
without merit. The other evidence was sufficient to permit the
jury to infer that Antoine knew his course of conduct was illegal.
The jury was instructed that they might infer from flight that
Antoine was conscious of his guilt.
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States v. Hernandez, 995 F.2d 307, 314-15 (1st Cir. 1993)
(significance of evidence of flight is for the jury) (citing
Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d at 52); United
States v. Noone, 913
F.2d 20, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1991) (no error if flight instruction sets
out appropriate legal framework for jury consideration of
contention that accused fled for entirely innocent reasons);
United
States v. Camilo
Montoya, 917 F.2d 680, 683 (1st Cir. 1990) (no
error if flight instruction has a solid evidentiary basis and the
instruction a correct statement of the law). See
also United
States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371, 373 (11th Cir. 1996) (where the
act for which defendant claims to have fled and the offense charged
are sufficiently related, evidence of flight and a consciousness of
guilt instruction are not abuse of discretion).
III.
Antoine did not object to the admission of evidence of
his flight from the scene of the crime charged to him. The jury
heard this evidence, and they were permitted to consider it. The
court undertook to instruct them as to its proper use. The court
cautioned the jury against overly broad inferences, and against any
inference at all if they felt it unreasonable to do so. The
instruction was not an abuse of discretion. The conviction is
affirmed.
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