Wells v. Monarch Corporation ( 1997 )


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  • [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 97-1221
    CHANNING M. WELLS III, ROBERT R. JUENGST,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    MONARCH CAPITAL CORPORATION, ET AL.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. A. David Mazzone, Senior U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Hill,* Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
    Edward  F. Haber, with  whom Thomas G.  Shapiro, Michelle H.
    Blauner, Shapiro Haber  & Urmy LLP, Herbert E.  Milstein, Lisa M.
    Mezzetti,  Cohen,   Milstein,  Hausfeld  &  Toll,  P.L.L.C.,  and
    Calhoun,   Benzin,  Kademenos  &   Heichel  were  on   brief  for
    appellants.
    Thomas L. Riesenberg, with whom  Ernst & Young LLP, Irvin B.
    Nathan, Andrew T. Karron, Arnold  & Porter, Kathryn A. Oberly and
    William P. Hammer were on brief for appellees.
    OCTOBER 29, 1997
    *  Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Per Curiam.  In this case the district court found that
    Per Curiam.
    no  reasonable trier  of  fact  could  conclude  that  Defendant-
    Appellee Ernst & Young LLP  (E&Y) had engaged in securities fraud
    and granted its  motion for summary judgment.   For the following
    reasons, we affirm.
    I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    This appeal from summary judgment is all that remains from a
    shareholder class  action filed in 1991  by Plaintiffs-Appellants
    Channing M. Wells, III et al. (the Class)1 under Section 10(b) of
    the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.   78j(b), and Rule
    10b-5  promulgated thereunder,  17  C.F.R.    240.10b-5,  against
    Monarch Capital Corporation  (Monarch Capital), its  wholly owned
    and  largest subsidiary,  Monarch  Life  Insurance  Co.  (Monarch
    Life), and  Monarch Life s  wholly owned  subsidiary, Springfield
    Life Insurance  Co., Inc.  (Springfield Life)  (collectively, the
    Monarch Defendants),  and E&Y.  Fourteen months  after filing the
    complaint, the Class settled with the Monarch Defendants for $4.7
    million.   Following the settlement, the only remaining defendant
    was E&Y.  The gravamen of the Class complaint against E&Y alleged
    that E&Y violated federal securities laws and state law by making
    material misrepresentations  in (and omissions from)  the Monarch
    Defendants   1989  consolidated financial  statements  (and E&Y s
    1   Wells  represented  a class  of  shareholders  who  purchased
    Monarch Capital stock between November 10, 1989, and November 14,
    1990, at prices ranging from $16 1/8 to $4 3/8 per share.
    -2-
    accompanying 1990 audit  opinion) with scienter.  It  did so, the
    Class alleged,  by materially overstating the  statutory surplus2
    of Monarch  Capital s subsidiaries, more particularly,  the value
    of the Cash Management Account (CMA).  See Part II.B. infra.  The
    end result of these actions, the Class complained, was to mislead
    investors  by   artificially  inflating  the   price  of  Monarch
    Capital s stock.
    After  the 1992 settlement,  the case remained  stagnant for
    three years.3  Then, in March 1995, the district court sua sponte
    scheduled a status  conference.  Three months later,  E&Y filed a
    motion for  summary judgment.   In response, the Class  filed its
    opposition  to E&Y s  motion and  a motion  for  leave to  file a
    Second Amended  Class  Action Complaint.   In  January 1996,  the
    Class   filed  its  own  motion  for  partial  summary  judgment.
    Stating,  in its forty-five  page opinion, that   Plaintiffs [the
    Class]  virtually abandoned the case,  the district court granted
    summary  judgment  for  E&Y  on the  Class   claims  for  primary
    liability  under Section  10(b) and  denied  the Class   motions.
    2  An insurance company s  statutory surplus  is comprised of its
    admitted   assets    (or   statutory  assets   minus   statutory
    liabilities).
    3  During this period of inactivity, the Supreme Court issued its
    decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
    of  Denver, N.A.,  
    511 U.S. 164
    (1994),  holding that  a private
    plaintiff  may not  maintain an  aiding and  abetting suit  under
    Section 10(b) as  the text of the  1934 Act does not itself reach
    those who aid and  abet a   10(b) violation.    
    Id. at 177.
      The
    district  court found,  after  Central  Bank,  that  all  pending
    secondary  liability claims against  E&Y were barred  and granted
    summary judgment  in favor  of E&Y on  all claims for  aiding and
    abetting.
    -3-
    This appeal follows.
    II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    A.  Monarch Capital - the Parent Holding Company
    Monarch Capital was  a typical financial holding  company of
    the  1970s  and 1980s.    Its operations  included  insurance and
    insurance services, corporate, real estate investment and venture
    capital,  and investment  management.   For  nearly two  decades,
    Monarch Capital  centered its focus on its  real estate business.
    By 1989,  it was  clear that this  focus was  in error.   Monarch
    Capital  was in severe  financial distress, with  reported losses
    totaling millions  of dollars.   Even its president, in  his 1989
    annual  report to  shareholders,  conceded that   [o]ur financial
    results  for the  past two  years have been  very disappointing.
    Monarch  Capital announced plans to terminate its capital markets
    and  real estate  operations and  concentrate  on its  profitable
    insurance  sector.   Despite vows  to  pull out  of its  downward
    spiral,  Monarch  Capital continued  to  deteriorate financially.
    The present  action struck the  death knell blow;  parent Monarch
    Capital was forced  into bankruptcy4 and subsidiary  Monarch Life
    was   placed  in  receivership  by  the  Massachusetts  insurance
    4  The bankruptcy action stayed the Class  claims against Monarch
    Capital.   When  the  settlement  agreement  was  finalized,  the
    bankruptcy court approved Monarch Capital s reorganization  plan,
    discharging and releasing the Class  claims against it.
    -4-
    commissioner.5
    5   Monarch Life was  regulated by the Commissioner  of Insurance
    for  the Commonwealth  of Massachusetts.   As  a state  regulated
    insurance company,  it was  required to  file annual  statements,
    Mass. Gen. L. ch. 175    25, annual audited financial statements,
    211  C.M.R.  Part  19:01, et  seq.,  and  registration statements
    containing current information  about material transactions, such
    as loans, between it and its  unregulated parent holding company.
    Mass. Gen.  L. ch.  175   193N(b)(iii)(1).   Under  Massachusetts
    law,  an  insurance  company  is  prohibited  from  including  an
    unsecured loan  to its  parent holding  company in its   admitted
    assets  and  statutory surplus.   Mass. Gen. L. ch. 175   11; see
    
    note 2 supra
    .
    -5-
    B.  The Cash Management Account (CMA)
    Monarch  Capital  established  the CMA  for  itself  and its
    subsidiaries in 1985.  It was formalized in 1986 by  a Short-Term
    Investment Pool Agreement (STIP).  Pursuant to  the STIP, Monarch
    Capital, Monarch Life, and Springfield  Life agreed to pool, on a
    daily basis,  any available  cash into the  CMA.6   A STIP  party
    requiring funds could  draw upon the CMA to  meet operating costs
    and obtain them from the  CMA at short-term interest rates.   The
    STIP agreement  provided that pooled funds would  be available to
    the depositing company in cash on  a demand basis.7  The official
    purpose of  the CMA was  to minimize administrative  expenses and
    external borrowing costs,  and maximize investment returns.   The
    unofficial purpose of the CMA,  the Class contended, was to offer
    an unsecured,  unregulated line of  credit to a  faltering parent
    and enable  it to obtain  illegal dividends.8  The  Class accused
    6  Springfield Life was a Vermont corporation.  Vermont insurance
    regulators initially  questioned Springfield Life s  inclusion of
    the CMA investment in its statutory surplus, but acquiesced after
    the  STIP was  formalized.    Another  one of  Monarch  Capital s
    subsidiaries,  First  Variable  Life  Insurance  Company   (First
    Variable), an Arkansas corporation, was  an original party to the
    STIP.    When   the  Arkansas  Department  of   Insurance  raised
    objections to the CMA, First Variable ceased participation in the
    STIP.
    7  Monarch  Capital disclosed the existence  of the CMA to  state
    insurance regulators  in June  1986, in  an amended  registration
    statement.  It declared that it had $125 million in bank lines of
    credit with  which to  guarantee on  demand  the availability  of
    funds to the STIP participants.
    8   Under Massachusetts insurance  laws, Monarch  Life could  pay
    dividends  to Monarch Capital  only out of  its statutory surplus
    and  only if its statutory  surplus (after paying such dividends)
    was reasonable  in relation  to its  outstanding liabilities  and
    adequate  for its  financial  needs.   Mass. Gen.  L.  ch. 175
    -6-
    the  Monarch Defendants  of abusing the  CMA by using  it to fund
    Monarch Capital s long-term, speculative real estate  activities.
    After settling with  the Monarch Defendants, the Class turned its
    attention to E&Y s role in this sequence of events.
    C.  The 1989  Audited Consolidated Financial Statements and  1990
    Unqualified Opinion of E&Y as to the CMA
    By December  31, 1989,  outstanding loans via  the CMA  from
    Monarch Life  to Monarch Capital  were $110.6 million;  they were
    $15.1  million   from  Springfield   Life  to   Monarch  Capital.
    Together,  the  combined   CMA  balances  of  Monarch   Life  and
    Springfield Life were  approximately $125 million.   E&Y included
    this  approximately $125  million figure  as part  of  the $138.1
    million  (statutory   basis)  stockholder s  equity   of  Monarch
    Capital s  life  insurance  subsidiaries  at  December  31,  1989
    (Footnote  F  to  Monarch Capital s  1989  consolidated financial
    statements)9  and  issued  a  report  in  1990  concerning  those
    193N(j)-(1).
    9  Footnote F states in pertinent part:
    Retained earnings include  adjustments from a
    statutory  basis  to   a  generally  accepted
    accounting   principles    basis   for    the
    Corporation s  life  insurance   subsidiaries
    that are  not available  for distribution  by
    the   Corporation  at   December  31,   1989.
    Stockholder s  equity  of  these subsidiaries
    available for distribution,  loan or advances
    to  the  Corporation  was $136.5  million  at
    December  31,  1989;   however,  payments  of
    dividends  from  this  amount  under  certain
    conditions   would   require    approval   by
    regulatory authorities.
    Statutory basis stockholder s  equity of
    -7-
    financial statements.10
    1.  The Contentions of the Class.
    The Class claims that E&Y committed securities fraud when it
    intentionally  misrepresented to  Monarch Capital  investors that
    Monarch Capital s life insurance subsidiaries had $138 million in
    statutory  surplus  or  restricted  assets  (not  available   for
    distribution  to Monarch  Capital under Massachusetts  law), when
    over  $125  million   of  the  $138  million   had  already  been
    distributed to Monarch  Capital and spent  by December 31,  1989.
    E&Y  accomplished  this  fraud, avers  the  Class,  by improperly
    including  the CMA balances of Monarch  Life and Springfield Life
    ($110.6   million  and  $15.1   million,  respectively)   in  the
    computation of statutory surplus used to determine the (statutory
    basis) stockholder s equity of each insurance company.  The Class
    the Corporation s life insurance subsidiaries
    was  $138.1  million  and $141.9  million  at
    December  31,  1989  and  1988,  respectively
    . . . .
    10   The February 12, 1990,  Report  of Ernst & Young Independent
    Auditors  states in pertinent part:
    We have audited the accompanying consolidated
    statements of financial  condition of Monarch
    Capital Corporation [and  subsidiaries] as of
    December 31, 1989 . . . .
    We  conducted our  audits in  accordance with
    generally accepted auditing standards . . . .
    In  our  opinion,  the  financial  statements
    referred  to  above  present  fairly, in  all
    material respects, the consolidated financial
    condition of Monarch  Capital Corporation and
    subsidiaries  at December 31,  1989 . .  . in
    conformity with generally accepted accounting
    principles.
    -8-
    claims that  the E&Y  overstatements on  the Monarch  Defendants
    1989  consolidated  financial  statements and  1990  report  were
    material,  lulling the  investing public  into a  false  sense of
    liquidity,  and  were  made  with  the  requisite  Section  10(b)
    scienter necessary to establish securities fraud.
    2.  The Contentions of E&Y.
    Countering  that this is  not a negligence  case, E&Y claims
    that, by  including CMA assets  in its computations  of statutory
    surplus, it acted without requisite Section 10(b) scienter, as it
    relied on the opinion of state insurance examiners.  E&Y contends
    that it  is uncontroverted in  the record that  the Massachusetts
    insurance  regulators,  with  jurisdiction   over  Monarch  Life,
    concluded in a regulatory examination  report, issued only a  few
    months  before  its  1990  report,  that  the  CMA  was  properly
    includable  when  calculating   a  life  insurance   subsidiary s
    statutory  surplus and that  E&Y explicitly read  and relied upon
    this conclusion  by noting  in its work  papers:  [the]  State of
    Massachusetts  has approved  the  carrying  of  the [CMA]  as  an
    admitted asset.  This balance should be considered admissible. 11
    E&Y claims that  neither the Class nor  market professionals
    relied  upon  its   purported  overstatements  in   making  their
    investment decisions or recommendations.   Further, E&Y  contends
    that  three  of  its   partners  contemporaneously  performed  or
    reviewed  their  own  independent   and  internal  collectibility
    11   E&Y claims that its auditors even raised this issue directly
    with  the Massachusetts  regulators who  confirmed  that the  CMA
    should be included as a statutory asset of Monarch Life.
    -9-
    analyses  and determined  that  Monarch  Life s  and  Springfield
    Life s $125 million  CMA investment was collectible  from Monarch
    Capital.
    III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review  the grant by  the district court of  E&Y s motion
    for  summary judgment de  novo.  Merino Calenti  v. Boto, 
    24 F.3d 335
    , 338 (1st Cir.  1994).  The district court  viewed the record
    in  the  light most  favorable  to  the  Class and  indulged  all
    inferences in favor of the Class.  Lucia v.  Prospect Street High
    Income  Portfolio, Inc.,  
    36 F.3d 170
    ,  174 (1st Cir.  1994).  To
    defeat summary  judgment, the  Class must  present facts  showing
    there  is a  genuine issue  for trial.   See  Mulero-Rodr guez v.
    Ponte, Inc., 
    98 F.3d 670
    , 673 (1st Cir. 1996).
    IV.  DISCUSSION
    A.  The District Court Opinion
    After Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First  Interstate Bank
    of Denver,  N.A., 
    511 U.S. 164
    (1994), the district  court found
    that  a claim of  securities fraud under  Section 10(b) prohibits
    only the making of a  material misstatement (or omission) or the
    commission of  a manipulative  act  and that  its text   does not
    itself  reach [secondary  actors] who  aid  and abet  a [Section]
    10(b) violation.   
    Id. at 177;
    see 
    note 3 supra
    .  It then focused
    -10-
    its  analysis on the  Class  remaining primary  liability claims,
    i.e., those based upon E&Y s 1990 audit opinion regarding Monarch
    Capital s  1989 financial  statements,  as  published in  Monarch
    Capital s 1989 annual report and its 1989 Form 10K.
    As  to these  documents, the  district court found  that the
    record failed  to show that  E&Y made a material  misstatement or
    omission affecting the purchase or sale of Monarch Capital stock.
    See SEC v. MacDonald, 
    699 F.2d 47
    , 49 (1st Cir. 1983)(substantial
    likelihood that  misstatements were  actually significant  in the
    deliberations of a  reasonable shareholder).  It  also found that
    the  record failed  to  show that  any E&Y  misrepresentations or
    omissions,  purportedly relied upon by  the Class, were made with
    Section 10(b)  scienter.  Ernst  & Ernst v. Hochfelder,  
    425 U.S. 185
    (1976) (section 10(b) cannot  be read to impose liability for
    negligent  conduct  alone).   The  district  court  granted E&Y s
    motion for summary judgment.  Under a  de novo review, we examine
    each element separately.
    B.  The Element of Materiality
    In most  circumstances,  disputes over  the  materiality  of
    allegedly false or misleading statements must be reserved for the
    trier of  fact.  Shaw v.  Digital Equipment Corp., 
    82 F.3d 1194
    ,
    1217  (1st Cir. 1996); see Basic  Inc. v. Levinson, 
    485 U.S. 224
    ,
    236 (1988);  
    Lucia, 36 F.3d at 176
    .   But  not every unfulfilled
    expression  of  corporate  optimism,  even  if  characterized  as
    misstatement, can  give rise  to a genuine  issue of  materiality
    under the  securities laws.    
    Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1217
    ;  Lucia, 36
    -11-
    F.3d at 176  (leaving open the possibility  that some materiality
    determinations  may  be made  as  a  matter  of law).     Summary
    judgment is warranted . . .  if reasonable minds could not differ
    as to the materiality of the undisclosed information.   Milton v.
    Van Dorn Co., 
    961 F.2d 965
    , 970 (1st Cir. 1992).   The mere fact
    that  an investor might find information interesting or desirable
    is   not  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  materiality  requirement.
    Rather,  information is  material   only if its  disclosure would
    alter  the  total mix  of facts available to the investor and  if
    there is a  substantial likelihood that a  reasonable shareholder
    would consider it important  to the investment decision.   
    Id. at 969
    (emphasis in  original) (citing 
    Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32
    );
    see also 
    Lucia, 36 F.3d at 174
    .
    Here, the district court found that all material information
    about the CMA was disclosed.  It determined that a jury could not
    have  concluded  that  E&Y made  material  misrepresentations  or
    omissions in its  1990 opinion because the opinion  did not alter
    the  total mix   of information available to the  Class.  
    Milton, 961 F.2d at 972
    .    Other public  filings,  the district  court
    reasoned, were  available to the  Class and clearly  revealed the
    existence and true nature of the CMA.12
    12  These public filings included:  Monarch Capital s 1989 annual
    report   and  Form  10K;  the  financial  statements  of  Monarch
    Capital s  subsidiaries,  Monarch   Life  and  Springfield  Life;
    Monarch    Capital s   president s    pessimistic   message    to
    stockholders;  annual statements filed by Monarch Life with state
    insurance regulators listing the STIP;  the triennial examination
    report  on  Monarch  Life  issued  in  November  1989,  by  state
    insurance  examiners; and  statutory  basis financial  statements
    filed by Monarch Life and  Springfield Life with state  insurance
    -12-
    After reviewing the record, we  agree.  The undisputed facts
    demonstrate  that  the  disclosure of  Monarch  Life s  statutory
    surplus  in Footnote  F of  Monarch  Capital s 1989  consolidated
    financial  statements, filed in  March 1990, was  not material to
    investors, but merely  duplicative of prior filings.   It is also
    clear that it was not a primary source of reliance for  insurance
    analysts evaluating insurance  companies.  We also note  that the
    record does  not reflect any   concrete evidence  put  forward by
    the  Class  to  indicate that  E&Y s  disclosures  were genuinely
    material to investors, Anderson v.  Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 243 (1986), nor does it  reflect a genuine issue of fact  on
    this element  of their claim.   See Mulero-Rodr 
    guez, 98 F.3d at 673
    .
    C.  The Element of Scienter
    The  scienter   requirement  is  satisfied  if  the  material
    misstatements or  omissions were  made knowingly,  see 
    MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 49
    ,  or if  they were  made recklessly.   See  First
    Commodity  Corp. of Boston  v. Commodity Futures  Trading Comm n,
    
    676 F.2d 1
    , 7 (1st Cir. 1982).13  Like materiality,  scienter [is
    regulators.
    13  Acts  of commission or omission  are made recklessly if  they
    are:
    . .  . so  highly unreasonable  and such  an
    extreme  departure  from   the  standards  of
    ordinary  care  as  to present  a  danger  of
    misleading the  plaintiff to the  extent that
    the danger was either known  to the defendant
    or so  obvious that  the defendant must  have
    been aware  of it.   Hoffman  v. Estabrook  &
    Co.,  Inc., 
    587 F.2d 509
    , 517 (1st Cir. 1978)
    -13-
    a] fact-specific  issue which  should ordinarily  be left  to the
    trier of fact.   In  re Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 
    886 F.2d 1109
    , 1113 (9th Cir.  1989).14  However, summary judgment is
    not automatically precluded even in cases where  motive or intent
    are at issue.   Vel zquez v. Chard n, 
    736 F.2d 831
    , 833 (1st Cir.
    1984); Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 
    40 F.3d 11
    , 13 (1st  Cir.
    1994)(where intent is  an issue the non-moving party  cannot rest
    merely upon  conclusory allegations, improbable  inferences, and
    unsupported speculation,  Medina-Mu oz  v. R.J. Reynolds  Tobacco
    Co., 
    896 F.2d 5
    , 8 (1st Cir. 1990)).   [S]ummary judgment  on the
    scienter issue  is appropriate only  where  there is  no rational
    basis in  the record  for concluding that  any of  the challenged
    statements  was made  with  requisite  scienter.      Provenz  v.
    Miller,  
    102 F.3d 1478
    ,  1490  (9th  Cir.   1996)(emphasis  in
    original), petition for cert.  filed, 
    65 U.S.L.W. 3756
     (U.S. May
    5, 1997)(No.  96-1770).   However,  this  court and  others  have
    granted summary judgment  to Section 10(b) defendants  based on a
    lack of  concrete evidence  that  would allow for an inference of
    fraudulent intent.   See, e.g.,  Bryson v. Royal  Business Group,
    
    763 F.2d 491
    ,  493-95 (1st Cir. 1985); Renovitch  v. Kaufman, 
    905 F.2d 1040
    ,  1047  (7th  Cir.  1990);  In  re  Worlds  of  Wonder
    (citation omitted).
    14  Where the non-moving party has indicated  that he can produce
    the requisite quantum of evidence to enable him to reach the jury
    with his  claim,  Vel zquez  v. Chard n, 
    736 F.2d 831
    ,  833 (1st
    Cir. 1984)  (citing Hahn v. Sargent, 
    523 F.2d 461
    , 468 (1st Cir.
    1975)),  trial courts should   use restraint in  granting summary
    judgment  where  discriminatory animus  of the  defendants is  in
    issue.  
    Id. -14- Securities
    Litigation, 
    35 F.3d 1407
    , 1424 (9th Cir. 1994).15
    The district  court found  that Section  10(b) scienter  was
    intended  to proscribe  knowing  or  intentional misconduct,  not
    negligence.   
    Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197
    .   Since  Hochfelder,
    recklessness can  also  satisfy the  scienter  requirement  under
    Section 10(b).   Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.,  
    914 F.2d 1564
    (9th  Cir. 1990),  cert.  denied,  
    499 U.S. 976
     (1991); ITT  v.
    Cornfeld, 
    619 F.2d 909
    , 923 (2d Cir. 1980);  see First Commodity
    
    Corp., 676 F.2d at 7
    .  Noting  that the First Circuit has assumed
    (without deciding)  that recklessness amounting  to  carelessness
    approaching  indifference   satisfies the  scienter  requirement,
    
    Hoffman, 587 F.2d at 516
    ,  the district court concluded  that  a
    lack of any showing of scienter  is alone sufficient to support a
    motion for summary  judgment.   
    Bryson, 763 F.2d at 493
    n.3.  The
    district court found that a reasonable and prudent investor would
    not be misled about the CMA due to the existence of  other public
    filings  and  that  E&Y s knowledge  of  these  prior disclosures
    negated the possibility that it acted with scienter.
    Based upon  our review  of the  voluminous record,  we agree
    15   Other  circuits have  held  that scienter  in Section  10(b)
    actions  against  accountants  or  independent  auditors  is  not
    established merely through a showing of an error of judgment or a
    misapplication of  accounting  principles.   The  plaintiff  must
    prove that  the accounting  practices were so deficient that  the
    audit amounted to no audit at all, or an egregious refusal to see
    the  obvious,  or  to  investigate  the  doubtful,  or  that  the
    accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable
    accountant would have  made the same decision if  confronted with
    the  same facts.   In  re Software Toolworks,  Inc., 
    50 F.3d 615
    ,
    627-28 (9th Cir. 1994); Worlds of  
    Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1426
    ;  Fine
    v. American Solar King Corp., 
    919 F.2d 290
    , 297 (5th Cir. 1990).
    -15-
    with the district court that E&Y has not been shown to have acted
    with  the requisite  degree of  Section  10(b) scienter.   As  an
    independent  auditor,  E&Y  had no  motive  to  commit securities
    fraud.  In  addition, we find no evidence  that E&Y intentionally
    (or recklessly)  prepared inadequate  collectibility analyses  in
    order  deliberately (or  recklessly)  to mislead  Monarch Capital
    investors.    Nor  do  we  find  evidence  that  E&Y  acted  with
    fraudulent  or  reckless  intent in  relying  on  state insurance
    examiners.  As to Footnote F of  the 1990 audit opinion, there is
    no evidence that E&Y deliberately or recklessly chose not to find
    fault  with the  figures  contained  therein.  Neither  is  there
    evidence  of conspiratorial  misconduct by  E&Y to  aid  in fraud
    allegedly being perpetrated  by the Monarch Defendants,  nor does
    the Class  supply any.   
    Bryson, 763 F.2d at 493
    -95; 
    Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197
    .
    What the Class offers to prove, and the record does support,
    however,  is that E&Y  made many mistakes.   For example,  it may
    have been a mistake for E&Y to take Monarch Capital s word on its
    own credit position.  It may have been a mistake to rely on state
    insurance  department examiners  who,  themselves, may  have been
    misinformed.    It  may  have  been a  mistake  to  view  Monarch
    Capital s subsidiaries  statutory surplus as a regulatory, not an
    accounting, issue.   And, it may have  been a mistake for  E&Y to
    rely  upon its own  internal collectibility analyses  (which were
    not models of professional accounting competence).  Nevertheless,
    mistakes  such as  these do  not support  a finding  of scienter.
    -16-
    
    Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214
    . Under the standards set forth above,
    based  upon  the  facts  of   this  case,  we  find  no  knowing,
    deliberate, or reckless fraud on the part of E&Y.   Negligence is
    not  to be  admired, but  it  is insufficient  for Section  10(b)
    purposes.  
    Id. V. CONCLUSION
    Based upon  the above, we  affirm the grant by  the district
    court of E&Y s motion for summary judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    -17-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-1221

Filed Date: 10/30/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021

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