Rodriguez v. United States ( 1997 )


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  • [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 95-2322
    ANGEL RODRIGUEZ,
    Petitioner, Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
    Angel Rodriguez on brief pro se.
    Donald K. Stern, United  States Attorney, and  Richard L. Hoffman,
    Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    December 12, 1997
    Per Curiam.  Appellant Angel Rodriguez appeals from
    the denial of his motion filed  under 28 U.S.C.   2255.   For
    the following reasons, we agree with the district court  that
    the motion was meritless.
    1.   Appellant's claim  that the forfeiture  of his
    property  was excessive  under the  Eighth  Amendment is  not
    cognizable in a   2255 proceeding since  appellant seeks only
    relief  from a  monetary-type penalty  and  not release  from
    confinement.   See Smullen v.  United States, 
    94 F.3d 20
    , 25
    (1st Cir.  1996)  (holding that  a  claim that  defendant  is
    entitled to  a reduced  restitution order  falls outside  the
    scope of   2255).
    2.    Appellant's   argument  that  the  forfeiture
    violates the  prohibition against  double jeopardy  fails for
    the simple reason that the forfeiture was imposed in the same
    proceeding that resulted in appellant's  conviction.  Compare
    Department  of Revenue  v.  Kurth Ranch,  
    511 U.S. 767
    ,  784
    (1994) (the collection of a  tax on dangerous drugs sought in
    a   separate  proceeding   initiated   subsequently  to   the
    termination  of  the  proceeding  in  which  defendants  were
    convicted violates the prohibition against double jeopardy; a
    second  punishment   "must  be   imposed  during   the  first
    prosecution or not at all").
    3.    Appellant's  claims   regarding  the  alleged
    ineffective assistance rendered by his trial counsel were not
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    presented  to the district  court in the    2255 motion.   We
    therefore  will  not consider  them  for  the first  time  on
    appeal.   See Dziurgot  v. Luther, 
    897 F.2d 1222
    ,  1224 (1st
    Cir. 1990)  (per curiam).   Appellant's ignorance of  the law
    does not provide  an excuse for this default.   See Eagle Eye
    Fishing Corp.  v. United  States Dep't  of Commerce, 
    20 F.3d 503
    , 506 (1st  Cir. 1994) ("the right  of self-representation
    is  not  a license  not  to  comply  with relevant  rules  of
    procedural and  substantive law")  (internal quotation  marks
    and citations omitted).
    4.  In any event, appellant's failure to assert all
    but one of  his claims in his first   2255 motion is an abuse
    of the  writ under  McCleskey v. Zant,  
    499 U.S. 467
     (1991).
    Again, appellant's  pro se status  and ignorance  of the  law
    does  not  constitute  "cause"   sufficient  to  excuse  this
    omission.   See, e.g., Saahir  v. Collins, 
    956 F.2d 115
    , 118
    (5th Cir.  1992) (ignorance  of the law  is not  an objective
    external  impediment); Rodriguez  v.  Maynard, 
    948 F.2d 684
    ,
    687-88  (10th Cir. 1991)  (where the factual  and legal bases
    for the new claims existed when the first habeas petition was
    filed, petitioner's  ignorance of  the legal  significance of
    those  claims does  not amount  to cause).   Nor,  obviously,
    would failure to consider these  claims on appeal amount to a
    fundamental  miscarriage of justice.  See Andiarena v. United
    States, 
    967 F.2d 715
    , 719  (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (this
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    narrow   exception  applies   only  where   a  constitutional
    violationlikely caused the conviction of an innocent person).
    The one  claim that  appellant did  present in  the
    first    2255 motion  -- the government's  alleged sentencing
    entrapment and  counsel's alleged  ineffective assistance  in
    connection  therewith -- cannot  be raised again  because the
    district court disposed of it  on the merits in that  first
    2255  proceeding.    See Rule  9(b)  of  the  Rules Governing
    Section 2255 Cases ("[a]  second or successive motion  may be
    dismissed if the judge finds that  it fails to allege new  or
    different  grounds for relief and the prior determination was
    on the merits").
    5.   It  follows that  the district  court did  not
    abuse its discretion in not holding a hearing  on appellant's
    forfeiture claims.  See United States v. McGill, 
    11 F.3d 223
    ,
    225-26 (1st Cir. 1993).
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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