United States v. Davis , 717 F.3d 28 ( 2013 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1179
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOHN DAVIS, JR.,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Stahl and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Peter B. Krupp, with whom Lurie & Krupp, LLP was on brief, for
appellant.
Kelly Begg Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
May 10, 2013
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. A jury in the District of
Massachusetts convicted the appellant, John Davis, Jr., of aiding
and abetting the making of a false claim against the United States
in connection with his 2008 federal income tax return. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 287, 2. In this appeal of his conviction, Davis alleges
that the district court's aiding and abetting instruction was
incorrect as a matter of law, that the instruction also
constructively amended the indictment in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
to sustain his conviction. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
For purposes of the sufficiency claim, we recount the
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, United States v.
Howard, 687 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2012), deferring some details to
our analysis of the specific issues raised on appeal. In early
2009, the Internal Revenue Service received a 2008 Form 1040
federal income tax return, filed electronically on behalf of John
Davis, Jr. of 11 Oakhurst Street, Apartment 1, in Dorchester,
Massachusetts. The return reflected an adjusted gross income of
$2,586 earned from "bingo lottery gambling winnings," and claimed
a refund of $7,390 based on a "first-time homebuyer credit."
Applicable to homeowners who purchased their initial
primary residences between April 8, 2008 and December 1, 2009, the
federal first-time homebuyer credit authorized a tax credit of 10%
-2-
of the purchase price, up to a maximum of $7,500. To obtain the
credit, and any refund that may result from it, the IRS required a
qualifying purchaser to submit an addendum -- Form 5405 -- with the
purchaser's federal income tax return providing additional detail
concerning the claimed credit. Davis's Form 5405 stated that he
purchased the Dorchester apartment on March 18, 2009 for $73,900
(home purchases in 2009 were eligible to be claimed on 2008
returns). The IRS processed the return and issued a $7,390 refund
check made payable to Davis, who cashed the check, retained $1,000
for himself, and gave the balance to an undisclosed recipient whom
he later described to investigators as his "tax preparer."
After a more thorough review, the IRS determined that the
owner of the Dorchester apartment was not John Davis, Jr., but his
mother, Greta Davis and that the property had been purchased by
Greta long before April 8, 2008, thus precluding eligibility for
the first-time homebuyer credit. When IRS agents subsequently
visited the appellant, he initially denied any involvement with the
filing, intimating that it had been submitted without his
knowledge. Upon further questioning, he acknowledged that the tax
return accurately reported his personal information, that he had
provided the information to his tax preparer -- whose identity he
declined to disclose -- for the purpose of filing his tax return,
and that he had never purchased the Dorchester apartment. He also
-3-
admitted to cashing the check, keeping $1,000 for himself, and
giving the remainder to the unidentified preparer.
Shortly thereafter, a federal grand jury in the District
of Massachusetts indicted Davis for making a false claim against
the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 287, and aiding and abetting the
same, id. § 2.1 Following a two-day jury trial, Davis was
convicted of aiding and abetting, for which he was sentenced to one
year of probation and ordered to pay $7,390 in restitution. This
timely appeal ensued.
II.
The court instructed the jury as follows on the aiding
and abetting charge:
The guilt of a defendant may also be
established without proof that he personally
and directly committed every act constituting
the violation alleged. A defendant may be
found guilty under the aiding and abetting
statute, Title 18 of the United States Code,
Section 2, if it is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that he participated in the commission
of a crime by another. Such other person is
commonly referred to as an "accomplice."
1
The indictment charged that Davis knowingly made to the IRS:
a claim . . . knowing such claim to be false,
fictitious and fraudulent by preparing and causing
to be prepared, and filing and causing to be filed,
what purported to be a 2008 federal income tax
return Form 5405, wherein he falsely claimed the
First Time Homebuyer Tax Credit for 11 Oakhurst
Street, Boston, Massachusetts, a property he did
not own and never purchased, and aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded and procured same.
-4-
In this case, if you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Davis aided and abetted his tax
preparer in submitting a material false claim
for a first-time homebuyer tax credit to the
Internal Revenue Service, you may find him
guilty as a principal in the offense. Now, it
is not enough for the government to show that
a defendant was simply present when a crime
was committed, or even that he knew of the
other person’s intent to commit a criminal
act. To be convicted of aiding and abetting,
it is necessary that a defendant be shown to
have in some way associated himself with the
criminal venture, and to have willfully
participated in it as something that he wished
to bring about, and by his actions sought to
make it succeed.
An act is done "willfully" if it is done
knowingly and intentionally and with the
conscious purpose of doing something that the
law forbids. Participation in every stage of
an illegal venture is not required to be
guilty as an accomplice; it is sufficient if
the government proves beyond a reasonable
doubt a defendant’s participation at some
significant stage of the transaction.
(emphasis added).
After deliberating for roughly ninety minutes, the jury
sent out a note with three questions, two of which are germane to
this appeal. The first question related to the substantive charge
in the indictment: "[a]re we deciding whether the defendant made
a false claim to the U.S. government, or are we deciding whether he
specifically and knowingly filed a false claim re: the first time
homebuyer's credit[?]" (emphasis in original). After discussion
with counsel, and over the government's objection, the judge
instructed the jury that Davis "would have to know at the time the
-5-
return was being filed that the false claim involved the first-time
homebuyer tax credit, because that's what the indictment as it is
framed alleges, and that is the false claim alleged to have been
made on the return itself."
The jury next asked, with respect to the aiding and
abetting charge, whether Davis "[m]ust . . . have known that the
tax preparer was fraudulently filing the first-time homebuyer tax
credit specifically?" The trial judge's initial response was
similar to the view given for the substantive charge. In
discussion with counsel, the court observed that, "given the way
the case is indicted, again, they'd have to find that [Davis] aided
and abetted the principal with the intent of seeing that a false
claim was filed with regard to the first-time homebuyer tax
credit." The government objected, arguing that the aiding and
abetting charge only required proof that Davis knew that "a false
tax return" was going to be filed. Davis agreed with the trial
court's formulation. The discussion concluded with the judge
rejecting the government's position.
After a recess, however, the court changed tack, ruling
that Davis did not need to know "the particular details of the
falsity, but he has to know that it was false, it was intended to
be false, so that he shared that intent with the principal." The
judge relied on United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209 (1st
Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds by Rivera-Feliciano v. United
-6-
States, 498 U.S. 954 (1990), observing that "a culpable aider and
abettor need not perform the subject offense, be present when it is
performed, or be aware of the details of its execution." After
acknowledging the defense's objection, the court answered the
jury's question as follows:
Aiding and abetting is slightly different but,
as I said, a derivative form of the offense.
Here, in effect, the government is alleging
accomplice liability. To establish that
someone is guilty as an accomplice, one has to
show more than mere presence or vicinity to a
crime. One has to show even more than simple
knowledge that somebody else was going to
commit a crime. Passive knowledge makes no
difference under the circumstances.
For you to find the defendant guilty under an
aiding and abetting theory, you would have to
find that he intended that a false return be
filed; that his intent was formed prior to the
filing of the return; that he knew that the
form would contain a material false statement,
or a material false claim against the
government, but he need not know its specific
details. This is the difference between
aiding and abetting under Section 2 and the
substantive offense under Section 287. Or, as
the First Circuit has said, "It is well
settled that a culpable aider and abettor need
not perform the substantive offense, be
present when it is performed, or be aware of
the details of its execution." But he would
have to know that the return would be false;
that he intended it to be filed as false; that
he knew it would contain a material false
statement, and that he took affirmative steps
to accomplish that goal.
The judge concluded by asking the jury whether his answer
was clear, to which one juror replied "no," and asked, "[s]o in
terms of a false return, would he have to know that it was
-7-
specifically going to be false relating to the first-time homebuyer
tax credit?" The court answered:
To convict the defendant under 287, the
substantive offense, the answer is "yes."
Under an aiding and abetting theory, he
wouldn't have to know necessarily that it was
going to involve the first-time homebuyer
credit. He would have to know, however, that
a material false statement was going to be
made; that he would have to materially assist,
affirmatively assist, the principal in making
that happen.
After less than an hour of additional deliberation, the
jury returned its verdict, acquitting Davis of the substantive
offense and convicting him of aiding and abetting.
Following the verdict, Davis renewed a Rule 29 motion for
acquittal that he had made orally at trial. He reiterated his
argument that the aiding and abetting instruction was erroneous
because it did not require the jury to specifically find that he
knew the tax return was false with respect to the homebuyer's
credit. The district court denied the motion, United States v.
Davis, 828 F. Supp. 2d 405 (D. Mass. 2011), concluding that there
was "no dispute that the evidence at trial established that Davis
was a willing participant in a scheme to file a false 2008 federal
tax return." Id. at 406. The court's ultimate ruling was premised
on its underlying observation -- as reflected in the answer to the
jury's question -- that an accomplice is responsible for all of the
natural and foreseeable consequences flowing from the common
scheme. Id. at 409. Thus, the court held that the conviction was
-8-
proper because the evidence supported the jury's finding that Davis
shared the tax preparer's intent to file a false return and because
the reliance on the homebuyer's credit was reasonably foreseeable
to Davis.
III.
Davis makes three separate arguments on appeal. First,
he asserts that the district court's aiding and abetting
instruction was legally incorrect. Relatedly, he argues that the
instruction constructively amended the grand jury's indictment, in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Finally, Davis claims
that the evidence was insufficient to support an aiding and
abetting conviction.
A.
We review de novo the claim that the trial court's jury
instruction was erroneous. United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56
(1st Cir. 2008).
The underlying premise of Davis's jury instruction
argument is that the substantive crime with which he was charged
was "filing a false Form 5405 for a First Time Homebuyer Tax
Credit." Therefore, he argues, a proper aiding and abetting
instruction would have required the jury to find that he had
specific knowledge of the filing of the homebuyer credit form. We
disagree.
-9-
Davis was charged with aiding and abetting a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 287, the elements of which are: 1) presenting a false
or fraudulent claim against the United States; 2) presenting the
claim to an agency of the United States; and 3) knowledge that the
claim was false or fraudulent. See United States v. Clark, 577
F.3d 273, 285 (5th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Drape, 668
F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Where a tax return is filed with the
'guilty, actual knowledge that it was false,' the jury may infer
the requisite intent to [violate 18 U.S.C. § 287]." (quoting United
States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1978))). Aiding and
abetting requires proof that: 1) the substantive offense was
actually committed; 2) the defendant assisted in the commission of
that crime or caused it to be committed; and 3) the defendant
intended to assist in the commission of that crime or to cause it
to be committed. United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32,
42 (1st Cir. 2012). Moreover, as the district court correctly
observed, a "culpable aider and abetter need not perform the
substantive offense, be present when it is performed, or be aware
of the details of its execution." Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d at 217.
Although Davis alleges that the substantive crime with which he is
charged is filing a false Form 5405, this in fact only represents
a detail of the execution of the actual crime that he aided and
abetted: making or presenting a claim upon the United States
"knowing such claim to be false, fictitious or fraudulent," in
-10-
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. The district judge was therefore
under no obligation to instruct the jury that it had to find that
he had specific knowledge of the filing of the false Form 5405 to
convict him of aiding and abetting. See United States v.
Hernandez, 218 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2000) (observing, in affirming
conviction for aiding and abetting drug distribution charge, that
defendant's knowledge of the particular controlled substance being
distributed is not necessary); United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586,
591 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that government need not prove that
defendant was aware of all the details of the fraud to sustain a
conviction for aiding and abetting mail fraud). The aiding and
abetting instruction given here accurately conveyed the appropriate
legal elements.
In support of his challenge, Davis cites cases and rules
that establish the contours of a legally sufficient indictment.
E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) ("The indictment . . . must be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged . . . ."); Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1974) (holding that statutory language
in an indictment "must be accompanied with . . . the facts and
circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence"
and "enable[] him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of
prosecution for the same offense"). But these authorities address
the sufficiency of indictments, while the instant appeal challenges
-11-
the court's jury instructions. As the government suggests, Davis's
argument confuses the purposes of indictments and instructions.
The purpose of the former is to provide a defendant with adequate
notice of the charges against him, see Cola v. Reardon, 787 F.2d
681, 700 (1st Cir. 1986), while the function of the latter is to
convey to the jury the legal elements required for conviction.
Harrington v. United States, 504 F.2d 1306, 1317 (1st Cir. 1974)
The trial court need not use the precise words proposed by either
party in its instructions; it is sufficient if the principle of law
is correctly stated. Id."The function of the appellate court with respect to jury
instructions is to satisfy itself that the instructions show no
tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect to the
applicable principles of law." Id. We are so satisfied here and
find no error in the district court’s aiding and abetting
instruction.
B.
Davis next argues that the district court's aiding and
abetting instruction constructively amended the indictment. "A
constructive amendment occurs when the charging terms of the
indictment are effectively altered by the prosecution or the court
after the grand jury has last passed upon them." United States v.
Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 663 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1592 (2012). While a constructive amendment is
-12-
prejudicial per se and requires reversal, United States v. DeCicco,
439 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2006), we conclude that no such amendment
took place here.2
This argument, like Davis’s instructional error claim,
depends on his underlying premise that he was charged with filing
a false homebuyer tax credit claim. Thus, he argues, the jury
instructions allowed him to be convicted for aiding and abetting
some other "false claim," other than the one in the indictment. As
a matter of law, this argument fails because, as we have noted
above, Davis was charged with aiding and abetting a violation of
the False Claims Act by presenting a false claim, not with "filing
a false tax credit claim."
The argument also fails as a factual matter, as there was
no evidence presented of any other falsity in the tax return other
than the filing of the Form 5405. Davis therefore could not have
been convicted for aiding and abetting the filing of anything
different than that alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, no
constructive amendment was effected. Cf. Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1960) (holding that an indictment was
unconstitutionally broadened where prosecution offered evidence of
two theories of liability -- interference with interstate sand
2
The government argues that Davis did not preserve this
objection and thus the claim should be reviewed only for plain
error. We need not resolve this issue, as Davis’s argument falls
short even upon de novo review.
-13-
shipments and interference with interstate steel shipments -- but
grand jury indicted defendant only on the first theory).
C.
Davis's final assertion on appeal is that the evidence at
trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support the aiding and
abetting conviction. As noted, the district court rejected this
argument in the context of Davis's Rule 29 motion. We review the
denial of that motion de novo, examining the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational
juror could have found the disputed facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012).
Here again, Davis's initial foray erroneously narrows the
charged crime to aiding and abetting the filing of the Form 5405.
Having already rejected that position, we assess whether the
evidence was sufficient to permit a rational juror to find that
Davis aided and abetted the tax preparer in filing a false claim.
We hold that the evidence was sufficient.
There is no dispute that Davis's return contained a false
claim for the homebuyer tax credit to which he was not entitled.
Thus, the first element of the charged crime -- that the principal
actor committed the substantive offense -- is easily satisfied.
See Gonzalez, 570 F.3d at 28-29.
Similarly, the evidence was sufficient to support the
other elements –- that Davis knew that his 2008 federal tax return
-14-
contained a false claim and that he helped the principal, the tax
preparer, file the false claim. See Rodríguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d at
42. The jury could have found that Davis willingly gave his name,
address, and telephone and social security numbers to the preparer,
although he refused to identify that person to law enforcement.
The jury also was aware of the odd fact that Davis had provided
only biographical information to the preparer, but no financial
information. Davis subsequently cashed a $7,390 IRS refund check,
of which he gave all but $1,000 to the un-named preparer. Finally,
given the evidence of Davis's paltry income and the fact that his
prior years' refunds were considerably smaller than $7,390, the
jury could have inferred from his payment of the lion's share of
the 2008 refund to the preparer that the two had an arrangement
regarding the false claim. In light of this factual record, the
verdict was supported by the evidence.
IV.
Davis's conviction is affirmed.
-15-