Garland-Gonzalez v. Universal Group, Inc. ( 2024 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1998
CATHERINE GARLAND-GONZALEZ; MIGUEL VICENS-RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNIVERSAL GROUP, INC.; UNIVERSAL FINANCE, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Howard, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Juan R. Dávila-Díaz on brief for appellants.
Juan J. Casillas-Ayala, Israel Fernández-Rodríguez, and
Casillas Santiago Torres LLC on brief for appellees.
July 1, 2024
PER CURIAM. Catherine Garland-Gonzalez's employment
was terminated by her employer, Universal Group, Inc., and
Universal Finance, Inc., after she took what she alleges was
protected leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"),
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, in order to care for her husband, Miguel
Vicens-Rodriguez. Garland and Vicens then brought this action
against her employer, asserting in part that the employer
interfered with and retaliated against the exercise of Garland's
FMLA rights.1 In a brief docket entry, the district court granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment "for the reasons
provided therein, as well as in their . . . Reply to Plaintiff's
. . . Opposition." Garland and Vicens now challenge that ruling.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo. See Alston v. Town of Brookline, 997 F.3d 23, 35 (1st
Cir. 2021). We assess the record ourselves in the light most
favorable to the non-movants and draw all reasonable inferences in
their favor. See id. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
After thoroughly reviewing the record and the parties'
submissions, we conclude that the couple's appeal must fail. To
1Garland and Vicens also asserted various claims under Puerto
Rico law which they do not renew before us.
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make out a leave-based FMLA claim, an employee must show that she
notified her employer of her need for leave "as soon as practicable
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 29
C.F.R. § 825.303(a). Accordingly, although the employee need not
have explicitly invoked the FMLA, she must have at least "state[d]
that leave [was] needed." Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178
F.3d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.303).
Garland does not meet this threshold requirement.
On the day before her putative leave, Garland sent an
email to her supervisor, titled "Remote work from Florida," which
spelled out various work-related tasks that she would be completing
from Florida. The record also indisputably shows that Garland
received her regular salary throughout the putative leave and that
she did not use any of her accrued sick leave or otherwise take
time off. In essence, then, Garland admits to requesting and
receiving a remote work arrangement. Yet such a request does not
implicate her FMLA rights. See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med.
Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 498 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a
"request for [a remote work] arrangement . . . was not a request
under the FMLA, which requires employers only to provide up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave").
Garland maintains that there is a genuine issue as to
whether she requested leave, pointing to the following statement
that she claims she made to her supervisor:
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[L]ook, I'm having this situation with Miguel,
he is crying, he can't control himself, he
doesn't want to be alone, he is always worried
because I come home at night, because there
are no lights and all of that anxiety is making
him freak out even more since I began to work.
He asks me to get him out of here so that I
will take care of him.
To this, her supervisor replied, "if you need to go, go, I have no
problem with you, you know that I have never had any problems with
you." This exchange, however, is wholly consistent with Garland's
request for remote work. Read alone, the exchange merely
demonstrates that the employer was willing to accommodate
Garland's need to care for her husband. And read alongside the
"Remote work from Florida" email, the exchange reaffirms that
Garland requested to work remotely to provide such care. No
reasonable jury could plausibly infer that Garland requested
leave, especially after considering Garland's own testimony that
she formally requested FMLA leave on two prior, unrelated,
occasions.
Thus, the couple's case raises no material dispute of
fact, and the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Garland's employer.
Affirmed.
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