United States v. Gonzalez-Santillan ( 2024 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 22-1677
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
GUILLERMO GONZÁLEZ-SANTILLAN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Rikelman, Hamilton, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Raúl S. Mariani Franco, for appellant.
Ricardo A. Imbert-Fernández, Assistant United States
Attorney, with whom Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United
States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and W. Stephen
Muldrow, United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
July 11, 2024
 Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. A person absconds when he
"depart[s] secretly and hide[s] [himself]." Merriam Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/absconds (last visited
June 10, 2024) [https://perma.cc/4C43-7TLW]. That's precisely
what Appellant Guillermo González-Santillan ("González-Santillan
") did. In 2009, González-Santillan fled Puerto Rico to evade his
sentencing hearing for conspiracy to commit money laundering after
entering into -- and pleading guilty pursuant to -- a plea
agreement with the government. After being on the run for thirteen
years, González-Santillan was eventually caught in the Dominican
Republic and returned to the United States, where he awaited
sentencing. However, now González-Santillan faced a recommended
two-point obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement for his
abscondment.
The upshot. Currently, González-Santillan is serving a
seventy-month term of imprisonment. In this appeal, he asks us to
vacate his sentence and judgment and to remand because, in his
telling, the district court erred in imposing the enhancement. On
review, we aren't persuaded and therefore decline the invitation
to let González-Santillan escape his sentence.
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HOW GONZÁLEZ-SANTILLAN GOT HERE1
Beginning in 2007, González-Santillan conspired with his
co-defendants to launder drug money. As a part of their scheme,
they moved drug money belonging to Colombian traffickers into
various United States bank accounts. Collectively their
conspiracy delivered deposits of over $2,000,000, and
González-Santillan himself was involved in the delivery of over
$1,500,000 for depositing. This all came to a head in 2008 when
González-Santillan was indicted by a grand jury in the District of
Puerto Rico on one count of conspiring to commit money laundering
and five counts of aiding and abetting money laundering. In due
course, González-Santillan and the government struck a plea deal
in which González-Santillan agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy
to commit money laundering (count one) in exchange for the
government's dismissal of his other counts at sentencing (counts
two through six).2
1We glean the relevant facts from the plea agreement,
presentence investigation report, and transcript of the sentencing
hearing. See United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 280
n.2 (1st Cir. 2017); see, e.g., United States v. Lasalle González,
857 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2017).
2 González-Santillan
pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which in
relevant part provides that "[a]ny person who conspires to commit
any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be
subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense
the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy."
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Per the plea agreement, González-Santillan landed an
adjusted offense level of twenty-five giving him an advisory
guideline range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months'
imprisonment. As relevant to this appeal, the plea agreement
provided that "[t]he parties agree[d] that no other adjustments or
departures [were] applicable in this case nor [would] be sought by
the parties" and that the government reserved its right "to dispute
sentencing factors or facts material to sentencing." The United
States Pretrial and Probation Office ("USPO") prepared a
presentence report that noted the parties' agreement.
González-Santillan entered his guilty plea on March 3, 2009 and
the court scheduled a sentencing hearing. And here's where things
began to go off the rails.
Prior to his sentencing, González-Santillan failed to
appear for a scheduled meeting with his probation officer on June
8th. And then, the next day, he failed to appear for his sentencing
hearing. In response, the court revoked the terms of
González-Santillan's bail (which included electronic monitoring
and home detention) and issued an arrest warrant.
González-Santillan's whereabouts were unknown until thirteen years
later when he was arrested on March 9, 2022 in the Dominican
Republic. In due course, he was extradited to the United States
and held in custody. In anticipation of González-Santillan's (at
long last) sentencing, and given the time that had elapsed, the
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court ordered the USPO to issue an updated presentence report (the
"Amended Presentence Report"), which it did on June 17th.
In relevant part, the Amended Presentence Report
mimicked the parties' original plea agreement. The government
objected on the basis that the "report fail[ed] to include that by
absconding the jurisdiction of the Court for thirteen years,
defendant obstructed justice." Accordingly, the government sought
a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which increases
a defendant's adjusted offense level by two for obstructing justice
(we'll explain this Guideline in more detail shortly).
The USPO adopted that recommendation and amended the
report (the "Second Amended Presentence Report") to include a
two-point obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement, placing
González-Santillan at a total adjusted offense level of
twenty-seven with a corresponding guideline range of seventy to
eighty-seven months' imprisonment. In making that adjustment, the
USPO explained that the enhancement was applicable for the reasons
outlined in the government's objection. In response,
González-Santillan submitted his sentencing memorandum, which
opposed the USPO's findings on the bases that: (1) the parties'
original plea agreement barred the government from seeking an
obstruction-of-justice enhancement because "[t]he parties agree[d]
that no other adjustments or departures [were] applicable in this
case nor [would] be sought by the parties"; and (2) the government
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had failed to prove that the enhancement was applicable because it
had not presented any evidence that he willfully failed to appear
at his sentencing hearing.
At González-Santillan's sentencing hearing, he argued
his total offense level wasn't twenty-seven; rather, he calculated
a total offense level of twenty-one in the event the court added
two points for obstructing justice, and requested a sentence of
thirty-seven months.3 The government argued that
González-Santillan's total offense level was indeed twenty-seven
and initially sought a sentence of eighty-seven months, at the top
of the guideline range, but later recanted and requested seventy
months, at the lower end of González-Santillan's guideline range,
in accordance with the plea agreement's original pledge that "[t]he
United States [would] recommend a sentence at the lower end of the
applicable guideline range."4 González-Santillan voiced his
objection to the government's recommendation for a sentence at the
higher end of the applicable guideline range, explaining that its
recommendation was a breach of the plea agreement. The court
3 AlthoughGonzález-Santillan had previously agreed to a total
offense level of twenty-five, he argued at sentencing that his
total offense level was then twenty-one because of the efforts he
took to rehabilitate himself during the thirteen years of his
abscondment.
4 Trueto its word, the government dismissed the five counts
of aiding and abetting money laundering against González-Santillan
at sentencing.
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agreed, noting that the government was bound by its pledge to seek
a sentence at the lower end of the guideline range. However, with
respect to the obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement, it
explained that the government could seek the enhancement because
González-Santillan had engaged in conduct, his thirteen-year
disappearance, that occurred after the plea agreement had been
signed by the parties and therefore the government was not in
breach of the agreement in making its request.
After hearing from the parties and in accordance with
the Second Amended Presentence Report, the court pegged
González-Santillan's total offense level at twenty-seven with a
corresponding guideline range of seventy to eighty-seven months'
imprisonment. In doing so, it applied the obstruction-of-justice
sentencing enhancement, explaining that "Mr. Gonzalez willfully
obstructed or impeded or attempted to obstruct or impede the
administration of justice with respect to his sentencing for this
offense by absconding from pretrial supervision and remaining a
fugitive for 13 years." The court then meted out a seventy-month
term of imprisonment. Before the hearing's conclusion,
González-Santillan's attorney lodged an objection to the sentence,
again incorporating his objections outlined in his sentencing
memorandum5 and labeling the sentence as both procedurally
5 In
relevant part, González-Santillan's arguments in his
sentencing memorandum included his belief that: the government
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unreasonable due to the absence (he says) of evidence of
willfulness and substantively unreasonable as excessively long.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
González-Santillan takes exception to the district
court's imposition of the two-level obstruction-of-justice
sentencing enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (the "enhancement" or
"sentencing enhancement") provides:
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede,
the administration of justice with respect to
the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing
of the instant offense of conviction, and (2)
the obstructive conduct related to (A) the
defendant's offense of conviction and any
relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related
offense, increase the offense level by 2
levels.
Application note 4(E) is illustrative of the statute's covered
conduct, explaining that "escaping or attempting to escape from
custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear,
as ordered, for a judicial proceeding" are examples of obstructive
or impeder conduct for which the enhancement applies. U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (emphases added).
improperly sought and obtained the obstruction-of-justice
sentencing enhancement; the government failed to provide any
evidence to support the sentencing enhancement; he was being
sentenced harsher than his co-conspirators who received sentences
of thirty, twenty-four, and about eleven months, respectively; he
was largely rehabilitated; and a lighter sentence was warranted as
a first-time offender.
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Against the application of the enhancement
González-Santillan launches two arguments, and we'll take each in
turn.
A. The Court's Application of the Obstruction-of-Justice
Enhancement
First up is González-Santillan's primary argument that
the district court erred when it applied the sentencing enhancement
because the government failed to properly establish that he
"willfully" failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. Rather
than produce evidence of willfulness, González-Santillan says, the
government did nothing more than summarily note that he left his
electronic monitoring device at his residence when he fled the
jurisdiction. That alone is insufficient proof, he concludes, and
accordingly the enhancement should not have applied as a matter of
law.
Unsurprisingly, the government disagrees.6 It argues
that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is applicable here because
6 The
government first maintains that González-Santillan has
waived his challenge to the court's application of the sentencing
enhancement because "he asked for [it] when recommending his
desired sentence" and never argued against its application. We
disagree. The sentencing hearing transcript (and his sentencing
memorandum) indicates that initially, González-Santillan requested
a sentence akin to that of his co-defendant. However,
alternatively he stated that "[i]f the Court understands that an
additional punishment should be imposed by his failure to appear,
disrespect to the courts, leaving the jurisdiction, I understand
that. But that shouldn't double that 30-month sentence [the
sentence he sought] to 60 and even less to 70 -- or more than 70
months." The "if" conditional language indicates to us that
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González-Santillan's abscondment is clearly covered conduct.
Furthermore, the government notes, the Second Amended Presentence
Report succinctly and pellucidly spelled out the factual findings
of González-Santillan's flight to the Dominican Republic for
thirteen years, and he did not object to those findings below.
Continuing, the government emphasizes that three things -- the
record, § 3C1.1.'s application notes, and the case law -- all make
clear that González-Santillan's abscondment was willful and
therefore the government met its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that González-Santillan willfully
failed to appear for his sentencing hearing.
We review preserved claims of procedural sentencing
errors for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Coplin-Benjamin, 79 F.4th 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2023). "Within this
framework, we review a district court's factual findings for clear
error, and its interpretation and application of the Guidelines de
novo." United States v. Velez-Soto, 804 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.
2015); see also United States v. Nygren, 933 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.
2019). When a defendant challenges the factual basis for the
district court's application of a sentencing enhancement, as
González-Santillan does here, "we ask only whether the court
González-Santillan simply argued an alternative basis to his
original plea to be sentenced as his co-defendant who the record
reflects was not given the two-point obstruction-of-justice
sentencing enhancement.
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clearly erred in finding that the government proved the disputed
fact by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v.
Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In
our review of the evidence we've noted that "[e]ither direct or
circumstantial evidence will do, with the sentencing court free to
draw commonsense inferences from the evidence." United States v.
Matthews, 749 F.3d 99, 105 (1st Cir. 2014).
Turning now to consider González-Santillan's specific
contentions on this issue, § 3C1.1 application note 4(E), as we
previously noted, explains that "escaping or attempting to escape
from custody before trial or sentencing[,] or willfully failing to
appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding" is the type of
conduct to which the sentencing enhancement applies. United States
v. Rivera-Nazario, 68 F.4th 653 (1st Cir. 2023), is instructive as
we consider González-Santillan's contentions. There, we
confronted an appellant's analogous claim that the government had
failed to show that he had acted "willfully" in failing to appear.
Id. at 661. Upon review, we held that everything about the
appellant's conduct -- namely his violation of "dozens of release
conditions"; "fail[ure] to appear at his sentencing hearing";
departure from "his third-party custodian's home without the
permission of pretrial services"; and outstanding fugitive status
"for over ten months" -- suggested willfulness. Id. We concluded
that "[a] criminal defendant who evades authorities and fails to
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appear for a sentencing hearing has obstructed justice; and '[t]o
hold otherwise would condone direct disobedience of a court's
conditional release order.'" Id. (second alteration in original)
(quoting Fuller v. United States, 398 F.3d 644, 652 (7th Cir.
2005)).
As with Rivera-Nazario, we similarly conclude that the
circumstances of González-Santillan's abscondment suggest
willfulness. As a reminder, the record evinces
González-Santillan's: failure to attend his scheduled appointment
with his probation officer; failure to appear at his sentencing
hearing; abscondment for thirteen years to a different country;
and of particular import, his acknowledgment of his abscondment at
his sentencing hearing.7 And to reiterate, "[a] criminal defendant
who evades authorities and fails to appear for a sentencing hearing
has obstructed justice." Id. Moreover, despite
González-Santillan's insistence that "no factual conclusion or
finding was included" in the Second Amended Presentence Report, in
its Addendum to the Report the USPO explained that the enhancement
was appropriate because (and to repeat) he "absconded from his
pretrial release just prior to his Sentence Hearing" and "was a
fugitive from justice for 13 years."
7 Before
the court announced its sentence, González-Santillan
remarked to the court that: "I'd like to apologize to you for my
mistake . . . . I know that I made a mistake by not having appeared
in court on that date. . . . I went to the Dominican Republic."
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Plucking another arrow from his quiver,
González-Santillan argues that our decision in United States v.
Marshall, 753 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 2014), "requires the government
to prove that [he] acted with knowledge that his conduct would
certainly obstruct the proceedings." However, in Rivera-Nazario,
we declined an appellant's invitation to address a similar
question: "whether district courts must make a particularized
finding that a defendant had a specific intent to obstruct justice
to impose a § 3C1.1 enhancement." 68 F.4th at 661–62. We declined
to do so because, as the record elucidated, the appellant's conduct
indisputably supported the enhancement. See id.; see also United
States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining to
address whether particularized findings of specific intent to
obstruct justice are required under § 3C1.1 where "evidence clearly
supports the district court's ultimate" obstruction-of-justice
finding). And while González-Santillan is correct that the
government bears the burden of proving sentencing enhancements,
see Matthews, 749 F.3d at 105, and by a preponderance of the
evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 715
(1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Cannon, 589 F.3d 514, 517 (1st
Cir. 2009), here, as in Rivera-Nazario, we conclude that the
government has easily met its burden because the facts of this
case -- as adequately set forth in the Second Amended Presentence
Report and by González-Santillan's own in-court admission --
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clearly support the conclusion that he willfully failed to appear
for his sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we espy no error from
the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement.8
8 Before turning the page on González-Santillan's primary
argument, we quickly dispatch a secondary aspect of that claim.
In his brief, González-Santillan summarily states that he "was not
'under custody' at any time prior to him absconding nor he
'escaped' [sic] from any prison." This is important,
González-Santillan explains, because U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1's
application notes distinguish between "escaping or attempting to
escape from custody before trial or sentencing" from failure to
appear for a judicial proceeding. And for the latter, unlike the
former, a showing of willfulness is required, which the government
failed to produce. However, a thorough review of the record
reveals that González-Santillan did not make this argument below
in either his sentencing memoranda or at his sentencing hearing.
Accordingly, "[t]here is a procedural obstacle to this claim of
error: it is raised for the first time in this court." United
States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2015). And
therefore, we review, at best, for plain error. See id.; see also
United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 218, 220 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc); United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999)
(applying plain error review when a defendant's objections were
raised for the first time on appeal). Yet, González-Santillan has
not even attempted to address the applicable standard of review,
and therefore we deem his claim waived. See United States v.
Vázquez-Rosario, 45 F.4th 565, 571 (1st Cir. 2022) (deeming an
appellant's claim waived when he did not address the applicable
standard of review); see also United States v. Bulger, 816 F.3d
137, 157 (1st Cir. 2016) ("Whether you characterize Bulger's Brady
claim as unpreserved because he did not seek a ruling below, or
waived for failure to adequately develop it on appeal, his claim
fails."). Separately, we deem González-Santillan's "under
custody" argument waived for lack of developed argumentation. His
barebones assertation that he was not "under custody" without any
further explanation for why he believes that to be so simply won't
cut it. As we explained many times, "we see no reason to abandon
the settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,
are deemed waived." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Brown v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337,
352 (1st Cir. 1989).
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B. Breach of the Parties' Plea Agreement
Alternatively, González-Santillan argues that the clear
terms of the plea agreement barred the government from seeking the
sentencing enhancement because they specified that "no other
adjustment or departures [were] applicable in this case nor shall
be sought by the parties," and therefore the government breached
the plea agreement by doing so. Furthermore, González-Santillan
claims that because the plea agreement did not contain a breach
clause,9 the government "had no power to withdraw from its
obligations [under] the plea agreement," including its vow not to
seek any upward adjustment or enhancement. Continuing on,
González-Santillan explains that this was not a situation where
the government was under an "unflagging duty" to provide accurate
information to the court, but instead was a situation where the
government, without any prompting from the court, sought a clearly
9 Simply
put, a breach clause, or breach provision as it is
sometimes referred to, is a clause sometimes found in a defendant's
plea agreement that allows the government to withdraw from the
plea agreement if the defendant violates a term or condition of
the agreement. For example, in United States v. Gardner, 5 F.4th
110, 113 (1st Cir. 2021), a case that both parties here cite to,
we considered Gardner's claim that he was not bound by his guilty
plea under the plea agreement after he breached the agreement and
the government withdrew from it. In relevant part, Gardner's
breach clause stated that if "before sentencing," he "violat[ed]
any term or condition of [his] Plea Agreement, engage[ed] in any
criminal activity, or fail[ed] to appear for sentencing," the
government "may consider such conduct to be a breach of the Plea
Agreement and may withdraw therefrom."
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barred sentencing enhancement. (Quoting United States v.
Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84, 89 (1st Cir. 2014)).
The government argues that it did not breach the plea
agreement because the agreement only barred it from seeking
additional adjustments based on conduct that took place before the
parties signed it, not conduct that occurred after its execution.10
And utilizing "traditional principles of contract law," it
launches an interpretive argument based on the clause's temporal
language to establish that the "are applicable" language of the
plea agreement could only include those adjustments and departures
that were then available at the time the agreement was signed.
Moving along, the government contends that González-Santillan
himself breached the plea agreement by absconding because "[a]n
implied but obvious term of any plea agreement is that the
defendant show up for sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction."
The government insists that González-Santillan has waived
10
his breach argument because he requested the sentencing
enhancement at his sentencing hearing and he has failed in his
opening brief to challenge the district court's rationale for
finding that no breach of the plea agreement had occurred. Upon
review, we are not persuaded for two reasons. First, as explained
above, González-Santillan initially objected to a sentencing
enhancement. And second, our review of his brief reveals that
González-Santillan does indeed attack the district court's
rationale for finding that no breach of the plea agreement
occurred. For example, González-Santillan argues that the
district court incorrectly assumed that his failure to appear for
his sentencing hearing constituted breach, cites to our decision
in Gardner, 5 F.4th at 110, for the proposition that the absence
of a breach clause supports his position, and launches additional
arguments against the district court's reasoning.
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United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2014).
Therefore, the government continues, González-Santillan materially
breached the plea agreement when he fled the jurisdiction and that
abscondment subsequently released it from the specific performance
of its remaining obligations under the agreement. And, seeking to
highlight González-Santillan's apparent hypocrisy, the government
points out that González-Santillan, himself, disregarded the
agreement at sentencing when he advocated for a sentence at the
lower end of his requested offense level of twenty-one, which is
not the twenty-five offense level the plea agreement had originally
contemplated.
At his sentencing hearing, González-Santillan objected
on the basis that the government violated the plea agreement, so
we review his claim de novo. See United States v. Brown, 31 F.4th
39, 50 (1st Cir. 2022). We've held that traditional principles of
contract law guide our interpretation of and performance of a plea
agreement. See United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.
1995). And because a defendant who enters into a plea agreement
waives his fundamental constitutional rights, "we hold prosecutors
to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and
performance.'" United States v. Marín-Echeverri, 846 F.3d 473,
478 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d at 89).
Accordingly, the government's burden is not satisfied by mere "lip
service." See id. (citation omitted). And "[i]n addition to
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entitlement to the government's technical compliance with the
agreement, appellant is entitled to the 'benefit of the bargain'
and the 'good faith' of the prosecutor." Brown, 31 F.4th at 50
(quoting Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d at 283). Therefore, we consider
"the totality of the circumstances" in considering whether the
government failed to uphold its end of the bargain. Id.In support of its argument that González-Santillan
breached the plea agreement when he fled the jurisdiction, thereby
relieving the government of any further obligations thereunder,
the government points to our sister circuit's opinion in Hallahan,
which considered a similar assertion.
In that case, the defendants entered into plea
agreements in exchange for the government's promise, amongst
others, to recommend sentences at the low end of the applicable
guideline ranges. Hallahan, 756 F.3d at 967. However, before
their sentencing hearings got underway, defendants fled the
jurisdiction for twelve years. See id. After their capture and
return, their sentencing hearings eventually commenced and the
government sought not the low-end sentences originally bargained
for, but rather the "longest of sentences" at the highest end of
the applicable guideline advisory ranges, arguing that it was
relieved of its original obligation to seek sentences at the low
end of the guideline ranges because the defendants had breached
the plea agreement by absconding. See id. at 967-68, 972. The
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district court agreed and imposed the government's requested
sentences at the higher end of the guideline ranges. See id. at
967-68.
Upon review and as relevant here, the Seventh Circuit
sided with the government, finding that the government's pledge
"was excused by the defendants' breach of their obligation to show
up for sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction." Id. at 972.
More specifically, the court explained that:
An implied but obvious term of any plea
agreement is that the defendant show up for
sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction. The
defendants breached this obligation when they
fled the district and avoided the punishment
for their crimes for twelve years. The
defendants' flight constituted a material
breach, depriving them of the ability to hold
the government to its promise to recommend the
low end of the applicable guideline range.
Id. (citation omitted).11
We find Hallahan persuasive and in full accord with our
circuit's plea-bargaining jurisprudence. See United States v.
11 Seealso United States v. Munoz, 718 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th
Cir. 2013) (explaining that "[n]o defendant could reasonably
expect that he could abscond for five years and still hold the
government to its promises under the plea agreement" and that
"[w]hen [defendant] fled the country and spent nearly five years
as a fugitive in Mexico, he breached what we believe was an implied
but obvious term of the plea agreement that he remain in the
country and show up for sentencing"); United States v. Delacruz,
144 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Since defendant failed to
appear for sentencing and continued his criminal conduct, the
government was no longer obligated to recommend a sentence of 24
months at his sentencing hearing.").
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Bermudez, 407 F.3d 536, 540 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[I]f [a] defendant
fails to fulfill his promises, the government is released from the
agreement." (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d
572, 578 (1st Cir. 1987))). Like the Hallahan court we conclude
that "[a]n implied but obvious term of any plea agreement is that
the defendant show up for sentencing and not flee the
jurisdiction." 756 F.3d at 972. Accordingly, we conclude that
González-Santillan materially breached the plea agreement when he
hightailed it out of the jurisdiction for thirteen years to avoid
punishment. See id. And therefore, it follows that
González-Santillan is now deprived of the opportunity to hold the
government to its original pledge "that no other adjustments or
departures [were] applicable in this case nor [would] be sought by
the parties." That is so because we have held that "if the
defendant fails to fulfill his promises, the government is released
from its agreement." Bermudez, 407 F.3d at 540 (quoting
Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d at 578). Accordingly, we detect no
breach of the parties' plea agreement stemming from the
government's request for the obstruction-of-justice sentencing
enhancement. Nor do we find error in the district court's
application of it.
FINAL WORDS
In sum, González-Santillan's sentence is affirmed.
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