Badose v. Garland ( 2024 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 23-1156
ALAIN GLODY CIRHUZA BADOSE,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Rikelman, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Gregory Romanovsky, with whom Romanovsky Law Offices was on
brief, for petitioner.
Jennifer A. Bowen, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, and Anthony C. Payne, Assistant
Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for
respondent.
September 20, 2024
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Soon after arriving in the United
States in 2014 on a student visa, petitioner Alain Glody Cirhuza
Badose applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). In 2019, an
Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied his claims for relief based on an
adverse credibility determination or, alternatively, because
Badose had failed to show a sufficient nexus between the harm he
described and a protected ground. About two and a half years
later, while his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
was pending, Badose married a U.S. citizen. He then filed a motion
to remand to the IJ to consider an adjustment of status based on
the marriage -- an independent form of immigration relief now open
to him. The government did not oppose the motion. The following
month, however, the BIA denied his remand request and affirmed the
IJ's removal order, stressing that Badose -- with his "lack of
candor" and documented history of "lying to immigration
officials" -- was fully "aware that his [immigration] status was
in jeopardy" when he wed.
Badose now contends we should vacate the BIA's decision
in its entirety because, among other things, the BIA arbitrarily
departed from a consistent practice of granting unopposed remand
requests for consideration of adjustment-of-status relief. He
also asserts that the BIA engaged in impermissible factfinding,
and thereby legally erred, when it all but said explicitly his
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marriage was a sham. We agree. Concluding that it was an abuse
of discretion for the BIA to deny the motion to remand, we grant
Badose's petition for review.
I.
We draw the relevant background from the administrative
record, though, in doing so, "we need not detail the totality of
[Badose's] dense history before various immigration agencies and
entities in order to inform and explain today's outcome." Manguriu
v. Garland, 86 F.4th 491, 493 (1st Cir. 2023).
A. Badose's U.S. entry and merits hearing
Badose, a national of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo ("DRC"), was admitted to the United States in January 2014
on an F-1 student visa. Instead of going to school, however,
Badose filed an application with the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services ("USCIS") for asylum and withholding of
removal -- a Form I-589 -- and also sought protection under the
CAT. In his application, he claimed that he would be in danger in
the DRC because of his political opinion or affiliation. See 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Removal proceedings were then initiated,
with Badose conceding removability as charged. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (non-citizen failing to maintain terms or
conditions of nonimmigrant status under which admitted, i.e.,
student).
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At his merits hearing before the IJ in October 2019,
Badose testified as the sole witness in support of his claims for
relief. He averred that he and his father were government
employees but also active members and supporters of "the main
opposition [political] party" in the DRC; that both were arrested
because of their challenges to "corruption"; and that Badose was
then detained for several days, during which he was separated from
his father, denied food and water, and repeatedly beaten. Badose
explained that a soldier allowed him to escape prison, but only
after he witnessed the execution of two fellow inmates and was
threatened that he would be next unless he relinquished money and
compromising information about his father. In his testimony,
Badose repeated several times that, "to this day," he has no
knowledge of his father's whereabouts or wellbeing. He also said
he feared he would be killed by government officials and would put
family members in danger if he returned to the DRC.
On cross-examination, however, Badose conceded that on
each of his visa application forms, he had listed his father's
contact information and indicated that his father was paying for
his travel to the United States. He also marked on these forms
that he had never been arrested in the DRC, despite his contrary
testimony at the hearing,1 and admitted that he had been denied
1 Badose has since sought to clarify these answers,
explaining, for example, that family money paid for his travel,
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two prior visas due to questions about the legitimacy of proffered
bank statements.2 Finally, Badose also admitted that he had no
plans to go to school when he travelled to the United States on
the student visa, and acknowledged that there had been a political
transition in the DRC after he left, with the opposition party
securing some key leadership positions.
B. The IJ's decision
In late 2019, the IJ issued a decision rejecting Badose's
direct testimony in its entirety and denying his request for relief
from removal. In explaining the adverse credibility finding, the
IJ noted that "[m]uch of [Badose's] testimony was inconsistent
with his three written [affidavits], his asylum application, his
visa interviews, and his asylum interview." The IJ then concluded
that "the cumulative effect of such inconsistencies calls into
question the credibility of the entire claim." Elaborating, the
IJ identified various portions of Badose's testimony that were
internally contradictory (such as Badose's description of his
arrest and his subsequent contact with his father), "implausible"
(such as the details of his prison escape), or both (such as the
that he has spoken with his father in recent years only in brief
cell phone conversations that his father initiated, and that he
reasonably understood the arrest question on the forms to be asking
whether he had ever been "lawfully arrested" in the DRC (the
truthful answer to which, he maintains, is "no").
2 The record indicates that these bank statements were
ultimately verified as authentic.
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suspiciously condensed timeline of his government employment,
arrest, and departure from the DRC).
Having thus discredited the facts Badose offered in
support of his request for immigration relief, the IJ denied his
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the CAT. The IJ also found, in the alternative, that Badose's
asylum and withholding-of-removal claims failed because he did not
sufficiently establish a nexus between any harm he experienced and
a protected ground (i.e., his political opinion or membership in
a particular social group); and that his CAT protection claim
failed due to insufficient evidence that the torture he experienced
was done or instigated by government officials. Badose filed an
appeal with the BIA in early 2020.
C. Events during the pendency of Badose's appeal
In August 2020, the BIA initially dismissed Badose's
appeal as untimely. However, Badose successfully asserted a
"deficient representation" claim, and the BIA reinstated his
appeal in April 2022.
In the meantime, in May 2021, Badose married Workenesh
Gregory Thier, a U.S. citizen, with whom he also had a child later
that year. Shortly thereafter, Thier filed a marriage-based visa
petition -- a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative -- on behalf
of Badose, along with various forms of proof of the "bona fides"
of the marriage, including their marriage certificate and a jointly
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filed tax return for 2021. The USCIS approved the I-130 petition
on October 28, 2022.
At that time, Badose -- with his appeal to the BIA
pending -- remained "in removal proceedings." 8 C.F.R.
§ 1245.2(a)(1). Because the I-130 approval made him prima facie
eligible for "adjustment of status" to "that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence," 8 U.S.C. § 1255, and on the
assumption that "the [IJ] hearing the proceeding ha[d] exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate" his adjustment-of-status application,
8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1), Badose filed a motion to remand his case
from the BIA to the IJ. In that December 2022 motion, Badose cited
the USCIS's "approv[al of] the I-130 petition filed by [his] U.S.
citizen wife" as evidence both "material" and "not available" at
the time of his October 2019 hearing or the IJ's December 2019
removal order. Asserting that the relief sought -- adjustment of
status to that of a lawful permanent resident -- was "on the basis
of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing,"
Badose requested a remand for the IJ to consider "this new evidence
and [Badose]'s eligibility for relief."
The government filed no response to Badose's appeal or
remand motion.
D. The BIA's decision
In January 2023, the BIA issued a written decision
affirming the IJ's 2019 denial of Badose's claims and denying the
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motion to remand. With respect to Badose's claims for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT protection, the BIA upheld the
IJ's adverse credibility finding as not clearly erroneous, noting
that the IJ had identified numerous discrepancies between Badose's
testimony and the documentary record.3 The BIA concluded that the
supportable adverse credibility determination foreclosed all three
forms of relief, and it affirmed the 2019 removal order on that
basis without reaching the IJ's alternative findings on the lack
of connection to statutorily protected grounds.4
The BIA then considered and denied Badose's unopposed
request for remand to seek an adjustment of status. The BIA
explained its denial as follows:
[Badose]'s marriage occurred, and visa
petition filed, after the Immigration Judge's
denial, and thus [Badose] was aware that his
status was in jeopardy. Furthermore, as we
have found no clear error in the Immigration
Judge's adverse credibility finding, which
included a finding of lying to immigration
officials to obtain a visa, [his] lack of
candor is a further negative discretionary
3 The BIA assessed the IJ's adverse credibility determination
on a range of discrete issues, including: the identity (and
political affiliation) of the arresting officials in 2013;
Badose's "unplausible" release by the sympathetic guard; Badose
and his father's discovery of governmental corruption preceding
their arrest; Badose's professed lack of contact with his father;
the nature of Badose's short governmental employment; and Badose's
overall "lack of candor" in the U.S. visa application process.
4Badose also sought relief under the CAT based on independent
evidence (i.e., DRC country conditions in 2019), but the BIA found
that claim waived. Given our disposition here, we need not delve
into this claim.
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factor. Beyond his recent marriage, [Badose]
has not identified any other positive equities
or extraordinary factors that would overcome
the negative factors identified above. As
such, we decline to remand as a matter of
discretion.
Badose now seeks review of the BIA's final order of
removal, specifically asking us to vacate the BIA's denial of his
remand motion and arguing that the adverse credibility finding
upheld by the BIA is unsupported by the record.5 As it is
dispositive here, we address only Badose's assertion that the BIA
abused its discretion in denying his request for remand.
II.
A. Standard of Review
We apply the "highly deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard" to the BIA's denial of Badose's remand motion. Moreno
v. Garland, 51 F.4th 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Adeyanju v.
Garland, 27 F.4th 25, 51 (1st Cir. 2022)). That is, we will
"overturn" such decisions only "when 'the petitioner can establish
that the BIA made an error of law or acted in a manner that is
fairly characterizable as arbitrary and capricious.'" Id.(quoting Lee v. Barr, 975 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2020)).
5 Following oral argument, we referred Badose's case to the
First Circuit Civil Appeals Management Program ("CAMP"). The
parties subsequently informed the court that they were unable to
resolve the case.
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B. Discussion
To prevail on his remand motion before the BIA, Badose
had to make three showings: (1) that the evidence he was seeking
to offer was "material" and previously unavailable; (2) that this
new evidence likely would "change the result in the case"; and (3)
"prima facie eligibility" for the relief sought, i.e., an
adjustment of status. Id.; see also Rivera-Medrano v. Garland, 47
F.4th 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2022). A noncitizen who entered the United
States illegally may apply for an adjustment of status to lawful
permanent resident if, inter alia, "an immigrant visa is
immediately available to [him] at the time his application is
filed." 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); see also Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S.
328, 332 (2022) ("[T]he Attorney General has discretion to adjust
the status of an eligible noncitizen who entered the United States
illegally to that of lawful permanent resident, forgiving the
illegal entry and protecting the noncitizen from removal on that
ground. . . . [T]he Attorney General has delegated to immigration
judges the ability to grant relief from removal.").
As Badose correctly points out, his 2021 marriage to a
U.S. citizen and the USCIS-approved I-130 rendered him prima facie
eligible for an adjustment of status. See Wen Yuan Chan v. Lynch,
843 F.3d 539, 545 (1st Cir. 2016).6 Relying on this prima facie
6 That is to say, the "approved I–130 petition from USCIS
show[ed] that" Badose now had "a visa available to [him]," giving
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eligibility, Badose asserts that the BIA abused its discretion in
rejecting his remand request by committing a half dozen material
errors of law. As one such error alone warrants reversal, see
Khalil v. Garland, 97 F.4th 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2024), we focus our
attention here on only two: the BIA's arbitrary departure from a
settled course of adjudication and the BIA's impermissible
factfinding.
1. The BIA's departure from a well-established practice
Badose asserts that the BIA inexplicably departed from
what he characterizes as a "settled course" of routinely granting
unopposed remand requests so that petitioners in removal
proceedings may pursue adjustment of status. See Thompson v. Barr,
959 F.3d 476, 484, 490 (1st Cir. 2020) (vacating BIA decision based
on conclusion that "the BIA departed from its settled course of
adjudication"); Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 49 n.25 (observing that "the
BIA's variation from th[e] 'settled course' can be a ground of
him another, independent basis for pressing his "eligibility for
adjustment of status and admissibility." Wen Yuan Chan, 843 F.3d
at 545. However, the "IJ has jurisdiction to inquire into the
bona fides of the anchoring marriage even if USCIS already has
approved an I–130 petition to the alien's behoof." Id. Moreover,
the USCIS view of the marriage as bona fide does not mean that the
IJ or the BIA, in turn, must view the marriage as a positive equity
in its own decision making. See Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 42 (holding
that the BIA continues to retain "de novo legal authority to assign
various weights -- positive or negative, heavy or little -- to
those undisputed underlying facts in its discretionary calculus").
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legal error" (quoting Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10, 22
(1st Cir. 2021))).
To support this contention, Badose identifies more than
a dozen orders issued during a roughly fifteen-year period in which
the BIA -- seemingly as a matter of course -- granted unopposed
motions akin to his. See, e.g., In re Lopez-Castillo, A206-237-
859, 2018 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 10954, *2 (Nov. 1, 2018) ("[W]e note
that the [government] has not responded to the motion or the
appeal. Accordingly, the following order [to grant the motion to
remand] will be entered." (citation omitted)); In re Toure, A087-
183-369, 2012 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5713, *1 (Aug. 10, 2012)
(similar). At least some of these orders granting remand involved
petitioners who, like Badose, were facing removal due to adverse
credibility determinations made in earlier proceedings. See,
e.g., In re Grullon, A096-762-369, 2015 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 7844,
*2-3 (Mar. 10, 2015) (granting remand to pursue adjustment of
status based on daughter's immigrant visa petition despite record
evidence petitioner previously married for immigration benefits).
The government brushes these cases aside by claiming they are
"inapposite" without acknowledging these relevant procedural and
factual analogies.
Further, in responding in this way, the government does
not assert that Badose's invocation of such a routine practice by
the BIA (granting unopposed remand requests so that petitioners in
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removal proceedings may pursue adjustments of status) is
incorrect. It has therefore forfeited any claim that Badose's
characterization of the BIA's practice is inaccurate, incomplete,
or otherwise misleading. See Lopez-Reyes v. Garland, No. 22-1014,
2023 WL 8919744, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 27, 2023) ("[T]he Government
has forfeited a defense . . . because it did not raise the defense
in its brief or during oral argument."); Alvarez v. Lynch, 828
F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2016) (the government forgoes consideration
of defense theory by "inexplicably ignor[ing] [an appellant's]
arguments in its response brief" and "outright fail[ing] to join
in the adversarial process"). Cf. Alejos-Perez v. Garland, 93
F.4th 800, 807 (5th Cir. 2024) ("[Petitioner]'s failure to raise
these authorities in his opening brief forfeits his ability to
rely on them, as the government had no ability to respond.");
Laparra-Deleon v. Garland, 52 F.4th 514, 523 (1st Cir. 2022)
(observing that the government may waive issues not raised before
the BIA).
However, in a notably odd argument, the government
instead suggests that we should dismiss Badose's settled-course
argument based on precedent from other circuits holding that the
BIA abuses its discretion by denying motions to remand solely
because the government opposed the motion with no analysis of the
merits of that opposition. See, e.g., Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517
F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2008). In other words, the government is
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saying that because the BIA may not automatically deny a motion to
remand based only on the government's unreasoned opposition, the
BIA cannot be required to automatically grant a motion when there
is no government opposition at all.
But the issue here is not whether the BIA is required by
law to grant a motion when there is no government opposition. The
question is whether there is a "settled course" by the BIA of
routinely granting such unopposed remand requests so that
petitioners in removal proceedings may proceed for an adjustment
of status. As a matter of law, it is arbitrary and capricious for
the BIA to suddenly and "inexplicably depart[] from established
policies, including its own precedents." Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 51
(internal quotation marks omitted). Badose asserts that this is
exactly what happened here. As noted, the government has not
refuted that proposition. Its invocation of an objection by the
courts to the BIA's practice on some occasions of denying motions
to remand just because the government opposed it (even when the
government provided little to no explanation as to why the case
should not be remanded) is entirely beside the point. Moreover,
Melnitsenko and similar cases reflect a judgment by the courts to
safeguard a fair process for noncitizens navigating immigration
proceedings by ensuring that the BIA considers on the merits the
factors supporting the noncitizen's eligibility for remand.
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Hence, the holdings in those cases are far more consistent with
Badose's position here than the government's.
We also think it noteworthy that the government not only
failed to oppose the remand request, but also did not respond to
Badose's appeal on the merits. Although the timing of the
government's knowledge of Badose's marriage and his intent to seek
a remand is unclear, its failure to respond on the merits of his
appeal would be understandable if the government had anticipated
that the case would be remanded as a matter of course.
We therefore conclude that the BIA's rejection of
Badose's unopposed remand request was an arbitrary and capricious
departure from its settled course of adjudication. See Thompson,
959 F.3d at 490. That error on its own warrants our vacating the
BIA's decision, with instructions on remand to return the case to
the IJ for consideration of Badose's request for adjustment of
status. As we explain below, however, the BIA's refusal to grant
the remand motion was legally flawed for another reason, and that
error would require us to vacate the BIA's decision regardless of
its routine handling of unopposed remand motions. Hence, we
proceed to discuss this additional legal error by the BIA with
respect to factfinding in the event of further proceedings before
the BIA in this case.
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2. The BIA's factfinding on the marriage
Badose contends that the BIA's refusal to remand was
premised in part on its implicit finding that his marriage was a
sham, and he argues that the BIA committed a legal error by making
such a finding.7 We agree with Badose that any determination on
whether his marriage was entered into with the proper intent is a
factual question that may be answered only by the IJ. And, as the
relevant statutory regime prohibits the BIA from "engag[ing] in
factfinding in the course of deciding cases," 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), such impermissible factfinding by the BIA
constitutes a material error of law necessitating reversal. See
Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 36, 44-45; Domingo-Mendez v. Garland, 47
F.4th 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2022) (noting that the BIA lacks statutory
authority to engage in factfinding of its own).
The government insists that the BIA did no factfinding
on the bona fides of Badose's marriage, with its decision instead
being fully and permissibly anchored by the IJ's supportable
adverse credibility determination. That contention, however, is
7 He also asserts that the BIA erred by impermissibly: (1)
failing to expressly evaluate the required remand criteria, see
Moreno, 51 F.4th at 46; (2) failing to make an "individualized
hardship inquiry," Perez-Trujillo, 3 F.4th at 23; (3) "attaching
weight to a factor that d[id] not appropriately bear on the
decision" when it referred to the timing of his marriage, Murillo-
Robles v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 2016); and (4) departing
from its own precedent by inappropriately relying on his
preconceived intent as a negative factor. We do not address these
claims.
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belied by the language the BIA used to explain its decision:
"[Badose]'s marriage occurred, and visa petition filed, after the
Immigration Judge's denial, and thus [Badose] was aware that his
status was in jeopardy." The insinuation here of an improper
motive for the marriage is unmistakable -- Badose married because
he was in jeopardy of removal.
The BIA then took this factual determination into
account when making its decision to deny the remand motion. After
discussing the timing of Badose's marriage, the BIA expressly
identified the IJ's adverse credibility determination as a
"further" negative factor it relied upon in exercising its
discretion. Plainly, the BIA's initial negative factor was its
doubt that Badose's marriage was unrelated to his immigration
status. But, as we have explained, the legitimacy of Badose's
marriage was a factual determination the BIA was not permitted to
make. Its reliance on that determination in rejecting Badose's
remand motion was thus a legal error.8
The government also suggests that the prohibition on
factfinding by the BIA does not apply to Badose's request for
remand. We find no support for that argument in the language of
8 Indeed, for the BIA to "rest its opinion" in part on the
very factor that made Badose eligible for a remand in the first
place -- his marriage to a U.S. citizen while he was in removal
proceedings -- without any evidence in the record showing that the
marriage was a sham can only be described as arbitrary and
capricious. See Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 51.
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the applicable regulation, which broadly prohibits the BIA from
"engag[ing] in factfinding in the course of deciding cases."
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (emphasis added). In practical
effect, the BIA's inclusion of this "negative" equity based on
impermissible factfinding in its remand balancing analysis
resolved not just the remand motion, but also "decid[ed]" Badose's
"case" -- i.e., it closed the door on Badose's pursuit of an
adjustment of status, ending his immigration proceedings
altogether. Cf. Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 38-43 (comparing appropriate
BIA legal determinations with impermissible factfinding in context
of motion for reconsideration); Thamotar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 1
F.4th 958, 975 (11th Cir. 2021) (same); Jin Li Ni v. Holder, 366
F. App'x 235, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2010) (same in context of motion to
remand). As Badose argues, the BIA is not allowed to effectively
"decid[e]" that a petitioner is ineligible or undeserving of
immigration relief by means of its own factfinding. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).
The government seems to be relying on language in our
unpublished decision in Tsai v. Holder, 505 F. App'x 4, 5 (1st
Cir. 2013), as support for its insistence that a remand motion is
outside the prohibition on BIA factfinding. There we observed:
"Although Tsai is correct that 'the Board will not engage in
factfinding in the course of deciding appeals,' 8 C.F.R. §
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1003.1(d)(3)(iv) [2008], this case concerns a motion to reopen and
not an appeal of an IJ's decision." Tsai, 505 F. App'x at 8.
The government's reliance is plainly inapt. Section
1003.1(d)(3)(iv) has been amended since Tsai was decided to change
the proscription on BIA factfinding from "appeals" to "cases."
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2008) with 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A) (2021); see also Appellate Procedures and
Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative
Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 81588, 81592 (Dec. 16, 2020). Indeed, the
shift in language from "appeals" to "cases" was made specifically
"to ensure that [the regulation] is clearly applicable to all cases
before the [BIA], not solely cases arising through appeals." See
id. at 81592 (emphasis added); id. at n.11 (applying same reasoning
specifically to subsection (d)(3)(iv)). In revising the
regulation, the agency explained that the BIA "adjudicates
multiple types of cases, not just appeals," i.e., "cases may be
initiated [by]: (1) The filing of a Notice of Appeal, (2) the
filing of a motion directly with the [BIA] (e.g., a motion to
reconsider or a motion to reopen), or (3) the receipt of a remand."
Id. at 81592. The petitioner in Tsai brought a motion to reopen
-- a "motion [filed] directly with the Board," id. -- and so, at
the time our court was considering the BIA's authority to find
facts, Tsai's motion was not expressly covered by the language of
the regulation prohibiting such factfinding. Therefore, the
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government's citation to language from Tsai that distinguishes
between an "appeal" (covered by the then-existing regulation) and
a motion to reopen (which was not) relies on a distinction that is
no longer legally relevant for factfinding purposes.9
Thus, if the BIA determined that "further factfinding
[was] needed in [this] particular case," despite the government's
lack of opposition to Badose's remand motion or his merits appeal,
the only available course was to "remand the proceeding to the
[IJ]." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); see also Rodriguez v. Holder,
683 F.3d 1164, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2012) (remand to IJ required for
outcome determinative supplemental factfinding). By instead
offering its own assessment of Badose's marriage, the BIA engaged
in impermissible factfinding, rendering its decision to deny
remand an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at
38 ("A 'material error of law automatically constitutes an abuse
of discretion.'" (quoting Aponte v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 2010))).
9Moreover, in Tsai, we concluded that the BIA had not engaged
in factfinding. Rather, the case involved the BIA's assessment of
the limited evidentiary value of non-authenticated documents in
deciding whether to revisit a removal order (based on an alleged
change in country conditions) that had been issued, appealed, and
affirmed years earlier. See Tsai, 505 F. App'x at 5, 8. The
government seems to be suggesting that the BIA's evaluation of the
authenticity of documents is somehow equivalent to the BIA's
conclusion that Badose's marriage itself was not authentic. If
so, that suggestion is plainly preposterous.
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On the record before us, we can only conclude that the
BIA improperly denied Badose's unopposed remand motion both by
arbitrarily deviating from a standard course of practice and by
improperly engaging in factfinding in violation of 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3). Badose is therefore entitled to a remand to the
IJ so that he can present his case for adjustment of status based
on his marriage. See Patel, 596 U.S. at 332 (explaining that
adjustment of status is discretionary notwithstanding noncitizen's
eligibility for such relief).
III.
Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review; VACATE
the BIA's decision; and REMAND the case to the BIA with directions
that the BIA grant Badose's motion to remand the case to the IJ
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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