Caz v. Garland ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 23-1108
TOMAS CAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Rikelman, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Kristian R. Meyer, with whom Kevin P. MacMurray and
MacMurray & Associates were on brief, for petitioner.
Marie V. Robinson, United States Department of Justice,
Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Brian M. Boynton,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and
Andrew N. O'Malley, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief, for
respondent.
October 11, 2023
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Tomas Caz ("Caz"),1
a member of Ecuador's Quechua indigenous group, applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture ("CAT") -- applications which were rejected by an
Immigration Judge ("IJ"). He then appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which affirmed the IJ's decision.
Convinced the BIA and IJ got it wrong, Caz filed a petition for
review with this court, asking us to reverse the BIA's affirmance
and remand his case. Limited by the deferential substantial-
evidence standard of review, we deny his petition.
BACKGROUND
Life in Ecuador and Entrance to the United States2
Caz is a native and citizen of Ecuador, born and raised
in Riobamba. While his life in Riobamba was, for the most part,
uneventful, he was "looked down on" and "discriminated against"
for his Quechua heritage, resulting in fewer employment
opportunities. Thinking it would be different in a larger city,
1Caz's name, at times, appears as "Segundo Tomas Caz-Quillay"
in the administrative record. We use Tomas Caz because that is
the name used in his opening brief.
2 We draw the facts from the administrative record, including
Caz's testimony before the IJ. Adeyanju v. Garland, 27 F.4th 25,
31 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d
33, 37 n.1 (1st Cir. 2018)). While the IJ did not find Caz
credible, the BIA, in adjudicating his appeal, "assum[ed], without
deciding, that [he] testified credibly." Our review of the BIA's
decision makes the same assumption.
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Caz moved to Guayaquil (about three to four hours from Riobamba)
in 2012, when he was about twenty-two years old.
Once there, Caz found work on a banana farm. One day in
2012, however, three of the temporary workers on the farm insulted
him, calling him "a small person," "a farmer . . . from the
village," and an "Indian." As Caz was leaving work that day, these
men attacked him, stole his money, and threatened him by
brandishing a firearm and by telling him they would kill him if he
returned to work. A second incident occurred months later in mid-
2013. On this occasion, the same three workers attacked Caz and
threw him down near a river or body of water, causing him to hit
his head on a rock when he went down and resulting in trauma to
the head. These men then threatened to kill him with a machete if
he reported their actions to the authorities.
Following this attack, Caz could no longer work due to
his head injury, so he returned to his parents' home in Riobamba
to recover. He lived there without incident for about one year.
Although Caz never saw his attackers again, these violent incidents
convinced him he was not safe in Ecuador, leading to his decision
to flee to the United States in November 2014.
Upon his arrival to the United States on December 28,
2014, Caz was issued an expedited removal order. He then expressed
a fear of returning to Ecuador and was referred to an asylum
officer for a credible fear interview. During the interview, Caz
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expressed that he feared harm in Ecuador due to his Quechua
heritage. The asylum officer deemed his fear credible and, as
such, referred his case to the immigration court for removal
proceedings.
Immigration Proceedings
Fast forward several years. Caz went before the IJ on
September 24, 2019, seeking to avoid removal through applications
for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. These
applications were principally supported by Caz's testimony, along
with his written affidavit, credible fear documents, asylum
application, and four country conditions reports.
After hearing Caz's testimony, the IJ issued an oral
decision denying all three forms of relief and ordering his removal
to Ecuador. In denying asylum, the IJ first found that Caz had
not testified credibly, focusing on purported discrepancies
relating to the presence of the firearm in the first attack and
the nature of his work in Guayaquil.3 Notwithstanding this adverse
credibility finding, the IJ went on to the merits of Caz's asylum
claim, concluding that he failed to carry his burden to prove past
3 To be specific, the IJ noted that,
in Caz's written affidavit
and credible fear documents, he never mentioned a firearm or its
use during either attack. The IJ further noted that Caz's written
statement indicated he worked in construction while in Guayaquil,
not at a banana farm. Reviewing the transcript of Caz's testimony
in 2019, it appears that the IJ's rapid, leading questioning of
Caz, who was testifying through an interpreter using his second
language, Spanish, may have contributed to the inconsistencies.
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persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. As to
past persecution, the IJ determined that the two incidents in
Guayaquil did not amount to persecution and, even if they did, the
persecution was not on account of his Quechua heritage. As to
future persecution, the IJ determined that Caz could not
demonstrate a well-founded fear because he could safely relocate
within Ecuador, citing Caz's testimony that he relocated to
Riobamba following the attacks and did not suffer any further
violence. Because Caz could not satisfy the asylum burden, the IJ
denied withholding of removal -- a form of relief with a higher
burden of proof than asylum. Turning to CAT protection, the IJ
denied relief because Caz failed to show it was more likely than
not that he would be tortured in Ecuador.
A timely appeal to the BIA followed. On January 11,
2023, the BIA issued a decision dismissing the appeal. While Caz
challenged the IJ's adverse credibility finding, the BIA side-
stepped the credibility issue entirely, choosing instead to assume
Caz testified credibly, then affirming the IJ's denial of relief
on the merits. Specifically, the BIA found no error in the IJ's
determination that Caz had not shown his Quechua heritage was the
motivation behind the attacks. Furthermore, the BIA agreed with
the IJ's conclusion that Caz could safely relocate within Ecuador,
noting that Caz had not contended it would be unreasonable for him
to relocate or otherwise challenged the IJ's internal relocation
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finding. Finally, the BIA noted (and of import to our analysis)
that Caz had not meaningfully challenged the IJ's denial of CAT
protection and deemed that claim for relief waived.
DISCUSSION
Against this factual and procedural backdrop, we turn
our attention to the three issues Caz raises to us in his petition
for review: 1) the BIA erred in adopting the IJ's adverse
credibility finding, a finding which was made (in Caz's view)
against the totality of the circumstances; 2) the BIA erred in
affirming the IJ's determination that Caz did not suffer past
persecution because his attackers were not motivated by his Quechua
heritage; and 3) the BIA erred in affirming the IJ's determination
that Caz could safely relocate within Ecuador and it would be
reasonable for him to do so. We bypass the first two issues and
focus our gaze squarely on the third issue, which is dispositive
of the whole petition. A quick review of some asylum fundamentals
explains why.
An applicant for asylum must show that they have
suffered or have a well-founded fear of suffering "persecution,"
which is harm on account of a protected ground "either . . .
perpetrated by the government itself or by a private actor that
the government is unwilling or unable to control." Aguilar-Escoto
v. Garland, 59 F.4th 510, 518 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Rosales-
Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 162 (1st Cir. 2018)). If an
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applicant shoulders their burden as to past persecution, they get
the benefit of a presumption that they will face persecution in
the future on the basis of the original claim. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1).4 All that said, however, even if an applicant
makes a sufficient showing that they have suffered past persecution
or have a well-founded fear of future persecution, their
application for asylum will be denied if the adjudicator determines
that they could avoid persecution by internally relocating within
the country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would
be reasonable to do so. See Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197, 202
(1st Cir. 2013); Tendean v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir.
2007); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2)(ii). Applying this
framework to Caz's case, assuming he testified credibly and
assuming his attackers were motivated by his Quechua heritage (thus
constituting past persecution and entitling him to that helpful
presumption of future persecution), if we conclude substantial
4As we noted earlier this year, "[i]n December 2020, the
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice
published a joint rule that amended portions of 8 C.F.R.
§ [208.13], including subsection [(b)(3)], which is cited in this
opinion." Reyes-Ramos v. Garland, 57 F.4th 367, 369 n.1 (1st Cir.
2023) (citing Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal;
Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80274 (Dec.
11, 2020)). But that rule has been enjoined, id. (citing Pangea
Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 512 F. Supp. 3d 966,
977 (N.D. Cal. 2021)), so any citation in this opinion to 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13 is to the 2020 version of that regulation -- the version
in effect immediately prior to the promulgation of the enjoined
rule.
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evidence supports the BIA's conclusion about the feasibility of
internal relocation (more on what substantial evidence means in
just a moment), his petition must be denied regardless.
Turning, accordingly, to the internal relocation issue,
"[f]or an applicant to be able to internally relocate safely, there
must be an area of the country where he or she has no well-founded
fear of persecution." Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 33
(B.I.A. 2012) (citing cases). "[T]he purpose of the relocation
rule is not to require an applicant to stay one step ahead of
persecution," so any proposed area of relocation "must present
circumstances that are substantially better than those giving rise
to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original
claim." Id. In considering an applicant's ability to safely
relocate internally, the adjudicator must assess the totality of
the circumstances, including "whether the applicant would face
other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any
ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic,
or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social
and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social
and familial ties." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3). Along these same
lines, an applicant's prior successful internal relocation and the
continued safe residence of the applicant's family members5 in the
5 Of course, if those family members are not "similarly
situated" (i.e., they do not have the applicant's same protected
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country of removal can be relevant to the analysis as well. See,
e.g., López-Pérez v. Garland, 26 F.4th 104, 112 (1st Cir. 2022);
Chen Qin v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016).
Here, as a reminder, the IJ determined that Caz could
safely relocate within Ecuador to Riobamba, as evidenced by the
fact that he returned there after the attacks in Guayaquil and
lived safely for one year before fleeing to the United States.
The BIA affirmed on this same basis and observed Caz made no
unreasonable-to-relocate argument. The standard we apply to our
review of that decision -- the substantial evidence standard --
determines the outcome here. See Tendean, 503 F.3d at 10–11.
Substantial evidence requires any finding be "supported
by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole." Odei v. Garland, 71 F.4th 75, 78 (1st
Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To
reverse under the substantial evidence standard means that "the
evidence must not only support the contrary finding, but compel
it." Mahmoud v. Barr, 981 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing
Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 372 (1st Cir. 2003)). In other
words, reversal requires that "the evidence point[] unerringly in
the opposite direction." López-Pérez, 26 F.4th at 111 (quoting
characteristic that can lead to potential persecution), their
continued residence in the country of removal is given little
weight in the internal relocation calculus. See Morales-Morales
v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 130, 134 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017).
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Rashad v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009)). And "where, as
here, the BIA accepts the IJ's findings and reasoning yet adds its
own gloss, we review [under the substantial evidence standard] the
two decisions as a unit." Cabrera v. Lynch, 805 F.3d 391, 393
(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Moreno v. Holder, 749 F.3d 40, 43 (1st
Cir. 2014)).
Crucially, under the substantial evidence standard, the
question we must answer is not whether the record included any
evidence suggesting Caz could not relocate safely within Ecuador.
Nor is the question whether we would have reached an opposite
conclusion to the IJ and BIA. Rather, the question is whether a
reasonable factfinder, having considered all the evidence, would
be compelled to conclude that Caz could not safely relocate within
Ecuador. See Barnica-Lopez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 520, 527 (1st
Cir. 2023).
A summary of the evidence presented below on this issue
explains why we answer that question in the negative. On one side
of the equation is the evidence suggesting Caz could not safely
relocate within Ecuador: 1) Caz presented four country conditions
reports detailing widespread discrimination in Ecuador against
members of the Quechua indigenous group; 2) in response to his
attorney's question regarding whether internal relocation would
help him avoid future harm, Caz responded, "No. I don't think so
because it -- it's the same everywhere. They rob and kill and
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hurt people all over."; and 3) in response to his attorney's
follow-up question, asking "[W]ere you afraid that other people
might target you for being indigenous in other parts of Ecuador
too?", Caz responded affirmatively.
On the other side of the equation is the evidence
suggesting Caz could safely relocate within Ecuador: 1) he
testified that other than the two violent incidents in Guayaquil,
he never suffered any other violence in Ecuador; 2) for the first
twenty-two years of his life and the year following the attacks,
he lived safely in Riobamba; 3) he testified that his parents (also
members of the Quechua indigenous group) continued to live in
Riobamba unharmed;6 and 4) when later asked again whether he could
safely relocate within Ecuador, he responded, "Maybe. There might
be another state, but most of the country is the same." Balancing
all this evidence together, we simply cannot conclude that a
reasonable factfinder would have been compelled to a contrary
conclusion, especially where Caz lived safely in Riobamba for the
6 Specifically, Caz stated, "I don't think [my parents have
suffered as a result of being indigenous], because they never --
they never leave the place where we used to live. They never go
out." To the extent "the place where we used to live" refers to
Riobamba, that would support the IJ's determination that Caz could
safely relocate there. Alternatively, to the extent "the place
where we used to live" refers to his parents' property and Caz
meant to imply that his parents do not leave their property out of
safety concerns, he provided no evidence to that effect such that
the IJ could have reasonably concluded his parents faced risks of
violence in Riobamba.
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vast majority of his life in Ecuador, his Quechua parents continue
to live there, and he himself stated that "[t]here might be another
state" where he could safely reside.
Caz resists this conclusion, offering three arguments
why the conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence.
First, he contends that the IJ and the BIA disregarded the country
conditions evidence and his testimony indicating internal
relocation would not have been possible. We know this is not true,
because the IJ's oral decision specifically cited the country
conditions reports and Caz's testimony, demonstrating they were
thus considered.
Second, Caz argues that, as the beneficiary of a
presumption of future persecution, the burden shifted to the
government to establish that internal relocation was reasonable.
Because the government provided no evidence to refute Caz's
testimony and the country conditions reports -- the argument goes
-- the government did not carry its burden and the BIA erred in
affirming the IJ's internal-relocation analysis. That
presumption, however, can be rebutted through the applicant's own
testimony. See, e.g., Herrera v. Garland, No. 21-60120, 2023 WL
1432009, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2023); Sherpa v. Barr, 837 F.
App'x 826, 829 (2d Cir. 2020). And recall that Caz testified that
the attacks were localized to Guayaquil, he suffered no violence
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in Riobamba, his parents still lived there safely, and he conceded
there were perhaps some states where he could live safely.
Caz's third and final argument is that relocation must
be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and, because
there is evidence in the record to suggest Caz faced employment
discrimination in Riobamba, relocating there is not reasonable.
This argument appeared for the first time not in his opening brief,
but at oral argument. Setting aside the fact that this argument
is, accordingly, waived, see Barros v. Garland, 31 F.4th 51, 62
n.8 (1st Cir. 2022), we reach the argument's merits for the sake
of completeness, see, e.g., Vaz Dos Reis v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1, 4
n.3 (1st Cir. 2010) (considering claim that was not advanced before
the court "[f]or the sake of completeness"); Kheireddine v.
Gonzales, 427 F.3d 80, 86 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005) (ignoring "[f]or
argument's sake . . . a waiver of [an] argument" and considering
the argument's merits).
The only case Caz offered at oral argument for that
proposition is Matter of T-Z-, where the BIA noted that economic
harm can amount to persecution where "[t]he economic difficulties
[are] above and beyond those generally shared by others in the
country of origin and involve noticeably more than mere loss of
social advantages or physical comforts" and "the harm [is] of a
deliberate and severe nature and such that is condemned by
civilized governments." 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 173 (B.I.A. 2007)
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(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The only evidence
in the record Caz offered at oral argument for the proposition
that he endured employment discrimination in Riobamba was two
sentences in his written affidavit: "The town I grew up in Ecuador
was very small so I decided to make my way to Guayaquil to find
work. I knew that people sometimes looked down on me and other
Quechua people because of our heritage but I believed that in a
larger city I would be safer and have an easier time finding work
and not being discriminated against." These two sentences hardly
satisfy the standard set forth in Matter of T-Z-. Moreover, his
claims of employment discrimination in Riobamba are belied by other
aspects of the record. For example, during his credible fear
interview, Caz was asked why he could not secure work in Riobamba,
to which he replied, "I live in the country, and there is no work
there, so I had to go far to look for work." His answer suggests
that his lack of employment in Riobamba was not a result of
discrimination, but rather limited employment opportunities in a
rural area. As such, any suggestion that employment discrimination
in Riobamba would make Caz's relocation there unreasonable is not
borne out by the record.
Having reviewed the evidence and considered all Caz's
arguments, we conclude that the IJ's and BIA's decisions as to
internal relocation are supported by substantial evidence and his
application for asylum was, therefore, appropriately denied. The
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corollary to this conclusion is that withholding of removal was
also appropriately denied because such relief requires a higher
showing than asylum.7 See Tendean, 503 F.3d at 11.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied.
7 Nowhere did Caz challenge the BIA's determination to deem
waived the issue of CAT protection. So, to the extent he wished
to challenge that determination, any arguments he had to that
effect are waived.
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