Corrigan v. Boston University ( 2024 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 23-1003
CAITLIN CORRIGAN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Selya, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Robert N. Meltzer, with whom Mountain States Law Group was on
brief, for appellant.
Thomas M. Elcock, with whom Prince Lobel Tye, LLP, Jennifer
C. Pucci, and Boston University Office of the General Counsel were
on brief, for appellee.
April 12, 2024
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Faced with grim statistics at the
height of the COVID-19 pandemic, universities collaborated with
medical and scientific experts in an all-out effort to implement
community-wide testing programs designed to safeguard the health
and safety of those who set foot on their campuses.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the fit was sometimes imperfect.
When one such university, defendant-appellee Boston University
(BU), implemented a mandatory testing program, plaintiff-appellant
Caitlin Corrigan — a graduate student at the time — claimed that
she could not comply due to a chronic medical condition. She
further claimed that requiring her compliance with the program
would violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), see 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213. Litigation ensued.
The district court did not reach the merits of Corrigan's
claims. Instead, the court dismissed Corrigan's suit for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction on the theory that it had become moot
once BU ended its mandatory testing program. Concluding, as we
do, that the district court appropriately applied mootness
principles to dismiss Corrigan's suit and that Corrigan has not
shown that her case comes within an applicable exception to those
mootness principles, we affirm the order of dismissal.
I
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the
case.
- 2 -
A
In the fall of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic raged
relentlessly throughout the nation. This circumstance prompted BU
to mandate that its students — even if asymptomatic — undergo
regular testing for the virus. To accomplish this goal, BU opened
an on-campus laboratory so that it could conduct polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) testing for the virus.1 The university also set up
a website that allowed it to broadcast information about university
protocols as rapidly as practicable.
Time marched on, however, and by March of 2022, the
pandemic was in decline. This decline led BU to terminate its
mandatory testing program in May of that year. By then, BU also
had relaxed other COVID-19 protocols (such as its masking
requirement).
Corrigan enrolled as a graduate student in BU's School
of Theology in the fall of 2021. She immediately cited a chronic
medical condition and invoked the ADA to apply for an exemption
from BU's mandatory testing program. BU rejected her proposed
exemption and (she says) refused to negotiate with her. As a
1 In COVID-19 testing, PCR — "a common laboratory technique
used . . . to amplify, or copy, small segments of genetic
material" — is run with fluorescent dyes that mark virus genetic
material to measure how much of that genetic material appears in
a human sample. Understanding COVID-19 PCR Testing, NAT'L HUMAN
GENOME RSCH. INST., https://perma.cc/QU6R-BW2E (last visited Apr. 2,
2024).
- 3 -
result, she was out of compliance with the university's protocol,
and BU suspended her for the fall semester.
Although Corrigan was advised that she would be welcome
to return to her academic pursuits after her suspension — assuming
that she adhered to the mandatory testing program — she never
returned to campus. Nor has she since attempted to reenroll as a
student at BU.
This was not the end of the matter. Rather than
attempting to repair her relationship with the university,
Corrigan sued BU, alleging that BU had violated Title III of the
ADA.2 See Corrigan v. Boston Univ., No. 22-10443, 2022 WL 11218108,
at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 19, 2022).
B
BU moved to dismiss Corrigan's suit for want of subject-
matter jurisdiction, and the district court — applying mootness
principles — granted the motion.3 See id. Because BU had ended
2 The portion of the statute upon which Corrigan relied makes
clear that discrimination on the basis of disability includes the
"failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices,
or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the[ir] nature." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(a)(ii).
3 Corrigan repeatedly mischaracterizes the district court's
opinion as granting BU's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The district court,
however, made no such ruling. Indeed, such a ruling would have
been grossly improper once the district court had held the case to
be moot. The only issue properly on appeal is the district court's
- 4 -
its mandatory testing program, the court determined that an order
requiring BU to provide Corrigan with a reasonable accommodation
to the program would have had no effect. After all, "there [was]
no ongoing conduct to enjoin." Id. at *4 (quoting Town of
Portsmouth v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016)). The court
added that "issuance of a declaratory judgment deeming past conduct
illegal [was] also not permissible as it would be merely advisory."
Id. (quoting Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of
Cath. Bishops (ACLUM), 705 F.3d 44, 53 (1st Cir. 2013)). In the
court's view, this general rule should be relaxed only if "there
is a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality
to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Id. (quoting
Lewis, 813 F.3d at 59). But "[n]o such immediacy or reality
exist[s] here." Id.In support of this reasoning, the district court noted
that "BU's mandatory testing program ended on May 23, 2022, and
nothing in the record suggests that the program will be revived —
let alone with the sufficient immediacy and reality to overcome a
mootness challenge." Id. And although Corrigan advanced two
potential exceptions to save her suit from mootness, the court
ruled that neither exception had any footing in the facts of this
case. See id. at *5-7. The voluntary cessation exception was
grant of BU's Rule 12(b)(1) motion for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
- 5 -
inapplicable because BU stopped its mandatory testing program for
a reason unrelated to Corrigan's suit (the waning severity of the
pandemic) and BU was unlikely "to impose a [program] 'similar'
enough to the old [program] to present substantially the same legal
controversy as the one presented by [Corrigan's] complaint." Id.
at *6 (alterations in original) (quoting Resurrection Sch. v.
Hertel, 35 F.4th 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2022)).
So, too, the district court found inapplicable the
exception for cases which, though capable of repetition, might
otherwise evade review. See id.; see, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523
U.S. 1, 18 (1998) (holding that habeas petition had become moot
after petitioner was released from second stint of incarceration
following parole revocation because he had failed to show that
"time between parole revocation and expiration of sentence is
always so short as to evade review" and that he again likely would
face parole revocation); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-84
(1982) (holding that defendant's challenge to denial of pretrial
release had become moot after he was convicted because he would
have been entitled to pretrial release only if his convictions
were reversed but had shown no more than a possibility of
reversal); cf. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,
551 U.S. 449, 462-64 (2007) (holding that advocacy group's
challenge to statute prohibiting certain campaign ads was not moot
even though elections had concluded because election cycle was too
- 6 -
short to obtain complete judicial review and advocacy group planned
to run similar ads in future elections); Neb. Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976) (holding that challenge to
restraining order against press coverage of trial that expired
after jury empanelment was not moot because such orders are short
lived and press was likely to dispute similar orders in the
future). The court pointed out that Corrigan's claim was not
inherently transitory (BU's mandatory testing program had been in
place for nearly two years) and BU was unlikely to subject Corrigan
to mandatory testing again. Corrigan, 2022 WL 11218108, at *7.
Finally, the court held that the monetary relief that
Corrigan sought was legally insufficient to support a claim of
jurisdiction. See id. at *5. Under applicable precedents, the
court maintained, Corrigan's prayer for monetary relief could not
resurrect an otherwise moot case because she asked for damages
without including a specific dollar amount.4 See id.; see also
Harris v. Univ. of Mass. Lowell, 43 F.4th 187, 192-93 (1st Cir.
2022) (explaining that, although damages can salvage case when
unavailability of equitable relief otherwise would render it moot,
4 Although the parties do not develop the point on appeal, we
pause to note that such a request for damages would be irrelevant
in all events because monetary damages are unavailable under Title
III of the ADA. See G. v. Fay Sch., 931 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019)
(explaining that, "[b]y the plain terms of that provision [of the
ADA], . . . damages for past harms are not available" (first and
third alterations in original) (quoting Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc.,
436 F.3d 44, 51 (1st Cir. 2006))).
- 7 -
complaint failed to include "any specific request for damages").
And a catchall "request for 'any other relief [the] Court deems
proper' cannot operate to save [an] otherwise moot action."
Corrigan, 2022 WL 11218108, at *5 (alterations in original)
(quoting Harris, 43 F.4th at 193). In like fashion, "an 'interest
in attorneys' fees [or costs] is . . . insufficient to create an
Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of
the underlying claim.'" Id. (second alteration in original)
(quoting Harris, 43 F.4th at 193).
This timely appeal followed.
II
We next proceed to note some applicable legal standards.
A
"Article III of the Constitution grants the federal
judiciary the authority to adjudicate cases and controversies, see
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, but that authority extends only
to live cases and controversies, not to those which are or have
become moot." In re Sundaram, 9 F.4th 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2021). In
this regard, "the key question 'is whether the relief sought would,
if granted, make a difference to the legal interests of the parties
(as distinct from their psyches, which might remain deeply engaged
with the merits of the litigation).'" Bos. Bit Labs, Inc. v.
Baker, 11 F.4th 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 897 F.2d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1990)).
- 8 -
The burden of showing mootness is a heavy one — and it rests
squarely with the proponent of the issue. See id.B
As a general matter, we review the district court's
mootness determinations de novo. See id. "The ultimate question
of whether jurisdiction exists . . ., however, may turn on or be
influenced by the district court's role as the decider of disputed
facts." Amoche v. Guar. Tr. Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48 (1st
Cir. 2009). That is, "a district court faced with a factual
challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) ordinarily must resolve disputed
facts (or, at least, choose among competing inferences from
subsidiary facts). . . . [And] such findings will be set aside
only if clearly erroneous." Valentín v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254
F.3d 358, 365 (1st Cir. 2001). For "mixed question[s] of law and
fact, the same deferential standard of review endures." Id.In first reviewing the facts, "we must accept the
[district] court's findings and the conclusions drawn therefrom
unless the whole of the record leaves us with 'a strong, unyielding
belief that a mistake has been made.'" Id. (quoting Cumpiano v.
Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990)). Our
next step is to "determine whether the facts, as supportably found,
justify the court's ultimate legal conclusion." Id. at 365-66
(emphasis in original).
- 9 -
III
On its face, this case presents a classic illustration
of mootness: the university requirement that led the parties to
a parting of the ways is no longer operative, and Corrigan does
not seriously dispute that conclusion. Yet, two exceptions to the
rule of mootness may be relevant — and Corrigan deploys both
exceptions in furtherance of her claims.
A
The voluntary cessation exception applies in situations
in which "a 'defendant voluntary[ily] ceases the challenged
practice' in order to moot the plaintiff's case, . . . and there
exists 'a reasonable expectation that the challenged conduct will
be repeated following dismissal of the case.'" Lewis, 813 F.3d at
59 (first alteration in original) (quoting ACLUM, 705 F.3d at 54,
56). To qualify for this exception, the defendant's conduct also
must be "sufficiently similar to the [past conduct such] that it
is permissible to say that the challenged conduct continues." Ne.
Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 662 n.3 (1993).
"[A] defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance
moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is
absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).
- 10 -
Otherwise, "a defendant might suspend its challenged conduct after
being sued, win dismissal, and later pick up where it left off; it
might even repeat 'this cycle' as necessary until it achieves all
of its allegedly 'unlawful ends.'" FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. ___,
___ (2024) [No. 22-1178, slip op. at 6] (quoting Already, LLC v.
Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)).
Although the university ceased the challenged conduct on
its own volition, the circumstances are such as to persuade us
that this posturing is not of concern. As the district court
supportably found: "After almost two years in place, BU retired
the program not in response to Corrigan's lawsuit, but rather
because of more favorable trends in regard to COVID-related
illnesses and hospitalizations." Corrigan, 2022 WL 11218108, at
*6. This development also explains why the university is unlikely
to repeat the challenged conduct. Because it is absolutely clear
that BU ended its mandatory testing program in response to
encouraging public health data and there are no signs that the
pandemic will worsen, it is not reasonable to expect that BU again
will impose a similar testing program.
B
This leaves the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-
review exception. To gain the benefit of this exception, "a
plaintiff [must] show that '(1) the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
- 11 -
expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.'" ACLUM, 705 F.3d at 57 (quoting Gulf of Me. Fisherman's
All. v. Daley, 292 F.3d 84, 89 (1st Cir. 2002)). As to the first
element, "the claims [must be] inherently transitory . . . [or
there must be] a realistic threat that no trial court ever will
have enough time to decide the underlying issues." Cruz v.
Farquharson, 252 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir. 2001).
Corrigan has failed to establish either of these
elements. It is struthious at best to suggest that a resource-
intensive effort continuously spanning almost two years is so
fleeting that a court could never have time to pass on its
legality. Indeed, we previously have observed that "[c]hallenges
to university-vaccination policies are not among or closely
analogous to the 'inherently transitory' claims that the Supreme
Court has previously found to fit this exception." Harris, 43
F.4th at 194. And as we explained earlier, BU ended the mandatory
testing program in response to promising public health data. Thus,
it is not reasonable to expect that the university again will
impose a similar program in the absence of a future public health
concern (the sole justification for the original program).
We also summarily reject Corrigan's argument that the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception "is a catch-
all when dealing with 'exceptional circumstances.'" This argument
- 12 -
inverts the Court's reasoning in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 109 (1983). The exception does not permit a court to
salvage an otherwise moot case whenever "exceptional
circumstances" weigh in favor of adjudicating the claims but,
rather, "applies only in exceptional situations, and generally
only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that
he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality." Id. As we
have discussed, Corrigan cannot make this showing.
IV
Refined to bare essence, Corrigan suggests three reasons
why her suit is not moot. First, she asserts that, in applying
the mootness exceptions, the district court misread Boston Bit
Labs and Lewis because those cases were rendered moot based on
considerations that are inapplicable here. Second, she asserts
that the district court misconstrued the facts in applying the
mootness exceptions. Third, she asserts that the district court
ignored the import of the ADA's scheme for providing prospective
relief. None of these assertions moves the needle.
A
Corrigan first challenges the district court's
discussion of Boston Bit Labs and Lewis as they pertain to the
analysis — required by both mootness exceptions — of whether there
was a reasonable expectation that Corrigan again would be subjected
to sufficiently similar conduct. The crux of the matter in Boston
- 13 -
Bit Labs, as Corrigan views it, involved the governor of
Massachusetts issuing executive orders — under the authority of a
state statute that permitted such action in times of emergency —
to ensure the safety of residents during the pandemic. See 11
F.4th at 7. Once the governor rescinded these executive orders,
Corrigan's thesis runs, further executive action would have
required a new declaration of emergency subject to the constraints
of the state statute and judicial review. See id. It was,
therefore, "'absolutely clear' that the supposedly 'wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur'" because there
would have been no justification (as required by state law) for
invoking the governor's emergency authority in the latter months
of the pandemic. Id. at 11 (quoting Bayley's Campground, Inc. v.
Mills, 985 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2021)).
The case at hand is a horse of a different hue. Here,
the university retains the authority to institute a mandatory
testing program at any time without similar legal constraints.
Corrigan insists, therefore, that BU's mere representations about
ending its mandatory testing program do not make it "absolutely
clear" that there is a reasonable expectation that BU will not
again subject her to a testing program. (Quoting id.).
This insistence is composed of more cry than wool. As
we observed in Boston Bit Labs, "[t]hat the Governor has the power
to issue executive orders cannot itself be enough to skirt
- 14 -
mootness, because then no suit against the government would ever
be moot." 11 F.4th at 10. In the same vein, that BU retains
authority to impose a mandatory testing program on students by
itself cannot keep a suit alive. Although BU does not have the
additional burden of complying with a state statutory scheme, its
decisions must remain sensitive to internal organizational
constraints and its responsibilities to students, faculty, and
staff. Put bluntly, imposing a mandatory testing program in the
absence of a full-fledged pandemic would be an unjustifiable
expenditure of resources and place an unnecessary burden on the
school's community members such that there is no reasonable
expectation that BU will reinstate a similar testing program with
which Corrigan must comply.
In Lewis, we observed that the challenged conduct (tolls
imposed by the state of Rhode Island) was unlikely to recur because
the Rhode Island legislature had repealed the enabling statute.
See 813 F.3d at 58. Although the governor had proposed new tolls
and the state senate had passed a bill that reauthorized tolls,
"the capital infrastructure for collecting the tolls ha[d] been
dismantled, [which] hardly [represented] the behavior of a
defendant that intended to return to its old ways upon dismissal
of a case." Id. at 60. The legal authority for the challenged
tolls could have been restored, but we nonetheless held that the
conduct was unlikely to recur based on factual developments. See
- 15 -
id. Similarly, BU was dismantling the extensive infrastructure
that it had developed solely for its testing program during the
height of the pandemic. These costly and time-consuming moves —
during a time of financial hardship for universities — "hardly
[represent] the behavior of a defendant [seeking] to return to its
old ways upon dismissal of a case." Id.B
Corrigan's factual challenge fares no better. In
mounting it, Corrigan seemingly disputes the district court's
finding that BU ended its mandatory testing program based on the
incidence of more favorable public health data and was unlikely to
resume a similar one that also would ensnare her (as required by
both mootness exceptions). She contends that BU made only oral
promises to end the mandatory testing program, and these promises
later were cast into grave doubt by a suggestion that the
university would continue with testing. These promises, she
suggests, are the equivalent of showing a receipt for a portable
ADA-compliant ramp purchased online with the intent of installing
it at some point, instead of hiring a designer, obtaining the
necessary building permits, and signing a contract with a
construction company to construct professionally an ADA-compliant
ramp (a much more permanent course of action).
In parsing this suggestion, we look to the relevant facts
as the court found them and intervene only where a factual finding
- 16 -
is clearly erroneous or a legal conclusion is incorrect. See
Valentín, 254 F.3d at 365. In March and April of 2022, BU issued
several statements announcing that the mandatory testing program
would end in May of that year. See Corrigan, 2022 WL 11218108, at
*3. The mandatory testing program subsequently lapsed in May, and
BU never reinstated the program as it no longer was necessary given
the waning severity of the pandemic. See id. What is more,
Corrigan did not reenroll as a student at BU after her suspension
even after the mandatory testing program's discontinuation. See
id.We can discern no clear error in connection with the
district court's account of these events. Indeed, Corrigan's only
evidence to the contrary is an announcement — presented without
any context — that, although the "United States [was] 'out of the
pandemic phase,'" BU would continue testing. As the district court
correctly explained, though, "[m]ere speculation that a defendant
will repeat challenged conduct cannot rescue an otherwise moot
claim." Id. at *7; see Harris, 43 F.4th at 195 (holding that
possibility that students would return to universities — after one
transferred and another graduated — and again be subjected to their
COVID-19 vaccination policies "rest[ed] on 'speculation' about
some future potential event" (quoting Pietrangelo v. Sununu, 15
F.4th 103, 106 (1st Cir. 2021))).
- 17 -
The supposedly contradictory statement that Corrigan
presents suggests only that BU would continue with some sort of
testing program. It does not suggest that the testing program
would be mandatory for everyone or even that it would be mandatory
for Corrigan specifically. And, moreover, it remains unclear
whether Corrigan even intends to return to the university at this
point. Corrigan is left prognosticating about a hypothetical
scenario in which BU reinstates a similar testing program with
which she must comply upon reentering the university at some
unspecified time.
C
Corrigan has one last blade in her scabbard. She
contends that the district court fundamentally misunderstood her
claim because BU's "violation of the ADA [was] not the testing
mandate per se, but [its] arrogant assertation that it need not
comply with the ADA on its own whim." In denying her prospective
relief, she maintains, the district court overlooked that the ADA
was drafted to counteract this type of situation — a situation in
which an entity is dodging compliance with the statute through
shifty procedural moves. But despite the harshness of her
rhetoric, she has nowhere in the record identified any evidence to
support such an allegation. To the contrary, BU has repeatedly
disputed Corrigan's claims that it violated the ADA, including
- 18 -
through its filing of a motion to dismiss on the merits. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
BU is contending at most that the legality of its conduct
cannot be adjudicated under our constitutional framework. As the
university's brief points out, no matter how important the
fundamental rights vindicated by the ADA may be, they cannot
supersede the constitutional threshold for a federal court to
assume jurisdiction.5 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("Federal courts . . . . possess
only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is
not to be expanded by judicial decree." (internal citations
omitted)).
And even assuming that BU clearly had stated an intent
to violate the ADA in the future — and we do not think that it has
— Corrigan would have to show a "material risk of future harm"
from this intended violation that is "sufficiently imminent and
substantial" to "satisfy the concrete-harm requirement" of
standing before a federal court could grant her any relief. Webb
5Even assuming that BU had violated the ADA in the past,
Corrigan fails to prove that the violation resulted in the harm
necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction. Title III of the ADA
does not provide for damages, see Fay Sch., 931 F.3d at 9;
attorneys' fees alone are legally insufficient to confer standing,
see Harris, 43 F.4th at 193; and a declaratory judgment deeming
past conduct illegal would be an impermissible advisory opinion,
see ACLUM, 705 F.3d at 53.
- 19 -
v. Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC, 72 F.4th 365, 375 (1st Cir. 2023)
(quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 435 (2021)).
Yet, as we concluded earlier, not only is there no imminent risk
of substantial harm to Corrigan from a testing program at BU, but
there is also good reason to believe that BU is unlikely to
reinstate a testing program with which she must comply.
In response, Corrigan raises the Supreme Court's recent
decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023), which
purportedly "reaffirm[ed] the doctrine of preventative injunction,
enjoining actual peril of constitutional violation which is likely
or imminent." But 303 Creative is readily distinguishable because
no constitutional claim exists here (disability is not a protected
class under the Constitution, and there is no state action).
Moreover, the Court explicitly held that the plaintiff there had
standing because she had shown "a credible threat of sanctions
unless she conform[ed] her views to the State's" before it reached
the merits of the case. Id. at 597. Not so here: Corrigan has
shown no comparable threat of harm.
V
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
- 20 -